

# SIGIR



Congress created SIGIR to provide independent oversight of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund by:

- promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of programs and operations
- preventing and detecting waste, fraud, and abuse in such programs and operations
- keeping the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Congress and the American taxpayers informed about problems and deficiencies relating to administration of programs and operations and about recommendations for corrective action

Inspector General Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., was appointed in January 2004. This past February, the IG made his eleventh trip to Iraq to review progress on the reconstruction effort.

## HIGHLIGHTS: April 2006 Quarterly Report

As U.S. relief and reconstruction in Iraq enters the second quarter of this Year of Transition, the program is ensuring project execution, contract close-out, and program transition. Sustaining reconstruction in Iraq at this critical juncture requires the U.S. to coordinate closely with the new Iraqi government and international donors to sustain the substantial investment in Iraq's infrastructure. SIGIR has identified five critical issues, the resolution of which will help secure a successful reconstruction transition in Iraq.

### IMPROVE INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY

Attacks on Iraq's oil and gas infrastructure have impeded efforts to improve production in this key sector. A SIGIR audit of "Task Force Shield" reviews an earlier unsuccessful Coalition Provisional Authority effort to address this key issue. Today, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq has given top priority to this important topic, and the Department of Defense has dispatched a team of experts to Iraq to assess the protection of oil and gas facilities.

### CLOSE THE RECONSTRUCTION GAP

Given the difficulties that accompany operating in Iraq, an overall project shortfall—dubbed the Reconstruction Gap—developed as reconstruction priorities changed. Delays driven by security problems, administrative issues, and poorly managed cost-to-complete schedules contributed to the gap. Ambassador Khalilzad's new initiative to transfer more project decision-making to Iraqis at the local governorate level should help remediate the effects of the reconstruction gap.



Rebuilding Intensifies in Iraq

### ENERGIZE THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR

Despite U.S. allocations of \$1.7 billion to this sector, oil and gas production has yet to return to pre-war levels. Several factors continue to limit progress on oil and gas production levels: the deteriorated infrastructure, uncertainties regarding the legal framework governing Iraq's petroleum industry, corruption, and insurgent attacks and sabotage. The United States and other donors should develop strategies with the new Iraqi government that will stimulate investment in this sector and help boost production levels.

### ATTACK CORRUPTION

Foreign investment in Iraq is not likely to increase appreciably until Iraqi corruption is brought under control. With the creation of a new Iraqi government well underway, Iraq, the United States, and donor nations should

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Although the story of Iraq reconstruction has been punctuated by shortfalls and deficiencies, the infrastructure overview provided in Section 2 of this Quarterly Report presents a picture of significant progress achieved through a substantial U.S. investment of **time**, **talent**, and **tax dollars** in Iraq's relief and reconstruction.

increase funding for Iraq's core anticorruption institutions: the Commission on Public Integrity, the Board of Supreme Audit, and the 29 inspectors general assigned to Iraqi ministries.

### INCREASE DONOR ACTIVITY

As IRRF funds draw down, the next phase of Iraq's reconstruction will require a broader international effort, with the role of non-U.S. donor nations and international institutions becoming increasingly important. U.S. reconstruction officials should continue to engage directly and intensively with their international counterparts—the World Bank, in particular—to help ensure that donors implement pledges and develop, in close coordination with the Iraqis, the next phase of reconstruction.

### Expanding Sector Progress Reports

In addition to updating its reviews of the electricity, oil and gas, and water sectors, SIGIR also introduces new reports on these sectors: security and justice; health care; transportation and communications; and democracy, education, and private sector development. Although the story of Iraq reconstruction has been punctuated by shortfalls and deficiencies, the infrastructure overview provided in Section 2 of this Quarterly Report presents a picture of significant progress achieved through a substantial U.S. investment of time, talent, and tax dollars in Iraq's relief and reconstruction.

### Audits & Inspections

SIGIR issued 29 audits and inspections this quarter that provide 58 new recommendations for program improvements. Two audits take an in-depth look at the primary health center contract and a CPA infrastructure security program called "Task Force Shield." They provide overviews of divergent programs that faced significant adversity and failed to achieve their goals.

The 13 inspections completed this quarter continue SIGIR's mission to provide on-site assessments of projects in every sector across Iraq. SIGIR also inspected 55 additional projects through its rapid-review program,


using local hires to visit sites that SIGIR inspectors cannot reach. Overall, SIGIR inspectors found that, where management and quality assurance programs were active in the on-site construction process, the quality of work usually met or exceeded contract standards.

### Investigations: Guilty Pleas in \$8.6 Million Bid-Rigging Scheme

SIGIR has 72 open investigations into alleged fraud and corruption, and continues to pursue investigative leads in Iraq and throughout the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.

Contractor Philip Bloom and CPA regional comptroller Robert Stein pleaded guilty this quarter to participating in a scheme to defraud the CPA of over \$8.6 million. Bloom faces up to 40 years in prison and a fine of \$750,000. Under the terms of his plea agreement, Bloom must pay \$3.6 million in restitution. Stein admitted stealing \$2 million and taking bribes to award contracts to Bloom. He faces up to 30 years in prison.

In March, SIGIR investigators conducted a successful sting operation, which resulted in the arrest of a contractor who offered a bribe to a SIGIR undercover agent.



Numbers reported in previous quarters have been updated to reflect DoS and DoL reports



## MESSAGE FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

I am pleased to submit to the U.S. Congress and the Secretaries of State and Defense the ninth Quarterly Report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR).

As this year of transition in Iraq reconstruction unfolds, U.S.-funded projects are rapidly being completed and transferred to Iraqi management and control. Within that context, SIGIR identifies, in Section 1 of this Report, five critical issues the resolution of which will help advance Iraq toward economic prosperity and democratic success:

- Improve Infrastructure Security—by intensifying efforts to ensure that Iraq can secure its essential energy infrastructure.
- Close the Reconstruction Gap—by providing funds for sustaining Iraq's infrastructure and developing Iraqi capacities to manage projects and programs.
- Bolster Anticorruption Efforts—by empowering and enabling Iraq's incipient anticorruption institutions through training and funding.
- Energize the Oil and Gas Sector—by stimulating and sustaining investment in this sector, which is the key to Iraq's future prosperity.
- Increase International Donor Participation—by engaging donor nations to participate more actively in the next phase of Iraq's relief and reconstruction.

Section 2 of this Report updates SIGIR's previous reviews of Iraq's essential service sectors—oil and gas, electricity, and water—and provides initial reports on the following sectors: security; transportation and communications; health care; and democracy, education, and private sector development. Taken together, these sector reviews provide, for the first time, a comprehensive and detailed picture of the activities, outputs, and outcomes arising from the enormous U.S. investment in Iraq's infrastructure. Despite certain setbacks, chiefly caused by security problems, the overall picture conveys a sense of substantial progress in the relief, recovery, and reconstruction of Iraq.

Section 3 of this Report provides summaries of SIGIR audits, inspections, and investigations performed this quarter. Notable among the audits is a performance review of the contract to construct primary health care centers across Iraq. As the audit notes, both the contractor and the U.S. government's oversight failed to meet expectations. After \$186,000,000 had been spent, only six health care centers were complete. Fourteen more will be completed by the contractor, and the remaining facilities, which are partially constructed, will have to be completed by other means. SIGIR performed five inspections of selected health care centers covered by this contract, and, at each facility, SIGIR inspectors found serious deficiencies.

SIGIR also audited "Task Force Shield" this quarter, a program designed in September 2003 to build Iraq's capacity to protect its oil and gas and electrical infrastructures. The audit documents significant shortcomings in the program and concludes that it failed to meet its goals because it was

burdened by a lack of clear management structure and poor accountability. There were also indications of potential fraud, which are now under review by SIGIR investigators.


SIGIR inspectors continued to meet their mission this quarter, which is to visit project sites from every sector and geographical region in Iraq and report on the quality of the work performed. The 13 on-site project assessments in this Report include positive reviews of the work performed at the Mosul Airport, the Erbil electrical transformer project, and the Dahuk primary school, and problematic reviews regarding construction at the Kirkuk airport and the Ninewa village roads project. Detailed inspection reports of these and other sites visited, with accompanying photographs, are in Section 3.

SIGIR's investigators continued work on more than 70 cases in Iraq and the U.S., combating and deterring fraud. During this quarter, a U.S. contractor and a former Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) regional comptroller pleaded guilty to charges of money laundering, bribery, and conspiracy; others have been arrested in this widening case that involves corruption in CPA's south-central regional office during 2003-2004. In March, SIGIR investigators also arrested a contractor for bribery in an undercover sting operation executed in Iraq.

This Report also contains a thorough review of the history and status of investments in Iraq's relief and reconstruction by non-U.S. donor nations and international institutions, as well as a summary of Iraq's current debt situation. SIGIR's Lessons Learned initiative made progress this quarter toward the publication of the contracting report, which will be out next quarter. The Lessons Learned forum on program and project management was held in April, and that report will be out in the summer of 2006.

I am gratified to report that SIGIR's dedicated auditors, inspectors, and investigators remain on the case in Iraq and the U.S. SIGIR continues to oversee the American taxpayers' investment by providing meaningful oversight that promotes efficiency, enforces accountability, and seeks to serve the interests of the overall success of U.S. relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

Submitted April 30, 2006

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.", followed by a period.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.

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**SIGIR SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE**  
**FEBRUARY 1, 2004 – APRIL 30, 2006**

**AUDIT**

Reports issued	55
Recommendations issued	165
Dollars Saved	\$10,900,000
Financial Benefit of SIGIR Audits	\$391,800,000 <sup>1</sup>

**INSPECTIONS**

Project Assessments issued	42
Limited preliminary assessments issued	97
Satellite imagery reports issued	112
Financial Benefit of SIGIR Inspections	\$1,339,700,000

**INVESTIGATIONS**

Investigations initiated	177
Investigations closed	105
Open investigations	72
Arrests	5
Convictions	2
Value of assets seized/recovered	\$13,011,304

**HOTLINE CONTACTS**

Fax	12
Telephone	55
Walk-in	108
E-mail	248
Standard mail	22
Referrals	25
Total Hotline Contacts	470

**NON-AUDIT PRODUCTS**

Congressional Testimony	5
Lessons Learned Reports issued	1

<sup>1</sup>For details on Financial Benefits, see Appendix I



# SIGIR Observations

A YEAR OF TRANSITION UPDATE

CRITICAL ISSUE: PROTECTING IRAQ'S INFRASTRUCTURE

CRITICAL ISSUE: CLOSING THE RECONSTRUCTION GAP

CRITICAL ISSUE: ENERGIZING THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR

CRITICAL ISSUE: BOLSTERING IRAQ'S ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS

CRITICAL ISSUE: ENCOURAGING MORE INTERNATIONAL DONOR  
PARTICIPATION

NOTABLE SIGIR ACTIVITIES DURING THIS QUARTER

FINANCIAL IMPACT OF SIGIR OPERATIONS

THE HUMAN TOLL

SECTION

1



With 67% of the \$21 billion in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds (IRRF) now expended and only \$2 billion left to obligate, the U.S. reconstruction program in Iraq is fully engaged in project execution and sustainment, contract close-out, and program transition. Effectively advancing the progress of reconstruction and development in Iraq at this critical juncture requires the U.S. government to work closely with the Iraqi government and

international donors to sustain the substantial U.S. investment in Iraq's infrastructure. For this process to succeed, more investment is necessary. To that end, Congress is currently considering a new supplemental funding bill that will support work toward achieving and sustaining U.S. reconstruction goals. The increasing pace of transition in Iraq makes it all the more important that these funds become available soon.

## A YEAR OF TRANSITION UPDATE

In its January 2006 Report, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) observed that this is the Year of Transition in Iraq reconstruction. By the end of 2006, most programs and projects funded by the IRRF will be turned over to Iraqi authorities. With that prospect on the horizon, reconstruction planning and operations are increasingly becoming a joint enterprise, with U.S. and Iraqi officials coordinating on key initiatives.

Iraq's new government is re-staffing the 28 ministries responsible for managing government operations. For transition to succeed, Iraq must ensure that its ministries are ready to receive and capably manage completed

projects. U.S. transition plans anticipate this structural development to occur within Iraq's government this year.

Insurgent activity continues to impede ongoing reconstruction projects and interrupt their transition to Iraqi control. But the attacks remain concentrated in a few areas, leaving daily life in much of the rest of Iraq—particularly the Kurdish north and some areas of the south—in a state of gradual recovery. Though recent reports indicate that attacks on infrastructure have abated, Iraq continues to suffer the ill effects of intermittent strikes on key energy nodes.

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## CRITICAL ISSUE: PROTECTING IRAQ'S INFRASTRUCTURE

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in early February 2006, the Inspector General noted his concern that attacks on Iraq's oil and gas and electrical infrastructures have limited progress in these key sectors. SIGIR subsequently announced and executed, during this reporting quarter, an audit of U.S. programs designed to improve the capacity of Iraqis to protect infrastructure—particularly the critical nodes in the oil and gas sector that have been most subject to attack since 2003. The Inspector General further addressed the matter with U.S. leadership in Baghdad during his eleventh trip to Iraq in February. Recognizing the importance of this issue, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq has made infrastructure security an essential element of the Embassy Joint Blueprint for Success.

Through April 2006, the United States has invested more than \$265 million to improve Iraq's capability to protect its oil and gas and electricity infrastructures. This investment is mission-critical because insurgent attacks and

criminal sabotage diminish oil and gas production and reduce exports. SIGIR auditors reviewed \$147 million of IRRF and Iraqi funds that supported Task Force Shield, a program established in September 2003 to build Iraq's capacity to protect its oil and gas and electrical infrastructure. Task Force Shield sought to cover 340 key installations, 7,000 kilometers of oil pipeline, and 14,000 kilometers of electrical transmission lines. The audit found that the program failed to adequately meet its goals. For a summary of SIGIR findings, see Section 3 of this Report.

To address this critical issue, the Department of Defense (DoD) recently dispatched a team of experts to Iraq to assess the protection of oil and gas facilities. They examined the sector's infrastructure protection programs, seeking to identify current security challenges. The team is now drafting a strategy that will help the Iraqis more effectively protect their energy infrastructure.

Insurgent activity continues to impede ongoing reconstruction projects.

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## CRITICAL ISSUE: CLOSING THE RECONSTRUCTION GAP

In its October 2005 Quarterly Report, SIGIR identified a “reconstruction gap,” which acknowledges that—for a variety of reasons, security being the most salient—the U.S. relief and reconstruction program will accomplish less than originally planned. The shortfall in various sectors was caused by more than 250 reprogramming actions, delays driven by security and administrative problems, poorly managed cost-to-complete schedules, and shifting emphases in contracting and program management. Of note, another reprogramming of the IRRF occurred this quarter: \$353 million was shifted from the electricity and health care construction sectors into non-construction programs.

The reconstruction gap, however, comprises more than simply the notion that fewer projects will be completed than expected; it also addresses the shortfall’s impact on outputs and outcomes. Fewer projects completed axiomatically affects infrastructure outputs in Iraq—that is, fewer electrical projects means fewer megawatts on the grid, and fewer oil and gas projects means fewer barrels of oil produced per day. These constrictions have the cumula-

tive effect of slowing improvement in the daily lives of Iraqis.

Ambassador Khalilzad’s initiative to devolve more project decision-making to Iraqis at the local governorate level should help remediate the effects of the reconstruction gap. Iraqis are now exerting a formative influence over project choices. Their management of the process through the Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils, assisted by coalition-staffed Provincial Reconstruction Teams, is building local government capacity in Iraq. The aim of the Ambassador’s initiative is to produce more immediate benefits for Iraqis in every governorate.

The success of the Ambassador’s initiative depends, in part, on new funding. Thus, SIGIR strongly supports the President’s FY 2006 supplemental and FY 2007 budget requests, which propose an additional \$3.2 billion to help secure and sustain Iraq’s critical infrastructure, to build the capacities of national and local governments, and to stimulate economic growth, increased employment, and private-sector development.

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## CRITICAL ISSUE: ENERGIZING THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR

Iraq has the second-largest oil and gas deposits in the world; revenue from this sector provides 94% of Iraq's national income. Several factors, however, have limited progress in the oil and gas sector: breakdowns in the sector's deteriorated infrastructure, delays in forming the new Iraqi government, uncertainties regarding the legal framework governing Iraq's petroleum industry, and attacks on the sector's critical nodes. The U.S. reconstruction plan allocated 9% of the IRRF for the rebuilding of Iraq's oil and gas infrastructure. Despite U.S. allocations of \$1.7 billion and supplemental Iraqi expenditures, the sector has not returned to pre-war oil production levels. Consequently, Iraq's national income has yet to achieve its great potential, which will be necessary if the country is to fully shoulder its primary role in recovery and reconstruction.

Before the war, it was assumed that:

- Oil and gas revenues in post-war Iraq would pay for much of the reconstruction.
- Foreign private investment in the oil and gas sector would quickly flow into Iraq after the fall of Saddam.

- Post-war Iraq would be sufficiently secure to allow the development of oil and gas without hostile impediment.

To varying degrees, each of these assumptions has not been realized. Continuing attacks on the oil infrastructure have slowed production and cut revenue. Moreover, outside investors have been unwilling to commit capital to this sector until the insurgency abates and a permanent government takes power. Accordingly, the new Iraqi government, which is now forming, can provide necessary certainty by approving and implementing laws that govern foreign investment in the oil and gas sector.

SIGIR recommends that the United States and other donors develop strategies with the Iraqis that will increase oil and gas production and stimulate new capital infusion into the sector. These must include aggressive efforts to curb corruption, which reportedly plagues the oil and gas industry in Iraq. For example, the long-delayed installation of a metering system is essential. Succeeding in these various efforts is critical for Iraq to achieve its enormous economic potential.

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## CRITICAL ISSUE: BOLSTERING IRAQ'S ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS

Corruption is another form of insurgency in Iraq. This second insurgency can be defeated only through the development of democratic values and systems, especially the evolution of effective anticorruption institutions in Iraq. The primary players in this effort are the Commission on Public Integrity (CPI), the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA), and the 29 inspectors general (IGs) in the Iraqi ministries.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) created the CPI and the IGs specifically to institutionalize anticorruption elements within the new Iraqi government. SIGIR worked at generating support for these institutions early on and continues to highlight the need to support them financially.

Iraq, the United States, and other donors should sustain and increase funding for these

essential institutions. New funding will bolster their effectiveness, while raising general awareness of the new Iraqi government's commitment to fighting corruption. Foreign investment in Iraq may not appreciably increase until Iraq's anticorruption institutions meaningfully investigate and prosecute fraudulent government practices.

SIGIR previously reported that the Department of State (DoS) developed an initiative to strengthen anticorruption efforts in Iraq. Now, at the request of U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, SIGIR and the DoS Office of Inspector General have announced a coordinated survey of the \$365 million supporting U.S. anticorruption programs in Iraq. The survey is intended to assess the initiatives and establish metrics to gauge progress.

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### CRITICAL ISSUE: ENCOURAGING MORE INTERNATIONAL DONOR PARTICIPATION

As IRRF funds draw down, the role of donor nations will become increasingly important. In Section 2 of this Report, SIGIR provides a detailed history and assessment of non-U.S. donor funding to Iraq.

The next phase of Iraq's reconstruction will require a broader international effort. U.S. reconstruction officials should begin now to engage more directly and intensively with their international counterparts—the World Bank, in particular—to help ensure that donors

implement pledges and develop, in close coordination with the Iraqis, the way forward for the next phase of reconstruction. Funding is now needed to stimulate the oil and gas sector, which has thus far underperformed for a variety of reasons. SIGIR notes the promising development of an integrated donor database to aid coordinating and deconflicting donor activities, but the system needs more comprehensive inputs from all donors before it can become an effective management tool.

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### NOTABLE SIGIR ACTIVITIES DURING THIS QUARTER

In the course of performing its oversight function during this reporting period, SIGIR found that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, the Commander of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division (GRD-PCO), and the Mission Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have continued to improve management coordination of the Iraq reconstruction program.

SIGIR issued 29 audits and inspections this quarter, which contain 58 new recommendations. Although these audits and inspections

raise a variety of concerns, SIGIR generally found that the likelihood of project success was high when quality control was integrated actively into the project's management and government oversight was consistently disciplined.

Notable SIGIR audits during this reporting period include a performance review of the contract to construct primary health care centers, an audit of reconstruction management information systems, and an examination of the planning and processes for transferring

reconstruction assets to the new Iraqi government. SIGIR's audit of the IRRF-funded primary health care centers contract, summarized in Section 3 of this Report, presents a difficult story. The audit took a comprehensive look at the program and found shortfalls: only 6 of 150 clinics have been completed, although 75% of the funding has been spent. 14 more PHCs will be completed under the original contract, each with construction issues yet to be resolved. The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) estimates that approximately \$36 million will be required to complete 121 partially constructed clinics that were terminated for convenience.

The 13 inspections completed this quarter continue SIGIR's mission to provide on-site assessments of projects in every sector across Iraq. Most of the projects reviewed are still in progress; thus, SIGIR's recommendations may allow for money-saving course-corrections. SIGIR also inspected 55 additional projects through its rapid-review program, using local hires to visit sites that SIGIR inspectors cannot reach. Overall, SIGIR inspectors found that, where management and quality assurance programs were active in the on-site construction process, the quality of work usually met or exceeded contract standards. Moreover, SIGIR believes that the expansive coverage of its inspections teams provides a highly visible deterrent to those who might be inclined to commit acts of fraud, waste, and abuse. Figure 1-1 shows the locations of SIGIR's various inspections across Iraq.

SIGIR investigators are currently work-


ing on 72 open cases involving fraud, theft, bribery, and other alleged crimes. During this quarter, contractor Philip Bloom and former CPA regional comptroller Robert Stein pleaded guilty to conspiracy, bribery, and money laundering in connection with a scheme to defraud the CPA. Bloom now faces up to 40 years in prison and a fine of \$750,000. Under the terms of his plea agreement, he must pay \$3.6 million in restitution and forfeit \$3.6 million in assets.

Bloom admitted that from December 2003 through December 2005, he, Stein (who faces 30 years in prison), and other officials conspired to rig bids to ensure that the contracts were awarded to Bloom. The total value of the contracts exceeded \$8.6 million. Bloom admitted paying Stein and other public officials more than \$2 million in bribes.

During this quarter, SIGIR's investigators conducted a sting operation involving an alleged criminal conspiracy. The sting resulted in the arrest of a contractor who offered a bribe to a SIGIR undercover agent. The case is currently being managed by the U.S. Department of Justice.

SIGIR continued its Lessons Learned Initiative this quarter, conducting its third forum, which focused on program and project management in Iraq reconstruction. The program and project management report is due for release later this summer. During the next quarter, SIGIR will release its second Lessons Learned report, addressing contracting in Iraq reconstruction. SIGIR's first Lessons Learned report, which examined human capital management, is available at [www.sigir.mil](http://www.sigir.mil).

Figure 1-1  
**LOCATION OF SIGIR PROJECT INSPECTIONS**  
As of April 2006



## FINANCIAL IMPACT OF SIGIR OPERATIONS

SIGIR’s oversight has produced tangible financial benefits. SIGIR audits have saved \$10.9 million, recovered \$1.4 million, and improved the use of \$7.8 million. SIGIR challenged payments of \$306.9 million, which included possible duplicate payments, overpayments, and payments for work that was not completed. SIGIR also made recommendations that improved property accountability valued at \$64.8 million. The net potential beneficial


impact of SIGIR’s audits amounts to approximately \$391.8 million, as of December 31, 2005. In addition, SIGIR inspections have produced recommendations that could potentially increase Iraqi oil revenues by \$1.277 billion. SIGIR investigations report that \$13 million in cash and assets have thus far been seized or recovered in the course of its investigations. The data supporting all of these accrued benefits is provided in Appendix I.

## THE HUMAN TOLL

The lethal environment in Iraq continues to pose a significant threat to civilians engaged in reconstruction activities. Since the relief and reconstruction effort began in March 2003, 516 death claims for contractors of all nationalities have been submitted under the Defense Base Act (DBA). The Department of Labor reports that death claims over the past four calendar quarters represent almost half (46.5%) of all claims filed over the three years since the war ended in April 2003.

GRD’s daily situation reports regularly summarize attacks at project sites in Iraq. The reports reveal a variety of ongoing threats to contractors in Iraq, ranging from small arms fire to mortars, rockets, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Attacks on reconstruction contractors and their security details most frequently occur when personnel are transiting to and from work sites. The death trends noted in prior SIGIR Reports continue: non-U.S. contractors continue to be killed at a faster

rate than U.S. contractors, although there was a spike in U.S. contractor deaths during this reporting period. Figure 1-2 provides a breakout of contractor death totals.



Note: Numbers reported in previous quarters have been updated to reflect recent DoS and DoL reports.

These attacks (and threats of attacks) cause work stoppages and worker absenteeism that push up construction costs. The financial impact is difficult to calculate, but SIGIR believes that delays caused by insurgent activity account for a substantial portion of the total security costs related to Iraq reconstruction.

Security threats vary greatly by region and

type, but all impede progress in Iraq. On March 24, 2006, for example, a project manager in central Iraq received an email threatening that the names, license plate numbers, and other personal information of employees working for the subcontractor would be turned over to assassins who would kill them all. No worker showed up at the site the following day.





# Uses of Funding: Status Reports by Sector

INTRODUCTION: SECTOR REPORTS

STATUS OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE

STATUS OF HEALTH CARE

STATUS OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

STATUS OF DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION, AND PRIVATE SECTOR

DEVELOPMENT

STATUS OF ELECTRICITY

STATUS OF OIL AND GAS

STATUS OF WATER

CONTRACTS

SOURCES OF FUNDING

SECTION

2



## INTRODUCTION

In its January 2006 Report, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) focused its first status reports on the heavy construction sectors—electricity, oil and gas, and water. This Report updates those reviews and features initial reports on four additional sectors: security and justice; health care; transportation and communications; and democracy, education, and private sector development.

These status reports examine three aspects of reconstruction—activities, outputs, and outcomes:

- *activities*: the reconstruction projects themselves (an electric turbine, a water treatment plant, a primary health care center, a training program for teachers, etc.)
- *outputs*: the results of the reconstruction projects (increased electricity generation, increased capacity to treat wastewater, more Iraqis with access to health care, more trained teachers, etc.)
- *outcomes*: the potential effects of the project outputs for the people of Iraq (hours of power, more Iraqis with access to clean



Iraqi children with U.S. Army Corps of Engineers staff and contractor in front of newly built school

water, more Iraqi children vaccinated for polio, higher literacy rates, etc.)

Outcomes are not always easy to determine in the short run. For example, the effect on infant mortality rates of new primary health care facilities may be measurable only years later.

## Observations

Based on the following sector reviews, SIGIR makes the following general observations:

- As a program, the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) 2 is in its close-out phase. All of the funds have been allocated, 88% of these funds have been obligated to contracts, and more than 60% have been expended. The focus of the program is now on completing assigned work in a timely and efficient manner. See Figure 2-1 for an overview of reconstruction status.
- Many completed IRRF projects have delivered positive results, but there exists a gap between U.S. project outputs and the delivery of essential services to Iraqis.

This gap narrowed somewhat in the last quarter. For example, the hours of power in all areas of the country, except Baghdad, have surpassed pre-war levels. Also, U.S. projects have provided potable water to an additional 3.1 million people and sewerage services for an additional 5.1 million. And oil production has advanced above the lows of last quarter.

- The pace of project completions and IRRF expenditures in the three critical infrastructure sectors—electricity, oil and gas, and water—increased from last quarter. In aggregate, however, projects in these sectors are still less than 50% complete. Assuming that the pace of project completion of the last six months continues, construction will not be completed in these three key sectors for nearly two more years. The primary IRRF implementing agencies—the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division (GRD) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—predict varying completion dates for construction.

Figure 2-1


## OVERVIEW OF RECONSTRUCTION PROGRESS

As of March 31, 2006

### SECTOR SHARES OF IRRF FUNDS

% of \$18.439 Billion

Source: DoS Iraq Weekly Status Report, 03/29/06




Note: Shares may not add to 100% due to rounding.

### STATUS OF IRRF PROJECTS


Number of Projects

Source: IRMS-IRMO Rollup File, 03/31/2006



### Status of Projects by Sector


Number of Projects and Budgeted Cost in Billions




### STATUS OF IRRF FUNDS

\$ Billions

Source: DoS Iraq Weekly Status Report, 03/29/06







## STATUS OF THE SECURITY AND JUSTICE SECTOR

The SIGIR security and justice sector review examines U.S. spending to support Iraq's military forces, police, and justice infrastructure.<sup>1</sup>

Based on available data, SIGIR finds that the security and justice sector in Iraq has shown steady development over the past three years. The overall security situation, however, remains volatile. Insurgent attacks continue to disrupt the reconstruction process by intermittently targeting key infrastructure facilities and increasingly exploiting sectarian divisions in Iraqi society. Because law and order are essential to the successful development of a democratic state, Iraq must field cohesive military and police forces under the control of capable Ministries of Defense and Interior.

In addition to covering IRRF-funded activities in this sector, SIGIR also presents information on the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF).

These are the highlights of this security and

justice sector report:

- More U.S. funds have been devoted to security and justice than any other reconstruction sector. A total of \$11.6 billion has been allocated, combining funds from IRRF 2 and ISFF.
- By the end of this quarter, 82% of the \$6.35 billion IRRF allocation had been expended, and 31% of ISFF funds have been expended. (See Figures 2-3 and 2-4.)
- Approximately 250,500 military and police personnel have reportedly been trained and equipped.
- More than 600 facilities have been completed—police stations, fire stations, courts, border forts, and army facilities.

### Activities in the Security and Justice Sector

On October 1, 2005, the primary responsibil-





Figure 2-2  
**SECURITY AND JUSTICE SECTOR  
AS A SHARE OF IRRF FUNDS**  
% of \$18.439 Billion

Source: DoS *Iraq Weekly Status Report*, 03/29/06



## SECURITY AND JUSTICE

ity for developing the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior was transferred from the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) to the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). Under IRMO and now MNSTC-I, the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) has managed the training and equipping of Iraq's police forces for the Ministry of Interior. CPATT has also managed initiatives to build capacity within the Ministry of Interior.<sup>2</sup>

The MNSTC-I, working with the Ministry of Defense, has begun to emphasize improving Iraqi logistics capabilities and leadership. Also, the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), designated 2006 as the "Year of the Police,"<sup>3</sup> and the Administration affirmed that one of the major U.S. reconstruction goals in 2006 is "to accelerate the training of the Iraqi police."<sup>4</sup>

## Funding Status of the Security and Justice Sector

As of March 31, 2006, more than 80% of IRRF 2 funds for military and police forces had been expended, although only 30.5% of ISFF funding was expended (ISFF funds began to be expended later than IRRF funds).

Figures 2-3 and 2-4 show the status of IRRF and ISFF funding for the security and justice sector.

The Administration also submitted an FY 2006 supplemental request that includes \$3.7 billion to continue to train, equip and build facilities for the Iraqi army and police and \$962 million in foreign assistance funding to fulfill goals related to security.<sup>6a</sup>

## Key Programs Completed and Underway

At the time of publication, a comprehensive list of projects in this sector could be obtained

Figure 2-3

### STATUS OF IRRF FUNDS IN THE SECURITY AND JUSTICE SECTOR

\$ Billions

Source: DoS *Iraq Weekly Status Report*, 03/29/06





Figure 2-4

### STATUS OF ISFF FUNDS IN THE SECURITY AND JUSTICE SECTOR

\$ Billions

Source: DoD *Weekly Financial Update*, 04/05/06








Figure 2-5  
**STATUS OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROJECTS**  
Number of Projects  
Source: IRMS-IRMO Rollup File, 03/31/06

only for activities funded by IRRF 2. Projects focus on facilities construction and refurbishment. For a detailed list of projects funded by IRRF 2, see Figure 2-5.

## FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION

In this sector, IRRF 2 has funded construction and rehabilitation of border forts, fire stations, police stations, public safety training academies, prisons and corrections facilities, courthouses, and witness protection facilities.<sup>9</sup> According to the Gulf Region Division and Project and Contracting Office (GRD-PCO), the last IRRF-funded construction project in the security and justice sector is scheduled to be completed by August 2007.<sup>10</sup> Figure 2-6 shows reconstruction activity in this sector by governorate.

Construction on the Provincial Police Headquarters in Mosul was 98% complete as of March 30, 2006.<sup>11</sup> Renovation of the Domies Police Station in Kirkuk is 99% complete and is expected to be finished by the end of April 2006.<sup>12</sup> This station will provide increased security to an economically crucial oil-producing region.





## SECURITY AND JUSTICE

Work continues on the Baghdad Police College (formerly the Baghdad Public Safety Training Academy), which will increase the Ministry of Interior's police training capacity. The project is 80% complete and is expected to be finished by July 2006.<sup>13</sup> Also, renovations on the Al-Zab Courthouse in Kirkuk, which began in October 2005, are 52% complete, with an estimated completion date of mid-August 2006.<sup>14</sup>


Progress on the Nassriya correctional facility, currently 28% complete, has been hampered due to inadequate workforce levels and security concerns at the site. This facility, expected to be completed in August 2006, is slated to have a capacity of at least 800 beds,


with the possibility of an additional 400 beds.<sup>15</sup>

Construction was also completed this quarter on these military facilities:

- Camp India Base, which will support 2,500 Iraqi soldiers in the 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division
- Samawah, which will support 750 Iraqi soldiers in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade of the 10<sup>th</sup> Division
- Naiad, which will support 250 Iraqi soldiers in the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade Headquarters of the 8<sup>th</sup> Division<sup>16</sup>

In Section 3 of this Report, SIGIR presents findings from a series of inspections on construction projects in the security and justice sector. These findings range from a determina-





tion that sufficient work has been performed at the new Second Brigade Base in Kirkuk to poor workmanship at certain border forts along the Iraq-Iran border.

### **INITIATIVES TO SUPPORT SECURITY AND JUSTICE DEVELOPMENT**

Several initiatives are underway to promote oversight and transparency in the security and justice sector, including continued funding and development of the Commission on Public Integrity (CPI), which is tasked to detect and investigate illegal activities and organizations. The CPI has become a crucial component in combating corruption throughout Iraq, and it has several significant corruption investigations focusing on the Ministry of Defense. Other initiatives support Iraq's witness protection program—moving judges into specially constructed facilities and equipping and training personnel at both the CPI and the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI).<sup>17</sup>

A notable project to support public security initiatives in Iraq is the Advanced First Responder Network (AFRN), a national communications and dispatch system that will enable first responders to communicate with government officials during crises. The project is currently being closed out and will soon be turned over to the Ministry of Interior.<sup>18</sup> SIGIR is auditing this project and will report its findings next quarter.


### **Outputs of Programs Funded by IRRF 2 and ISFF**

Approximately 250,500 Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces have been trained and equipped for counter-insurgency and police operations:

- 115,700 Iraqi Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel
- 134,800 police, highway patrol, and other Ministry of Interior forces<sup>19</sup>

The goal of the coalition and Ministry of Interior is to train and equip 195,000 personnel. MNSTC-I projects that this goal will be met by December 2006.<sup>20</sup> The force generation plan for the Ministry of Defense forces will be completed by mid-2006, with an end-strength of approximately 131,000 soldiers.<sup>21</sup> To determine the readiness of Iraqi security and police forces, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq uses the Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) process.<sup>22</sup> These metrics may change over time as key personnel rotate, equipment is added or replaced, and the tempo of unit operations changes.<sup>23</sup>

Large-scale counter-insurgency initiatives this quarter demonstrated the growing capacity of Iraqi forces to operate successfully in the field. In March 2006, soldiers from the 6<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> Iraqi Army Divisions, with support from coalition forces, led Operation Glory Light, one of the largest operations of the last six months. Soldiers succeeded in taking control of an insurgent stronghold just south of Baghdad.<sup>24</sup>



## SECURITY AND JUSTICE

Security conditions have also affected reconstruction in this sector. On April 18, 2006, GRD-PCO reported that insurgents destroyed the Al Yusufiyah Police Station in the Baghdad governorate, which was 83% complete when the attack occurred.<sup>25</sup>

In January 2006, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) reported that fielding and equipping trained troops had received priority attention, but inadequate attention was paid to the ethnic and sectarian composition of those forces.<sup>26</sup> The coalition and Ministry of Defense have addressed this issue by increasing efforts to recruit in Sunni areas and to move soldiers away from their home areas to other parts of the country.

Ethnic and sectarian composition is also an issue for the police services. According to the DoS *Human Rights Report* for 2005, “the vast majority of human rights abuses reportedly carried out by government agents were attributed to the police.”<sup>27</sup>

### TRAINING INITIATIVES

To evaluate overall progress in this sector, SIGIR looked at a variety of tangible results, such as fielding troops and police officers, and also intangible results. For example, conditions in the Iraqi Corrections Service (ICS) prison system have significantly improved over the past year. Many ICS facilities meet most international penal standards, although none meet all of the standards.<sup>28</sup> Concerns have been aired, however, that government military and police forces may have participated in the

abuse, torture, and deaths of Iraqi civilians.<sup>29</sup> To address this problem, coalition and Iraqi officials are providing more professional training for Iraqi security forces. For a description of training programs and initiatives currently underway, see Table 2-1.

According to the DoS *Human Rights Report* for 2005, the Iraqi police had received relatively little training, and their effectiveness was seriously compromised by sectarian militia influences, corruption, and intimidation.<sup>30</sup> As of late February, however, DoS reports that more than 8,600 Iraqi police recruits were being trained, and an additional \$250 million in emergency funding has been requested to continue the training process.<sup>31</sup> One of the purposes of this training is to foster a better appreciation among security forces of the need to respect human rights.

### Outcomes of Programs Funded by IRRF and ISFF

Three challenges continue to limit positive outcomes in the security and justice sector. First, the Iraqi insurgency remains active. Second, ethnic and sectarian tensions continue to rise—especially between Sunnis and Shiites—inflamed by the attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra on February 22, 2006. Third, criminal violence persists. According to the World Bank, Baghdad alone “records an average of 90 crime-related murders per 100,000 residents every month—three times higher than in most major cities in the world.”<sup>32</sup> Security conditions have delayed the transfer of security responsibilities to Iraqi forces, affected the pace of the



## SAMPLE OF TRAINING INITIATIVES, AS OF MARCH 31, 2006

PROGRAM	GOAL
Basic Police Academy (BPA)	More than 7,900 recruits completed the BPA program (10 weeks) during this quarter, and nearly 570 recruits graduated from the 3-week Transition Integration Program (TIP), which gives police officers under the Saddam regime skills training and instruction in human rights and rule of law.
6-month Police Officer Academy	For current police officers with higher education; 278 new police lieutenants graduated on March 30, 2006.
9-month Police Officer Academy	For current police officers; began in December with 300 cadets.
3-year Police Officer Academy	Will begin next quarter with an anticipated enrollment of 500-1,000 new officer candidates.
Former Officer Course (FOC)	Provides training in human rights, ethics, and counter-insurgency operations; 500 students completed the program during this reporting period.
Basic Officer Commissioning Course	77 officers graduated from this one-year course on January 19, 2006.

Sources: DoS *Section 2207 Report*, January 2006 and April 2006.

TABLE 2-1

reconstruction effort, and increased security costs.<sup>33</sup>

Notwithstanding these difficulties, Iraqi security forces are assuming responsibility for more demanding missions and making gradual progress toward operational independence.<sup>34</sup>


### MINISTERIAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

In this sector, SIGIR notes that officials are now focusing on improving support functions and developing the capacity of the Ministries of Defense and Interior. For instance, the Iraqi Army is building ministerial capabilities and also increasing combat support and combat service support units to supplement the battalions.<sup>35</sup> Increasing command/control and logistics capabilities will better prepare Iraqi Security Forces to be self-reliant and

independent.

The Ministry of Interior is developing capabilities to better provide the growing number of police personnel in the field with logistical and administrative support. The Ministry of Interior employs a Qualifying Committee to help eliminate “ghost employees” who remain on the payroll but no longer work in the Ministry.

Absenteeism is another problem in the police force. This year, more International Police Liaison Officers are slated to deploy to stations around the country to train and mentor Iraqi police, which is expected to reduce absenteeism.<sup>36</sup> In early October, CPATT was designated to lead coalition initiatives to develop the capabilities of the Ministry of Interior. CPATT and the Police Partnership Program for the Ministry of Interior have realigned their



## SECURITY AND JUSTICE

organization into a single team consisting of integrated military, International Police Liaison Officers, International Police Trainers, and former IRMO personnel.<sup>37</sup>

### Infrastructure Security

Protecting Iraq's oil and gas and electricity infrastructures is a critical issue for the future of Iraq. In the second half of 2005, the oil industry lost 78% of potential export earnings in the north,<sup>38</sup> primarily because of attacks on the infrastructure. Task Force Shield was established in September 2003 to oversee the training and operation of 20,400 guards of the Iraqi Oil Protection Force (OPF) and the Iraqi Electrical Power Security Service (EPSS). An ongoing, classified SIGIR review will measure the success of U.S. and Iraqi officials in protecting the oil and electricity infrastructure.

### ACTIVITIES IN INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY

Two entities are responsible for the security of Iraq's oil infrastructure—the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) and the OPF. The electric infrastructure is protected by EPSS.

- The SIBs currently field more than 3,400 trained personnel to guard Iraq's critical oil infrastructure, particularly the vast network of pipelines.<sup>40</sup>
- The OPF, managed by the Ministry of Oil, is responsible for guarding all other Iraqi oil industry assets and facilities.<sup>41</sup>

In early 2005, the Iraqi Transitional Gov-

ernment formed the SIBs to improve infrastructure security. The SIBs are part of the Ministry of Defense, and four have completed basic training.<sup>42</sup> They are currently conducting security operations to protect oil pipelines and facilities that are critical to the domestic market and export industry.<sup>43</sup> MNSTC-I equipped the SIBs and helped the Ministry of Defense develop institutional expertise and tradecraft.<sup>44</sup> More than 3,400 soldiers have completed training in this area, and training for a second group has already begun.<sup>45</sup>


### OUTPUTS IN INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY

On February 9, 2006, the IRMO Director detailed the goals of infrastructure security program:

- strengthen the capacity of Iraqi security forces to protect critical infrastructure
- improve ministry coordination
- implement rapid infrastructure repair-and-response programs

It is simply impossible to guard the entire 17,000 kilometers of linear infrastructure in the oil and gas and electricity sectors. Thus, the strategy focuses on protecting key nodes and bolstering Iraqi capabilities.<sup>46</sup>

SIGIR's Task Force Shield audit (SIGIR 06-009) indicated that the early programs to train and deploy an Iraqi oil and electricity security capacity did not meet their goals. The lack of a clear U.S. management structure for the program degraded the ability of Task Force Shield



to develop and meet critical capacity-building objectives. For a summary of this audit, see Section 3 of this Report.

### **OUTCOMES IN INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY**

Attacks on Iraq's infrastructure account for only a small portion of total attacks. According to DoD, attacks on infrastructure during this quarter are down by 60%.<sup>47</sup> But, combined with other variables, attacks on critical infrastructure are still expected to have a significant impact on:

- oil and fuel production
- revenues derived from crude exports

Additionally, although the number of infrastructure attacks has recently decreased, the complexity of the attacks has increased: insurgents have become more proficient at targeting critical infrastructure nodes, as well as intimidating personnel who deliver essential services.<sup>48</sup> In early March 2006, DoS reported that Iraqi police had arrested several SIB guards on suspicion of aiding insurgents in targeting the oil pipeline system. This was the second recent incident in which SIB personnel were arrested in connection with insurgent plots against the oil pipeline infrastructure.<sup>49</sup>





## STATUS OF THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR

The SIGIR health care sector examines U.S. spending to support Iraq's medical system, training, and vaccinations. Iraq once had one of the best health care systems in the region, but it declined significantly during the Saddam Hussein regime.<sup>50</sup> In 2002, the Ministry of Health had a budget of \$16 million—a 90% reduction from ten years earlier.<sup>51</sup> After the 2003 war, a United Nations (UN) and World Bank estimate showed that the health care sector needed \$1.6 billion in near- and medium-term investment.<sup>52</sup>


U.S. reconstruction has focused on rehabilitating and equipping local facilities, and providing more medical services like immunizations. Overall progress in this sector has been steady, but SIGIR auditors have identified several concerns this quarter regarding the

Primary Health Care Centers (PHC) Program.

These are the highlights of the health care sector report:

- The sector has IRRF 2 allocations of \$739 million (see Figure 2-7), and about 56% (\$417 million) had been expended by the end of this reporting period.
- More than 75% of projects have been completed in this sector, but progress has been significantly diminished by security and management problems.
- The notable shortfall in this sector involved the failure of the contractor to complete the PHC contract. The contract originally planned 150 clinics, but now it will complete only 20 facilities. The remaining 130 health care clinics were descope or cancelled. For a summary of SIGIR's audit of

Figure 2-7  
**HEALTH CARE SECTOR AS A  
 SHARE OF IRRF FUNDS**  
 % of \$18.439 Billion  
 Source: DoS *Iraq Weekly Status Report*, 03/29/06





- this contract, see Section 3 of this Report.
- U.S. projects to provide immunizations have been successful: almost all Iraqi children have been inoculated against measles, mumps, and rubella. Nearly 98% of children under five have been immunized against polio.

Figure 2-8 shows facilities construction projects in this sector by governorate.

## IRRF-funded Activities in the Health Care Sector


As of March 29, 2006, more than 90% of the sector's funding had been obligated, and 56% had been expended. The sector was originally

allocated \$793 million in IRRF 2 funding,<sup>53</sup> but as of March 2006, allocations had decreased by \$54 million (<7%). Figure 2-9 shows the status of funds in the health care sector.

Projects in this sector focus on constructing, rehabilitating, and equipping PHCs and hospitals. They also address training and vaccination programs. In this sector, 608 of 803 total projects have been completed (76%), mainly non-construction. There are no remaining projects to start.

Completion of health care projects has been hampered by security issues and management problems. Figure 2-10 shows the status of projects in the sector.

Figure 2-8  
**HEALTH CARE PROJECTS BY GOVERNORATE**  
Number of Projects  
Source: IRMS—IRMO Rollup File, 03/31/06





## Projects Completed and Underway in Health Care

In March 2004, the Project Management Office (PMO) awarded a design-build contract with a \$500 million ceiling to Parsons Global. The contract provided for the construction or refurbishment of ministerial buildings, hospitals, primary health care centers, and schools. Much of the work was tasked to local subcontractors or awarded through direct contracts to local firms and other contractual arrangements.<sup>54</sup>

Originally, Parsons was to construct 150 PHCs throughout Iraq, but because of cost increases, the design-build contract was initially descope to include only 141 centers.<sup>55</sup> But, as of March 2006, only six PHCs had been completed, all in Baghdad. These were handed

over to the Ministry of Health on March 15, 2006.<sup>56</sup> According to SIGIR's audit, only 14 more PHCs will be completed under the design-build contract (See Figure 2-11).<sup>57</sup>

GRD-PCO has reported to SIGIR that the remaining PHCs have since been descope from the design-build contract. They are expected to be completed through alternate funding means or by the Iraqis at a later date. For details of the SIGIR audit of this contract, see in Section 3 of this Report.

GRD-PCO is overseeing 22 hospital projects throughout Iraq. Six hospitals had been completed as of March 31, 2006, and 14 more are undergoing refurbishments.<sup>59</sup> Most will be completed by November 2006, but the Najaf Teaching Hospital is expected to be completed by March 2007.<sup>58</sup>

Figure 2-9  
**STATUS OF HEALTH CARE FUNDS**  
\$ Billions  
Source: DoS Iraq Weekly Status Report, 03/29/06






Figure 2-10  
**STATUS OF HEALTH CARE PROJECTS**  
Number of Projects  
Source: IRMS—IRMO Rollup File, 03/31/06





USAID is also in the process of completing one hospital project in the Basrah governorate, bringing to 21 the total number of hospitals in progress or completed with IRRF 2 funding. Completion rates have been slowed by poor security conditions, low contractor productivity, and quality-control issues.<sup>60</sup>

Although construction may be complete, these hospital facilities face other challenges. One of the contractors working on the Hilla Maternity and Children's Hospital is in the process of handing over the facility to the Iraqi Ministry of Health. However, much of the equipment is missing, and the contractor

is having difficulty locating the subcontractor. This missing equipment includes three chillers and a cooling tower, all scheduled to have been delivered by April 15, 2006.<sup>62</sup>

These are other ongoing hospital projects:

- Basrah Children's Hospital: a \$50 million design-build contract that is currently 30% complete.<sup>63</sup>
- Alwaiya Children's Hospital: a \$2.9 million project to modernize the facility that is approximately 72% complete.<sup>64</sup>


## Outputs of IRRF-funded Health Care Projects

Over the previous 20 years, a combination of under-investment and poor management have contributed to the overall deterioration of the physical infrastructure of Iraq's health care sector.

Before the war, Iraq had an estimated 250 hospitals and 1,200 PHCs, but they were poorly managed and maintained. Thus, many Iraqis in rural areas did not have access to health care facilities.<sup>69</sup>

Further, the capacity to deliver health care services was seriously compromised by the post-war looting that occurred in April 2003. A 2004 survey by the Ministry of Health found that looting or serious damage had affected one-third of primary care clinics and one-eighth of hospitals.<sup>70</sup> Erratic electricity supplies, unreliable water quality, and an unstable security situation also degrade the health care system's performance.

Figure 2-11  
**PHC PROJECTS BUILT UNDER THE DESIGN-BUILD CONTRACT**  
Source: IRMS—IRMO Rollup File, 03/31/06;  
IRMO Weekly Update Reports





HEALTH CARE

## HEALTH CARE FACILITIES

Coalition health advisors have worked, in conjunction with the Iraqi Ministry of Health, to move the health care system from the current hospital-based model to a system based on localized primary care clinics. The goal is to develop a more sustainable health care delivery system that improves services for all Iraqis, particularly vulnerable population groups in remote or underserved areas.<sup>72</sup> Execution of this strategy has been limited by the shortfall in PHC construction.

During this reporting period, SIGIR inspectors assessed five of the PHCs that were part of the Parsons contract. SIGIR found that these facilities were far from complete, and the completed portions were poorly constructed. There was inadequate quality control by the contractor and poor quality assurance plans. SIGIR inspectors also assessed two maternity and pediatric hospitals and four other clinics

but reported no significant deficiencies at any of the facilities. For details of these assessments, see Section 3 of this Report.

Of the six completed PHCs, three will reach initial operating capability by late April 2006 and will be used to train staff for the first group of 20 clinics.<sup>73</sup>

To date, the renovations of six hospitals have been completed, and another 14 are ongoing. See Table 2-2 for the status of facilities projects in this sector.

The hospitals and PHCs constructed under GRD-PCO supervision were funded with IRRF 2 dollars; the three sets of construction projects administered by USAID used mostly IRRF 1 funding. Of the USAID projects, the rehabilitated PHCs were meant to restore essential services to their service regions as rapidly as possible after the cessation of hostilities. The PHCs constructed and equipped by USAID focused on expanding the availability of basic health care in areas facing less risk of violence.<sup>75</sup>

### HEALTH CARE FACILITY CONSTRUCTION: CURRENT & PLANNED

HEALTH CARE FACILITIES	CURRENT STATE, AS OF 03/21/06	IRRF PLANNED END STATE
Hospitals Rehabilitated <sup>1</sup>	6	20
Hospitals Built <sup>2</sup>	In progress	1
Primary Health Care Centers Rehabilitated <sup>2</sup>	110	110
Primary Health Care Centers Equipped <sup>2</sup>	600	600
Small Primary Health Care Centers Built and Equipped <sup>2</sup>	6	6
Primary Health Care Centers Built and Equipped <sup>1</sup>	6	142

Source: NEA Data Call Response, March 24, 2006 (<sup>1</sup> represents work overseen by GRD-PCO; <sup>2</sup> represents work overseen by USAID)  
Table 2-2



## HEALTH CARE

## NON-CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

The United States has procured and delivered approximately \$226 million in new medical equipment and supplies for Iraqi hospitals and PHCs.<sup>78</sup> Unfortunately, the PHCs that were to use this equipment are mostly incomplete. The United States has successfully trained thousands of health care professionals and funded two very effective vaccination campaigns for polio and measles, mumps and rubella (\$4.8 million).<sup>79</sup>

Table 2-3 presents the status of vaccination and training programs in Iraq.

### Outcomes of IRRF-funded Health Care Projects

The construction and delivery of only six PHCs—out of a planned total of 150—limits the progress of the reconstruction effort in this sector. IRMO estimates that approximately \$36

million is required to finish the 121 partially constructed PHCs that could not be finished under the contract.

Although the outcomes of U.S. projects will not be fully apparent for years, a few statistics show the immediate beneficial effects of U.S. interventions. Almost all Iraqi children have been inoculated against measles, mumps, and rubella. From 2004 to 2005, lab-confirmed cases of measles in Iraq dropped 90%. Also, nearly 98% of children under five have been immunized against polio, and there have been no recorded cases of polio since the war.<sup>80</sup> From 2002 to 2005, malaria cases dropped from 1,043 to 86.<sup>81</sup> Some data suggest that infant mortality rates have decreased from 10.7% in 2003<sup>82</sup> to an estimated 5.03% last year.<sup>83</sup>


The effects of U.S. health care construction projects remain unclear.

## VACCINATION AND TRAINING PROGRAMS

OUTPUTS METRIC	CURRENT STATUS, AS OF 3/21/06
Vaccination programs	3.6 million children vaccinated against MMR (98% of target population) 4.6 million children vaccinated against polio (97% of target population)
Number of Ministry of Health Professionals Trained in Maternal and Child Health Service Delivery	3,400 3,200 from IRRF 1; 200 from IRRF 2
Community Leaders and Other Non-ministry Personnel Trained in Health Promotion	3,100 All IRRF 1 funding

Sources: DoS, SIGIR Data Request, received on March 31, 2006; USAID, SIGIR Data Request, April 7, 2006.

Table 2-3



## STATUS OF THE TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR

This section examines the progress of reconstruction in the transportation and communications (T&C) sector. Projects in this sector improve transportation systems in Iraq, such as ports, railways, roads, bridges, and airports. This sector also includes U.S.-funded telecommunications projects.<sup>84</sup>

These are the highlights of SIGIR's progress report on transportation and communications:

- More than 80% of projects have been completed in this sector, with 53% of the \$799 million allocated to this sector expended. Figure 2-12 shows sector funding as a portion of total IRRF 2 allocations.
- A series of IRRF-funded projects has restored Iraq's only operational deepwater port at Umm Qasr.
- U.S. projects have nearly completed repairs at most of Iraq's 107 railway stations, but the effects of these projects are not yet apparent. Only 4% of trains run each day, primarily because of security concerns.
- After the 2003 conflict, Iraq did not have any functioning airports; now there are two international and three regional airports.
- Almost 5.2 million more Iraqis now have access to mobile phone service than before the 2003 conflict, financed by the private




Figure 2-12  
**TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS  
 AS A SHARE OF IRRF FUNDS**  
 % of \$18.439 Billion  
 Source: DoS *Iraq Weekly Status* report, 03/29/06



## TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

sector. The United States provided technical guidance to the Iraqi government in developing mobile licenses, and the CPA built a “first responder” network.

Figure 2-13 shows reconstruction activity in this sector by governorate.

### IRRF-funded Activities in the Transportation and Communications Sector

In this sector, 384 projects of 470 total projects have been completed. Projects in the T&C sector focus on five major areas:

- shipping
- railways
- air transportation
- roads and bridges
- telecommunications

Figure 2-14 shows the status of projects in the T&C sector.

Transportation infrastructure received heavy investment during the 1970s and 1980s, but much of it was destroyed during the first Gulf War, and years of neglect and sanctions slowed the rebuilding process.<sup>85</sup> In 2003, the UN and World Bank estimated that transportation and telecommunications in Iraq would require \$3.38 billion of investment in the immediate- and medium-term.<sup>86</sup> But CPA discovered later in 2003 that Iraq’s transportation and telecommunications infrastructure—would require significantly more investment.

The sector was originally allocated \$870

million in IRRF 2 funding<sup>87</sup> but currently has IRRF allocations of \$799 million. More than 90% of the sector’s funding has been obligated, and 53% has been expended. These are higher rates than all other U.S. reconstruction sectors except two: security and justice; and democracy, education, and private sector development. Figure 2-15 shows the status of funds in the T&C sector.

GRD-PCO estimates that construction will be completed in this sector by late 2008, when the last of the major highway projects executed through the Ministry of Construction and Housing are completed.<sup>88</sup>

PCO and USAID have executed most of the projects in the T&C sector. USAID infrastructure reconstruction contracts included the rehabilitation of airports and restoration of the deep water port at Umm Qasr.<sup>89</sup>

PCO projects in this sector were originally funded through an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract with a ceiling of \$325 million. This contract was terminated in October 2004, in part because of a shift from large design-build contracts to direct contracting with Iraqi firms.<sup>93</sup>

### SHIPPING


#### Key Shipping Projects Completed and Underway

Although there are six cargo ports in Iraq, Umm Qasr, on the Iraq border with Kuwait, is the only deepwater port.<sup>94</sup> A 2003 UN-World Bank assessment recommended that port reconstruction efforts focus on Umm Qasr because of the critical role the port would play



TRANSPORTATION AND  
COMMUNICATIONS

## ONGOING



## COMPLETED




Figure 2-13  
**TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS  
PROJECTS BY GOVERNORATE**

Number of Projects

Source: IRMS—IRMO Rollup file, 03/31/06






Figure 2-14  
**STATUS OF TRANSPORTATION AND  
COMMUNICATIONS PROJECTS**

Number of Projects

Source: IRMS—IRMO Rollup file, 03/31/06

Figure 2-15  
**STATUS OF TRANSPORTATION AND  
COMMUNICATIONS FUNDS**  
\$ Billions  
Source: DoS Iraq Weekly Status report, 03/29/06





## TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS



Port at Umm Qasr

in supplying the country.<sup>95</sup>

To ensure that the port could receive emergency supplies, the U.S. Army of Corps of Engineers (USACE) began work on it immediately following combat operations. By mid-June 2003, Umm Qasr was open for commercial shipping.<sup>97</sup> Since that time nearly \$42 million of IRRF 2 has been obligated for rehabilitation of the port, and much of the work is already completed.<sup>98</sup>

During this quarter, an operations building for the port was completed,<sup>99</sup> as well as \$4.8 million of security upgrades.<sup>100</sup> Also, a \$2.5 million project to buy various port vehicles—fire trucks, buses, and more—and fund operational training is nearly complete.<sup>101</sup> PCO has completed three of eight construction projects at the port and will finish the remainder by January 2007.<sup>102</sup>

### Outputs and Outcomes of IRRF-funded Shipping Projects

During the week ending March 25, 2006, 14 ships were berthed at Umm Qasr, and 18 ships continued to unload from the previous week. During the same week, 4,544 trucks were processed at the port.<sup>104</sup> U.S. projects have focused on repairs at Umm Qasr, and the increased activity at the port shows the value of these efforts. Figure 2-16 shows the number of new berths at Umm Qasr from December 21, 2005, to March 28, 2006.

## RAILWAYS

### Key Railway Projects Completed and Underway

Iraq has one of the most extensive railway networks in the region.<sup>105</sup> To support the repair of this network, projects in this subsector were originally budgeted at \$210 million, but \$21 million of that was reallocated. Current allocations total \$189 million.<sup>106</sup>

By the end of last year, GRD-PCO had rehabilitated 79 railway stations at a cost of \$1.5 million.<sup>106a</sup> During this reporting period, 89 stations were reported complete.<sup>107</sup> A SIGIR on-site inspection of station renovations in Basrah found poor quality work in several areas. For a summary of this inspection, see Section 3. During this reporting period, work was set to begin on a \$3.4 million renovation of the Baghdad Central Railway station and two equipment maintenance facilities, budgeted at \$10.4 million, were near completion at Baji and Samawa.<sup>108</sup>


TRANSPORTATION AND  
COMMUNICATIONS

Figure 2-16

**NEW SHIP BERTHS AT UMM QASR**

Number of Berths

Source: IRMO *Weekly Status* reports, 12/28/05–3/28/06

GRD-PCO is spending \$125 million on non-construction railway projects. Much of this funding has been spent on track-maintenance machinery, spare parts, and tools and materials.<sup>109</sup> One of the largest projects, costing \$54 million, provides communications for a train-control system, which is essential to a viable, national railway system. The project is expected to be completed by early 2007,<sup>110</sup> but it faces a major challenge. Training on implementation and operation of the system is scheduled for July 2006 in the United States. However, obtaining travel permits from the Iraqi government for the trainees has been difficult. IRMO reported that this may cause this project to fail.<sup>111</sup>

**Outputs of IRRF-funded Railway Projects**

Iraq's 1,522 miles of rail lines and 107 rail stations were in poor condition at the end of the 2003 conflict.<sup>112</sup> IRRF 2 money has not been

used to repair track but instead has been used to purchase tools and machinery needed for Iraqi workers to accomplish the repairs.<sup>113</sup> U.S. projects have also helped bring the number of operational locomotives from 25 immediately after the war to 100 currently.<sup>114</sup> Although the majority of funding has been allocated to non-construction projects, GRD-PCO does plan to repair 106 out of 107 rail stations in Iraq.

**Outcomes of IRRF-funded Railway Projects**

Although there has been progress in refurbishing railway stations and locomotives, the security situation in Iraq has contributed to a gap between planned and actual train movements. Train activity has declined substantially from post-war levels because of attacks concentrated in a six-mile section in Latafiya, south of Baghdad. No trains have operated along the Baghdad-Basrah-Umm Qasr route since February 2006, and PCO trains have not operated since



## TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

January 2006. Figure 2-17 shows weekly train traffic for 2006.

While the effects of U.S. projects have not been felt by many Iraqis, improvements in security have enabled the Iraqi Republic Railway (IRR) to operate two large trains daily along the Mosul-Rabiya line, importing food, consumer goods, and fuel from Syria and Turkey.<sup>115</sup>

### AIR TRANSPORTATION

#### Key Air Transportation Projects Completed and Underway

Iraq last conducted normal air transportation operations in 1989 when airlines carried about 1.2 million passengers to 42 destinations within Iraq and abroad. UN sanctions from 1990 to 2003 grounded most civil international air traffic, although there were still sporadic flights into Baghdad.<sup>116</sup> Airports in Iraq were not maintained during the sanction years and

suffered further damage during the 2003 conflict. A 2003 UN/World Bank study noted that the two international and three major domestic airports in Iraq were incapable of supporting commercial operations and that most of the electromechanical systems were useless.<sup>117</sup>


In May 2003, USAID began emergency work at Bagdad International Airport (BIAP) and Basrah International (BIA). U.S. projects have since restored commercial operations at two international airports—BIAP and BIA—and regional operations at Mosul, Kirkuk, and Irbil.<sup>119</sup> The program goal is to bring all of these airports up to the standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization. Work in Basrah will be complete in May 2006, and work in Baghdad and Mosul is estimated to be complete by August 2006.<sup>120</sup>

During the last reporting period, IRRF 2 allocations for civil aviation decreased by \$38 million, to \$76 million.<sup>121</sup> U.S. projects alone will not bring Iraqi airports to international standards; Iraqi efforts and funding will also be required.<sup>122</sup>

#### Outputs of IRRF-funded Air Transportation Projects

After the 2003 war, Coalition forces provided air traffic approach and control services.<sup>123</sup> BIAP was returned to Iraqi control in August 2004.<sup>124</sup> Since September 2004, Iraqi Airways has operated a single Boeing 737 airplane, recently adding a Boeing 767 and other aircraft via leases.<sup>125</sup> A recent SIGIR project assessment at the Mosul Airport found that U.S.

Figure 2-17  
**VOLUME OF RAIL TRAFFIC**  
Number of Train Trips  
Sources: IRMO *Weekly Status*  
Reports, 2/28/06–3/28/06





projects there were of high quality and that sustainability has been adequately addressed. For a summary of this assessment, see Section 3 of this Report.

## Outcomes of IRRF-funded Air Transportation Projects

During the week of March 20-26, 2006, there were 291 civil aviation operations at BIAP.<sup>127</sup> Figure 2-18 shows the number of daily commercial flights at BIAP from this past quarter.

## ROADS AND BRIDGES

This section outlines the key U.S. projects to improve roads and bridges in Iraq. SIGIR does not report outcomes in the roads and bridges subsector.

## Key Road and Bridge Projects Completed and Underway

In 2003, Iraq was estimated to have 25,230 miles of roads, and 85% of the roads were paved.<sup>128</sup> Although roads were not seriously damaged during the 2003 conflict,<sup>129</sup> only 50% of the expressways were then estimated in “good” condition, and only 20-30% of secondary and village roads were in “good” condition.<sup>130</sup> Insurgent attacks after the war further damaged the road infrastructure, especially to the main highway connecting Baghdad and Amman.<sup>131</sup>

PCO reports that five bridges will be rebuilt by January 2008, at a cost of \$21.2 million. Two major roadway projects are also in their initial stages. The 54-mile highway between Baghdad




Figure 2-18  
**VOLUME OF FLIGHTS AT BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT**  
Number of Flights  
Sources: IRMO Weekly Status reports, 1/18/05–3/28/06

and Kirkuk will be upgraded to four lanes by December 2008, at a cost of \$27.9 million. The 43.4-mile highway between Diwaniyah and Semawa is also being upgraded to four lanes. It will be completed in January 2008, at a cost of \$15.5 million.<sup>134</sup>

Major U.S. programs are also underway to repair small roads. The Village Roads Program, a \$38 million effort overseen by GRD-PCO, will provide 263 miles of improved roads, of which more than 50% has been completed to date.<sup>135</sup>

A SIGIR assessment team reviewed a small section of village roads outside of Mosul and found that the project is on target. The team

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found problems with the design drawings of the project; but all other work was consistent with the contract. SIGIR also conducted two limited on-site inspections of road projects in Basrah and Thi-Qar. Summaries of these limited on-site inspections and the Mosul assessment—including aerial imagery of a road project in An Najaf—are in Section 3 of this Report.

Small roads are also receiving up to \$52 million through the Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees (PRDCs), which will allow provincial councils to prioritize the road projects in their respective provinces.<sup>136</sup> At the end of this reporting period, 59 projects, valued at \$49.5 million, had been approved. The projects are intended to meet key needs for Iraq's national highways, with scheduled completion in April 2007.<sup>137</sup>

#### **Outputs of IRRF-funded Road and Bridge Projects**

U.S.-funded projects have focused on only a small percentage of roads and bridges in Iraq. Table 2-4 compares the cumulative total of miles of road repaired and built, as well as the number of bridges repaired and built, against pre-war levels.

### **TELECOMMUNICATIONS**

#### **Key Telecommunications Projects**

##### **Completed and Underway**

Nearly \$20 million in IRRF was allocated to modernize the Iraqi Telephone and Post Company (ITPC). During this reporting period, 9 postal trucks and 26 vans were purchased and delivered for \$1.3 million.<sup>138</sup> PCO also plans

to construct or renovate 36 Iraqi post offices for \$2.83 million. To date, the projects are 41% complete; when finished, they will provide mail service for one million Iraqis.<sup>139</sup> The Iraqi telecommunications system was originally allocated \$90 million, but now has only \$48 million to initiate long-term upgrades and increase capacity and sustainment.<sup>140</sup>

An allocation of \$20 million was also made available to rebuild the Al Mainoun Telecommunications Center. This technology center will house major switching elements of the Iraqi Telephone Network, the national operations center, and international gateway equipment.<sup>141</sup>

The \$70 million Consolidated Fiber Network (CFN) is intended to rehabilitate and extend the existing ITPC fiber network. When complete, the CFN will allow the Ministry of Electricity to control the electrical system and communicate via the network. By the end of this reporting period, 82% of the cable was installed, and the project is scheduled to be completed in summer 2006.<sup>142</sup>

The National Communications and Media Commission (NCCMC) was originally allocated \$25 million, but now has only \$20 million. To date, the headquarters for NCCMC has been finished and equipped, and a training strategy plan is in progress.<sup>143</sup>

#### **Outputs of IRRF-funded**

##### **Telecommunications Projects**

The first Gulf War and the air strikes of 1998 severely damaged the telecommunications infrastructure. During the war, Coalition forces



## ROADS AND BRIDGES REPAIRED AND GOAL

OUTPUTS METRIC	PRE-WAR LEVEL (2003)	PLANNED REPAIRS/PAVING – GRD/PCO ONLY, AS OF MARCH 29, 2006
Miles of Road	25,230 21,450 paved  *Only 50% of expressways and 20-30% of secondary roads in "good condition"	Village roads: 263* City carriageways: 125 Major roads: 17 Total: 405 *Village Roads program originally planned for 445 miles
Number of Bridges	1,156 *In poor condition or completely destroyed	10 *5 funded by IRRF, 5 funded by DFI

Sources:  
Pre-war Level: Note, these figures are rough estimates. United Nations/World Bank, "Joint Iraq Needs Assessment," October 2003, p. 23.  
Miles of road repaired: GRD-PCO, "Response to SIGIR request dated February 25, 2006," March 29, 2006, p. 8.  
Number of bridges repaired: DoS Email to SIGIR, March 31, 2006.

Table 2-4

bombed many Iraqi telephone exchanges to disrupt communications within the country.<sup>144</sup> After combat operations in 2003, 12 of Baghdad's 38 switching stations were out of service, which made nearly 45% of all landlines inoperable. USAID repaired all 12 of these stations using IRRF 1 funds.<sup>145</sup> To date 35 of 42 ITPC sites have fiber connectivity through the CFN project,<sup>146</sup> with approximately 106 miles of fiber lines operational.<sup>147</sup>


### Outcomes of IRRF-funded

#### Telecommunications Projects

Before the war, only the Kurdish governorates had a civilian mobile phone network, but now wireless technology is the most popular com-

munication method in Iraq. In late 2003, the Iraq Ministry of Telecommunications granted three, two-year licenses for Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM).<sup>148</sup> Although the U.S. Embassy provided technical guidance to the NCMC in awarding these licenses<sup>149</sup> and the CPA designed and built a "first responder" network for security forces,<sup>150</sup> most development in wireless communications has come through private investment. Table 2-5 compares the current number of telephone subscribers with the pre-war numbers.

Before the war, Internet access was expensive and carefully controlled, and only a few thousand users subscribed. After the war, the state-owned Internet service provider—State



## TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

Company for Internet Services (SCIS)—began addressing the challenges of Iraq’s limited regulation, policy, and legal framework.<sup>151</sup>

Currently, there are about 213,000 SCIS Internet subscribers in Iraq; most Iraqis continue to gain access through cafes and hotels.<sup>152</sup> DoS estimates that there are 2,000 Internet cafes and Internet access points in Iraq.<sup>153</sup>

### CURRENT TELEPHONE SUBSCRIBERS VS. PRE-WAR LEVELS


OUTPUTS METRIC	PRE-WAR LEVEL (2003)	CURRENT STATUS AS OF 3/28/06
Landline subscribers	833,000	1,036,854
Mobile Phone subscribers	80,000	5,261,789

#### Sources:

Pre-war Levels: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2005-Iraq, 2005, p. 34; International Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators, No Date, p. A-30. Available online at [http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/at\\_glance/cellular03.pdf](http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/at_glance/cellular03.pdf).

Current Status: IRMO, Weekly Status report, March 28, 2006, p. 19.

Table 2-5



## STATUS OF DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION, AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

This SIGIR review examines U.S. spending on democracy programs, education, and private sector development. Projects reviewed in this sector include construction or rehabilitation of education facilities and training programs in education, democracy, and private sector development. Many of the private sector development projects have focused on providing the Iraqi government with technical advice on institutional and market reforms.<sup>154</sup>


After initially focusing IRRF 2 funding almost exclusively on large infrastructure projects in 2004, U.S. spending in this sector was reoriented through a series of reallocations specifically designed to support elections in 2005.

These are the highlights of the report on democracy, education, and private sector development:

- These sectors have IRRF 2 allocations of \$2.249 billion. (See figure 2-19.) Other donors, including the World Bank, have seen education as a priority and have funded projects in this sector. In their 2003 needs assessment, the UN and World Bank estimated that the human resource development sectors needed \$6.7 billion in the near- and medium-term.<sup>155</sup>
- More than 90% of projects (8,613) have been completed in this sector, and 872 are ongoing.
- A total of 5,108 schools have been repaired and rehabilitated, and more than 47,000 teachers have been trained. It has been difficult to derive the precise number of schools refurbished and constructed because these projects had multiple funding sources and implementing agencies.

Figure 2-19  
**DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION, AND  
 PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT SECTOR  
 AS A SHARE OF IRRF FUNDS**  
 % of \$18.439 Billion  
 Source: DoS Iraq Weekly Status Report, 03/29/06

Democracy, Education, and  
 Private Sector Development





## DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION, AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

- Private sector development projects have focused on training programs and technical advice to the Iraqi government on institutional and market reforms. These programs have helped to set the stage for economic growth based on private sector initiatives. The Iraqi economy grew by an estimated 75% between 2002 and 2005, and some of this growth is directly linked to U.S. programs.


Figure 2-20 shows reconstruction activity in this sector by governorate.

## IRRF-funded Activities in Democracy, Education, and Private Sector Development

By the end of this quarter, more than 93% of the sector's funding had been obligated, and 67% had been expended. Democracy, education, and private sector development were originally allocated \$533 million in November 2003,<sup>156</sup> but allocations have been increased to more than \$2.2 billion, for an increase of 322%, which is shown in Table 2-6. Figure 2-21 shows the status of funds in the democracy, education, and private sector development sector.

Three wars, sanctions, and massive corruption under the Saddam regime degraded Iraq's economy in every area. After the first Gulf War, there was little national investment in the services sector. The education system of Iraq was

Figure 2-20  
**DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION, AND PRIVATE SECTOR  
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS BY GOVERNORATE**  
Number of Projects  
Source: IRMS-IRMO Rollup file, 03/31/06





## DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION, AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

Figure 2-22  
**STATUS OF DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION, AND  
PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS**  
Number of Projects  
Source: IRMS--IRMO Rollup File, 03/31/06





Figure 2-21  
**STATUS OF DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION, AND  
PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT FUNDS**  
\$ Billions  
Source: DoS Iraq Weekly Status Report, 03/31/06



## IRRF 2 ALLOCATION CHANGES FOR DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION, AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT (DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)

2207 SECTOR	CONGRESSIONAL ALLOCATION, NOV. 2003	CURRENT ALLOCATION, MARCH 2006	CHANGE IN DOLLARS	PERCENTAGE CHANGE
Private Sector Development <sup>1</sup>	\$153	\$805	\$652	426%
Education, Refugees, and Human Rights	\$280	\$410	\$130	46%
Democracy <sup>2</sup>	\$100	\$1,033	\$933	933%
<b>Total for Democracy, Education, and Private Sector Development</b>	<b>\$533</b>	<b>\$2,248</b>	<b>\$1,715</b>	<b>322%</b>

<sup>1</sup> \$360 million of private sector development is allocated to Iraqi debt forgiveness as required by Congress to enable implementation of the U.S.-Iraq bilateral debt agreement signed pursuant to the Paris Club debt forgiveness arrangement.

<sup>2</sup> \$100 million was made available for democracy-building activities from the justice, public safety infrastructure, and civil society sector.

Sources: U.S. Congress, Public Law 108-106, 117 Stat. 1225; DoS Iraq Weekly Status report, March 29, 2006.

Table 2-6



## DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION, AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

once among the best in the region, but schools and universities seriously declined during the past two decades.

Although 8,613 projects have been completed (91%) in this sector, the project completion rate is not evenly distributed among subsectors: private sector development programs lag, as do projects focused on refugee assistance. Figure 2-22 shows the status of projects in the sector.

### DEMOCRACY

Since the last quarter, democracy-building initiatives have received approximately \$38.5 million in additional funding,<sup>157</sup> reflecting the premium that the U.S. government places on consolidating the success of the nationwide elections in December 2005. The development of a broadly representative national unity government in Iraq is a key to stabilizing the country.<sup>158</sup>

#### Democracy Projects Completed and Underway

During the quarter, the United States continued to promote IRRF-funded local democracy-building initiatives, working through the Coalition Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the newly created Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils (PRDCs). The PRDCs comprise local officials and community leaders in each of the 18

governorates who are empowered to make decisions about local reconstruction priorities. Staffed by both civilian and military personnel skilled in various development specialties, the PRTs will help monitor reconstruction programs and various outreach efforts in the governorates. PRT staff help the leaders of their respective governorates prioritize initiatives to address the needs of the local people. As funds become available, the PRTs use those funds to help execute contracts that address the concerns of the local people and generate short-term employment opportunities and civic education initiatives.<sup>161</sup>

Cumulatively, \$126 million in IRRF funding was obligated to oversee and support the election and political process.<sup>163</sup> Support has also been given to media training and coalition-building initiatives, including workshops and educational training, to encourage political parties not represented in parliament to remain engaged in the constitutional process.<sup>164</sup>

USAID also manages a number of democratic development initiatives, including:

- Community Action Program (CAP)
- Iraqi Civil Society and Independent Media Program
- Local Governance Program II

Because of funding shortfalls, current plans are to fund only the Local Governance Pro-



DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION,  
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gram II in the future. This program promotes diverse and representative participation in local government in all 18 governorates. The program also offers training in government management and works with civil society organizations to help them become more involved in the public sector.

#### **Outputs of IRRF-funded Democracy Projects**

To date, only 4 of the 18 PRTs have been fielded, and a fifth is pending deployment. An agreement was reportedly reached in early-April 2006 between DoS and DoD, with DoD agreeing to provide security for the PRT teams already in the field.<sup>167</sup>

According to USAID, 750,000 Iraqis have participated in 22,000 democracy dialogues initiated under the Local Governance Program II.<sup>168</sup> This program was also used to establish or rebuild 16 governorate councils, 90 district councils, 194 city or sub-district councils, and 437 neighborhood councils. The Local Governance Program II has also provided training to 88% of newly elected Iraqi political leaders, supported efforts to increase the participation and role of women in the new Iraqi democracy, and assessed PRDCs to help identify and prioritize local governance efforts.<sup>169</sup>

The USAID CAP operates throughout Iraq to promote democracy and help mitigate conflict at the local level. This program has thus far established more than 1,400 community associations throughout the country and has created more than 2 million short-term jobs.<sup>170</sup>

USAID also reports that the Civil Society

Program has issued 400 small grants, totaling \$3.5 million.

#### **Outcomes of IRRF-funded Democracy Projects**

The transition to democracy and representative government is a significant development for Iraq given its history. Representative structures are being built at the local and national levels. A persistent insurgency, ethno-sectarian violence, and human rights violations, however, all continue to threaten the development and consolidation of democratic governance.

Approximately 14,000 Iraqi citizens have received training on the role of elected members of parliament and how to advocate for citizens' rights,<sup>172</sup> and more than 1,000 media managers have received training under CAP; smaller media outlets, in particular have demonstrated improved skills in reporting on complex social topics.<sup>173</sup> Finally, USAID activities helped provide electoral support to organize and manage the three milestone democratic events that occurred in January, October, and December 2005. Specifically, USAID-led initiatives helped build the capacity of Iraqi political parties, supported the transitional and constitutional processes, and promoted voter awareness.<sup>174</sup> For an overview of progress toward democracy in Iraq, see Figure 2-23.

#### **EDUCATION**

This section presents the key projects and outputs in the DoS *Section 2207 Report* sectors: Education, Refugees, Human Rights, and Gov-



DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION,  
AND PRIVATE SECTOR  
DEVELOPMENT




Figure 2-23

## MILESTONES OF PROGRESS TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC IRAQ

Source: DoD 9010 Report, February 2006

\*Pursuant to the TAL, the TNA extended the deadline from August 15 until August 22

ernance; and education construction projects in the Roads, Bridges, and Construction sector. The outcomes of education projects will not be realized for some years; therefore, SIGIR does not report on them in this subsection.

### Education Projects Completed and Underway

Renovations on the Malk Al Ashtar School project in Diwaniyah were completed during this reporting period. This project will ben-

efit approximately 2,000 Iraqi students who are currently attending classes in two inferior facilities. Refurbishment of the Imam Ali School in Karbala was also completed, serving approximately 960 students.<sup>175</sup>

In addition, the Al Watan School in Beni-Zaid has refurbished classrooms, offices, and storage rooms, as well as a new schoolyard for the secondary school. This work will benefit more than 300 local students. The Al Ara-



DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION,  
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biyah School in Istiglal also received repairs and upgrades of its structural, mechanical, plumbing, and electrical building systems, all to the benefit of approximately 250 students.<sup>176</sup> Construction on a \$100,000 USACE school renovation project in Adhamiyah was also recently completed; it is expected to benefit approximately 250 students in grades K-6.<sup>177</sup>

In Section 3 of this Report, SIGIR reports its findings on inspections of various school construction projects. The inspections reveal that, although the quality of workmanship at a primary school in Dahuk was good, the quality of workmanship at three other school projects assessed in the governorate of Thi-Qar appears to be low.

Several non-construction projects have also been completed in this subsector. The Revitalization of Iraq Schools and Stabilization of Education (RISE) is funded through an IRRF 1 contract valued at \$62.6 million and an IRRF 2 contract valued at \$56.5 million (a total of \$119.1 million).

USAID has also partnered with the United Nations Children's Fund and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization to provide educational sector assessments, teacher training, health education, and an accelerated learning program for out-of-school youth. The programs have received grants of \$29.6 million.

More than \$20 million has gone to the Higher Education and Development Program, which partners higher education in Iraq with U.S.-led university consortiums.<sup>180</sup> More than

1,500 Iraqi faculty and students have benefited from this program.<sup>181</sup>

### Outputs of IRRF-funded Education Projects

Until the 1980s, the education system in Iraq was considered to be a model for the region. However, the system has steadily deteriorated because of Saddam Hussein's neglect, a lack of resources during multiple wars, and the politicization of the system.<sup>182</sup> In 2003, the UN/World Bank needs assessment reported that rehabilitating the Iraqi education system to its 1980s level must be at the heart of the reconstruction effort, and that it could take \$4.8 billion.

The major cause for the deterioration of the education sector's infrastructure was Saddam Hussein's decision to terminate almost all maintenance and new construction of school facilities after the 1991 Gulf War when international sanctions came into force. Education expenditures fell from \$620 per student in 1989 to \$47 in 2002. During the 2003 conflict, many school buildings were damaged further by bombing and looting.<sup>183</sup>

Just before the 2003 war, there were more than 14,000 schools in Iraq; an estimated 11,000 of those needed repairs or refurbishments. The specific purpose of the GRD-PCO school program was to refurbish existing facilities to restore them to an acceptable level to promote a healthy learning environment.<sup>184</sup> In February 2003, USAID reported that the coalition goal for physical reconstruction of school facilities would be to repair or rehabili-



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tate 6,000 schools within 18 months after the end of conflict.<sup>185</sup>

As of March 31, 2006, GRD-PCO reported that it has successfully constructed or refurbished 800 schools using IRRF 2 funds,<sup>186</sup> and USAID had reported the construction or refurbishment of 2,943 with funding from both IRRF 1 and IRRF 2.<sup>187</sup> In addition to the schools completed by PCO and USAID, 1,365 schools have been refurbished by MNF-I, which also includes funding through the Commander's Emergency Response Fund (CERP).<sup>188</sup>

For a breakdown of total schools in Iraq versus IRRF funded activities, see Table 2-7.

Non-construction education projects have successfully trained thousands of teachers. USAID has also provided Iraqi schools with hundreds of thousands of desks, chairs, and

chalkboards, and more than three million school kits.<sup>189</sup> Table 2-8 shows the cumulative total of teachers trained with IRRF 2 funding.

## REFUGEES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE

This section presents projects covered in the DoS *Section 2207 Report* sector for Education, Refugees, Human Rights, and Governance. Results and effects are difficult to measure in the short term for refugees, human rights, and governance components of the subsector and so are not presented in this section.

### Projects Completed and Underway

Migration and Refugee Assistance received an increase of \$27 million in IRRF 2 funding

TOTAL SCHOOLS IN IRAQ VERSUS IRRF FUNDED ACTIVITIES

TOTAL SCHOOLS (2003)	SCHOOLS NEEDING REPAIR (2003)	SCHOOLS COMPLETED	SCHOOLS IN PROGRESS	SCHOOLS NOT YET STARTED
14,121	11,000	2,358 – USAID IRRF 1 585 – USAID IRRF 2 800 – PCO IRRF 2 1,365 – MNF-I	N/A – USAID IRRF 1 221 – USAID IRRF 2 3 – (PCO) N/A – MNF-I	N/A – USAID IRRF 1 N/A – USAID IRRF 2 1 – PCO IRRF 2 N/A – MNF-I

Sources: DoS *Section 2207 Report* Executive Summary, April 2006, p. 18; USAID and PCO responses to SIGIR data calls on April 19, 2006.

TABLE 2-7



DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION,  
AND PRIVATE SECTOR  
DEVELOPMENT

CUMULATIVE TOTAL OF TEACHERS TRAINED WITH IRRF 2 FUNDING

OUTPUT METRIC	FUNDING	CURRENT STATUS AS OF 3/31/06	GOAL BY END-STATE
Teachers Trained	\$5.6 million	47,695	60,000

Sources: USAID, SIGIR Data Request submitted by DoS, March 24, 2006; USAID, Email to SIGIR, April 7, 2006; USAID, Email to SIGIR, April 19, 2006.

TABLE 2-8

last quarter, reaching \$186 million in total allocations. This includes cash grants for displaced persons, a capacity-building program, and work and relocation programs.<sup>190</sup>

The DoS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) and USAID have been allocated \$15 million to promote human rights in Iraq.<sup>192</sup>

USAID is working on governance issues with the Ministry of Finance. Two contracts have been awarded to reform the tax, legal, fiscal, institutional, and regulatory frameworks in Iraq. The first, funded at \$79.6 million from IRRF 1, was completed in September 2004. The second, funded by \$184.6 million from IRRF 2, was awarded during the same month.<sup>193</sup> The U.S. Department of Treasury is working to establish modern central bank functions, with \$35.1 million from IRRF 1 and IRRF 2.<sup>194</sup> During the last quarter, bank restructuring recommendations were presented to the Ministry of Finance for consideration.<sup>195</sup>

## PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

This section presents the key projects in private sector development. SIGIR has not been able to verify the total number of Iraqis trained as a result of U.S. projects. It is difficult to measure the results of U.S. projects promoting institutional and market-based reforms in Iraq. As a result, outputs and outcomes are not presented for this subsector.

### Projects Completed and Underway

USAID awarded two contracts in October 2004 for private sector development. The first—a \$154 million contract—was intended to provide assistance in privatizing state-owned enterprises, developing capital markets and trade policy, and training Iraqis in business management. The second—a \$12 million contract—was to build and maintain business centers that provide training and technical assistance to businesses.<sup>196</sup>

At the program level, \$53 million has been made available for microfinance loans,<sup>197</sup> and \$184 million for institutional and market-




### DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION, AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

based reforms. These reforms focus on helping develop the Iraq Stock Exchange, Iraq Securities Commission, and Iraq Association of Securities Dealers.<sup>198</sup> Work is also progressing on measures to support Iraq's membership in the World Trade Organization.

During last quarter, the \$75 million Vocational Training program was terminated because Iraq's government has changed priorities.<sup>200</sup> A business skills training program, allocated \$40 million, was also closed out this

quarter by USAID. The program provided for \$3 million in grants for small and medium business startups, and training for 2,436 Iraqi entrepreneurs.<sup>202</sup>

The agriculture sector employs more Iraqis than any other sector; about a quarter of the Iraqi workforce is in the agriculture sector.<sup>203</sup> Agriculture programs have been allocated \$105 million. These programs mainly focus on tractor repairs, training, and irrigation systems.<sup>204</sup>



## STATUS OF THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR

This review updates the status of U.S. reconstruction projects to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure for generating, transmitting, and distributing electricity. SIGIR makes the following observations about progress over the last quarter in the electricity sector:

- By the end of the quarter, 44% of planned projects in this sector were complete,<sup>205</sup> and 48% of the allocated dollars had been expended. More than \$700 million of the \$4.22 billion are still left to be obligated (See Figure 2-26). In addition, 1 nationwide project has been completed, and 33 nationwide projects are currently ongoing in the electricity sector.
- The current predicted completion date for all GRD-PCO projects in this sector is January 2008. However, at current rate of expenditures, actual completion by this date will not be met.
- IRRF-funded U.S. electricity projects have contributed 2,710 megawatts (MW) to Iraq's generation capacity. Overall genera-

tion capacity available to the grid, however, is currently below the estimated pre-war level—4,004 MW currently, compared to 4,500 MW before the war.

- For the week ending March 28, 2006, the average load served was 91,092 megawatt hours (MWH). Last year, during this same time period, the average was 86,700 MWH.
- On average, Iraqis outside of Baghdad are now receiving more hours of power than they did before the war. In Baghdad, there is less power (eight hours a day) than before the 2003 conflict. However, pre-war power distribution emphasized Baghdad's needs over the rest of the country.
- Slow progress in this sector can be attributed to many of the same challenges as found in other sectors: security, increased demand caused by growth and subsidies, widespread pre-war deterioration in the sector, corruption and theft, poor equipment operation and maintenance, and fuel shortages.




Figure 2-24  
**ELECTRICITY SECTOR AS A SHARE OF IRRF FUNDS**  
 % of \$18.439 Billion  
 Source: DoS *Iraq Weekly Status Report*, 03/29/06



Figure 2-25 shows reconstruction activity in this sector by governorate.

## IRRF-funded Activities in the Electricity Sector

Only 58 projects in this sector (9.6%) have yet to begin,<sup>206</sup> and 44% are complete. To date, 63 design/build (D/B) projects valued at \$758 million have been completed and are operational. The 51 ongoing D/B projects valued at \$496 million are expected to be completed by June 2007.<sup>207</sup> All GRD-PCO projects in this sector will be completed by January 2008.<sup>208</sup>

During the reporting period, \$240 million was disbursed in this sector—an increase of 67% from last quarter's \$144 million. More than 80% of the sector's funding has been obligated, and nearly half (48%) of the funding has been expended. Figure 2-26 shows the status of funds in the electricity sector, as of March 29, 2006.

## Key Projects Completed and Underway

The U.S. reconstruction program in the electricity sector has three major types of projects:


- *Generation facilities*, which produce capacity for the power system
- *Transmission networks*, which carry that power throughout the country
- *Distribution networks*, which deliver the transmitted power to local areas, homes, and businesses

## GENERATION

One of the largest IRRF-funded generation projects, the Al-Doura power plant, will add 280 MW to the power grid and serve more than 1.5 million people in the Baghdad area.<sup>209</sup>

Khor Al Zubayr power plant, the other large power-generation facility constructed with IRRF 2 funds, was completed at the end of last

### ONGOING



### COMPLETED




Figure 2-25  
**ELECTRICITY PROJECTS  
BY GOVERNORATE**  
Number of Projects  
Source: IRMS—IRMO Rollup File, 03/31/06




Figure 2-27

**STATUS OF ELECTRICITY PROJECTS**

Number of Projects

Source: IRMS—IRMO Rollup File, 03/31/06



Planned (603)  
\$2.83B





Figure 2-26

**STATUS OF ELECTRICITY FUNDING**

\$ Billions

Source: DoS Iraq Weekly Status Report, 03/29/06



quarter, and the plant is now operational. It is supplying 250 MW of power for the 1.5 million residents of Basrah.<sup>210</sup>

GRD-PCO completed the refurbishment of a turbine at the Nassiriyah power plant, restoring 28 MW of generation capacity at a cost of \$21 million.<sup>211</sup> Additionally, GRD/PCO completed the refurbishment of three gas turbine units, restoring 64.5 MW at the Petrochemical Power Plant.<sup>212</sup>

As the construction component of the power generation program wraps up, the focus is now on improving Iraq's capacity to maintain the plants and continue to develop the sector independently. The execution of the newly awarded long-term Operations and Maintenance (O&M) support contract is critical to preventing the deterioration of the power generation plants.

**TRANSMISSION**

During this reporting period, \$305 million of deferred funds were reinstated to the sector to fund transmission projects in Iraq. This funding will be used to build substations and to supplement existing overhead lines.<sup>213</sup> Eleven transmission projects were started this quarter.<sup>214</sup>

**DISTRIBUTION**

GRD-PCO reports that 46 distribution projects were completed this quarter, and 42 distribution projects started.<sup>215</sup> During this quarter, SIGIR conducted an assessment of the \$3.4 million Erbil City Transformer project. The SIGIR team observed good construction, effective project management, and adequate



ELECTRICITY

sustainment efforts at the project site. If work continues in this fashion, the team concluded that the project will improve electricity service in the area. For a summary of the assessment, see Section 3 of this Report.

### The Outputs of IRRF-funded Electricity Projects

The outputs of U.S. electricity projects are measured by generation capacity added in megawatts. U.S. reconstruction projects have contributed more than 2,700 MW of generation capacity. When all projects are complete, the

United States is expected to have contributed more than 3,700 MW of generation capacity.

Despite the success of U.S. projects, generation capacity now falls below the pre-war level and the goal for summer 2006. Table 2-9 shows the estimated pre-war level and summer goal compared to the current level. It is important to note that the current status of 4,004 MW provides only a snapshot, and production can be influenced by many factors, including weather, security problems, and system maintenance. Table 2-10 compares the summer 2006 goal for generation capacity with cur-

#### CURRENT ELECTRICITY GENERATION CAPACITY VS. PRE-WAR LEVEL (Megawatts)

OUTPUTS METRIC	PRE-WAR LEVEL AS OF MARCH 2003	IRAQ GOAL FOR JULY 2006	CURRENT STATUS AS OF MARCH 28, 2006
Generation Capacity	4,500	6,000	4,004

Sources: Pre-war Level: UN/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, 2003, p. 28. Note: GAO recently reported the pre-war level as 4,300 MW (GAO Report 06-697T, April 25, 2006, p. 19).  
Goal: Joint U.S.-Iraqi Electricity Action Plan, March 12, 2006, p. 2.  
Current Status: IRMO, Weekly Status Report, March 28, 2006.

TABLE 2-9

#### ELECTRICITY GENERATION PROJECT OUTPUTS

IRAQ GOAL FOR JULY 2006	CURRENT U.S. CONTRIBUTION, AS OF MARCH 31, 2006	CURRENT U.S. CONTRIBUTION AS A PERCENTAGE OF JULY 2006 GOAL, AS OF MARCH 31, 2006	TOTAL PLANNED U.S. CONTRIBUTION
6,000 MW	2,710 MW	45%	3,710 MW

Sources:  
Goal: Joint U.S.-Iraqi Electricity Action Plan, March 12, 2006, p. 2.  
Current Status: IRMO, Weekly Status Report, March 14, 2006.  
Current and Total U.S. Contributions: SIGIR Data Call from DoS/NEA-I, March 24, 2006.

TABLE 2-10



rent U.S. contributions and the U.S. goal for contributions.

## Outcomes of IRRF Projects

During this reporting quarter, the “hours of power per day” increased by several hours to exceed pre-war levels countrywide. In Baghdad, this metric continues to lag behind pre-war levels, in part because of a strategic

decision to provide power more equitably throughout the country. Current hours of power per day in Baghdad have been rising to near the 2006 Iraqi goal supported by the U.S.-Iraqi Joing Electricity Action Plan.


A comparison between the current load served and the same quarter last year shows that the load served has increased: for the week ending March 27, 2005, load served was 86,700 MWh.<sup>216</sup> Load served averaged 91,092 MWh per day for the week ending March 28, 2006.<sup>217</sup> However, this is well below the goal of 110,000 MWh.<sup>218</sup> Figure 2-28 shows the weekly average load served during this quarter.

Table 2-11 demonstrates the outcomes of U.S. projects in relation to the pre-war levels.

## Challenges

SIGIR continues to examine the challenges in this sector reported during last quarter’s Report, including rising demand that now exceeds generating capacity. This quarter, SIGIR also looked at O&M in the electricity sector. Other challenges include the lack of a centralized monitoring and control system and a shortage of fuels to operate power plants.<sup>219</sup>

Figure 2-28  
**ELECTRICITY LOAD SERVED**  
Megawatt Hours (MWh)  
Source: IRMO Weekly Status Reports, 12/28/05–03/28/06



## CURRENT OUTCOMES VS. PRE-WAR LEVEL AND GOALS

OUTCOME METRIC	PRE-WAR LEVEL	IRAQ GOAL FOR JULY 2006	CURRENT STATUS AVERAGE OF WEEK ENDING 3/28/06
Iraq Hours of Power/Day	4-8	12	16
Baghdad Hours of Power/Day	16-24	12	8

Sources:  
Pre-War level: Department of State Briefing by U.S. Embassy Baghdad, November 30, 2005.  
Goals: Joint U.S.-Iraqi Electricity Action Plan, March 12, 2006, p. 2.  
Current Status: IRMO, Weekly Status Report, March 28, 2006.

TABLE 2-11



The deteriorated infrastructure in Iraq continues to affect reconstruction efforts in the sector. Infrastructure security also remains a problem. Security in the electricity sector was the subject of SIGIR Audit 06-009, which reviewed the Task Force Shield programs to protect the electric and oil infrastructure. The electricity component of this security program—EPSS—was found to be unsuccessful and “barely got started before it was cancelled.”

### ISING DEMAND

Demand for electricity in Iraq continues to outstrip the total generation capacity by more than 60% (6,429 MW demanded vs. 4,004 generation capacity).<sup>221</sup> Thus, generators are commonly used in Iraqi homes to make up for the shortage. DoS estimates that private generators provide up to 2,000 MW of generating capacity.<sup>2-z</sup>

The surge in demand from pre-war levels stems from a growing economy, fueled by Iraqi purchases of new appliances and electronics and by the subsidized prices charged for electricity by the Iraqi government. According to the World Bank, Iraqis pay less than one cent per kilowatt-hour.<sup>222</sup> This is much lower than rates in other countries in the region: Iranians, Jordanians, and Syrians pay 1.5 to 5 cents per kilowatt-hour.<sup>223</sup> The artificially low rate provides little curb on demand.

Electricity revenues in Iraq also suffer from a collection rate of less than 30%,<sup>221a</sup> partly



Electricity transmission tower

because of inoperable meters and the dangerous work environment.<sup>225</sup> The “collection of revenue is the best method to encourage the efficient use of electricity and thereby reduce the total usage.”<sup>226</sup>

The supply shortage has ramifications for every key infrastructure sector. Water supply stations often require on-site generators to operate. And the oil sector would virtually shut down without power because pump stations, refineries, and injectors cannot function without electricity.



## OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE

SIGIR continues to examine the O&M problem in the electricity sector, where estimates are that the lifespan of a generator in Iraq is 10-25% of the lifespan of properly maintained equipment.<sup>227</sup> The joint action plan for electricity from IRMO and the Iraqi government calls for an increase in generation capacity of 854 MW by July 2006, which will be achieved through new O&M projects and programs.<sup>228</sup> The United States is partnering with the Iraqi government to implement a comprehensive O&M plan.<sup>229</sup> This \$80 million program is part of the joint action plan and will develop the technical capacity of Iraqis, which is vital to the sustainability of the electricity system. The program includes:

- on-site training and mentoring at eight sites
- communication, control, and monitoring of power plants
- training on gas turbine technology<sup>230</sup>

The U.S. government and the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity are concentrating on securing the sustainable operations of completed generation facilities in order to maximize power generation for the summer. The Ministry of Electricity and U.S. government have developed, and are beginning to implement, a coordinated sustainability plan that includes the execution of improved inspections, provision of spare parts and consumables, and regular maintenance for plant equipment. The production of electricity in Iraq will decline unless the plan's objectives are realized and incorporated into the daily operation of Iraqi-controlled facilities.<sup>231</sup>





## STATUS OF THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR

This review updates the status of U.S. reconstruction projects to increase Iraqi oil production and exports, improve natural gas production, and enhance critical fuel-refining capabilities. Project work is designed to maintain major production fields and to repair key facilities and infrastructure.

SIGIR makes these observations about progress in the oil and gas sector:


- Expenditures in the sector increased to 47% of allocated funds this quarter. At the current rate of expenditure, this sector will not be complete until after the end of 2006.
- Oil production, which is at 2.18 million barrels per day (BPD), is below pre-war levels and also below the Ministry of Oil goal of 2.3 million BPD.
- Exports are below pre-war levels and relatively stagnant.
- The reasons for the low production and export levels are the severely deteriorated infrastructure, insurgent attacks, and limited sustainment capability.
- Corruption in the oil and gas sector is a continuing problem that could have devastating effects on both the progress of sector reconstruction and on the overall status of the reconstruction and democracy-building effort in Iraq.

The situation in the oil and gas sector has not changed considerably since the January 2006 Report. Crude oil production climbed back to 2.0 million BPD in early March 2006, having averaged lower output levels in January and February, chiefly because of storage and weather issues in the Persian Gulf. Production throughout March 2006 has steadily increased each week, reaching 2.18 million BPD during the last week of the month.

Although U.S.-funded projects continue to progress in developing the sector, Iraqis are not yet fully benefiting from their nation's enormous oil supply. Security and critical infrastructure challenges have not improved significantly since the last quarter, and allegations of corruption in the Ministry of Oil present a substantial challenge to reconstruction.

Total funding for the oil and gas sector has changed little since last quarter, increasing by nearly \$15 million to \$1.736 billion because of proposed funding increases for the Al Fatah

Figure 2-29  
**OIL AND GAS SECTOR AS A  
 SHARE OF IRRF FUNDS**  
 % of \$18.439 Billion  
 Source: DoS Iraq Weekly Status Report, 03/29/06





crossing and the Infrastructure Sustainment Program.<sup>232</sup> Figure 2-29 shows the current allocation in oil and gas sector funding as a percentage of total IRRF funding.<sup>233</sup>

The total number of planned projects in this sector increased to 180, including 120 Engineering and Procurement (EP) and 60 Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) projects.<sup>234</sup> The EP projects are non-construction, primarily to provide spare parts, training, procurement, and other services. These projects include:

- 57 projects executed by design-build contractors for Iraqi operating companies that worked on construction
- 21 government procurement projects
- 27 area task orders
- 15 capacity-development projects for training Ministry of Oil employees and the personnel of Iraqi operating companies<sup>235</sup>

Table 2-12 shows the completion status for EP and EPC projects as of the end of the quarter. Figure 2-30 shows reconstruction activity in this sector by governorate. Figure 2-31 shows the status of projects by subsector.

### IRRF-funded Activities in the Oil and Gas Sector

Critical oil and gas facilities are nearing completion, and U.S. reconstruction officials hope that construction in the sector will be complete by the end of this year.<sup>236</sup>

During this reporting period, \$170 million was expended—up from the \$110 million expended last quarter—bringing the cumula-

tive total to \$820 million. Though almost 90% of the sector's funding has been obligated, only 47% has been expended. The next quarter is expected to have the largest project completion rate, assuming that project schedules hold. If the pace of expenditures for the last six months continues, construction will not be complete until well into next year. Figure 2-32 shows the status of funds in the oil and gas sector.

### Key Oil and Gas Projects Completed and Underway

The Al Basrah Oil Terminal (ABOT) task order was 30% complete as of April 6, 2006,<sup>237</sup> comprising 13 individual projects scoped that will provide a total crude-oil loading capacity of 6 million BPD.<sup>238</sup> PCO reported to SIGIR that, as of March 31, 2006, 3 of the 13 projects had been completed,<sup>239</sup> upgrading the safety, effectiveness, and efficiency of loading crude oil onto tankers. This refurbishment helped increase the load-out capacity of one portion of the terminal to its capacity of 3 million BPD.<sup>240</sup>

The Iraqi Ministry of Oil is beginning to work on a system to meter (and thus measure) all oil production and the flow of petroleum products to foreign markets for export. This metering initiative will complement the metering project being executed by the United States at ABOT,<sup>241</sup> which is 29.9% complete.<sup>242</sup>

Although the Al Fatah pipeline crossing initiative in northern Iraq has suffered repeated delays associated with security, logistical, and weather problems, it is now approaching completion. Its estimated completion date is May 2006, and the project is 96% complete,



## EP vs. EPC PROJECT STATUS SUMMARY

TYPE	TOTAL PROJECTS	NOT STARTED	ONGOING	COMPLETED
EP <sup>1</sup>	120	20	72	28
EPC <sup>2</sup>	60	5	42	13

Sources: <sup>1</sup>GRD Bi-weekly Situation Report, April 3, 2006, p. 9; <sup>2</sup> Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS), as of March 31, 2006.

TABLE 2-12

Figure 2-31

### STATUS OF OIL AND GAS PROJECTS

Number of Projects

Source: IRMS—IRMO Rollup File, 03/31/06





Figure 2-32

### STATUS OF OIL AND GAS FUNDS

\$ Billions

Source: DoS Iraq Weekly Status Report, 03/29/06



### Status of Projects by Subsector





Figure 2-30

### OIL AND GAS PROJECTS BY GOVERNORATE


Number of Projects

Source: IRMS—IRMO Rollup File, 03/31/06

#### ONGOING



#### COMPLETED





Loading oil tankers at the Al Basrah Oil Terminal

with \$64 million of work accomplished out of a budget of \$67 million.<sup>243</sup> Al Fatah connects crude oil and natural gas distribution from the northern oil fields in Kirkuk to the Baiji Refinery and power plants. The crossing also carries oil through the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP), the northern route for oil exports. The project is expected to add an additional 300,000 BPD of capacity to the ITP.<sup>244</sup>

At the Qarmat Ali water injection plant, a task order was initiated to provide treated water for injection wells to maintain reservoir pressure and help sustain production levels in one of the largest southern fields.<sup>246</sup> The project will result in increased oil production capacity of 200,000 BPD. Phase I was completed in November 2005, and Phase II is scheduled for

completion by December 2006.<sup>247</sup>

GRD-PCO also reported progress on 14 Gas-Oil Separation Plants (GOSPs) being refurbished throughout Iraq.<sup>250</sup> GOSPs separate associated gas, water, and salts from crude pumped from the well. The GOSPs already completed in northern Iraq have added 300,000 BPD of crude oil production capacity.<sup>251</sup> The 14 refurbished GOSPs are expected to have the capacity to treat 1 million BPD of crude oil.<sup>252</sup> The GOSP projects are expected to be completed by September 2006.<sup>254</sup>

According to GRD-PCO, five Natural Gas Liquids/Liquefied Petroleum Gas (NGL/LPG) processing plants and storage facilities are currently undergoing refurbishment,<sup>255</sup> with the objective of producing 3,000 tons per day



Liquid petroleum gas plant at Khor Zubair

(TPD) of LPG to meet domestic demand. These projects will be completed by September 2006.<sup>256</sup> The SR3R Compressor Station in Basrah, which was 57% complete as of mid-March, is considered a critical production component toward reaching the LPG goal of 3,000 TPD.<sup>257</sup>

### Outputs of IRRF-funded Oil and Gas Projects

Progress has been made in improving outputs in this sector, but since reconstruction began 95 oil and gas projects have been descoped or cancelled. Some of these include projects that address flared gas recovery, expansion of existing storage capacity, and pipeline repairs and upgrades.<sup>258</sup> Projects were descoped or

cancelled because they were not required to achieve the oil program objectives or because the Ministry of Oil took control of them.

### Outcomes of IRRF-funded Oil and Gas Projects

There are at least two ways to measure overall progress in reconstructing the oil and gas sector:

- production capacity, which measures how many barrels of crude oil can be pumped on a daily basis
- daily production levels

Table 2-13 presents both of these metrics and weighs them against their respective pre-war levels and overall U.S. and Iraqi goals.

The Iraqi budget assumes a crude oil pro-



duction average of 2.3 million BPD for 2006,<sup>261</sup> gradually increasing production to hit 2.5 million BPD by the end of this year. For much of 2006, however, oil production has remained below 2.0 million BPD because of logistical bottlenecks in the south caused by rough seas and a lack of storage, which forced wells to be shut down. Production crept above 2.0 million BPD in March 2006.

Insurgent attacks account for a significant proportion of diminished output in the north, particularly when insurgents target crude pipelines from the Kirkuk oil fields to Baiji. This results in decreased production of crude oil, which impacts the production of refined fuel and thus the generation of electricity.

Northern production averaged 424,000 BPD in 2004 and 312,000 BPD in 2005.<sup>262</sup> Current production capacity for the northern fields is estimated to be about 600,000 BPD.<sup>263</sup> Southern crude oil production has a greater oil production capacity, amounting to approximately 1.9 million BPD.<sup>265</sup> It provides the majority of Iraqi national production, averaging 1.83 million BPD in 2004 and 1.77 million BPD in 2005.<sup>266</sup> Figure 2-33 shows a timeline of oil production levels.

## EXPORTS

The oil and gas sector remains the economic mainstay of the Iraqi economy: crude oil exports account for about 94% of Iraq's national income. In 2005, oil exports were estimated to generate \$23.5 billion in revenue,<sup>268</sup> but this

positive outcome had more to do with high crude prices than production levels. Exports suffered a variety of setbacks throughout 2005, including insurgent attacks in the north, bad weather, low storage capacity in the south,<sup>269</sup> slower than planned reconstruction, and allegations of corruption in Iraqi ministries. Revenues from oil exports in 2006 are forecast to reach approximately \$28 billion by the end of this year.<sup>270</sup> Figure 2-34 shows a timeline of monthly exports and associated revenues.

However, exports decreased from a monthly average of 1.37 million BPD in February 2006 to 1.34 million BPD in March, mostly because of poor weather conditions at ABOT.<sup>271</sup> Overall, average losses in potential export earnings between October and December 2005 were approximately \$90 million per month, and these losses continued into 2006.

## REFINING

Domestic refining of critical refined fuels has been limited, particularly regarding domestic fuels. The causes for unstable refining capacity include: post-war accelerated product demand, insurgent attacks on critical oil infrastructure, dilapidated infrastructure, weak operations, and overdue maintenance.<sup>273</sup>

Unstable production of critical refined fuels has affected Iraqi access to domestic commodities like gasoline and kerosene, and adversely impacted other sectors. Most notably, the electric sector has suffered many fuel shortages that have caused blackouts.<sup>275</sup> During these



### CURRENT OIL AND GAS PROJECT OUTCOMES VS. PRE-WAR LEVELS AND GOALS

OUTCOMES METRICS	PRE-WAR LEVEL (2003) <sup>259</sup>	CURRENT STATUS	U.S. END- STATE GOAL	IRAQ END- STATE GOAL
Oil Production Capacity (million BPD)	2.6	2.5	2.8	2.8
Oil Production (Actual) (million BPD)	2.58	2.18 <sup>c</sup>	2.8 <sup>a</sup>	2.3 <sup>b</sup>
Export Levels (million BPD)	Not Available	1.32	2.2 <sup>a</sup>	1.65 <sup>b</sup>
Natural Gas Production (MSCFD)	Not Available	600	800	Not Available
LPG (TPD)	Not Available	1,200	3,000	Not Available

<sup>a</sup>According to a DoS energy expert, these targets are not annual averages.

<sup>b</sup>According to a DoS energy expert, these targets are annual averages.

<sup>c</sup>March 27–April 2, DoS *Iraq Weekly Status Report* p. 22

Sources: DoS *Iraq Weekly Status Report*, DOE Country Analysis Brief, meetings and interviews with SIGIR, DoS briefing by U.S. Embassy-Baghdad Oil Metrics (11/30/2005), and “The Oil Story of Iraq,” by PCO (3/2006)

TABLE 2-13

blackouts, water and sewage processing facilities must rely on on-site electricity generators. Figure 2-35 shows days of stock for critical refined fuels since January 2005.

The low domestic production levels of critical refined fuels have led to high demand for costly imports from abroad, most notably from Turkey. Problems associated with the Iraqi government making import payments on time have led Turkish suppliers to refuse to continue delivering these products until being guaranteed payment.<sup>277</sup> According to a SIGIR interview with a U.S. government oil expert, no new truck shipments have loaded from Turkey since January 21, 2006. Fuel trucks that were waiting to enter Iraq were allowed to proceed as scheduled; the last of these trucks reached their destinations in Iraq in early March. On February 15, 2006, an initial agreement was reached, but only two payments were subse-

quently made to Turkish exporters, and the dispute continues.

### Challenges

The World Bank reports that the short-term outlook for a significant increase in oil production and exports in Iraq remains uncertain. Maintaining current production levels would require new annual investments of at least \$1 billion.<sup>278</sup> These projections indicate the difficulty ahead in the effort to reach both Iraqi- and U.S.-stated goals for the sector.


### SECURITY

The World Bank reports that “oil production and exports remain heavily constrained by rundown facilities and sabotage.”<sup>279</sup> Attacks on oil infrastructure remain a serious problem, despite attempts to bolster infrastructure secu-



OIL AND GAS

Figure 2-33  
**CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION**  
 (Millions of BPD)  
 Source: IRMO



rity forces. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for guarding pipelines, while the OPF, under the control of the Ministry of Oil, is tasked with guarding all other Iraqi oil industry assets.<sup>280</sup> SIGIR's initial assessment (SIGIR 06-009) of programs to train and deploy Iraqi oil protection forces indicated that they have been largely unsuccessful. See Sector 3 of this Report for a full discussion.

Attacks on the northern pipeline have reduced northern oil exports, which account for approximately 15-20% of all oil exports.<sup>281</sup> These attacks have placed a greater production burden on the southern fields and facilities, which are constrained by limited storage facilities. For instance, on February 1, 2006, insurgents attacked a new desulphurization plant in Kirkuk, which reportedly has a capacity of 1 million BPD. An older plant was brought online to make up for the loss, but it has a capacity of only 500,000 BPD, resulting in a

substantial drop in northern production.<sup>282</sup>


According to the World Bank, the "volatility of oil export revenues may hamper the prospects of Iraq's reconstruction program."<sup>283</sup> Moreover, the repositioning of financial resources within the sector to address security concerns has had a deleterious effect on overall oil and gas development.<sup>284</sup>

## SUSTAINMENT

The sustainment of U.S.-funded projects continues to be an important aspect of successfully developing the oil and gas sector. SIGIR reported last quarter that U.S. reconstruction agencies have launched a variety of programs aimed at bolstering capacity development and improving operations and maintenance practices at oil and gas facilities. Reconstruction officials have also launched a number of training courses to address petroleum refining,



Figure 2-34  
**OIL EXPORTS VS. REVENUE RAISED**  
 Source: DoS Iraq Weekly Status Reports,  
 06/2003 – 03/2006



project management, distribution and marketing, leadership, human resource management, and financial methods.<sup>285</sup>

decision to not focus more heavily on natural gas and refinery refurbishment is also becoming a sector reconstruction challenge effort.

### DETERIORATED INFRASTRUCTURE

In the January 2006 Report, SIGIR identified the deteriorated state of Iraq's oil infrastructure as a significant factor slowing the progress of restoring oil production.

The decision to not prioritize the refurbishment of existing storage facilities or construct new ones, for instance, has affected production, particularly in the south, where exports are impacted by external variables like bad weather in the Gulf, which has lowered production rates and led to harmful crude oil re-injection practices. The decision to descope or cancel a project related to expanding existing storage capacity is potentially problematic given the limited existing storage capacity. The


### ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION

In 2005, Transparency International ranked Iraq 136<sup>th</sup> worst of 159 countries that suffer from corruption.<sup>287</sup> In the oil and gas sector, in particular, continued market distortions encourage illicit activity and corruption. These market distortions are driven primarily by large government subsidies and state domination of the economy.<sup>288</sup>

According to one analysis, "corruption has diverted much of Iraq's oil revenue from reconstruction to the bank accounts of government officials and their friends in organized crime."<sup>289</sup> A high-ranking reconstruction official stated in mid-February 2006 that corruption is particularly troubling in the oil and



Figure 2-35  
**INVENTORIES OF CRITICAL REFINED FUELS**  
 Days of Stock  
 Source: DoS *Iraq Weekly Status Reports*,  
 01/2004 – 03/2006



gas sector precisely because of oil's economic significance and the lack of an effective and extensive metering system to gauge how much is being pumped relative to what is getting to market.<sup>290</sup> Moreover, the insurgency has reportedly been partly funded by corrupt activities within Iraq and from skimming profits from black marketers.<sup>291</sup>

The Iraqi government took steps in December 2005 to dismantle the fuel subsidy system. This is a positive start toward reducing the incentives for such corruption within the Ministry of Oil, as well as reducing smuggling.

Additionally, continued assistance to support the Commission on Public Integrity, the Board of Supreme Audit, and the Ministry of Oil's Inspector General can help mitigate the corruption in the sector.



## STATUS OF THE WATER SECTOR

This review updates the status of U.S. reconstruction projects in Iraq to increase access to clean water and sewerage services and improve water resource management capabilities. SIGIR makes the following observations about progress in the water sector:


- The sector currently has allocations of \$2.13 billion. (See Figure 2-39.) Almost all projects in this sector have started, and nearly two-thirds are complete. However, only 42% of allocated funds have been expended, with the most expensive projects still to be completed.
- More than \$600 million is yet to be obligated in the water sector.
- The focus in this sector is now on completing projects and ensuring that they are sustained. The Water Sector Sustainment Program (WSSP), new in 2006, provides

\$110 million for sustainment activities.

- Currently, IRMO metrics show that 3.0 million more people have access to clean water, and an additional 5.1 million people have access to sanitation services since the 2003 conflict because of U.S. projects.

During this reporting period, \$202 million was expended, bringing the cumulative total to \$892 million for projects in this sector. Currently, 427 of the 676 total local projects are complete. In addition, 3 nationwide projects have been completed, and 17 nationwide projects are currently ongoing in the water sector. Figure 2-37 shows reconstruction activity in this sector by governorate.

Figure 2-36  
**WATER SECTOR AS A SHARE OF IRRF FUNDS**  
 % of \$18,439 Billion  
 Source: IRMS-IRMO Rollup File, 03/31/06





## IRRF-funded Activities in the Water Sector

At the end of this reporting period, 63% of projects were complete. Water sector funding is not expected to be fully expended until 2008.<sup>295</sup> All USAID projects will be completed by August 2006.<sup>296</sup> Figure 2-38 shows the status of projects in the water sector.

During this quarter, \$202 million was disbursed—a sharp drop from last quarter’s \$295 million in expenditures. Although more than 70% of the sector’s funding has been obligated and nearly two-thirds of projects are complete, only 42% has been expended, as of March 29, 2006. Figure 2-39 shows the status of funds in the water sector.

## Key Water Projects Completed and Underway

SIGIR reported last quarter on the December 2005 insurgent attack on a convoy at the Erbil Water Treatment Plant project.<sup>297</sup> The project will now be delayed beyond the original completion date of April 2006.<sup>298</sup> The \$193 million project was 94% complete at the end of March, with final completion expected by June 2006. The plant will provide 144,000 cubic meters (m<sup>3</sup>) of water per day, which will serve 333,000 residents in Erbil and the surrounding areas.<sup>299</sup>

The Nassriya Water Treatment Plant is now 70% complete.<sup>300</sup> The completion date was originally estimated to be June 2006,<sup>301</sup> but was recently pushed back to October 2006.<sup>302</sup> The setback is attributed to tribal conflicts, a shortage of trained workers, the replacement of

an unqualified subcontractor, logistics delays at the Iraq-Kuwait border, foundation problems, and schedule and safety issues at some of the water tank construction sites.<sup>303</sup> Valued at \$234 million, the completed water treatment plant will provide 240,000 m<sup>3</sup> of water per day serving more than 555,000 people.<sup>304</sup>

122 of the 157 Small Water Rehabilitation Program (PW-90) projects have now been completed; these projects, valued at \$63 million, will benefit 1.65 million Iraqis.<sup>305</sup> An additional \$50 million for small water projects (PW-99 and PW-101) has been earmarked for an estimated 100 new projects.<sup>306</sup>

A \$30.1 million rehabilitation of the Baghdad water main was completed this quarter, which will provide better service reliability to the people of Baghdad.<sup>307</sup> During this quarter, GRD-PCO cancelled the Halabja Water Supply project (\$1.9 million) and descoped four projects valued at \$17.2 million.<sup>308</sup>

Progress continues to be made on the joint Iraqi-USAID initiative for developing a national Strategy for Water and Land Resources for Iraq, the first nationwide water resource master plan completed for the country since 1982. The 14-month Phase 1 of the plan includes data collection and analysis related to water resources, land use, water quality, and crop requirements. The overall goal of the strategy is “to provide a sound and comprehensive basis for the management and development of Iraq’s water and land resources over the next few decades, together with a framework and methodology for ongoing updates to the planning process.”<sup>309</sup>



Figure 2-37  
**WATER PROJECTS BY GOVERNORATE**  
 NUMBER OF PROJECTS  
 Source: IRMS-IRMO Rollup File, 03/31/2006




Figure 2-39  
**STATUS OF WATER FUNDS**  
 \$ Billions  
 Source: DoS Iraq Weekly Status Report, 03/29/06






Figure 2-38  
**STATUS OF WATER PROJECTS**  
 Number of Projects  
 Source: IRMS-IRMO Rollup File, 03/31/06





Water treatment plant at Nassriya

### Outputs of IRRF-funded Projects

A 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report concluded that better performance metrics and indicators are needed in the water sector to evaluate U.S. reconstruction efforts. To that end, SIGIR now reports a new output metric, developed by IRMO in cooperation with Iraqi experts, that estimates cubic meters per day of restored or new capacity. With this new metric, additional system capacity for each U.S. project is calculated by taking the difference between the actual system capacity before implementation and the capacity of the system after reconstruction.<sup>311</sup>

To date, the United States has repaired or rehabilitated 19 potable water treatment facilities and 9 centralized sewage treatment facilities.<sup>313</sup> The outputs of these IRRF-funded projects appear in Table 2-14, which shows the current capacity created by completed U.S. water projects and the anticipated capacity at the end-state, when all planned U.S. projects are completed.

### Outcomes of IRRF-funded Projects in the Water Sector

There are a range of estimates of the number of Iraqis who had access to water before the war. Before the first Gulf War, Iraq had an efficient water system that was accessed by 95% of the urban population and 75% of the rural population.<sup>314</sup> In 2000, the UN and World Bank estimated that roughly 19 million Iraqis had access to water. During the build-up to the 2003 conflict, the continuing sanctions caused a steady decline in access. Last quarter, SIGIR reported that 12.9 million people had access to water before the war.<sup>315</sup> Other estimates of pre-war coverage range from 9.5 to 14 million people.<sup>316</sup>

It is difficult to measure accurately the total number of Iraqis with access to clean water and sanitation services, but IRMO's new outcome metric to measure the number of people who benefit from U.S. projects has focused the assessment on value added by U.S. projects. This metric for potable water service includes a



Table 2-14

## CURRENT U.S. WATER PROJECT OUTPUTS AND ANTICIPATED END-STATE

OUTPUTS (Maximum additional system capacity)	CURRENT STATUS AS OF 03/21/06	ANTICIPATED END-STATE (APRIL 2007)
Potable water	1.1 million cubic meters per day	2.5 million cubic meters per day
Sanitary sewage	1.2 million cubic meters per day	1.2 million cubic meters per day

Sources: IRMO, SIGIR Data Request, received via email on March 24, 2006, p.6.

physical loss factor of 60%, and the metric for sanitation service includes an infiltration factor of 20%. Table 2-15 summarizes data on the outcomes of U.S. water and sanitation projects.

## Challenges to Sustainment

SIGIR continues to track the progress of sustainment efforts for U.S. water sector projects. Last quarter, SIGIR noted that a 2005 GAO report found that more than a quarter of reviewed completed projects were not operating at all or were operating at a lower capacity than expected. Since that time, the Water Sector Sustainment Program (WSSP), a new \$110 million sustainment project has been initiated

to address that problem.<sup>317</sup> WSSP builds on two other major sustainment programs:

- USAID's Water Sector Institutional Strengthening Program (\$25 million)<sup>318</sup>
- GRD-PCO's Ministry of Municipalities and Public Water Resources (MMPW) Management Systems training program (\$14.5 million)<sup>319</sup>

According to GRD-PCO, WSSP will include both operations and maintenance support and assistance and capacity development activities. It will ensure that U.S.-funded assets are operated effectively in the near term, while creating favorable conditions for sustained operation by

Table 2-15

## CURRENT OUTCOMES OF U.S. PROJECTS AND ANTICIPATED END-STATE

OUTCOME METRIC (Additional people potentially served at a standard level of service, considering actual system conditions)	CURRENT STATUS 03/21/06	ANTICIPATED END-STATE
Potable water	3.0 million people	8.4 million people
Sanitary sewage	5.1 million people	5.3 million people

Sources: IRMO, SIGIR Data Request, received via email on March 24, 2006, p.6; IRMO, Information Memorandum from Acting IRMO Director to Deputy Chief of Mission, April 19, 2006.



the MMPW, the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR), and Baghdad Amanat (Mayoralty).<sup>320</sup> Capacity-development activities conducted through WSSP will be directly related to sustaining U.S.-funded assets and will include:

- training
- equipment
- technical assistance
- mentoring in the areas of project management
- O&M planning and budgeting
- maintenance management systems
- inventory and warehousing
- vehicle fleet management
- infrastructure protection<sup>321</sup>

The Capacity Development Initiative (\$11.8 million) is training the technical and managerial staff of the MMPW and MWR in budget-

ing, water quality, project management, utility master planning, and other management skills. This program is scheduled to be finished at the end of this quarter.<sup>322</sup>

Project Partnership Agreements (PPAs) have also been used in the water sector to develop Iraqi capacity. PPAs are agreements between GRD-PCO and the responsible Iraqi organization to offer Iraqis the opportunity to award, administer, and oversee U.S. funded projects. PPAs will be used for a small number of water projects—including the construction of the Baladrooz Water Treatment Plant—to further build capacity in the MMPW and the MWR.<sup>324</sup>

## CONTRACTS UPDATE

During this quarter, \$944 million of the IRRF was obligated, increasing the cumulative total to \$16.3 billion.<sup>325</sup> As required under Public Law (P.L.) 108-106, as amended, SIGIR lists IRRF contracting actions through the SIGIR Iraq Reconstruction Information System (SIRIS). For a complete list of all IRRF-funded contracting actions received by SIGIR, see Appendix G on the Report CD.

No single U.S. government information system currently captures comprehensive project, contract, and financial information about Iraq reconstruction. To meet its statutory mandate, SIGIR designed and built SIRIS as a repository for all project, contract, and financial data on Iraq reconstruction. SIRIS serves as a warehouse of Iraq reconstruction data from all of the organizations authorized to obligate IRRF monies. The executing agencies feed contracting actions into SIRIS (subject to later validation) from facsimile copies of the source contract documents.

Since the January 2006 Report, SIGIR recorded 407 new contracting actions from Joint Contracting Command-Iraq (JCC-I/A), which obligated more than \$89 million. These contracting actions include modifications to existing contracts, as well as new task orders issued and contracts awarded. Of the \$89 million, more than \$5 million were IRRF obligations issued in 61 new contracting actions. Most of the contracting actions were funded

by the ISFF—179 actions obligating more than \$47 million.

To date, SIGIR has received 4,044 contracting actions into SIRIS, obligating \$12.8 billion. Of those actions, 1,677 have been funded by IRRF for obligations of more than \$5.3 billion.

Currently, no other U.S. information system tracks the \$16.3 billion in IRRF obligations. GRD-PCO plans to develop the capability as part of its newly integrated Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS). See Section 3 for the audit, “Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs: The Evolution of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System.”

### Competition and Contracting Action Analysis

Analysis of SIRIS contract data uses two parameters: the total number of contracting actions and the total dollar value of contracting actions.

During reconstruction in Iraq, several acquisition strategies were implemented based on project requirements and constraints. For the first two quarters of FY 2006, contracting actions were awarded using primarily full and open competition. Table 2-16 lists the total value of contracting actions by competition type.

For FY 2003, several projects were generally broader in scope and were therefore funded by

contracts with flexible terms. Indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts have these flexible terms: they are awarded based on the total ceiling value that a contractor may receive. The contractor receives payment only for work on task orders issued under the overall IDIQ contract.

Beginning in FY 2005, the method of solicitation shifted from issuing task orders under large “umbrella” contracts to competi-

tive, supply-and-build direct contracts. Table 2-17 delineates, by fiscal year, the increased gap between the total number of task orders and contracts issued. Table 2-18 breaks out contracting actions by contracting office. For the current fiscal year, contracting actions have been primarily managed by the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A).

## TOTAL VALUE OF CONTRACTING ACTIONS BY COMPETITION TYPE, AS OF MARCH 31, 2006 (IN MILLIONS)

COMPETITION TYPE	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006 QUARTER 1	FY 2006 QUARTER 2	TOTAL
Full & Open	\$4,336.85	\$22,964.55	\$1,064.37	\$119.86	\$41.45	\$28,527.07
Sole Source	8,578.54	1,302.64	0.00	0.00	0.00	\$9,881.18
Not Available	69.32	1,468.18	207.74	28.04	1.51	\$1,774.79
Limited Competition	480.01	729.25	39.40	0.00	0.00	\$1,248.65
Set-aside Small Business	29.57	172.60	5.35	0.00	0.00	\$207.52
Small Disadvantaged	112.70	19.52	0.00	0.00	0.00	\$132.22
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>13,606.99</i>	<i>26,656.73</i>	<i>1,316.85</i>	<i>147.90</i>	<i>42.96</i>	<i>\$41,771.44</i>
Dollars out of Date Range	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	\$141.85
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$13,606.99</b>	<b>\$26,656.73</b>	<b>1,316.85</b>	<b>\$147.90</b>	<b>\$42.96</b>	<b>\$41,913.29</b>

Note: The values above represent the potential “ceiling value” of contracts.

Table 2-16

## ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTING ACTIONS BY COMPETITION TYPE, AS OF MARCH 31, 2006

CONTRACTING ACTION	FY 2003		FY 2004		FY 2005		FY 2006	
	QUANTITY	% OF TOTAL	QUANTITY	% OF TOTAL	QUANTITY	% OF TOTAL	QUANTITY	% OF TOTAL
Contracts	32	53.33%	189	34.18%	1428	82.45%	371	81.72%
Task Orders	28	46.67%	364	65.82%	304	17.55%	83	18.28%

Department of State, Iraq Weekly Status, January 4, 2006, and March 29, 2006

Table 2-17

## ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTING ACTIONS BY CONTRACTING OFFICE, AS OF MARCH 31, 2006

CONTRACTING OFFICE	NUMBER OF CONTRACTING ACTIONS	% OF TOTAL CONTRACTING ACTIONS	TOTAL VALUE (IN MILLIONS)	% OF TOTAL CONTRACT VALUE
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers	220	5.44%	\$13,572.16	32.38%
Defense Contract Management Agency	888	21.96%	\$7,001.84	16.71%
Coalition Provision Authority	331	8.18%	\$5,555.47	13.25%
U.S. Department of State	12	0.30%	\$5,332.80	12.72%
U.S. Agency for International Development	56	1.38%	\$4,000.64	9.55%
NAVFAC	4	0.10%	\$1,701.34	4.06%
Projects and Contracting Office	1199	29.65%	\$1,031.35	2.46%
AMC	13	0.32%	\$666.59	1.59%
Joint Contracting Command Iraq-Afghanistan	1155	28.56%	\$558.00	1.33%
DCCW	44	1.09%	\$404.82	0.97%
HQ JMC	1	0.02%	\$303.53	0.72%
Pentagon Renovation Office	4	0.10%	\$297.58	0.71%
Ordinance and Engineering	5	0.12%	\$290.80	0.69%
NRCC General Support Division	10	0.25%	\$251.04	0.60%
Defense Contracting Command	2	0.05%	\$191.11	0.46%
U.S. Army Tank-automotive Armaments Command	24	0.59%	\$178.41	0.43%
AFCEE	10	0.25%	\$172.75	0.41%
Acquisition and Assistance Office	1	0.02%	\$119.07	0.28%
Communications Electronics Command	1	0.02%	\$75.00	0.18%
SPAWAR Systems Center	6	0.15%	\$60.87	0.15%
Army Contracting Agency	7	0.17%	\$46.04	0.11%
DITCO	16	0.40%	\$42.11	0.10%
Defense Information Systems Agency	11	0.27%	\$30.13	0.07%
Other	24	0.59%	\$29.84	0.07%
<b>Total</b>	<b>4044</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$41,913.29</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

TABLE 2-18



## COST TO COMPLETE

Cost-to-complete (CTC) data helps to identify reconstruction sectors that are under-funded and helps to avoid exhausting budgets before project completion. U.S. agencies executing reconstruction projects are mandated by law to produce reliable cost-to-complete data. To do so, agencies must compare the amount budgeted for a project with current estimates of the final costs of the project to determine if there is a variance. This metric helps determine whether a project will run over its budget.

SIGIR reported on efforts to develop CTC data in its January 27, 2006 audit, “Methodologies for Reporting Cost-to-complete Estimates.” In the audit, SIGIR identified several challenges to consolidated reporting of the costs to complete projects, making several recommendations to U.S. reconstruction agency management. Table 2-19 provides the approximate consolidation of data reported by USAID and GRD-PCO into SIGIR progress report sectors. However, several issues prevent a clear accounting of the cost to complete projects in each sector:

- For some sectors (electricity, water, transportation and communications, and health care), the reported variance does not equal the mathematical difference between the authorized amount and the estimate at completion (EAC). This discrepancy occurs in both the GRD-PCO and USAID reports.
- For some sectors (electricity, water, transportation and communications, and health care), the variance reported in the Project Assessment Report (PAR) does not equal the mathematical difference between the authorized amount and the EAC. This discrepancy occurs because USAID uses an internally generated number—Project Identification Form (PIF)—in place of authorized amount in calculating variance.
- The values in the sector authorized amount field do not match the allocated (authorized) amounts for any sector reported in the April 2006 DoS *Section 2207 Report*. GRD-PCO and USAID’s explanation is that they report only construction projects, and they have deemed some projects to be non-construction, even in predominantly construction sectors.

As the reconstruction program moves toward completion in 2006-2007, SIGIR finds that the lack of consistent CTC data makes it impossible to accurately estimate the real costs to complete remaining Iraq reconstruction projects and programs. Thus, SIGIR cannot determine whether the remaining IRRF funds are sufficient to complete the U.S. reconstruction projects that are currently underway or those yet to start.

CONSOLIDATED IRRF COST-TO-COMPLETE REPORTS  
GRD-PCO AND USAID PROJECTS, AS OF MARCH 31, 2006  
(MILLIONS)

Sector	Authorized Amount	Estimate at Completion (EAC)
Electricity	\$3,605	\$3,520
Water	1,783	1,744
Oil and Gas	1,333	1,341
Security and Justice	1,059	1,022
Transportation and Communications	402	353
Democracy, Education, and Private Sector Development	111	109
Health Care	421	426

Note: Dollar totals are grouped by SIGIR-defined sectors.

Table 2-19

## SOURCES OF FUNDING FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

SIGIR is required to report on the oversight of, and accounting for, funds expended in Iraq relief and reconstruction, under P.L. 108-106, as amended. Three primary funding sources support reconstruction and relief activities: U.S. appropriated funds, international donor funds, and Iraqi funds.

To date, U.S. appropriated funds total more than \$31.9 billion, including:

- \$2.44 billion of reconstruction and relief funding authorized in April 2003 (IRRF 1)
- \$18.439 billion of reconstruction and relief funding authorized in November 2003 (IRRF 2)
- \$5.391 billion of funding approved in May 2005 to support the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior security forces (ISFF)
- 16 additional reconstruction and relief programs totaling \$5.63 billion

As of March 31, 2006, international donor pledges totaled \$14.7 billion—\$13.6 billion pledged at the 2003 Madrid Conference on Reconstruction in Iraq, and \$.98 billion in post-


Madrid pledges. About 25% of these pledges—\$3.5 billion—have been expended.

Iraqi funds include vested and seized funds, the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), and the Iraq Capital Budget. Iraqi funds have been an important source for relief and reconstruction efforts, particularly during the CPA's tenure. As of March 31, 2006, these funds total \$31.5 billion, including:

- vested (frozen) funds of \$1.72 billion
- seized funds, including confiscated cash and property, of just less than \$1 billion
- DFI funds, drawn primarily from oil proceeds and repatriated funds (more than 55% of the overall total Iraqi funds)
- budgeted Iraqi funding of \$14.762 billion, since 2004 (although much less has actually been expended)

Figure 2-40 provides an overview of all sources of Iraq reconstruction funding. More details are provided in Appendices B, C, and D.

Figure 2-40  
**SOURCES OF IRAQ RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING—\$81.1 BILLION**  
 \$ Billions



### **U.S. Appropriated Funding**

Since the 2003 conflict in Iraq, the U.S. Congress has passed six bills to appropriate \$31.907 billion for Iraq reconstruction. As of mid-April 2006, the Congress was considering legislation that could add \$8.57 billion to this amount.

The largest funding activities associated with reconstruction were the two Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds (IRRF 1 and IRRF 2), created under P.L 109-11 and P.L 108-106 in 2003. As of April 2006, IRRF appropriations account for nearly two-thirds of the entire U.S. effort for reconstruction.

During the past three years, 19 funds have supported the rebuilding effort, principally administered by DoD, DoS, and USAID. These funds range from infrastructure development to refugee and migration assistance.

See Table 2-20 for a list of current U.S. appropriations for reconstruction and pending requests.

## U.S. APPROPRIATED FUNDS

FUNDING MECHANISM	EMERGENCY WARTIME SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2003	EMERGENCY APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR THE DEFENSE AND RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, 2004	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2005	EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR DEFENSE, THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR, AND TSUNAMI RELIEF, 2005	APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FY 2006	APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FY 2006	TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS	FY 2006 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST	FY 2007 BUDGET REQUEST (DoS/DoD)	TOTAL REQUESTS
	PL 108-11	PL 108-106	PL 108-287	PL 109-13	PL 109-148	PL 109-102				
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 2)	16-Apr-03	6-Nov-03	5-Aug-04	11-May-05	4-Jan-05	4-Jan-05	\$18,439,000,000			
		\$18,439,000,000								
Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF)				\$5,391,000,000			\$5,391,000,000	\$3,703,000,000		\$3,703,000,000
Diplomatic and Consular Programs <sup>1</sup>	\$35,800,000		\$665,000,000	\$666,300,000			\$1,367,100,000	\$1,497,500,000	\$65,000,000	\$1,562,500,000
Economic Support Fund (ESF)					\$60,390,000		\$60,390,000	\$1,489,000,000	\$478,770,000	\$1,967,770,000
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 1)	\$2,475,000,000						\$2,475,000,000			
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)		\$140,000,000	\$718,000,000		\$375,000,000		\$1,233,000,000	\$378,000,000		\$378,000,000
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) <sup>2</sup>		\$908,000,000					\$908,000,000			
Department of State, International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (DoS/INL)	\$25,000,000						\$25,000,000	\$107,700,000	\$254,600,000	\$362,300,000
New Iraqi Army <sup>3</sup>		\$127,500,000	\$210,000,000				\$337,500,000			
Assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan Military and Security Forces <sup>3,e</sup>					\$425,000,000		\$425,000,000			
Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund (NRRRF)	\$489,300,000						\$489,300,000			
USAID Administrative Expenses	\$21,000,000			\$24,400,000			\$45,400,000	\$119,600,000		\$119,600,000
International Disaster Assistance	\$143,800,000						\$143,800,000			
Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CINC Initiative Fund) <sup>4</sup>	\$29,750,000	\$12,750,000	\$21,250,000	\$21,250,000	\$21,250,000		\$106,250,000	\$21,250,000	\$21,250,000	\$42,500,000
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) <sup>4</sup>		\$75,000,000					\$75,000,000	\$24,000,000		\$24,000,000
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid <sup>4</sup>		\$17,000,000					\$17,000,000			
International Affairs Technical Assistance								\$13,000,000		\$13,000,000
Legal Activities and U.S. Marshals (Salaries and Expenses)								\$5,500,000		\$5,500,000

FUNDING MECHANISM	EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2003	EMERGENCY APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR THE DEFENSE AND FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, 2004	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2005	EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR DEFENSE, THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR, AND TSUNAMI RELIEF, 2005	APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FY 2006	APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FY 2006	TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS	FY 2006 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST	FY 2007 BUDGET REQUEST (DoS/DoD)	TOTAL REQUESTS
United States Agency for International Development, Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG)	\$3,500,000	\$1,900,000		\$2,500,000			\$7,900,000		\$2,500,000	\$2,500,000
Department of Treasury (Salaries and Expenses)								\$1,300,000		\$1,300,000
DoD Office of the Inspector General								\$1,120,000		\$1,120,000
Military Construction <sup>5</sup>					\$341,900,000		\$341,900,000	\$347,700,000		\$347,700,000
Department of State Office of the Inspector General								\$1,000,000	\$1,000,000	\$2,000,000
Migration and Refugee Assistance									\$20,000,000	\$20,000,000
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance	\$37,000,000						\$37,000,000			
Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, and Demining (NADR)									\$16,630,000	\$16,630,000
International Military Education and Training									\$1,185,000	\$1,185,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$3,260,150,000</b>	<b>\$19,581,150,000</b>	<b>\$1,036,250,000</b>	<b>\$6,823,450,000</b>	<b>\$1,163,150,000</b>	<b>\$60,390,000</b>	<b>\$31,907,540,000</b>	<b>\$7,726,670,000</b>	<b>\$860,935,000</b>	<b>\$8,570,605,000</b>

<sup>1</sup>Logistical, security and construction costs

<sup>2</sup>Excludes \$75M for SIGIR under P.L. 108-106

<sup>3</sup>Where Iraq-only appropriations unavailable, based on historical trends SIGIR split 85% for Iraq and 15% for Afghanistan

<sup>4</sup>CPA Operating Expenses under PL 108-106

<sup>5</sup>As identified in GRD bi-weekly reports

<sup>6</sup>Congress provided DoD with authorization for drawdown authority for these funds

TABLE 2-20

## International Donor Funds

Funds pledged by non-U.S. bilateral donors and international institutions comprise the third source of funding for Iraq's reconstruction and development. As of the end of March, 2006, \$14.58 billion had been pledged, and approximately \$3.5 billion (25%) had been expended.<sup>326</sup>

### HISTORY OF DONOR ACTIVITY

International donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were active in Iraq for more than a decade before the start of hostilities in 2003. Several UN organizations in Iraq were monitoring the Oil-for-Food Program and conducting basic humanitarian and development work, particularly in the three northern Kurdish provinces. As the war approached, UN organizations and NGOs prepared for various humanitarian contingencies—particularly food shortages and refugee movements—using funding from international donors, including the United States.

Shortly after the war, in June 2003, donors met in New York to begin preparing for a major pledging conference to be held in Madrid in October 2003. In the next few months, donors held several meetings to plan for the conference, designing what would become the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), based on the experiences of other multi-donor trust-fund models, including Afghanistan. During that same period, the United States sent high-level

delegations to various key donor nations to urge generous grant support for Iraq.

Table 2-21 shows donor pledges by nation as of March 31, 2006.

The United States, 28 other nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have pledged a total of \$33 billion in grants and loans for 2004-2007. Of this total, \$13.5 billion was pledged by donors other than the United States:

- \$8.4 billion by other governments
- \$5.1 billion by the World Bank and the IMF

The World Bank pledged between \$3-\$5 billion, including \$500 million in International Development Association (IDA) loans; the IMF pledged \$2.55-\$4.25 billion. The lower end of each of these number sets was used in tabulating the total.

Most of the pledges—\$22.1 billion—were for grant assistance, \$9.625 billion were for loans, and \$335 million were unspecified. The United States strongly encouraged grant assistance, because it can be expended more quickly and would not add to Iraq's already considerable debt burden. Since the Madrid Conference, new pledges total \$911 million:

- European Commission, \$480 million (in two \$240 million tranches for 2005 and 2006)
- Islamic Development Bank, \$300 million (soft loans)
- Denmark, \$40 million
- Germany, \$10 million
- Australia, \$31 million

## PLEDGES OF RECONSTRUCTION AID TO IRAQ BY COUNTRY, AS OF MARCH 31, 2006

Donor	Original Madrid Pledge October 2003	Additional Pledges Since Madrid Conference	Total Pledges March 2006
Australia	\$ 45,590,974	\$ 31,000,000	\$ 76,590,974
Austria	5,478,165		5,478,165
Belgium	5,890,500		5,890,500
Bulgaria	640,000		640,000
Canada	187,466,454		187,466,454
China	25,000,000		25,000,000
Cyprus	117,810		117,810
Czech Republic	14,659,023		14,659,023
Denmark	26,952,384	40,000,000	66,952,384
Estonia	82,467		82,467
Finland	5,890,500		5,890,500
Germany	-	10,000,000	10,000,000
Greece	3,534,300		3,534,300
Hungary	1,237,005		1,237,005
Iceland	2,500,000		2,500,000
India	10,000,000		10,000,000
Iran	5,000,000	5,000,000	10,000,000
Ireland	3,534,300		3,534,300
Italy	235,620,020		235,620,020
Japan	4,914,000,000	50,000,000	4,964,000,000
Korea	200,000,000		200,000,000
Kuwait	500,000,000	65,000,000	565,000,000
Lithuania	-	30,000	30,000
Luxembourg	2,356,200		2,356,200
Malta	27,000		27,000
Netherlands	9,424,801		9,424,801
New Zealand	3,351,975	990,000	4,341,975
Norway	12,867,617		12,867,617
Oman	3,000,000		3,000,000
Pakistan	2,500,000		2,500,000
Qatar	100,000,000		100,000,000
Saudi Arabia	500,000,000		500,000,000
Slovenia	419,382		419,382
Spain	220,000,000		220,000,000
Sri Lanka	-	75,500	75,500
Sweden	33,000,000		33,000,000
Turkey	50,000,000		50,000,000
United Arab Emirates	215,000,000		215,000,000
United Kingdom	452,326,416		452,326,416
United States	10,000,000		10,000,000
Vietnam		700,000	700,000
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>7,807,467,293</b>	<b>202,795,500</b>	<b>8,010,262,793</b>
European Commission	235,620,000	480,000,000	715,620,000
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>8,043,087,293</b>	<b>682,795,500</b>	<b>8,725,882,793</b>
<b>International Financial Institutions</b>			
IMF (low range)	2,550,000,000		2,550,000,000
World Bank (low range)	3,000,000,000		3,000,000,000
Islamic Development Bank	-	300,000,000	300,000,000
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>5,550,000,000</b>	<b>300,000,000</b>	<b>5,850,000,000</b>
<b>Total Donor Assistance</b>	<b>\$13,593,087,293</b>	<b>\$982,795,500</b>	<b>\$14,575,882,793</b>

TABLE 2-21

Source: U.S. Department of State

Note: Data not formally reviewed, audited, or verified.

Pre-Madrid pledges for humanitarian assistance are not included in this table.

Japan also spent an additional \$50 million in grant aid beyond its \$1.5 billion pledge.

Up to this point, no single entity has been responsible for tracking donor pledges and expenditures. However, donors recently requested the World Bank to undertake an update on the status of pledges that were made at Madrid.

The Madrid Conference formally endorsed IRFFI, which comprised two trust funds—one managed by the World Bank and the other by the UN. IRFFI provided a structure through which donors could channel their assistance, if they did not wish to establish a bilateral mission in Iraq or if they wanted to support larger projects through a multilateral effort. A committee of 18 donors, 16 who have contributed at least \$10 million (and two representatives of smaller donors), advise the World Bank

and UN on the management of IRFFI. Table 2-21 lists the member countries. Most of the smaller bilateral donors have disbursed their pledges through the trust funds; larger bilateral donors—such as the United States, United Kingdom (UK), and Japan—also contributed to the trust funds.

The donor committee has met four times since Madrid, each time in conjunction with a broader donor gathering. At the first meeting in Abu Dhabi in February 2004, about \$1 billion from the Madrid pledges were promised to the trust funds, which were then formally launched. Japan was selected to chair the donor committee. For a list of IRFFI commitments and deposits as of April 20, 2006, see Table 2-22.

In 2004 and 2005, donors conducted three more meetings: at Doha, Qatar; Tokyo, Japan;

#### INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION FUND FACILITY FOR IRAQ DONOR COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Canada (Chair)	Kuwait
United Kingdom	Iran
Italy	Norway
India	Korea
Turkey*	Qatar
Sweden	Spain
Finland*	European Commission
Japan	United States
Australia	Denmark

\*Rotating members

Table 2-21

and the Dead Sea, Jordan. The next meeting is expected to be scheduled shortly after the new Iraqi government is in place. In March 2006, representatives of the donor committee met with World Bank and UN officials in Washington to review IRFFI developments—particularly the ongoing external evaluation of World Bank and UN trust fund activities designed to determine the effectiveness of IRFFI planning and implementation. The meeting also proposed to extend the life of IRFFI from the end of 2007 to the end of 2010.

### **PROMOTING DONOR COORDINATION**

During the last three years, all donors, particularly those with bilateral programs, have been increasingly interested in better coordinating their programs, both among themselves and with the Iraqi authorities, to avoid duplication of effort and to ensure that their priorities adequately reflect Iraq's needs. Although the donor meetings provide a valuable opportunity for consultation and coordination, all agreed that more needed to be done to coordinate in Iraq.

To meet this need, the Baghdad Coordination Group was established after a decision reached at the donors meeting at the Dead Sea, Jordan, in July 2005. Chaired by the Minister of Planning, the group meets periodically to discuss a variety of reconstruction issues and to share information on the progress of projects and programs. On February 27, 2006, a special session of the group was called to discuss reconstruction of the damaged Al-Askari

Mosque in Samarra. The group agreed that the UN would prepare a plan for international assistance to Iraqi efforts to rebuild the shrine and other damaged religious sites. There are also sector working groups in health, education, electricity, oil, and rule of law—each chaired by the appropriate Iraqi minister and a supporting donor. Similar donor coordination groups meet in regional cities, such as Basrah and Mosul.

Donors, including the World Bank and the UN, submit proposed projects to the Iraqi Strategic Review Board (ISRB), chaired by the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation. The ISRB gives the planning ministry visibility on projects proposed for the various line ministries and helps ensure that the overall resources implications are taken into account. (The United States has not, as a rule, submitted its proposed projects to the ISRB, in part because the sheer number of U.S. projects would overwhelm the board's capacity to review projects on a timely basis.)


Another tool to promote donor coordination is the UN-sponsored Donor Assistance Database (DAD), funded in part by the United States, which is now operational and maintained by a newly established directorate in the Ministry of Planning. The database is populated with data on projects totaling more than \$8.5 billion; however, more data needs to be added if the DAD is to reflect all current projects. Ministry of Planning officials have said that they expect the DAD to become key to future Iraqi management of foreign assistance flows.

### MAJOR BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL PROGRAMS

The United States is actively encouraging other donors to implement their pledges as soon as possible. Figure 2-41 shows a breakout of other pledges by donor.

Since before the Madrid Conference, DoS has chaired a monthly teleconference of key donors and Iraqi officials to exchange information and respond to donor concerns. Coalition partners with a military presence in Baghdad, like the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia, have found it easier to establish an aid mission in Baghdad. In coordination with the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad has set up working and living accommodations on

Figure 2-41  
**PLEDGES FROM INTERNATIONAL DONORS—\$14.58 BILLION**  
Dollars in Billions  
Source: DoS as of March 2006



a reimbursable basis in a “donor village” in the PCO compound in the International Zone in Baghdad, which is now used by representatives from the EU, Canada, the World Bank, and others.

Both the World Bank and the UN reconstruction and development assistance mission have been constrained by security concerns since the UN headquarters was destroyed by a truck bomb in August 2003. The bombing killed the UN Secretary General’s representative and 25 other UN staffers. The UN presence in Iraq is primarily in support of the political mission, although assistance officials make periodic trips into Iraq. The World Bank is represented by a contract staffer in the International Zone, and by Iraqi staff and consultants outside the International Zone. Plans to open a mission are under review pending resolution of security concerns.

### Japan

Japan pledged \$5 billion at Madrid:

- \$1.5 billion in grant funds, of which \$490 went to the IRFFI trust fund
- \$3.5 billion in concessional (soft) loans
- \$50 million to international organizations, such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP), Iraqi institutions and NGOs, and direct bilateral projects

Japanese funds have been used in the power, health, water, and sanitation sectors; for repairing roads; and for training and capacity build-

ing. Japan has provided hundreds of police vehicles, ambulances, and fire trucks. Japanese NGOs have been active in Al-Muthanna governorate, where Japanese troops are rehabilitating schools, health clinics, and hospitals.

On March 28, 2006, Japan announced its decision to extend concessional loans up to \$655 million for three projects:

- Umm Qasr Port Sector Rehabilitation Project (\$259 million)
- Irrigation Sector Loan (\$81 million)
- Al Mussaib Thermal Power Plant Rehabilitation Project (\$315 million)

Japan is continuing discussions with Iraq on the use of the remainder of the \$3.5 billion concessional loan program that it pledged in Madrid. Japan’s assistance officials are based in Amman; its programs are implemented and monitored by contractors.<sup>326a</sup>

### United Kingdom

The UK pledged \$452 million at Madrid of which \$392 million has been disbursed:

- \$127 million to IRFFI—\$71 million to the World Bank, \$56 million to the UN
- \$265 million to bilateral projects

Together with the \$468 million provided for humanitarian relief, before Madrid, UK contributions total \$920 million.

The UK Department for International Development (DFID) is responsible for implementing bilateral projects and has personnel

both in Baghdad and Basrah. Working with the UK forces in the four southern governorates, DFID has supported rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, capacity development of provincial and local governments, civil society institutions, and independent media. In Baghdad, the UK has been working to improve the basic organizational structure and functions of government and to advise on key economic reforms. The UK has also trained dozens of Iraqi officials.<sup>326b</sup>

#### **Canada**

Canada pledged \$187 million at the Madrid Conference, of which \$92.8 million has gone to the IRFFI trust funds. Canada's focus is on reconstructing socio-economic infrastructure, including basic education, primary health care, clean water and sanitation, governance, civil society, and capacity building. Canada has contributed about \$15 million to the security sector, including police training. Canada is active in donor coordination, currently chairing the IRFFI Donor Committee.

In response to the UN Humanitarian Appeal before the war, Canada also provided an additional \$42 million, bringing its total contribution to \$230 million.<sup>326d</sup>

#### **Australia**

Australia pledged \$46 million at the Madrid conference, of which \$31 million was committed to the IRFFI trust funds. Before Madrid, Australia had pledged \$55 million to meet Iraq's immediate humanitarian needs. Accord-

ing to the AusAid website ([www.ausaid.gov.au](http://www.ausaid.gov.au)), Australia has budgeted another \$31 million for 2006, bringing the total to \$132 million.

Australia's reconstruction assistance focuses on the agricultural sector to promote food security, market-based pricing, higher yields, better agricultural support services, and agricultural research. Australia has provided technical assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture, trained many officials from the ministry, and provided police training, election support, aid to internally displaced persons, and governance support.<sup>326c</sup>

#### **Italy**

Italy pledged \$240 million in Madrid for 2003-2007, of which \$80 million have been allocated, including \$12 million to the IRFFI UN trust fund. Italy has been active in the health care sector, contributing to the Italian Red Cross, basic infrastructure development, and local governance in areas in the south where Italian troops are stationed. Italy also provides a wide variety of training courses for Iraqis, electoral assistance, and cultural and archaeological activities. Italian officials estimate that they have spent up to 30% of their funds on security.

#### **Spain**

Spain pledged \$220 million at Madrid for 2004-2007, in addition to the \$80 million it had provided for humanitarian assistance in early 2003. Of this, \$42.4 million has been

## TOTAL IRRFI DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS AND WORLD BANK IRAQ TRUST FUND ALLOCATIONS

DONOR	COMMITMENTS		DEPOSITS	
	WORLD BANK	UNITED NATIONS	WORLD BANK	UNITED NATIONS
Australia	\$16,100,000	\$13,457,000	\$16,100,000	\$13,457,000
Australia (Dept of Immigration)	-	3,292,000	-	3,292,000
Austria	-	3,292,000	-	3,292,000
Belgium	-	1,321,000	-	1,321,000
Canada	22,300,000	46,400,000	22,300,000	46,400,000
Denmark	-	10,046,000	-	7,693,000
Finland	2,600,000	6,234,000	2,600,000	6,234,000
Greece	-	3,630,000	-	3,630,000
Iceland	1,000,000	500,000	1,000,000	500,000
India	5,000,000	5,000,000	5,000,000	5,000,000
Ireland	-	1,226,000	-	1,226,000
Italy	-	29,782,000	-	29,782,000
Japan	130,000,000	360,951,000	130,000,000	360,951,000
Kuwait	5,000,000	5,000,000	5,000,000	5,000,000
Luxembourg	-	200,000	-	200,000
Luxembourg (EURO)	-	2,119,000	-	200,000
Netherlands	6,200,000	6,697,000	6,200,000	6,697,000
New Zealand	-	3,365,000	-	3,365,000
Norway	6,700,000	7,009,000	6,700,000	7,009,000
Qatar	5,000,000	5,000,000	2,500,000	5,000,000
Republic of Korea	4,000,000	11,000,000	4,000,000	11,000,000
Spain	20,000,000	20,000,000	20,000,000	20,000,000
Spain	-	2,380,000	-	2,380,000
Sweden	5,800,000	10,622,000	5,800,000	10,622,000
Turkey	1,000,000	200,000	1,000,000	200,000
United Kingdom	71,400,000	55,542,000	71,400,000	55,542,000
United States	5,000,000	5,000,000	5,000,000	5,000,000
European Commission (RRM)	-	25,142,000	-	23,573,000
European Commission (Human Rights)	-	7,307,000	-	6,937,000
European Commission	149,800,000	283,724,000	149,800,000	266,615,000
<b>Total non-U.S. Donor Assistance</b>	<b>\$456,900,000</b>	<b>\$935,438,000</b>	<b>\$454,400,000</b>	<b>\$912,118,000</b>

Source: [www.irffi.org](http://www.irffi.org)  
Table 2-22

deposited in the IRRFI trust funds, \$20 million to the World Bank, \$22.4 million for the United Nations, and \$5 million with the IFC's Small Business Financing Facility. Spain's bilateral activities have supported production of the new Iraqi dinar, training of security forces, medical equipment, and rule-of-law training.

## The European Commission

The European Commission (EC) has pledged assistance on an annual basis, \$240 million at Madrid and two subsequent tranches of \$240 million. Before the war, the EC provided \$120 million of humanitarian assistance through the

European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), then \$19.8 million more to support the January 2005 elections, for a total \$849.8 million.<sup>326e</sup>


The EC was one of the early promoters of establishing a multi-donor instrument for channeling the international support to the reconstruction process in Iraq. It has channeled the bulk of its assistance (\$434 million thus far) through the IRRFI trust funds. The main focus has been on rehabilitating basic services in water and sanitation, health, electricity, education, and income generation.<sup>1</sup>

Figure 2-42

### INTERNATIONAL DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO IRRFI

As of March 2006

Source: www.irrfi.org



The 2005 EC Assistance Program is firmly anchored in the overall medium-term strategy for Iraq outlined in the Commission's Communication of June 9, 2004 (*The European Union and Iraq—a framework for engagement*).<sup>2</sup> In 2006, the EC assistance program will be guided by the principle of Iraqi ownership and Iraqi partnership. The Assistance Program also aims to respond to the framework and policy priorities conveyed in Iraq's National Development Strategy (NDS) presented at the Dead Sea donors conference, and to complement activities of other major donors. Figure 2-42 shows a breakout of donor commitments.

### World Bank

The World Bank trust fund has received \$454 million from 17 donors. Ten projects totaling \$385 million have been approved, and one has been completed. Eight of the ten projects are being implemented by Iraqi ministries and municipalities. World Bank supervision of projects relies on Iraqi staff and consultants,


supported by World Bank staff working out of Jordan and Washington who regularly video-conference with Iraqi ministries. The World Bank provides Iraqi government staff with extensive training in procurement, financial management, and project management. World Bank projects have focused on building capacity, supplying textbooks, and rehabilitating infrastructure (schools, health units, irrigation systems, and water supply and sanitation). The objective is to help Iraq build better institutional frameworks, policies, and systems to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of both national expenditures and international aid.

In addition to the trust fund, the World Bank has approved \$100 million in concessionary IDA loans for a Third Emergency Education Project and is working closely with the government to prepare an additional \$400 million in IDA-financed projects to support improvements in transportation, electricity, and water supply and sanitation. Iraq became eligible for IDA loans in December 2004, when it cleared its arrearages with the World Bank. Iraq's eligibility for loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development depends on its creditworthiness, which includes political stability and security, economic recovery, and implementation of debt relief.

### United Nations

The UN trust fund has \$906 million in deposits from 24 donors. It supports 16 UN implementing agencies. The trust fund has approved \$759 million for 83 projects, all of which have been approved by the Iraqi Strategic Review Board.

Figure 2-43  
**UNDG IRAQ TRUST FUND**  
Approved and Funded Projects by UN Cluster as of 3/31/06  
Source: [www.irffi.org](http://www.irffi.org)



A total \$573 million has been obligated for these projects, and \$451 million has been expended. UN staff who manage the Iraq programs are located offshore in Amman, Nicosia, and Kuwait; senior officials travel regularly to Baghdad. Programs are implemented by a network of more than 1,000 national staff who were trained by UN employees before the war. UN contracting is done on the Internet for efficiency and transparency.

In a departure from past practice when projects were implemented by individual UN agencies, the UN has organized the program in clusters. The relevant UN agencies work together under a cluster lead agency. Most UN funding has gone to UNDP and UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS); major sectors are election support/governance, infrastructure rehabilitation, education, health, and agriculture/food security.

Figure 2-43 shows the UN Development Group (UNDG) Iraq Trust Fund by UN cluster.<sup>326f</sup>

### **International Monetary Fund**

At the Madrid donors conference, the IMF pledged to make available to Iraq more than \$2.55 billion in loans. On September 29, 2004, the IMF Board approved an Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) package to provide Iraq \$436 million in balance-of-payments support. The main goals were to maintain macroeconomic stability, lay the groundwork for the development of a reform program that could be undertaken in years to come, and begin the process of restoring Iraq's fiscal and external debt sustainability.

On December 23, 2005, the IMF Board approved a historic Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) for Iraq that

provides approximately \$685 million in balance-of-payments support, of which a first tranche of \$114 million has been made available. The 15-month SBA provides a comprehensive framework of policies intended to ensure continued economic stability. The IMF has also been providing technical assistance to Iraq, including training in these macroeconomic policy areas:

- public expenditure management
- fiscal federalism
- tax policy
- tax and customs administration
- monetary operations
- banking supervision
- payments system reform
- statistics

Some of this training has been done jointly with the World Bank.

### **Islamic Development Bank**

At the Dead Sea donors meeting in Jordan, the Islamic Development bank agreed to make \$300 million in concessional financing available to Iraq.

### **Support from Iraq's Neighbors**

Iraq's neighbors pledged generously at Madrid, but little of the promised funds have yet been expended despite regular demarches by U.S. and other coalition officials. Kuwait is reportedly active in small-scale humanitarian programs in the south but has not moved much of its \$565 million pledge. Similarly, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are holding off on expenditures. Further, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait believe they have been supportive in

other ways, as suppliers of fuel, and Jordan has supported police training and provides a major supply route into Iraq. Turkey has not reported disbursements of the \$50 million pledge at Madrid, but the Turkish private sector is very active in reconstruction in the Kurdish areas.<sup>326h</sup>

### Iraqi Funds

The Iraqi government has funded reconstruction activities since the transfer of governance authority. In addition to donor funds and the Iraqi oil revenues dedicated to reconstruction activities during the CPA administration, the Iraqi government draws on three sources of funding:

- the Iraqi National Budget
- commercial borrowing
- international donors

#### THE IRAQI NATIONAL BUDGET

Iraq has significant capacity to contribute to its reconstruction. The government's capital budget for 2004, 2005, and 2006 totals \$14.762 billion. For a year by year breakdown see figure 2-44.

The Iraqi government has been slow to release these funds, according to DoS, for two reasons. First, line ministries have limited capacity to implement reconstruction projects. Second, the Iraqi Ministry of Finance closely controls spending because of concern about the volatility of oil revenues.

#### COMMERCIAL BORROWING

International borrowing is another potential source of funds for the Iraqi government. Iraq has made considerable progress settling Saddam-era debt, a likely precondition to further borrowing. Iraq's creditors fall into two general categories—Paris Club members and non-Paris Club members:

- In November 2004, Iraq and the Paris Club came to an agreement to forgive 80% of Iraq's debt. Nearly all of the members of the Paris Club have concluded the required bilateral agreements under the agreement, which covered more than \$40 billion. By April 2006, Iraq had settled \$18.4 billion in commercial claims, out of an estimated total of \$22 billion.
- Non-Paris club creditors, including neighboring Arab states, hold an estimated \$60 billion in Iraqi debt; Iraq must settle with these creditors on terms comparable to the Paris Club agreement. Iraq has signed only five bilateral deals with non-Paris Club creditors.

Borrowing on international capital markets will not be a practical option for Iraq for some years to come. Even after settling the Paris Club debt and the non-Paris Club debt on similar terms, Iraq will still have a large debt burden of 20% of the roughly \$120-125 billion in Saddam-era debt.


#### LOANS FROM INTERNATIONAL DONORS

For Iraq, the best source of lending is the assistance offered by donors at the Madrid Donors Conference:

- Japan: \$3.5 billion in concessional<sup>327</sup> loans
- Saudi Arabia: \$1.0 billion in trade credits and loans
- World Bank: \$3-5.0 billion in loans (\$500 million concessional)

If all of these loans were activated, an additional \$2 billion would be available for reconstruction beyond the \$33 billion recorded at Madrid. The Madrid totals were calculated at the low end of the World Bank pledge.

Figure 2-44  
**CAPITAL BUDGET ALLOCATIONS**  
\$ Billions







# SIGIR Oversight

SIGIR AUDITS  
SIGIR INSPECTIONS  
SIGIR INVESTIGATIONS  
SIGIR HOTLINE  
SIGIR LESSONS LEARNED INITIATIVE  
SIGIR WEB SITE  
ANTICORRUPTION INITIATIVE

SECTION

3



## SIGIR AUDITS

During this quarter, SIGIR continued to apply a balanced approach to provide insight, foresight, and oversight through audit and non-audit activities assisting executing organizations in Iraq and those who support these organizations from outside Iraq.

- SIGIR's *insight* efforts advise leadership on governance issues, focusing on creating an environment of accountability, rule of law, and public trust in Iraq.
- SIGIR's *foresight* efforts continue to emphasize end-state issues, such as transition, sustainment, and capacity building.
- SIGIR's *oversight* efforts ensure maximum return on the U.S. taxpayer investment and promotes transparency and accountability of the U.S. administration of Iraqi resources.

In March 2006, SIGIR reached its authorized number of 26 auditors in Baghdad; an additional 15 auditors work at the headquarters office in Arlington, Virginia. The audit team comprises auditors, evaluators, management and program analysts, contract specialists, and program acquisition specialists. SIGIR also has the capability by contract or by special authority to add expertise as needed.

From February 1, 2006, to April 30, 2006, SIGIR completed 15 final reports, bringing the total number of SIGIR audits since inception to 55. This quarter, SIGIR audits addressed a wide range of issues—from reviews of organizational cash controls to a review of one of the largest contracts in Iraq to an evaluation of progress on Iraqi infrastructure security capabilities.

SIGIR also has 1 draft report issued and 12 ongoing audits, with 5 more in the planning stages. SIGIR performs audit work under generally accepted government auditing standards prescribed by the U.S. Comptroller General.

For more details on SIGIR audits:

- For the titles and release dates of the 15 SIGIR audits this quarter, see Table 3-1.
- For the executive summaries, excerpts of management comments, and SIGIR's response to these comments, see Section 3 of this Report.
- For information on all SIGIR audit work completed as of April 30, 2006, and for the full text of all final audit reports, see the SIGIR Web site: [www.sigir.mil](http://www.sigir.mil).

SIGIR Audit continues to find the U.S. government leadership in Iraq challenged by prior decisions on the execution of selected projects. The audits conducted this quarter show that although the challenges of the past are present, current leadership is moving forward to achieve positive results for the U.S. government and the Iraqi people. Management has acted positively and quickly to make the improvements recommended by our audits.

Several of the audits SIGIR conducted this quarter were requested by the Ambassador and subordinate Commands of the Multi-National Force-Iraq. Most of the shortcomings uncovered this quarter arise from past contract and project management, and SIGIR has seen significant improvement in overall U.S. management.

## SIGIR FINAL AUDIT PRODUCTS, SINCE JANUARY 30, 2006

REPORT NUMBER	REPORT TITLE	DATE ISSUED
06-001	Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program: The Evolution of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System	April 2006
06-002	Prompt Payment Act: Analysis of Expenditures Made from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund	February 2006
06-003	Review of Data Entry and General Controls in the Collecting and Reporting of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund	April 2006
06-004	Changes in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program Activities—October through December 2005	April 2006
06-005	Follow-up on Recommendations Made in SIGIR Audit Reports Related to Management and Control of the Development Fund for Iraq	April 2006
06-006	Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq: Management of the Transfer of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government	April 2006
06-007	U.S. Agency for International Development: Management of the Transfer of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government	April 2006
06-008	Development Fund for Iraq—Cash Accountability Review: Joint Area Support Group-Central	April 2006
06-009	Review of Task Force Shield Programs	April 2006
06-010	Review of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Reconciliation of the Iraqi Armed Forces Seized Assets Fund	April 2006
06-011	Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects	April 2006
06-012	Development Fund for Iraq Cash Accountability Review: Joint Area Support Group-Central/Falluja	April 2006
06-013	Briefing to the International Advisory and Monitoring Board for Iraq: Management Controls Over the Development Fund for Iraq	April 2006
06-015	Iraqi Armed Forces Seized Assets Fund: Review of Contracts and Financial Documents	April 2006
06-016	Interim Audit Report on the Review of the Equipment Purchased for Primary Healthcare Centers Associated with Parsons Global Services, Contract Number W914NS-04-D-0006	April 2006

TABLE 3-1

## Final Audit Products

### Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program: The Evolution of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System

SIGIR-06-001, APRIL 2006

**Introduction.** In June 2005, SIGIR initiated this audit to determine whether the information systems used by U.S. government organizations resulted in the effective management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) programs. This audit report was delayed to consider significant actions to improve management, which took place in September 2005.

At that time, the Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), required that a unified IRRF reporting system be developed, and he directed all agencies spending IRRF dollars to load and update project data in the system. IRMO used the preliminary findings of this SIGIR audit as input in the development of the requirements that the IRMO Director issued in a September 20, 2005 Action Memorandum.

This audit is one of a series of reports addressing the information technology (IT) and management information systems that support IRRF programs, examining the ability of these systems to produce reliable and

accurate information. This report discusses the development, management, and evolution of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS).

**Objective.** The objective of this audit was to determine whether the information systems used by U.S. government organizations support the effective management of IRRF programs. Specifically, this audit focused on the development and evolution of the information management system intended to support all organizations for reporting IRRF project and funding information.

**Findings.** Although progress is being made, there were many delays (during the 20-month period ending September 2005) in developing and making fully operational a management information system to report on IRRF projects and funds. In developing the initial IRRF-management information system (PCO Solution), the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) did not follow some parts of the established leading practices or approved guidance used in the federal government for managing the design and development of an IT system. Because PCO did not assert sound management controls over this project, it did not provide adequate assurance that the PCO Solution would operate effectively and efficiently and comply with applicable laws and regulations. Further, neither PCO nor IRMO senior management took a proactive role in ensuring that all government entities that receive IRRF monies used the PCO Solution for input of their project and fund information. As a result, this system took longer than necessary to develop, did not meet

the full intent of the congressional mandate, and hampered the work of others who relied on the PCO data set for the management and reporting of IRRF activities as required by Section 2207 of Public Law (P.L.) 108-106.<sup>1</sup>

One of the most important factors in selecting the design and software application of the PCO Solution was a requirement for a joint-use, U.S.-Iraqi government component that could be transferred to the Iraqi government (i.e. Ministry of Planning) as a fully operational, life-cycle project management solution. This component was referred to as the Iraq Infrastructure Management System (IIMS). However, the SIGIR audit observed these problems:

- A detailed joint-use training and transition plan for the IIMS requirements existed only in fragmented form and was not formalized.
- Multiple software applications used will require licensing transfers from the U.S. government to the recipient Iraqi ministry.
- A number of export-controlled software components used in IIMS will require special handling or removal before transfer to the Iraqi government.

IRMO used preliminary findings from this audit to develop actions to correct problems with the PCO Solution. For example, in September 2005, the IRMO Director requested several actions, which included but were not limited to:

- directing the development of a unified IRRF management information system—IRMS

- requiring all agencies currently spending IRRF dollars to load and keep current data in the system
- developing a common data dictionary
- developing a timeline for a transition strategy plan for IRMS turnover to the Iraqi government
- using IRMS information to build the basis for creating the congressionally mandated *Section 2207 Report*
- discontinuing the manual process in IRMO's information management system

Although some progress has been made, delays continue in achieving the goals of the system and providing accurate data for reporting. As of December 30, 2005, data had not been fully loaded into IRMS for all organizations to report on IRRF dollars and reconstruction projects. Several organizations were still reviewing, verifying, and refining data.

**Conclusion.** Investments in IT can have a dramatic impact on an organization's performance. A well-managed IT investment that is carefully selected and focused on meeting mission needs can move an organization forward, dramatically improving operations and reducing costs. Likewise, poor investments—those that are inadequately justified or whose costs, risks, and benefits are poorly managed—can hinder and even restrict an organization's performance.

Progress has been made to meet the automated support requirements, as outlined by the IRMO Director, and to comply with the original congressional mandate. Specifically, the U.S. government organizations are working

together to develop the IRMS: a data dictionary has been developed, and each organization has signed a Memorandum of Understanding in which they agree to discuss common issues such as data usage and security.

While time-consuming, the meticulous verification of the data is critical to ensure the completeness and accuracy of IRMS. IRMO and the Gulf Region Division-Project and Contracting Office (GRD-PCO)<sup>2</sup> in conjunction with the Information Technology Working Group (ITWG), are working to resolve these problems. But many of the IRMO Director's due dates were missed, as reported in the status update on IRMS initiatives. Most significant, the original December 2005 date for using the unified system as the basis for the *Section 2207 Report* has now been revised to March 2006.

**Recommendations.** It is important for IRMO, in coordination with the GRD-PCO and the agencies using IRRF, to continue to provide active leadership to ensure that all organizations work together to correct the problems identified with the IT system. A complete and accurate IRRF database—accessible by the U.S. government activities and their respective management via an automated solution—is the key to the success of the IRRF program. This effort must be maintained to ensure that a viable, unified, and sustainable IT management system is developed to provide an accurate and reliable picture of IRRF programs and funds for Congress, U.S. government organizations, and transition to the Iraqi government.

SIGIR recommended that the IRMO Director work with the Commanding General, GRD-PCO, and ITWG to continue the development of IRMS by ensuring that all requirements identified in the IRMO Action Memorandum of September 20, 2005, have been addressed and actions implemented.

SIGIR further recommended that the IRMO Director develop:

- a detailed plan to mitigate the presence (to the extent required at time of transfer) of all export control software and substitute, where appropriate, alternative solutions to retain overall solution integrity and functionality at time of transfer
- a software maintenance and licensing transfer plan to ensure that the value of the software and infrastructure investment is protected by maintaining appropriate levels of annual maintenance support, and licensing agreements, and by executing sound equipment maintenance practices. Further, as part of this plan, a formal turnover folder should be created containing all of the necessary documents to officially transfer this software from U.S. government to the Iraqi government.

**Management Comments.** *A combined response to the draft of this report was received from the U.S. Ambassador of Iraq and IRMO. The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq concurred in general with the findings of the audit and the recommendation relative to the transfer of the IRMS system to the Iraqi government, and he stated that corrective actions have been taken.*

*An IRMS Migration Working Group has been authorized to look at the policies relating to transferring IRMS to Iraqi authorities. The comments received are fully responsive. GRD-PCO also provided technical comments which were considered in preparation of the final report.*

#### **Prompt Payment Act: Analysis of Expenditures Made from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund**

SIGIR-06-002, FEBRUARY 3, 2006

**Introduction.** This audit report discusses the management and payment of interest penalties incurred resulting from provisions of the Prompt Payment Act by U.S. government organizations responsible for managing IRRF.

**Objective.** The objective of this audit was to determine whether expenditures by U.S. government organizations responsible for managing IRRF complied with the Prompt Payment Act and other applicable policies and regulations.

**Findings.** During FY 2005, the U.S. Army made approximately \$1.4 million in interest penalty payments against IRRF disbursements of nearly \$5.275 billion, made by Department of Defense (DoD) organizations because of late payments of contractor invoices. This interest exceeded an Army management goal, which stipulated that no more than \$85 in interest penalty payments be made for every million dollars disbursed; in this case, that would have been \$448,381. However, the \$1.4 million in interest penalties paid amounted to about \$259 in interest penalties per million disbursed, which exceeded the Army goal by 304%.

As a result, interest penalties paid to contractors from the IRRF appropriation reduced, dollar for dollar, the availability of funds appropriated for the reconstruction of Iraq and for the benefit of the Iraqi people. DoD has \$7 billion of apportioned IRRF dollars left for disbursement. If the Army achieves the current management goal of no more than \$85 in interest penalty payments for every million dollars disbursed, the Army could avoid making interest penalty payments of more than \$1.2 million and make better use of those funds to support pressing relief and reconstruction needs.

**Recommendation.** SIGIR recommended that the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) identify and monitor interest penalty payments from IRRF dollars to ensure that Army organizations managing IRRF consistently meet established Army goals.

**Management Comments.** *The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) concurred with the finding and recommendation. Actions are underway to implement the recommendation, and the comments received are fully responsive.*

**Follow-up.** Management actions taken as a result of our report resulted in an all-time low in prompt payment fees during March 2006.

## Review of Data Entry and General Controls in the Collecting and Reporting of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund

SIGIR-06-003, 2006

**Introduction.** In November 2005, SIGIR initiated this audit to determine whether policies, procedures, and internal controls established by U.S. government organizations ensure valid and reliable data for managing more than 13,000 IRRF projects. These projects have a total value of \$18.4 billion.

To improve overall management of IRRF projects and funds and to improve the reporting to Congress and the other senior U.S. decision makers, PCO began developing an IT management reporting system in mid-2004. By mid-2005, the IT system was only partially operational and was not being used by all of the agencies receiving IRRF dollars. In September 2005, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), GRD, and PCO officials briefed the IRMO Director on a recommended solution requiring consolidation of information from multiple data sources into a single database. The proposed integrated U.S. government IT solution was named IRMS. GRD-PCO<sup>3</sup> is responsible for maintaining the operational and security aspects of IRMS.

Ensuring the security and integrity of the data in the computer systems that support critical operations and decision making has never been more important because of concerns about attacks from individuals and groups with malicious intent, including terrorists. These concerns are well founded for a number of reasons, including the dramatic increase

in reported computer security incidents, the ease of obtaining and using hacking tools, and the steady advance in the sophistication and effectiveness of attack technology.

Further, internal control procedures specific to data entry provide the initial level of confidence that helps ensure completeness, accuracy, and validity of all transactions during processing. It is the basis for establishing the integrity of the data contained in the IRMS.

This audit is one of a series of reports addressing the IT and management information systems being used to support the IRRF programs and the ability of these systems to produce reliable and accurate information.

**Objective.** The objective of this audit was to determine whether policies, procedures, and internal controls established by U.S. government organizations ensure valid and reliable data for effective management of Iraq reconstruction projects. Specifically, this report addresses internal control procedures used to assure integrity of data entering the IRMS and the general controls relating to the IRMS system itself. The review did not address controls over individual applications within IRMS.

**Findings.** The development of policies and procedures to validate the data being entered into IRMS has been ad hoc at best. Management officials of the GRD-PCO Communications and Information Technology function<sup>4</sup> (GRD-PCO G-6) stated that they rely on the organizations owning the data to provide the quality assurance controls on the security and accuracy of the data that they submit to IRMS. However, our discussions with officials at the

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and our review of other audit reports identified a lack of documented internal control procedures to validate the data entered into the systems providing input to IRMS.

In assessing general controls over IRMS, SIGIR used the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual. SIGIR reviewed GRD-PCO practices that were either under construction or implemented. Several of the supporting documents, as well as processes that were not documented, appear to be a good start in developing a quality security management program. Some of the control elements were partially implemented, including access controls, data backup, and data retention. SIGIR also identified specific vulnerabilities and the lack of official GRD-PCO G-6 policies and procedures in these general control areas:

- security program planning and management
- access controls
- application software development and change controls
- system software
- segregation of duties
- service continuity

**Conclusion.** The reliability of the reports generated by IRMS is diminished without assurance that the initial data entering the system are complete, accurate, and valid. Internal control procedures specific to data entry are

critical in providing the initial level of confidence that helps ensure completeness, accuracy, and validity of all transactions during processing. It is the basis for establishing the integrity of the data contained in the IT system. In addition, well-designed and properly implemented IT general controls are essential to protect GRD-PCO's computer resources and operational environment from the risks of inappropriate disclosure and modification of sensitive information, misuse or damage of computer resources, and disruption of critical operations.

For IRMS general controls, GRD-PCO has taken many important steps to implement an information security program. However, key elements of such a program have not been fully implemented. Weaknesses in information security controls have placed IRMS financial and management information at risk. Implementing an effective information security program could help ensure that known weaknesses affecting the IRMS computing resources are promptly mitigated and that general controls effectively protect its computing environment. Until such improvements are made, there is diminished assurance that adequate security and integrity of the data in IRMS supports program management oversight and decision making.

It is important for IRMO, in coordination with GRD-PCO and the agencies using IRRF, to continue to provide active leadership to ensure that all organizations work together to correct the problems identified with IRMS.

**Recommendations.** SIGIR recommended that the IRMO Director develop and issue a policy requiring all organizations entering data into IRMS to have documented internal control procedures that require validation of all data entering the system.

SIGIR also recommended that the GRD-PCO Commanding General direct the GRD-PCO G-6 Director of Information Technology to:

- Review all operating procedures of the security management program to ascertain if they contain current and accurate information and are still applicable to the operation. The GRD-PCO G-6 IT Director should formally sign and date the operating procedures that are still valid. When formalized, the procedures should be distributed and discussed with the IT staff responsible for implementing the procedure, referenced to the IT Security Plan (if applicable), and kept on site at various locations for reference.
- Document and formalize a security plan for IRMS. The basis for a GRD-PCO IT security plan is contained in the GRD-PCO G-6 draft document, "System Security Authorization Agreement" (SSAA), September 6, 2005. Conduct a review of the draft SSAA to update existing information and to ensure that it contains all required elements, as prescribed by OMB Circular A-130, including such topics as application rules and contingency planning. The GRD-PCO G-6 IT Director should approve the updated security plan and make multiple

copies of the security plan available, storing some at off-site locations.

- Ensure that the access control policy posted on the network server room door is adhered to. All unauthorized personnel should be escorted while in the network server room. In addition, for control purposes, GRD-PCO G-6 should establish a visitor log to document all personnel escorted into the network server room.
- Develop adequate application software development policies and procedures to establish a formal configuration control process for IRMS. At a minimum, this policy should address the authority of the Configuration Control Board, the requirements authorization and approval process, and the configuration management tracking processes. Policies and procedures should also clearly identify the duties and responsibilities of those identified in the design, development, review, and approval of the system modifications.
- Develop adequate policies and procedures for testing application software to clearly define, at a minimum: the testing methodology to be used, the development of specifications and requirements to be tested, required documentation to be recorded and retained, and the levels of testing and associated procedural differences with each level.
- Develop adequate system software control policies and procedures to clearly define, at a minimum: procedures for identifying, selecting, installing, and modifying system

software; required documentation to be recorded and retained; and the levels of testing and associated procedural differences with each level.

- Develop policies and procedures to clearly delineate separation of duties and responsibilities, including those performed by application programmers; system programmers; and data center, security, and quality-assurance staff.
- Develop a contingency plan for restoring critical applications, which includes arrangements for alternative processing facilities in case the usual facilities are significantly damaged or cannot be accessed. These plans must be clearly documented, communicated to affected staff, and updated to reflect current operations. Multiple copies of the contingency plan should be available, with additional copies stored at off-site locations to make sure that they are not destroyed by the same events that made the primary data processing facilities unavailable. In addition, the plan should be tested on an ongoing basis to determine whether it will function as intended in an emergency situation. A copy of the contingency plan should be kept in the installation's Security Plan.

**Management Comments.** *A combined response was received from the U.S. Ambassador of Iraq and IRMO. Actions are underway to implement the recommendation to document and implement policy and procedures, with the Information Management Unit of IRMO*

*taking the lead. The comments received are fully responsive.*

*The Commanding General, GRD, concurred with the recommendations. Actions have been implemented or are underway to implement all recommendations, and the comments received are fully responsive.*

### Changes in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program Activities—October through December 2005

SIGIR-06-004, APRIL 2006

In January 2006, SIGIR reported on the challenges faced by the Department of State (DoS) in directing and supervising IRRF program activities. That report focused on changes that occurred in the original U.S. reconstruction plans from November 2003 to September 30, 2005. This report updates the earlier SIGIR report to include project changes that occurred between October 1, 2005 and December 31, 2005.

**Introduction.** In November 2003, Congress appropriated \$18.4 billion for relief and reconstruction activities in Iraq and allocated the funds to specific sectors of Iraqi infrastructure and governance based on lists of project plans developed during the summer of 2003. In January 2006, SIGIR reported that reconstruction plans had changed significantly as evidenced by the large-scale movement of funds between sectors. For example, as of September 30, 2005, approximately \$3.46 billion had moved between sectors, and another \$2.1 billion had moved within sectors as a result of:

- dramatically increased spending for security needs
- strategy changes as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and DoS responded to the changing environment in Iraq
- needed increases in spending for sustainment
- the need to fund IRRF administrative expenses that were not considered in original planning
- plans made without a clear understanding of actual situational conditions

As a result, SIGIR reported that many of the original plans will not be fully achieved in some sectors. The largest changes occurred in the Security and Law Enforcement sector and the Justice, Public Safety Infrastructure, and Civil Society sector indicating the higher priority accorded these sectors. The two service sectors, Electric and Water Resources and Sanitation, provided the bulk of these funds. This report updates the changes in DoS IRRF program plans that occurred from October 1, 2005, to December 31, 2005.

**Objectives.** The objectives of this audit were (1) to determine the changes, if any, in the DoS Iraq relief and reconstruction plans from October 1, 2005, to December 31, 2005, and (2) to identify reasons, if any, for those changes.

**Findings.** Significant adjustments to IRRF program plans continued through the last quarter with \$353.3 million in program changes. Cumulatively, \$195.3 million moved between sectors, and another \$158 million moved within sectors. Non-construction

programs in the Justice, Public Safety Infrastructure, and Civil Society sector; and the Education, Refugees, and Human Rights sector received the largest increases in funding—\$154.3 million of the \$195.3 million that was reallocated between sectors. The service sectors (Transportation and Telecommunications, Health Care, Electric, and Water Resources and Sanitation) were the source for most of the reallocated funds.

These were some of the results of the adjustments:

- Six transmission projects in the Electric sector were cancelled.
- Two expanded health care centers and eight public health care centers in the Health Care sector were cancelled.
- Aircraft navigational aid and visual aid contracts and the national radar system contract were cancelled in the Transportation and Telecommunications sector.
- Three large water treatment projects in the Potable Water subsector were reduced from design-build contracts to design-only contracts because of limited funding.
- The last remaining project in the Irrigation and Drainage subsector was reduced to engineering design only.
- The scope of the Umm Qasr to Basr water channel renovation project was reduced to repairs of the original channel.
- the need to train Iraqi officials in key ministries in the modern techniques of civil service policies, requirements based budget processes, information technology standards, and logistics management systems as the basis for the new Ministerial Capacity Development program
- other new programs intended to expand local government, community, and election support; and address issues such as the criminal justice system, corrections, public prosecutors, intellectual property rights and property rights legislation; and boost the capacity of the Iraqi ministries

These changes would indicate a continuation of the prior strategy shift toward non-construction programs intended to establish security, increase employment and diversification in the private sector, and strengthen local and provincial government, and away from construction projects.

**Recommendations.** SIGIR made no recommendations in this report.

### **Follow-up on Recommendations Made in SIGIR Audit Reports Related to Management and Control of the Development Fund for Iraq**

SIGIR-06-005, APRIL 2006

**Introduction.** This report follows up on recommendations made in a series of SIGIR reports addressing the use of the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) for relief and reconstruction activities. These recommendations were made to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Joint

The January 2006 DoS *Section 2207 Report* generally cites emerging needs as the basis for the program changes that occurred during the quarter. For example, the report identifies:

Area Support Group-Central (JASG-C), and Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A). Overall, these reports determined that improvements could be made in overall control and accountability for contracts, grants, and cash transactions using the DFI, and SIGIR made recommendations for such improvements. This report follows up on those recommendations to determine if appropriate corrective actions were taken to address the deficiencies.

**Objective.** The objective of this review was to determine whether the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, JASG-C, and JCC-I/A have developed and implemented action plans to correct the deficiencies identified by SIGIR in these reports:

- Control of Cash Provided to South-Central Iraq (SIGIR-05-006, April 30, 2005)
- Administration of Contracts Funded by the Development Fund for Iraq (SIGIR-05-008, April 30, 2005)
- Management of Rapid Regional Response Program Grants in South-Central Iraq (SIGIR-05-015, October 25, 2005)
- Management of the Contracts and Grants Used To Construct and Operate the Babylon Police Academy (SIGIR-05-016, October 26, 2005)
- Management of the Contracts, Grant, and Micro-purchases Used To Rehabilitate the Karbala Library (SIGIR-05-020, October 26, 2005)
- Management of Rapid Regional Response Program Contracts in South-Central Iraq (SIGIR-05-023, January 23, 2006)

**Results.** In the six SIGIR reports in our review that addressed the use of the DFI for contracts, grants, and cash transactions, SIGIR made 40 recommendations: 15 to the Commander, JASG-C; 19 to the Commanding General, JCC-I/A; and 6 to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.<sup>5</sup> SIGIR's review identified these actions taken in response to the recommendations:

- **JASG-C:** The Commander, JASG-C, implemented appropriate actions to close eight recommendations from the above reports and has actions underway to address the remaining seven recommendations. SIGIR recommended that JASG-C establish special action teams to review and reconcile DFI accounts and to ensure that all transactions are appropriately supported and documented. JASG-C has contracted for these services and estimates that the contractor will complete all tasks by April 30, 2006.<sup>6</sup>
- **JCC-I/A:** The Commanding General, JCC-I/A, implemented appropriate action to close 13 recommendations and is in the process of implementing a new review process that should address the remaining 6 recommendations. The new reviews, Procurement Management Reviews, will provide enhanced monitoring of contracts. JCC-I/A anticipates starting these reviews in the spring of 2006. JCC-I/A is also developing a database of DFI contracts and will be using the JASG-C contractor efforts to assist in completing this database.

- **U.S. Ambassador to Iraq:** The U.S. Ambassador implemented appropriate action to close two recommendations and is coordinating actions with JCC-I/A and JASG-C to resolve the issue in the four remaining recommendations.

SIGIR considered the actions taken or underway on the prior recommendations to be responsive and, as a result, makes no further recommendations. However, SIGIR does plan to follow up on the special action team's work at the completion of the contract.

**Recommendations.** SIGIR made no recommendations in this report.

### **Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq: Management of the Transfer of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government**

SIGIR-06-006, APRIL 2006

This audit report is one of a series addressing the management by U.S. government organizations of the transfer of completed reconstruction projects to the Iraqi government.

**Introduction.** In November 2003, Congress appropriated \$18.4 billion through P.L. 108-106 for the IRRF to support security, relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction projects in post-war Iraq. National Security Presidential Directive No. 36 gave the responsibility to the Chief of Mission for Iraq, under the guidance of the U.S. Secretary of State, to provide policy direction for Iraq reconstruction efforts.

MNSTC-I is a principal organization in the Iraq relief and reconstruction effort, with a mission to organize, train, equip, and mentor

Iraqi security forces. In that capacity, it has provided professional engineering and project management support for 1,634 IRRF-funded projects, with a projected completion cost of \$1.7 billion.

In a previous report,<sup>7</sup> SIGIR found that the GRD-PCO management of the transfer of IRRF-funded assets to the Iraqi government did not involve notification to the Iraqi government at the ministerial level when assets were transferred at the local and provincial levels. In the same report, SIGIR also noted that a working group was formed in December 2005 to develop a policy to direct U.S. organizations in managing and reporting asset transfers to the Iraqi government at the ministerial level.

A formal asset recognition and transfer process is necessary to enable the Iraqi government to integrate the completed project assets into a nationwide infrastructure management plan, adequately budget for sustaining the transferred project assets, account for the assets, and leverage the project assets to obtain financing for additional projects from world markets. The 2007 Iraqi budget cycle requires that the Ministry of Finance recognize assets transferred to Iraqi control by June 2006 so that adequate sustainment funds for the assets can be provided in the budget.

**Objectives.** The overall objective of this audit was to determine whether the U.S. government organizations responsible for managing IRRF projects have developed and approved policies and procedures for transferring the billions of dollars of assets—purchased, renovated, and constructed with IRRF funds—to the Iraqi government and its

citizens. This audit focused specifically on asset recognition and transfer policies and procedures used by MNSTC-I.

**Findings.** MNSTC-I used standard DoD facilities management procedures to transfer project assets to the Iraqi government at the local level, but did not provide formal notification of the project asset transfer to the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Ministry of Finance, largely because a requirement to report projects at that level has not yet been established. The need to formally transfer assets to the Ministries of Defense and Planning was first identified in the late summer of 2005, but DoS did not establish a formal working group to develop policy until December 2005. Currently, the working group reports that it anticipates having a directive in place by May 1, 2006. MNSTC-I is a member of this working group and has stated that it will follow the new policy when it is established.

Although MNSTC-I is actively participating in the DoS asset recognition and transfer program, a number of significant challenges remain. Planning for the Iraqi budget must be completed by late summer 2006, and the Iraqi Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Planning must have information on the assets by that time if they are to ensure that the costs of labor, security, operations and maintenance, and training associated with these projects are appropriately recognized and budgeted.

MNSTC-I has a well-established process for transferring capital assets to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Using this process, MNSTC-I should successfully meet the Iraqi budget

deadlines. However, there are problems in transferring capital assets to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of Interior has not recognized the project assets transferred to the Iraqi police forces for the past two years, and it also does not have an effective process in place to receive and recognize assets for budgetary purposes. For example, in the 2006 budget there were no project sustainment costs for Ministry of Interior projects. The same MNSTC-I management team that appears to be successful in the transfer of defense-related assets is leading this effort, but the Iraqi Ministry of Interior's limited management and budgeting capacity poses a significant risk.

The problems in the Ministry of Interior may be helped by IRMO's newly created program in ministerial capacity development. The Embassy has developed a comprehensive approach to train Iraqi officials in key ministries and to inculcate best practices. In support of this effort, Ministerial Assistance Teams were established, led by IRMO senior consultants. These teams will work with key ministries and provide a baseline assessment of each ministry's ability to perform key functions. This will also serve to identify the basic needs of each ministry for developing action plans to train leadership and staff in efficient and effective governance.

**Management Actions.** MNSTC-I facilities engineers worked closely with the Ministry of Defense to create a well-defined plan that has successfully begun to take shape. However, the relationship at the Ministry of Interior has not been as successful because of ongoing political

problems within the Ministry and a turbulent and unpredictable project approval process.

**Recommendation.** SIGIR recommended that MNSTC-I continue to participate fully in the development of a common U.S. government policy and process to facilitate the transfer of completed project assets to the Iraqi government, and lend its professional engineering and facilities management expertise to the working group process. When DoS directs a policy to provide formal notification of the project asset transfer to the Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Finance, and the appropriate operating ministry, MNSTC-I should ensure that appropriate resources are made available so that its project information is provided in time to meet the planning deadline.

**Management Comments.** *MNSTC-I concurred with the finding and recommendations. Actions are underway to implement the recommendations, and the comments received are fully responsive.*

### **U.S. Agency for International Development: Management of the Transfer of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government**

SIGIR-06-007, APRIL 2006

This audit report is one of a series addressing the management by U.S. government organizations of the transfer of completed IRRF projects to the Iraqi government.

**Introduction.** To finance reconstruction in Iraq, Congress appropriated \$2.48 billion through P.L. 108-11 for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 1 (IRRF 1), on April 16,

2003. On November 6, 2003, it appropriated an additional \$18.4 billion for IRRF through P.L. 108-106 to fund Iraq reconstruction requirements that the CPA had identified during the summer and fall of 2003.

USAID has provided management support for 99 IRRF-funded construction projects with an estimated completion cost of approximately \$2.3 billion. USAID has completed 87 of these projects through February 23, 2006, and the remaining 12 are expected to be finished by October 2006. These projects include more than 1,600 facilities and sub-projects located throughout Iraq.

In a previous report,<sup>8</sup> SIGIR found that GRD-PCO management of the transfer of IRRF-funded assets to the Iraqi government did not involve notification to the Iraqi government at the ministerial level when assets were transferred at the local and provincial levels. In the same report, SIGIR also noted a working group was formed in December 2005 to develop a policy to direct U.S. organizations in the managing and reporting asset transfers to the Iraqi government at the ministerial level.

A formal asset recognition and transfer process is necessary to enable the Iraqi government to integrate the completed project assets into a nationwide infrastructure management plan, to adequately budget for sustaining the transferred project assets, to account for the assets, and to leverage project assets to obtain financing for additional projects from world markets. The 2007 Iraqi budget cycle requires that the Ministry of Finance recognize assets

transferred to Iraqi control by June 2006 so that adequate sustainment funds are provided in the budget.

**Objectives.** The overall objective of this audit was to determine whether the U.S. government organizations responsible for managing IRRF projects have developed and approved policies and procedures for transferring the billions of dollars of assets—purchased, renovated, and constructed with IRRF funds—to the Iraqi government and its citizens. This audit focused specifically on asset recognition and transfer policies and procedures used by USAID.

**Limitation of Assessment.** As part of SIGIR's efforts to perform this review in accordance with government audit standards, we must report that during the course of this review SIGIR was denied access to USAID policies and procedures that were material to the audit objective announced in its memorandum of October 31, 2005. This limitation affected SIGIR's ability to fully address the adequacy of USAID's policies and procedures for transferring assets to the Iraqi government and its citizens.

**Findings.** Recognizing the need for formal policies and procedures for asset recognition and transfer, USAID is working in coordination with IRMO and others to resolve the issue. Current USAID policies and procedures do not fully address the information needs of the Iraqi ministries responsible for planning the integration and sustainment of completed projects. USAID has acknowledged the issue and is participating in three working groups to develop a common policy and process for

facilitating the legal, financial, and logistical transfer of assets to the Iraqi government.

**Management Actions.** During the course of this audit, USAID acknowledged the need to further address the asset recognition and transfer issue. USAID participates in three multi-agency working groups, the Information Technology Working Group, the Asset Recognition and Transfer Working Group, and the Sustainability Working Group. All of the working groups include representatives from the principal U. S. government agencies charged with the relief and reconstruction effort in Iraq, including USAID, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, Multi-National Force-Iraq, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division-Project and Contracting Office. The Information Technology Working Group was formed to consolidate all U.S. government funded and managed relief and reconstruction project asset information across all infrastructure sectors and organizations throughout Iraq into one database. The Asset Recognition and Transfer Working Group was established to develop a common policy and process for the represented agencies to facilitate the legal, financial and logistical transfer of assets to the Government of Iraq. The Sustainability Working Group was formed to develop and implement a plan for the sustainment of IRRF Projects.

**Recommendations.** SIGIR recommended that USAID, in coordination with IRMO, complete the development of a common policy and process facilitating the transfer of completed project assets to the Iraqi government.

That process should, at a minimum, provide formal notification of the project asset transfer to the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Finance, and the appropriate operating ministry central headquarters (Electricity, Water, Oil, Health, Education, Transportation, Roads, Communications, Justice, Interior, and Defense). Notification should also include, at a minimum, relevant data, such as operation start date, asset cost, estimated short-term and long-term sustainability costs, terms of warranties, and the location of manuals and other instructions for maintenance and systems.

**Management Comments.** *USAID did not concur with SIGIR's recommendation that it complete the development of a common policy and process for transferring completed projects to the Iraqi government. USAID reports it has adapted its current policies for asset turnover and believes those policies will be sufficient. Further, USAID did not provide SIGIR with a copy of those policies. Although SIGIR was not provided the adapted policies, SIGIR did evaluate the practice currently being followed and determined this process did not meet the U.S. Embassy's position that the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Planning needed to be notified of assets being transferred.*

**Development Fund for Iraq—  
Cash Accountability Review:  
Joint Area Support Group-Central**  
SIGIR-06-008, APRIL 2006

**Introduction.** This audit report is one of a series addressing controls by U.S. government officials over cash in Iraq. This audit report

discusses the accountability for DFI cash controlled by the JASG-C Comptroller, who also serves as the DFI Account Manager.

The DFI fund was established to meet:

- the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people
- the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq's infrastructure
- the continued disarmament of Iraq
- the costs of Iraqi civilian administration
- other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq

**Objective.** The overall audit objective was to provide assurance that funds on hand agreed with government records. SIGIR specifically looked at whether DoD policies and procedures for controlling cash and cash expenditures were being followed and whether the procedures were adequate given existing conditions.

**Findings.** On January 31, 2006, SIGIR conducted an unannounced cash count, providing assurance that the \$28.5 million funds on hand agreed with government records. The JASG-C Comptroller/DFI Account Manager was accountable for DFI cash assets on hand and complied with the DoD requirements for safeguarding cash, with some exceptions. SIGIR found that the processes employed by the JASG-C Comptroller/DFI Account Manager's office were acceptable for completing, controlling, and maintaining accurate records for cash on hand (Palace Vault), issuing cash to paying agents in the Central Region, and clearing paying agents' cash account balances.

However, SIGIR noted these exceptions during the review:

- There is no file system to store and readily retrieve the paying agent's documents.
- The process for properly identifying the current accountable Disbursing Officer for backup access to the vaulted DFI funds did not follow applicable DoD Financial Management Regulations.
- The mechanical condition of the vault does not allow for the periodic changing of the lock combination prescribed by DoD requirements.

**Management Actions.** The JASG-C Commander has taken actions to correct two of the reported deficiencies. Using contracted resources, the JASG-C Comptroller's Office has started scanning the payment agent's payment packages to a database. The expected completion date is May 30, 2006. The database will allow proper filing of the payment packages, and faster retrieval if a payment question is raised. In addition, after SIGIR informed the JASG-C Deputy Comptroller of the deficiency relating to signatures on the combination and key envelope, the envelope was updated with the current Disbursing Officer's signature. SIGIR commends the JASG-C Commander and JASG-C Comptroller for these prompt and thorough actions to correct these deficiencies.

**Recommendations.** SIGIR recommended that the Commander, JASG-C, require these actions of the JASG-C Comptroller/DFI Account Manager:

- Develop a file system to store and more readily retrieve specific payment packages.
- Whenever a new Disbursing Officer takes custody of the cash assets, ensure that current signatures are affixed to the sealed envelope containing the safe combination and duplicate key.
- Develop a contingency plan for secure and reliable access to the vault and its contents to lower the risk of unauthorized access or in the event of mechanical failure of the combination lock.

**Management Comments.** *The JASG-C concurred with the finding and recommendations. Actions have been taken and are underway to implement the recommendations. The comments received are fully responsive.*

## Review of Task Force Shield Programs

SIGIR-06-009, APRIL 2006

**Introduction.** Task Force Shield was established in September 2003 with the mission of building Iraq's capacity to protect its oil and electrical infrastructure. This infrastructure includes approximately 340 key installations, 7,000 kilometers of oil pipeline, and 14,000 kilometers of electricity transmission line. To protect the infrastructure, Task Force Shield was to oversee the training and operation of an Iraqi Oil Protection Force (OPF) of 14,400 guards for the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, as well as the training and equipping of 6,000 Iraqi Electrical Power Security Service (EPSS) guards for the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity. SIGIR determined that about \$147 million from the DFI and IRRF were spent on these efforts from August 2003 to September 2005. Records for these programs are maintained by IRMO, JCC-I/A, and other U.S. agencies.

**Objectives.** This report addressed the U.S.-led effort, implemented by Task Force Shield, from September 2003 through April 2005, to build the capacity of the Iraqi government to protect its oil and electrical infrastructure. Specifically, this report addressed the extent to which:

- U.S. agencies in charge of reconstruction activities provided a clear management structure for Task Force Shield
- Task Force Shield trained and equipped a competent Oil Protection Force
- Task Force Shield trained and equipped a competent Electrical Power Security Service

**Limitation of Assessment.** As part of SIGIR's efforts to perform this review in accordance with government audit standards, SIGIR reported the lack of available program, financial, and contract records and U.S. officials in Baghdad who had first-hand knowledge of the Task Force Shield program. Further, SIGIR did not receive access to selected information SIGIR requested from the MNF-I subordinate commands that was material to the audit objectives announced in a SIGIR memorandum on January 27, 2006. This limitation affected SIGIR's ability to respond to the request made during a Senate hearing on February 8, 2006, from members of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to report on the capacity of the Iraqi government to protect its infrastructure.

**Findings.** Task Force Shield management of the OPF and EPSS programs ultimately proved

to be unsuccessful. Although OPF showed some initial success, EPSS barely got started before it was cancelled. SIGIR believed that U.S. agencies could not provide reasonable assurance that the \$147 million expended to train and equip the OPF and EPSS was used for its intended purposes.

- Most of the information SIGIR gathered generally indicated that the lack of a clear management structure for the U.S. agencies responsible for the protection of Iraq's security degraded the ability of Task Force Shield to effectively manage the OPF and EPSS programs.
- SIGIR found limited records documenting program cost, how the money was used, or the location of the millions of dollars of equipment purchased with Task Force Shield funds. The lack of records and equipment accountability raised significant concerns about possible fraud, waste, and abuse of Task Force Shield programs by U.S. and Iraqi officials.
- SIGIR found about \$7 million in unexpended IRRF funding that is potentially eligible to be de-committed or de-obligated and used for other purposes.

**Indications of Potential Fraud.** During this audit, SIGIR found indications of potential fraud and referred these matters to the SIGIR Assistant Inspector General for Investigations.

**Management Actions.** During the course of this audit, SIGIR notified IRMO that it believed approximately \$7 million currently obligated for Task Force Shield contracts could

be de-committed or de-obligated and used for other purposes. IRMO agreed and \$3.1 million of these funds were de-committed or de-obligated, as of April 22, 2006. SIGIR also notified JCC-I/A of the lack of contract documents for the EPSS contract, and that the EPSS Training Academy at Taji was never appropriately transferred to the U.S. military. JCC-I/A agreed and took steps to reconstruct the EPSS contract file and to also transfer the Academy to the appropriate authority. These actions were still in process at the conclusion of SIGIR's review.

**Recommendations.** SIGIR recommended these steps:

1. The IRMO Director should require IRMO management to take these actions:
  - In cooperation with JCC-I/A, determine the current status of equipment procured for the OPF and the EPSS programs, including equipment transferred to the Ministry of Oil and the Ministry of Electricity.
  - In cooperation with JCC-I/A, conduct a thorough examination of the performance of the contractor in relation to the construction of the EPSS Training Academy at Taji. Determine whether the government received what the statement of work called for, and if not, what financial adjustment should the contractor make to the government.
  - In cooperation with JCC-I/A, ensure that the EPSS Training Academy at Taji is formally transferred from the Task Force Shield EPSS contracting officer representative to either MNSTC-I or the Multi-National Corps-Iraq.
2. Determine whether unexpended IRRF funds currently committed or obligated to Task Force Shield contracts can be de-committed, de-obligated, and reallocated for other purposes.
3. The JCC-I/A Commanding General should require JCC-I/A management to take these actions:
  - In cooperation with IRMO, determine the current status of equipment procured for the OPF and the EPSS programs, including equipment transferred to the Ministry of Oil and the Ministry of Electricity.
  - In cooperation with IRMO, conduct a thorough examination of the performance of the contractor in relation to the construction of the EPSS Training Academy at Taji. Determine whether the government received what the statement of work called for, and if not, whether the contractor should make a financial adjustment to the government.
  - In cooperation with IRMO, ensure that the EPSS Training Academy at Taji is formally transferred from the Task Force Shield EPSS contracting officer representative to either MNSTC-I or the Multi-National Corps-Iraq.
  - Determine whether unexpended IRRF funds currently committed or obligated to Task Force Shield contracts can be de-committed, de-obligated, and reallocated for other purposes.

**Management Comments.** *IRMO and JCC-I/A officials concurred with the report recommendations. IRMO and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also provided technical comments for this report. SIGIR received these comments and changed the report where appropriate.*

**Review of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Reconciliation of the Iraqi Armed Forces Seized Assets Fund**  
SIGIR-06-010, APRIL 2006

**Introduction.** In response to a U.S. Army Audit Agency (USAAA) recommendation, MNSTC-I requested that SIGIR conduct an extended review of the MNSTC-I internal review and reconciliation of the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) Seized Assets Fund and associated financial disbursing documents to determine whether there were any issues warranting further investigation. SIGIR subsequently obtained custody of MNSTC-I internal review workpapers and IAF Seized Assets Fund financial disbursing documents.

**Objectives.** The audit objectives were to determine whether (1) sufficient documentation existed to complete the MNSTC-I reconciliation of the IAF Seized Assets Fund, and (2) any acts by responsible internal and external certifying officials, pay agents, vendors, and contractors could be identified that warranted further investigation.

**Findings.** SIGIR's review of the IAF Seized Assets Fund contract and financial documentation provided to SIGIR confirmed MNSTC-I's internal review conclusion that the records were too incomplete and unreliable to be

audited and that a valid reconciliation could not be achieved. Overall, there was little apparent oversight during the time period covered by the documents reviewed. As a result, SIGIR found official records that MNSTC-I did not provide to the contracting office. As such, JCC-I/A made contracting actions without the benefit of this pertinent contract information. SIGIR also reported separately on our review of the status of documentation maintained by JCC-I/A.

**Indications of Potential Fraud.** During this review, SIGIR also noted indications of potential fraud and referred those matters to the SIGIR Assistant Inspector General for Investigations for action. Related investigations are continuing.

**Management Actions.** During the review, SIGIR noted that MNSTC-I had initiated training for its paying officers and developed standard operating procedures and other guidance that, if implemented and enforced, could address many of the problems discussed in this report. However, SIGIR did not address the effectiveness of these changes within the scope of this review.

**Recommendation.** SIGIR recommended the MNSTC-I Commanding General establish a plan and process and hand over originals and copies of contract documents and files in so far as possible, in cooperation with the JCC-I/A Commanding General, to meet the requirements for complete and accurate record keeping.

**Management Comments.** *MNSTC-I and JCC-I/A officials concurred with the findings*

*and recommendation. Actions are underway to implement the recommendation, and the comments received are fully responsive.*

### **Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects**

SIGIR-06-011, APRIL 2006

This audit is one of a series of SIGIR reports that will focus on specific IRRF reconstruction projects. This report discusses management of the Primary Health Care Centers (PHC) construction project in response to a request by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division (GRD) and the U.S. Ambassador. This report is a follow on to correspondence on this subject provided by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) in December 2005.

**Introduction.** On March 25, 2004, Parsons Delaware, Inc., was awarded a cost-plus contract, W914NS-04-D-0006. Task orders 4, 11, and 12 contracted for the construction of 150 PHCs throughout Iraq. The total definitized cost of the construction was \$103,538,411. In addition, the task orders provided for the purchase and installation of medical and dental equipment for each center. The total definitized cost of the equipment was \$69,115,742. The contract also had an administrative task order, task order 7, to cover indirect costs of projects under the contract. The total definitized cost of task order 7 was \$110,000,000. (SIGIR estimated that the amount of definitized cost of task order 7 associated with the PHC projects is 64 percent or \$70,400,000.) This report addresses the combined definitized cost on this contract

of about \$243,000,000 associated with the 150 PHCs.

**Objectives.** The objectives of the audit were to determine if the contractor complied with the terms of the contract or task orders and whether the government representatives complied with general legislative and regulatory guidance on contract administration and financial management. SIGIR also evaluated the effectiveness of the monitoring and controls in place by administrative contract officers.

**Limitation of Assessment.** As part of SIGIR's efforts to perform this review in accordance with government audit standards, it must report that during the course of this review, SIGIR's access to both, (1) available program management records and (2) key U.S. officials in Baghdad with first-hand knowledge of the project status was restricted by GRD. As a result, this limitation affected SIGIR's ability to independently complete objective 1, which was to determine if the contractor was in compliance with the terms of the contract or task orders. However, SIGIR used the information available and readily provided to us by U.S. Government agency officials which clearly showed the overall extent of the contractor's failure to deliver to the terms of the contract. Further, the contractor was cooperative in meeting with SIGIR, discussing contract status, and timely providing requested information.

**Findings.** As of March 6, 2006, approximately \$186 million (about 77% of the definitized cost) was spent on the PHC project,

over a two-year period, with little progress made. These project outcomes resulted:

- 8 of the 150 planned centers were descope.
- 1 was placed under another contract vehicle.
- 135 were only partially constructed (with 121 subsequently “terminated for convenience”).
- Only 6 were accepted as completed by USACE GRD.

In September 2005, the U.S. government descope 8 of the 150 planned PHCs because of lack of progress and to cover gaps in project funding caused by the Iraqi Ministry of Health’s failure to meet its program funding commitment. Another PHC continued through direct contracting. Of the remaining 141 PHCs, 135 are partially complete throughout Iraq. On March 3, 2006, the U.S. government executed a “termination for convenience,” descope 121 of the 135 PHCs. As a result, the current U.S. government requirement is for Parsons Global Services, Inc., (Parsons Global) to deliver 20 PHCs, including the 6 already completed, by April 3, 2006. The estimated additional cost to complete the 121 PHCs is approximately \$36 million. However, an IRMO senior official stated that there is not sufficient IRRF funding available on this contract to complete all of the centers.

Contractor performance and U.S. Government management actions were both factors in the failure to complete the PHC project as planned. According to GRD, the contractor lacked qualified engineering staff to supervise

its design work, failed to check the capacity of its subcontractors to perform the required work, failed to properly supervise the work of its subcontractors, and failed to enforce quality assurance/quality control activities. On the government side SIGIR identified a lack of complete responsiveness to contractor requests for equitable adjustments and excusable delays based on unplanned site conditions, design or scope changes, or delays based on site access restrictions or security; high U.S. Government personnel turnover and organizational turbulence; a failure to follow required procedures for making contract changes; poor cost controls; poor cost to complete reporting; a failure to properly execute its administrative responsibilities; and a failure to establish an adequate quality assurance program.

GRD provided SIGIR a lengthy description of the contractor problems it faced during the course of this contract. SIGIR does not dispute that there were signs of failure on the part of the contractor. Further, as already noted, poor contractor performance delayed completion of the project and escalated costs. However, this report focuses on the government’s contract administration because SIGIR believes that the Federal Acquisition Regulations, if properly followed, identify the responsibilities of each party in a contract and provide sufficient contract controls to ensure that the government receives the goods or services it seeks at a fair and equitable price.

**Management Actions.** U.S. government officials have taken steps to address some of the issues that SIGIR identified.

- On July 18, 2005, JCC-I/A issued a “letter of concern” to Parsons Global “regarding certain shortfalls and non-compliance issues with quality, safety, schedule, and performance criteria that must be immediately addressed and rectified.” The letter referred to issues raised as a result of a PCO site visit to PHCs in the Baghdad area.
- In the Fall of 2005, JCC-I/A assigned an overall interim unsatisfactory performance evaluation to the contractor because of unmet milestones and schedule slippages, and elusive administrative task order costs.
- Lacking confidence in the Parsons Global weekly cost performance reports, the contracting officer requested the monthly cost performance reports as prescribed by Contract section 2.3.5. On October 23, 2005, the government and Parsons Global agreed on a format for the new reports. Subsequently, Parsons Global has produced monthly cost performance reports in the new format.
- On October 24, 2005, the contracting officer briefed PCO and Parsons Global that required procedures for “constructive changes” to the project would be enforced. The contractor officer required that future constructive changes must be properly definitized. He also pushed the formal process to bring the outstanding request for equitable adjustment (REA) to resolution. On December 21, 2005, negotiations to reconcile Parsons Global, \$39 million REA began. As of February 24, 2006, 50 of 58 items had been resolved for \$22 million. An agreement was signed, and the task orders were funded. The eight remaining items are still being negotiated.
- On December 21, 2005, Parsons Global and the U.S. government began negotiation of the Parsons Global submission of excusable delays. An agreement was reached, and schedules were adjusted in February 2006.
- As SIGIR previously reported,<sup>9</sup> GRD-PCO and IRMO took steps late in 2005 to improve the quality of cost-to-complete reporting. The estimates reported in the December 31, 2005 Project Assessment Report for the PHC project appear more realistic than those previously reported. Representatives of IRMO and GRD-PCO stated that cost-to-complete reports are now used more effectively as a project management tool.
- On February 4, 2006, GRD-PCO convened a teleconference with both U.S. government officials and representatives of Parsons Global to determine a workable solution for how many PHCs should be completed by Parsons Global, and how many PHCs should be descope. The conference led to the plan for Parsons Global to complete 20 centers by April 3, 2006, and to descope the other 121 centers. According to GRD, it is exploring options to complete the remaining 121 PHCs.

**Conclusion.** Overall management of the primary healthcare centers construction projects could have been better executed from

**TWO CONSTRUCTION SITES PROVIDED BY THE IRAQI  
MINISTRY OF HEALTH FOR PUBLIC HEALTH CARE CLINICS**



Site 1: before remediation by Parsons



Site 1: after remediation by Parsons



Site 2: before remediation by Parsons



Site 2: after remediation by Parsons

March 25, 2004, to early July 2005. In July 2005, U.S. government management recognized that the PHC construction program was in trouble and began a series of actions that led to a reduction in the number of centers to be delivered from 150 to 20. Unfortunately, as a result, 121 centers remain partially complete. However, there is also a strong commitment among the Iraqi and U.S. government managers to complete the 121 partially completed centers. Both governments are developing a plan and attempting to identify the required funds to finalize these centers for the benefit of the Iraqi citizens. SIGIR made recommendations to assist in ensuring a successful completion of this desired goal. SIGIR also identified lessons learned for the improvement in managing large complex projects in the future.

#### **Recommendations.**

1. The IRMO Director should require IRMO management to take these actions:
  - Develop a Project Delivery Team to meet periodically and facilitate contract completion, in cooperation with JCC-I/A, GRD-PCO, and Parsons.
  - Develop a plan for pursuing the funding necessary to complete the project.
  - Develop a strong program management team, in partnership with the Iraqi Ministry of Health, to ensure completion of the 121 remaining centers.
2. The JCC-I/A Commanding General should require JCC-I/A management to take these actions:
  - For any future contracts awarded for completing the construction of the remaining centers, require that the contracting officer ensure that staff who have been delegated responsibility are properly trained.
3. The GRD Commanding General should require GRD-PCO sector management to take these actions:
  - Require that GRD personnel, who are responsible for traveling to the construction sites to record the information for the daily QA reports, are properly trained to perform this function.
  - Ensure that proper reporting mechanisms are established, maintained, and monitored for any delegation of program management to government or non-government staff.
  - Ensure that cost-to-complete and schedule performance reports are periodically validated by government managers and are reconciled to the quality assurance reports provided by independent staff.

**Additional Observations.** During the course of the review of the management of this construction contract, SIGIR noted areas where lessons learned may improve other contract oversight. SIGIR provided these specific suggestions:

- Maintain a log of contracting officers and dates of service in the contract file.
- Provide for a length of tour for government personnel that is sufficient to manage large and complex contracts.

- Seek bilateral agreements with the contractor as the norm and document exceptions with justifications including known and accepted risk. Senior leadership should review and approve these agreements.
- Conduct on-site inspections of proposed construction sites before selection and before definitization of task orders to minimize unknown risks of cost and schedule overruns.
- Ensure that contract performance reports include budgeted cost of work performed so that cost and schedule variances can be properly calculated.

**Management Comments.** *SIGIR received written comments on this report from GRD, JCC-I/A, and IRMO. JCC-I/A and GRD concurred with our recommendations. GRD, however, stated that the recommendations did not offer significant assistance to the organization and reconstruction effort. While SIGIR's recommendations address the need for proper training and better reporting, which are perennial problems in contract management, SIGIR believes they bear repeating given the magnitude of the problems encountered in managing this contract. GRD provided additional information on contractor problems and the actions it took and, SIGIR added this information to the report. IRMO did not directly respond to the SIGIR recommendations; instead, it stated that, with regard to the recommendations on developing project delivery teams and a strong program management team, that those matters are the responsibility of PCO. SIGIR's intent was*

*to have the key offices involved in the project work together to mutually resolve problems in constructing the PHCs, regardless of who leads the effort. IRMO's response underscores that at present, no one office has taken responsibility for this project. IRMO did not address the SIGIR recommendation to develop a plan for pursuing the funding necessary to complete the project.*

*In its written response to this report, GRD correctly noted that this audit was undertaken at the request of GRD-PCO and that the audit was coordinated with the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commander, MNF-I. SIGIR revised the report to reflect the origin of the audit. GRD also provided a detailed description of the problems encountered by both it and the contractor during the course of the contract, which are reprinted in their entirety in the Management Comments section of this report. According to GRD's description, the contractor encountered myriad problems, and from the beginning of the project, failed to meet various contract requirements due to numerous significant management and technical shortcomings. SIGIR agreed that there were early signs that the contractor would not or could not meet contract requirements and that these problems delayed project completion and escalated costs. JCC-I/A expressed these concerns to the contractor on several occasions in June and July 2005. However, it is the government's responsibility to oversee the contract and, given that the government was aware of problems with the project for quite some time, SIGIR believes that effective government contract oversight was not provided.*

### Development Fund for Iraq Cash Accountability Review: Joint Area Support Group-Central/Falluja

SIGIR-06-012, APRIL 2006

**Introduction.** This audit report is one of a series addressing controls over cash in Iraq. This audit report discusses the accountability for the DFI cash controlled by the JASG-C Comptroller, who also serves as the DFI Account Manager.

The DFI fund was established to meet:

- the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people
- the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq's infrastructure
- the continued disarmament of Iraq
- the costs of Iraqi civilian administration
- other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq

This particular audit addresses DFI cash held by the Division Level Agent (DLA) in Falluja, Iraq. DLA is responsible for issuing cash payments to designated entities (individuals and/or businesses) and for clearing their accounts with the JASG-C Disbursing Officer. The JASG-C Disbursing Officer maintains an accounting ledger of cash accountability that includes evidence of cash issued and receipts returned. Due to the availability of Electronic Funds Transfer, the DLA for Falluja, Iraq, no longer needs to maintain cash on site.

**Objective.** The overall audit objective was to provide assurance that DFI funds turned in by the Falluja DLA agreed with government records. It specifically looked at whether DoD policies and procedures for cash accountability and disposition were being complied with.

**Findings.** On March 30, 2006, SIGIR conducted an unannounced cash count, providing assurance that the \$7.2 million turned in by the Falluja DLA agreed with government records. The Falluja DLA was accountable for DFI cash assets and complied with the DoD requirements for the disposition of cash to the JASG-C Disbursing Officer. SIGIR found that the processes employed by the DLA and the JASG-C Disbursing Officer for completing, controlling, and maintaining accurate records for the cash (DFI/Falluja) and the clearing of cash account balances were acceptable.

**Recommendations.** SIGIR made no recommendations in this report.

### Briefing to the International Advisory and Monitoring Board for Iraq: Management Controls Over the Development Fund for Iraq

SIGIR-06-013, APRIL 2006

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, requires SIGIR to determine by follow-up and report semiannually on actions planned or taken to implement the recommendations made in SIGIR audit reports. This briefing, presented on April 5, 2006, provided the status of corrective actions taken in response to a series of audits conducted by SIGIR addressing the use of the DFI for Iraq relief and reconstruction activities. These recommendations were made to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, the JASG-C, and the JCC-I/A. Overall, these audit reports found a lack of control and accountability for contracts, grants, and cash transactions using the DFI and made recommendations for improvement.

**Background.** From May 2004 to September 2005, SIGIR conducted eight audits of contracts, grants, and small purchases using DFI. These were the overall findings:

- CPA had developed adequate policies and procedures to provide adequate controls over DFI.
- Compliance was the issue.
- Oversight of adherence to policy and procedures was not performed.

Of those audits:

- 6 identified significant material control weaknesses in controlling and accounting for Iraqi cash assets
- 40 recommendations were made for improving oversight and management of DFI funds

**Results.** SIGIR found that all recommendations were being implemented satisfactorily or are in the process of being implemented. Specifically, of the 40 recommendations, 23 were closed, and 17 had corrective actions underway or planned.

**Recommendations.** SIGIR made no recommendations in this follow-up report. SIGIR plans to review final implementation efforts in May 2006.

### **Iraqi Armed Forces Seized Assets Fund: Review of Contracts and Financial Documents**

SIGIR-06-015, APRIL 2006

**Introduction.** In response to a USAAA recommendation, MNSTC-I requested that SIGIR conduct a further review of MNSTC-I's

reconciliation of the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) Seized Assets Fund and associated financial disbursing documents to determine whether any issues warranted further investigation. SIGIR subsequently obtained custody of MNSTC-I's internal review workpapers and IAF Seized Assets Fund financial disbursing documents. JCC-I/A also maintains a centralized contract database, and SIGIR used information in this database to verify MNSTC-I's records.

**Objective.** The objective of this review was to determine whether the JCC-I/A centralized contract database contained complete records of Seized Assets Fund transactions.

**Findings.** JCC-I/A does not have complete records of Seized Assets Fund transactions. SIGIR identified numerous documents in MNSTC-I's records that were not in JCC-I/A's database, and vice versa. Discrepancies included missing contracts, contract numbers, and supporting invoices. SIGIR analysis of the combined records found payments exceeding documentation limits, potential overpayments, and potential de-obligations. We also reported separately on our review of the status of documentation maintained by MNSTC-I for the reconciliation of IAF seized assets.

**Indications of Potential Fraud.** During this review, SIGIR also noted indications of potential fraud and referred those matters to the SIGIR Assistant Inspector General for Investigations for action. Related investigations are continuing.

**Management Actions.** During the review, SIGIR noted that MNSTC-I had initiated

training for its paying officers and developed standard operating procedures and other guidance that, if implemented and enforced, could address many of the problems discussed in this report. However, SIGIR did not address the effectiveness of these changes within the scope of this review.

**Recommendations.** SIGIR recommended that the JCC-I/A Commanding General, in cooperation with the MNSTC-I Commanding General, take these actions:

- Establish a plan and process and hand over original and copies of contract documents and files to best meet the requirements for complete and accurate records for both organizations.
- Review related contracting and payment actions in light of newly turned-over documents and files to determine the extent that previously completed payment, contract close outs, and other related actions should be reconsidered.
- Take action to recover any overpayments or payments to wrong contractors.
- Take action to de-obligate any remaining funds that remain available for better use.

**Management Comments.** *JCC-I/A and MNSTC-I officials concurred with the finding and recommendations. Actions are underway to implement the recommendations, and the comments received are fully responsive.*

### **Interim Audit Report on the Review of the Equipment Purchased for Primary Healthcare Centers Associated with Parsons Global Services, Contract Number W914NS-04-D-0006**

SIGIR-06-016, APRIL 4, 2006

This interim audit report is provided to alert management to concerns SIGIR noted on the accountability for and utilization of the \$70 million of medical equipment procured by Parsons Global for the PHC construction project. SIGIR is reporting these concerns in an interim report to provide management timely information and the opportunity to take corrective actions. This can reduce the risk of accountability shortfalls and ineffective use of the procured medical equipment because certain events may occur before our final report is issued.

**Objectives.** Our overall audit objectives are to determine whether medical equipment acquired by Parsons Global is properly accounted for and to identify the impact of descoping the PHCs contract on the medical equipment.

**Background.** The contract required Parsons to procure 151 medical equipment sets to equip 150 healthcare centers that Parsons was to build, and to equip one medical Teaching Academy (which was to be constructed by other than Parsons). The cost of this equipment was approximately \$70 million. However, the construction part of the contract was descoped by 9 PHCs in September 2005, and then further descoped by an additional 121

PHCs on March 6, 2006, leaving only 20 centers to be completed by Parsons. In addition, the Teaching Academy was never constructed. Unfortunately, due to the timing of the descoping of the construction, the number of medical equipment sets Parsons was to procure was not descoped and Parsons has already procured and plans to deliver all 151 medical equipment sets to the U.S. government by the end of April 2006. This will leave the U.S. government with a total of 131 medical equipment sets more than required to equip the 20 PHCs currently completed or expected to be completed within the next 30 days.

**Planning for Equipment Acceptance, Storage, and Use.** There is no formal written plan as to what specifically will be done with the 131 excess medical equipment sets to be delivered by Parsons Global in April 2006. In discussions with JCC-I/A, GRD-PCO, and IRMO representatives responsible for equipment acceptance, storage, and usage, SIGIR received contradictory information as to where the excess medical equipment would be delivered and stored and how the equipment would be turned over to the U.S. government. SIGIR also found differences in the number of equipment sets that Parsons Global planned to deliver and what GRD-PCO expected would be delivered to specific storage locations.

During the audit, SIGIR revealed many of these discrepancies and received verbal confirmation that the equipment acceptance and storage issues were being worked with all concerned. Further, SIGIR was told that measures would be fully coordinated and implemented

to ensure accountability and effective utilization. Personnel with each of the U.S. government activities involved (IRMO, JCC-I/A, and GRD-PCO) are doing their best within their respective lanes of responsibility/authority to address the issues. However, without an overall coordinated plan on how the medical equipment will be accepted, stored, secured and used, there is no assurance that individual plans will succeed in providing effective and efficient accountability and use of the medical equipment sets. As the direct liaison to the Iraqi government, IRMO should take the lead in developing and coordinating a formal plan for the overall storage and use of the medical equipment sets.

**Recommendations.** SIGIR did not make recommendations in this interim report. No response to this interim report was required, but SIGIR will follow up on the concerns raised in this report and management actions in response to these concerns as the audit continues.

## Draft Reports Issued

SIGIR had one draft audit as of the reporting date.

### Survey of the Status of Funding for Iraq Programs Allocated to the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, as of December 31, 2005

SIGIR-06-018

This is a joint survey by the DoS OIG and SIGIR of funding for Iraqi-related activities

by the Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). This survey was performed in support of the DoS OIG's continuing responsibility to assist management through independent reviews of DoS operations. The primary objectives were to: (1) identify funding received and expended by INL that was earmarked for Iraq, and (2) evaluate INL accounting procedures for those funds. The survey scope covered funding received, obligated, and expended from October 1, 2002, through December 31, 2005.

## Ongoing Audits

### Review of Administrative Task Orders (ATOs)

SIGIR-2005-19

The objectives of this audit are to determine:

- To what extent did ATOs accomplish their intended purpose—to capture the design-build contractors' fixed administrative costs for the total indefinite delivery order? (Contract audits will also determine whether those information systems were adequately reliable and sufficiently coordinated among those organizations to ensure accurate, complete, and timely reporting to senior government officials and Congress on the use of IRRF funds.)
- To what extent did the de-scoping of projects impact the necessity for certain administrative costs included in the ATO?
- To what extent did increased or decreased periods of contract/task order performance

impact the value of ATO cost, and to what extent did ATOs vary from one design-build contractor to another?

### Survey of the Program, Contract, and Financial Management Systems and Reporting for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF)

SIGIR-2005-24

The objectives of this survey are to obtain sufficient information on the program, contract, and financial management processes, systems, and transaction-level data maintained to understand the management information available. SIGIR will also obtain information on the official reporting requirements from each of the U.S. government agencies that administer IRRF.

SIGIR will use the results of this survey to develop specific audit plans to evaluate the effectiveness of controls and the accuracy and timeliness of reconciliations of the budget authorities, fund allocations, disbursements, and contract actions that comprise the majority of IRRF monies. Each audit will be announced with specific objectives.

### Analysis of Risk in Contracting Methods Used for Iraq Reconstruction Projects

SIGIR-2005-25

The overall objective of this audit is to obtain sufficient information on the procurement processes, contract management, and financial management relating to design-build and direct contracting to perform a comparative analysis of the alternative contracting methods

and to identify the risks associated with these methods. Further, we intend to identify lessons learned on the uses of these contract methods in Iraq.

### **Reconstruction Transition to Iraq Government Management**

SIGIR-6003

SIGIR will ask these questions in this review:

- Do U.S. reconstruction management offices in Iraq have strategic plans in place for transitioning their respective parts of the reconstruction program?
- Are there sufficient resources to operate and maintain new U.S.-provided plants and equipment?
- Have Iraqi officials sufficiently planned and budgeted for the essential maintenance of the new U.S.-provided infrastructure?
- How will the pace of reconstruction and project completion affect transition?

### **Review of the Use of Definitization of Contracts Supporting the Reconstruction in Iraq**

SIGIR-6005

This audit will determine whether contracts funded by the IRRF (including letter contracts and task orders) are being definitized on time and whether the definitization process complied with applicable regulations, policies, and procedures.

### **Review of Close-out Processes and Procedures for IRRF Contracts**

SIGIR-6006

This audit will determine whether contracts funded by IRRF (including task orders, grants, and cooperative agreements) are being closed out on time and whether they comply with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 4.804 1(a) and other applicable regulations, policies, and procedures.

### **Review of the Advanced First Responders Network**

SIGIR-6008

This audit will determine if responsible personnel efficiently and effectively managed the Advanced First Responders Network (AFRN) project, which was created to provide Iraqi police, fire, and emergency medical units with a core national public safety communication, command, and control system. More specifically, SIGIR plans to answer these questions:

- Does the AFRN provide effective emergency communications for the Iraqi police, fire, and medical departments?
- Did U.S. government officials properly definitize the AFRN task orders and ensure that equipment purchases and contractor services were within the scope of the contract?
- Were assets purchased for the AFRN properly accounted for, controlled, supported, and transferred to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior?
- Are U.S. government plans and funding in place to sustain the AFRN pending the

Iraqi government's assumption of those responsibilities, and did U.S. officials provide the responsible Iraqi ministry with sufficient information on operations and maintenance support requirements?

### **Review of Infrastructure Protection**

SIGIR-6009

This audit will determine the extent to which U.S. efforts to increase the capacity of the Iraqi government to protect its critical oil and electricity infrastructure are measurable and are meeting U.S. and Iraqi requirements. More specifically, SIGIR plans to answer these questions:

- To what extent can the government of Iraq perform independently to protect its oil and electricity infrastructure?
- What support is the United States providing to the Iraqi government to improve its capability to protect its oil and electricity infrastructure?
- What does available data indicate about attacks on Iraqi infrastructure, including the types of infrastructure attacked, the level of attacks, and the trend in attacks?

### **Review of U.S. Government Organizations' Roles and Responsibilities for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Activities**

SIGIR-6012

This audit will determine the roles and responsibilities for each principal U.S. government organization that has programmatic, operational, and/or financial stewardship of relief and reconstruction activities in Iraq. Specifi-

cally, SIGIR will answer these questions:

- Which U.S. government organizations have been authorized to perform a role in Iraq relief and reconstruction activities?
- What are the authorized roles and responsibilities of each organization and their relationship to other organizations?
- How do these organizations coordinate policies, procedures, and activities with each other?
- Of the U.S. government organizations that do not have principal roles and responsibilities, which have provided staff to Iraq relief and reconstruction activities?
- What amount and type of funding was provided to each organization and for what purpose?
- What performance reporting does each organization produce, to whom, and how often?
- What event triggers the cessation or transfer of each organization's mission relating to Iraq relief and reconstruction activities?

### **Audit of the Equipment and Supplies Purchased for the Primary Healthcare Centers Associated with Parsons Delaware, Contract Number W914NS-D-0006**

SIGIR-6013

This audit will determine whether medical equipment and supplies associated with PHCs, Parsons Delaware, Contract Number W914NS-04-D-0006, are properly accounted for, and identify the impact of the descoping of construction of the PHCs. As of February 26, 2006,

the USACE Financial Management System shows that \$62.3 million has been obligated, of which \$53.5 million has been expended for medical equipment and supplies to equip the originally planned PHCs under this contract. The audit will also answer these questions:

- Where are the medical equipment and supplies currently located, and which organizations maintain physical control of the assets?
- How and when will the U.S. government transfer the equipment?
- What are the “lessons learned” from the management and execution of the non-construction process and practice related to this contract?

### **Survey of the U.S. Embassy-Iraq Anticorruption Program**

SIGIR-6011

SIGIR and DoS OIG are initiating a survey of the subject program. The survey will concentrate primarily on the following questions:

- Who are the U.S. government agencies participating in the anticorruption program in Iraq, and do they have a coordinated strategic plan with identified goals?
- Have program outcomes and metrics been established to measure progress and success?
- Have organizational roles and responsibilities been clearly identified and resources provided to meet the program goals?

### **Review of the Basrah Pediatric Facility (Hospital) Project**

SIGIR-6016

This review will evaluate the effectiveness of the government project management and the contracting team in the performance of this project. SIGIR will also assess the management control over this project by USAID, IRMO, and others as appropriate. Specifically, SIGIR will answer the following questions:

- Does USAID have effective policies, procedures, and management controls in place to achieve expected project outcomes?
- Does USAID have adequate financial controls in place to effectively monitor the project and to collect and report on cost to complete?
- Does the management reporting process in place by USAID and IRMO ensure effective transparency of project cost, schedule and performance?

### **Planned Audits**

SIGIR will conduct performance audits that assess the economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and results of Iraq reconstruction programs and operations as necessary. These audits will be accomplished through individual audit projects of specific issues, as well as an audit series that will evaluate several components of related topics. Each of these audits will be announced before the start of any audit field work. For the full text of the Audit Plan, see the SIGIR Web site: [www.sigir.mil](http://www.sigir.mil).



## SIGIR INSPECTIONS

This quarter, SIGIR inspection teams continued to conduct inspections and assessments of reconstruction projects throughout Iraq to determine and report on the adequacy of work planned and accomplished. SIGIR has now completed 42 project assessments and 97 limited on-site inspections.

The growing visibility of SIGIR is having a positive impact throughout Iraq. Contractors and subcontractors are well aware that their project sites are subject to on-site inspections by SIGIR teams with limited advance notice, and this promotes efficiencies.

Many of the projects that SIGIR assessed this quarter were of high quality and showed good controls and quality assurance programs. Some SIGIR assessments show that certain contractor performance continues to be a problem. At several project sites, contractor-required quality control and government quality assurance programs were inadequate. Deficient concrete construction continues to be a major concern at a number of projects.

These are the projects that SIGIR assessed this quarter and an overview of the results.

### Project Assessments: Findings at a Glance

#### Five Primary Health Care Centers (\$2.7 million)

- These projects will not meet the objectives.
- These projects had inadequate contractor quality control.
- These projects had inadequate government quality assurance.

- These projects had concrete deficiencies that may potentially result in safety issues.

#### Fire Station New Construction (\$1.3 million)

- This project should meet its objective.
- There are unresolved concrete quality and structural issues.
- The project had an adequate contractor quality control program and government quality assurance.

#### Aviation Base Building (\$2.25 million)

- This project met its objectives, and the building is in use.
- The government quality control was inadequate.
- The project had poor-quality electrical, plumbing, and finishing work.

#### Ninewa Village Roads (\$0.92 million)

- This project should meet its objective.
- The design was not sufficient.
- Contractor quality control was inadequate.
- Government quality assurance was adequate.

#### Zakho Military Academy (\$5.8 million), Erbil City Transformers (\$3.4 million), Primary School Dahuk (\$0.4 million), New 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Base (\$114.0 million), and Air Traffic Control Tower (\$10.3 million)

- All five projects should meet their objectives.
- Contractor quality control was adequate.
- Government quality assurance was adequate.

- Design was sufficient for all projects.
- Quality was within contract requirements.

## Limited On-site Inspections

### 17 New Border Posts

- The quality of concrete is a concern.
- SIGIR found a lack of retaining walls.
- Of the 17 projects, 7 lacked perimeter security.

### 5 MNSTC-I Border Forts

- No documentation is available regarding the contracts, statements of work, or designs.
- All five were of poor quality renovation and showed no signs of recent maintenance.

### 3 Educational Facilities

- SIGIR found poor quality in certain areas.
- SIGIR found substandard material.
- The renovation was not comprehensive.

### 6 Medical Facilities

- SIGIR found no significant issues.

### 21 Public Safety Projects

- SIGIR found many electrical, plumbing, and finishing quality deficiencies.

### 3 Transportation Projects

- SIGIR found no significant issues.

## Approach to Assessment

During this quarter, SIGIR teams assessed 13 project sites. To accomplish these assessments, the teams gathered contractual specifications,

traveled to the project sites, examined on-site efforts and accomplishments, and reviewed their results with reconstruction managers. Each assessment team consisted of an engineer and auditor.

While the assessment teams were conducting project assessments and summarizing the results of limited ground project surveys, other SIGIR personnel were conducting preliminary assessments of 42 additional construction projects. SIGIR shares this information with project management staff to select projects for more in-depth assessments.

During the second quarter of 2005, SIGIR established a satellite imagery operation to conduct analyses on projects that are remote or inaccessible because of security concerns. This operation also assists the project assessment teams with preliminary research of site progress. This quarter, SIGIR continued to expand its satellite imagery operation, conducting 58 imagery assessments of sites throughout Iraq. The SIGIR Satellite Imagery Group conducted these 58 imagery assessments with assistance from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC).

## Planning

SIGIR selected from each of the major sectors a cross-section of projects to assess, survey, and analyze, including:

- projects involving water, electricity, oil, facilities and transportation
- projects involving large and small contract amounts

- projects of different general contractors
- projects in different sections of the country
- projects in programs of each of the major U.S. agencies
- projects that were fully completed and partly completed
- construction and non-construction projects

### On-site Project Assessment Program Approach

Since it was created in June 2005, SIGIR Inspections has completed 42 project assessments. During this quarter, SIGIR inspected and completed assessments of 13 project sites. These were the general objectives of the project assessments:

- Were project results consistent with the original objectives?
- Were project components adequately designed before construction or installation?
- Did construction or rehabilitation adequately meet the standards of the design?
- Were the contractor's quality control plan and the U.S. government's quality assurance program adequately carried out?
- Were project sustainability and operational effectiveness adequately addressed?

Table 3-2 lists project assessments completed this quarter. Table 3-3 lists project assessments completed in previous quarters. Figure 3-1 shows the approximate location of each project in Iraq.

### SIGIR Project Assessments

#### Primary Healthcare Centers

##### Near Kirkuk, Iraq

SIGIR-PA-06-42—06-46

The October 2005 SIGIR Quarterly Report to Congress highlighted a project assessment (SIGIR-PA-2005-016) of a single primary healthcare center (PHC) in Hillah. That assessment showed significant construction and quality assurance problems. At the time of the visit, corrective action had not been proposed or approved. The contractor stated that it was developing procedures to increase quality control for concrete. The contractor, PCO, and USACE were working to develop corrective actions. Although only one clinic was assessed at that time, the Prime Contractor was responsible for 142 clinics nationwide.


Based on the results of SIGIR-PA-2005-016, SIGIR assessed five more clinics in February 2006 to determine the extent of construction and quality control issues. The SIGIR team visited five PHC construction sites in February 2006. The reported cost for these five projects was \$2.7 million. The original objective was to provide public health sector facilities and employment to the Iraqi people and more specifically, to construct PHCs in northern Iraq to increase health care to the Iraqi population.

THIRTEEN PROJECTS ASSESSED IN THIS QUARTER (DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)

PCO ID	PROJECT NAME	GOVERNORATE	BUDGETED TOTAL COST	EXECUTING AGENCY	CONTRACTOR	GRD REGION
12637	Mosul Airport—Air Traffic Control Tower Rehab	Ninewa	\$10,329	GRD	Foreign	North
17846	Ninewa Village Roads Segment 3	Ninewa	\$920	GRD	Foreign	North
6176	Ainkawa Fire Station	Erbil	\$1,392	GRD	Parsons Global Services, Inc.	North
5623	Erbil City Transformers	Erbil	\$3,372	GRD	Washington International, Inc.	North
18922	Sheile Primary School	Dahuk	\$401	GRD	Foreign	North
19144	Zakho—Military Academy	Dahuk	\$5,591	GRD	Foreign	North
11937	Public Health Care Clinic Type A at Shiqaq Hai Musalla	Tameem	\$608	GRD	Parsons Delaware, Inc.	North
11936	Public Health Care Clinic Type A at Hai Alhajjaj	Tameem	\$608	GRD	Parsons Delaware, Inc.	North
11940	Public Health Care Clinic Type A at Hai Alasra Wa Al Mafqoodeen	Tameem	\$648	GRD	Parsons Delaware, Inc.	North
11939	Public Health Care Clinic Type A at Hai Al Wasity	Tameem	\$648	GRD	Parsons Delaware, Inc.	North
11938	Public Health Care Clinic Type B at Hai Tis'een	Tameem	\$734	GRD	Parsons Delaware, Inc.	North
23160	New Second Brigade Base	Tameem	\$114,000	AFCEE	Environmental Chemical Corporation	North
20645	Aviation Base Building	Tameem	\$13,200	AFCEE	Environmental Chemical Corporation	North

TABLE 3-2

Figure 3-1  
APPROXIMATE LOCATIONS OF  
PROJECT ASSESSMENTS



## THE 29 PROJECTS ASSESSED IN PREVIOUS QUARTERS (DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)

PCO ID	PROJECT NAME	GOVERNORATE	BUDGETED TOTAL COST	EXECUTING AGENCY	CONTRACTOR	GRD REGION
19158	Hillah SWAT Facility	Babylon	\$2,219	GRD	Foreign	South
18427	Seif Sa'ad Police Station	Babylon	\$153	GRD	Foreign	South
12883	Border Post–As Sul #37– Bnawasuta-Issawa	Sulaymaniyah	\$272	GRD	Parsons Delaware	North
12787	Border Post–As Sul #29– Kuralau Bnaw-Azmik	Sulaymaniyah	\$275	GRD	Parsons Delaware	North
12840	Border Post–As Sul #20–Marwa	Sulaymaniyah	\$272	GRD	Parsons Delaware	North
12855	Border Post–As Sul #23– Bargurd-Safrah	Sulaymaniyah	\$272	GRD	Parsons Delaware	North
18638	Military Base Um Qasr–Ammo Supply Point	Basrah	\$253	GRD	Foreign	South
21196	Operation Center and Security	Basrah	\$1,175	GRD	Foreign	South
21304	Port of Umm Qasr Security Upgrades	Basrah	\$3,747	GRD	Foreign	South
19071	Project Phoenix–Restore Qudas Gas Turbines	Baghdad	\$11,391	PCO	FluorAmec	Central
Life Support Contract	Al Hillah Police Academy–CN W914NS- 04-C-9046	Babylon	\$9,135	JCC-I/A	Foreign	South
4 DFI Contracts	Karbala Library	Karbala	\$1,294	CPA (South Central)	Global Business Group	South
3532	Al Wahda Water Treatment Plant	Baghdad	\$4,712	PCO	FluorAmec	Central
3529	Al Wathba Water Treatment Pant	Baghdad	\$8,698	PCO	FluorAmec	Central
18462	Al Nahrwan Water Supply Project	Baghdad	\$348	GRD	Foreign	Central
18079	Al Sumelat Water Network	Baghdad	\$764	PCO	SIMA International	Central
1654	Al Hakamia Substation	Basrah	\$5,934	PCO	Perini Corporation	Central
1657	Hamdan Substation	Basrah	\$5,001	PCO	Perini Corporation	Central
1655	Al Kaffat Substation	Basrah	\$5,934	PCO	Perini Corporation	Central
1656	Al Seraji Substation	Basrah	\$5,709	PCO	Perini Corporation	Central

PCO ID	PROJECT NAME	GOVERNORATE	BUDGETED TOTAL COST	EXECUTING AGENCY	CONTRACTOR	GRD REGION
1659	Shut Al Arab Substation	Basrah	\$5,298	PCO	Perini Corporation	Central
18183	Al Fathah Pipe Crossing	Tameem	\$29,715	PCO	Parson PJIV	North
18185	Kirkuk Canal Crossing	Tameem	\$2,088	PCO	Parson PJIV	North
19604	Al Fathah River Crossing Tie-ins	Tameem	\$8,156	PCO	Parson PJIV	North
19250	Al Balda Police Station	Babylon	\$135	GRD	Foreign	South
13607	Al Hillah Maternity and Children's Hospital	Babylon	\$7,414	PCO	Parsons Global Services	South
11812	Al Imam Primary Care Center	Babylon	\$533	PCO	Parsons Delaware	South
21950	Babil Railway Station	Babylon	\$274	PCO	Foreign	South
DFI	Horizontal Drilling	Tameem	\$75,500	GRD-PCO	KBR	North

TABLE 3-3

### What We Found

SIGIR concluded that project results were not consistent with original objectives in view of these facts:

- The five PHCs SIGIR assessed were far from complete and were poorly constructed.
- Construction deficiencies raised questions about the safety of occupancy of the structures.
- SIGIR was informed that the contract for PHC construction was to be terminated,

and that only 20 of the original 150 PHCs were to be completed under the contract.<sup>11</sup>

- The five PHCs that SIGIR assessed were not to be included in the 20 PHCs to be completed under the modified contract.

The construction did not meet the international standards required by the contract. SIGIR documented several areas of inferior quality construction during the on-site inspections. Inadequate quality control and quality assurance on the part of the contractor and

the U.S. government, respectively, resulted in not properly identifying and correcting construction deficiencies. At the time of the SIGIR inspections, the projects consisted of concrete columns, beams, ceiling slabs, x-ray room walls, and stairwells. Reinforced concrete did not appear to be constructed to contract specifications and needed to be evaluated to determine whether corrective actions were required. Corrective action pro-



Reinforced load-bearing column out of plumb

cedures have not been submitted or completed, even though the quality assurance representative for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) documented concrete deficiencies.

SIGIR identified concrete segregation, voids, rebar exposure on the surface of the load-bearing reinforced concrete ceiling beams, and columns with chipped concrete. A reinforced load-bearing column was noticeably out of plumb. Also, SIGIR identified many defects in workmanship of the non-load-bearing walls, such as gaps in the walls and improper and uneven brick placement. Instead of correcting each defect, the walls were plastered over with gypsum. In one instance, a concrete stairwell was in place; however, the workmanship of the concrete was poor. The surface was uneven, small pieces of the stairs were chipped off, and concrete segregation was visible on the side and underneath the stairwell. Furthermore, a lintel—a load-bearing support above windows and doors—was not properly installed.

In addition to the construction deficiencies observed, the contractor quality control plan and the government quality assurance plan were not adequate. The contract specified requirements for a contractor quality control plan and procedures, which the contractor submitted. However, the quality control daily reports were generic. They lacked any site-specific or task-specific details or details of the subcontractors' job qualifications, and test plans did not contain a subcontractor organizational chart.

The daily quality control reports were inadequate and did not disclose concrete issues that



Concrete segregation on underside of reinforced concrete stairwell

Segregation of load-bearing reinforced concrete ceiling beam





Example of concrete block work for non-load-bearing walls

Improperly installed lintel



could require corrective actions. Additionally, the contractor did not have quality control deficiency logs for four of the five PHCs, and the one deficiency log that was available did not provide sufficient information to ensure that the potential construction deficiencies that were detected were evaluated and properly corrected quickly. Further, the quality assurance program was inadequate. USACE did not provide adequate oversight. These are some examples of the inadequate oversight:

- insufficient daily quality assurance reports to document the identification and correction of concrete issues
- lack of independence
- insufficient review of contractor invoices before payment

In response to our draft report, USACE noted that the objectives, conclusions, and recommendations were inconsistent. And, while disagreeing with statements made in the draft report and opining that SIGIR had not adequately considered the security situation in Iraq, the USACE allowed that the report contained valid points, but that recommendations should be directed only to the five PHCs reviewed by SIGIR. The USACE did not concur with the recommendations because they addressed the entire PHC program.

SIGIR will work with USACE representatives to resolve areas of dispute. However, in view of the termination of the task orders for the construction of 141 PHCs (with only 20 to be completed), SIGIR continues to believe that



New headquarters building

recommendations that address the entire PHC program are appropriate.

### **Zakho Military Academy**

SIGIR-PA-06-039

The Zakho Military Academy project included building renovation work, as well as the construction of new buildings and other facilities with a contract cost of \$5.8 million. When assessed, the project was reported as 96% complete. Specifically, the project consisted of the renovation of the existing training building, two dining facilities, and the Academy's swimming pool. The project also included construction of a headquarters building, a barracks, a water treatment plant and distribution system, a wastewater treatment plant and collection system, a three-kilometer extension of the perimeter security wall, a track and soccer field, an obstacle course, a concrete parade field with stadium lighting, and the development of a water well.

### **What We Found**

The assessment team found that the construction and renovation project results were consistent with the original task order objectives. All project components were adequately designed prior to construction. The plans and specifications provided an accurate depiction and adaptation of the design to existing site conditions.

The government quality assurance program was effective in monitoring the contractor's quality control program. The USACE project engineer and the quality assurance representative ensured that all deficiencies cited during quality assurance inspections were corrected. The quality assurance representative also maintained daily quality assurance reports that contained project specific information to document construction progress and highlight deficiencies.

The assessment team found that the construction and equipment installation workmanship was of high quality. A major factor

contributing to the success of the project was that the USACE project engineer and quality assurance representative lived and worked at the military academy and were fully engaged in daily construction activities to ensure quality and compliance with the task order requirements.

#### **Sustainability**

In addition, sustainability was adequately addressed in the task order requirements, particularly for the water and wastewater treatment plants. They were designed as “packaged plants” for simplicity in operation and maintenance. The design also required manufacturer’s training on the plants’ components, as well as a spare parts list, and operations and maintenance manuals.

#### **Air Traffic Control Tower and Navigational Aids—Mosul, Iraq**

SIGIR-PA-06-034

The project scope included the construction of an Air Traffic Control (ATC) Tower facility, including an 8-level, 25-meter-high tower structure and an adjoining 2-story administration building at the Mosul Airport. The navigational and visual aids part of the project included construction and the installation of equipment such as the Doppler VHF Omni Directional Radio Range with Distance Measuring Equipment, Glide Slope/Precision Approach Path Indicator, and a High Intensity Approach Lighting System at each end of the runway. Also, the other major part of the project scope was an upgrade of the electrical distribution system. The objective of the upgrade was to provide reliable electrical power for



Swimming pool with new barracks in the background at Zahko Military Academy



Packaged wastewater treatment plant at Zahko Military Academy

the ATC facility, navigational aids, and airfield lighting systems by building in redundancy with the electrical power grid at the airport, and by installing emergency backup electrical generators.

### **What We Found**

The PCO database reported the project as 46% complete at the time of the assessment. The SIGIR assessment team found that this \$10.3 million project is being constructed in a manner that is consistent with the contract objectives and in accordance with the plans and specifications. The team concluded that the project components were adequately designed, and construction and installation of the ATC Tower and navigational and visual aids should meet the standards of the design.

A significant positive factor contributing to the high-quality workmanship on the project included the contractor's concrete operations. The amount of concrete needed to construct the facility necessitated the utilization of materials, equipment, and processes that could produce consistent mix proportions when batching concrete. The contractor erected its own batch plant, drilled and developed a well for a ready supply of water for concrete, and set up a concrete materials testing lab. The contractor's process controls at the batch plant and their active testing program resulted in the production of high-quality structural concrete for the ATC Tower facility.

The high-quality workmanship can also be attributed to the government's quality assur-

ance program. The USACE quality assurance representatives were on site every day in managing the project, spending a significant amount of their time at project sites, interacting with the contractor, and observing construction activities. Although much of the project work was taking place on or near the active runway and taxiway, the quality assurance representatives closely coordinated with airport operations personnel to ensure the contract work could proceed with minimal impact to air operations.

### **Sustainability**

The assessment team also found that sustainability was adequately addressed in the task order requirements. The task order required warranties on installed equipment and operations for a 12-month period, as well as operations and maintenance manuals, spare parts list, and classroom and hands-on training.

### **Ninewa Village Roads, Ninewa, Iraq**

SIGIR-PA-2006-035

A SIGIR assessment team conducted a site inspection of a village roads project approximately 25 kilometers (km) east of the city of Mosul. The specific objective was to convert 16 km of dirt roads to six meter (m) wide, two-lane paved roads from the village of Nimrud to the village of Balawat and from the village of Balawat to the village of Al Hamdaniya. This \$920,000 project required construction of a 10 centimeter (cm) asphalt concrete road surface



Mosul ATC Tower at the time of SIGIR assessment



Concrete batch plant to mix concrete



Asphalt concrete pavement near village of Balawat

layer over a 30 cm thick aggregate base. The project also required constructing 1.75 m soil shoulders, and the construction of reinforced concrete pipe culverts and the extension of existing box culverts.

At the time of the SIGIR assessment, the project was reported to be 67% complete. When completed, the project should meet and be consistent with the original contract objectives, if current construction methods are continued. The completed project should result in a paved two-lane asphalt concrete road connecting the villages of Al Hamdaniya, Balawat, and Nimrud.

## What We Found

Although construction appeared to meet the standards, the SIGIR team found problems with the design drawings. The design included only basic cut-and-fill roadway cross-sections, typical details on reinforced concrete pipe culverts, curbs, and retaining walls, but no details on box culverts. Further, there were no drawings showing the plan views of the road-



Extension of existing box culvert

way or culvert locations. In addition, although the contract required compliance with the Iraq Standard Specifications for Roads and Bridges, the USACE Resident Engineer Office did not have a copy.

These problems notwithstanding, all work observed appeared to be consistent with the intent of the project. A major reason the project stayed “on target” was that the USACE resident engineer and the quality assurance representative were experienced with road construction and effectively monitored and supervised the construction efforts of the contractor.



Honeycombing and exposed rebar in concrete—photo provided by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers



Honeycombing after surface coating



Close-up of honeycomb area

### Fire Station Construction, Ainkawa, Iraq SIGIR-PA-2006-036

The project objective was the design and construction of a fire station in Ainkawa, Iraq in order to provide emergency fire protection services needed in an underserved area within the Erbil governorate. The fire station is a 1,020

square meter, four level building constructed with structural reinforced concrete (columns, beams, slabs, and shear walls) and block walls finished with a painted cement-sand exterior coating. The fire station was designed to house three fire trucks, as well as two sport utility vehicles. The design also included a training room, berthing areas for 20 firefighters, a kitchen and dining room for 30 people, office space, bathrooms, and storage space.

#### What We Found

At the time of the SIGIR assessment, the project was reported as 49% complete. Almost all of the structural concrete columns, beams, shear walls, floor and roof slabs were constructed and most of the exterior and interior concrete block walls had been completed.

This \$1.3 million project has three unresolved issues associated with the design and construction that required management attention. Two of the three pertain to the concrete construction. The structural concrete had problems with honeycombing<sup>12</sup> and exposed rebar in columns and shear walls, particularly in locations on the first level. As a result, there are concerns regarding the structural integrity of the building. The contractor conducted



Exterior view of the Ainkawa Fire Station

ultrasound testing of the structural elements (columns, beams, and shear walls) in attempting to determine their strength, which was then analyzed by the contractor's structural engineering consultant. Although the government requested the contractor to certify that the structural elements had achieved full design strength, no certification of the contractor's testing and analysis had been submitted.

The other concrete issue is related to the corrective action taken by the contractor to repair the honeycomb areas. The contractor repaired these areas utilizing a rich cement-sand patch, instead of using a recommended epoxy grout patching material to repair the voids. It remains a durability issue that must be resolved by USACE and the contractor.

The third unresolved issue pertains to the responsibility for driveway, sidewalk, and perimeter wall construction. According to the language of the task order and the 30% design submission, the contractor was responsible for constructing driveways, sidewalks, and perimeter walls. However, based on the assessment team's review of the 90% design and discussions with the contractor, these items have been removed from the Scope of Work (SOW). The driveways, sidewalks, and perimeter walls are integral to a complete and usable facility. If they are not the contractor's responsibility to construct, the Iraq Ministry of Interior needs to be informed so the Ministry will have enough lead time to plan and construct them.

As a result of these three unsettled issues, the assessment team could not conclude

whether the fire station, when completed, will meet the original project objectives.

### **Erbil City Transformers, Erbil, Iraq**

SIGIR-PA-06-037

The Erbil City Transformer project was one of 14 ongoing or completed electrical distribution system improvement projects within the Erbil governorate. The scope of the Erbil City Transformer project included the upgrade of the existing electrical distribution system by installing and connecting 144 three-phase, 11kV-400V/230V transformers on existing or new H-poles in various areas within the Erbil



Transformer and low voltage electrical distribution panel



Preparing fuse cutouts on H-pole prior to setting



11kV-400V/230V transformers at contractor's storage facility

governorate, as well as providing new electrical distribution service to, and from, the new transformers. The project construction involved the placement of 428 new galvanized steel poles, stringing and connecting low and medium voltage overhead aluminum conductors and cable, and the installation of platform mounted 11kV-400V/230V transformers and low voltage distribution panels on the H-poles.

#### **What We Found**

This project has a cost of more than \$3.4 million. At the time of our assessment, the project was reported as 55%

complete. The assessment team found that the project results will very likely be consistent with the original objectives, because the design and construction practices conformed to the requirements. During the site visit, our team observed good construction practices and effective project management.

The government quality assurance program was effective in monitoring the contractor's quality control program and construction activities. In addition, the USACE resident engineer and quality assurance representative ensured that all deficiencies cited during quality assurance inspections were corrected. Further, quality assurance reports contained project specific information to document construction progress and highlight deficiencies and were supplemented with detailed photographs that reinforced the narrative information provided in the reports.

If current construction practices are continued, the existing electrical distribution system in Erbil will be significantly improved because of the upgrades and added service provided by this project.

### **Sustainability**

Sustainability was adequately addressed in the task order requirements. The task order required a 12-month warranty on all equipment and operations and required the contractor to provide all as-built drawings, preventive maintenance plans and operations, and maintenance manuals for installed equipment, which included the 11kV–400V/230V transformers. These will be provided to the Erbil

Governorate Ministry of Industry and Energy upon completion of the project.

### **Primary School, Dahuk, Iraq**

SIGIR-PS-2006-038

SIGIR assessed the construction of a 12-classroom primary school in Dahuk, Iraq.

The SIGIR assessment team determined that the completed project will be consistent with contract plans and specifications. The design of the school was based on an existing UN design for primary schools used during the Oil-for-Food program. The school, when completed, is expected to accommodate approximately 800 students from first to sixth grades. The teaching staff is expected to range from 35 to 38 teachers.

The project included construction of the main school building and an auxiliary building containing bathrooms for students and a room for concessionaire operation. The project also included a paved basketball court, a play area, a garden area, and a generator building.

### **What We Found**

At the time of the SIGIR assessment, the project was reported to be 80% complete and was budgeted at \$401,000 for construction cost. The main school building containing the classrooms, assembly room, office space, and the auxiliary building were substantially complete. Interior finishes such as doors, windows, and terrazzo tile flooring were installed. Interior walls and the ceilings in each room were gypsum-plastered and painted. Electrical outlets, light fixtures, and ceiling fans were installed

in each classroom and workroom. Roof-top water storage tanks and interior plumbing for the bathrooms and exterior hand wash areas were also complete. Remaining work included completion of the generator building, exterior site work to construct the garden and play areas, and the construction of the basketball court.

Based on the assessment, SIGIR determined that the quality of the workmanship on the school construction was good. The USACE project engineer and quality assurance representative effectively managed the project. They were frequently on site during construction and provided sufficient oversight to ensure that adequate quality control was maintained.

The school will be commissioned and delivered to the Iraqi Ministry of Education after the final inspection and all punch list items are resolved. Sustainability issues are not signifi-

cant because of limited maintenance requirements. No equipment requirements existed in the contract beyond basic lighting and ceiling fans. Equipment such as desks, tables, chairs, and a backup generator are the responsibility of the Ministry of Education.

#### **New 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Base in Kirkuk, Iraq**

SIGIR-PA-06-041

The assessment team visited this new \$115 million Iraqi military base. The completed project was consistent with original objectives. At the time of the SIGIR assessment, the facilities were in use for the intended objectives. This project consisted of almost entirely new construction of perimeter security, roadways, small arms ranges, barracks, dining facilities, water systems, wastewater systems, and electrical generation.



Entrance to the primary school in Dahuk

## What We Found

The contract required submission and approval of design drawings and specifications for the construction. Based on review of contractor and the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence (AFCEE) project files, the design was sufficient to complete the project to Iraqi standards. In addition, the contractor obtained



Soccer field with barracks in background



Interior of one of the four dining facilities

design and support services from the Iraqi Ministry of Housing and Construction.

The contract included the turnover of the operation and maintenance manuals, as-built drawings, local procurement of parts and equipment, technical training of personnel, a one-year warranty for all equipment and operations, and provided spare repair parts for one year. A review of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade facility showed that it was operating in accordance with the SOW's specific objective for a functional facility.

At the time of the assessment the earthwork appeared complete. Asphalt roads, concrete sidewalks and parking areas, gravel pads, parade grounds, and soccer fields appeared to meet the contractual requirements and were in use. Underground utilities were adequately installed and operational. The small arms ranges appeared to be well drained and constructed with baffles so that if they were used correctly, bullets could not go over the backstop berms. Construction work was complete on the motor pool and the street lighting system. The motor pool was fully stocked with equipment and was in use for the intended purpose. Construction on the four dining facilities was complete and some of the facilities were in use. The selection and fabrication of the wastewater treatment system was complete and the system was in use. The treatment system used physical, biological, and chemical processes to purify the water before discharge. The plant appeared to be well constructed and easy to operate.



Six-bay operational automobile maintenance facility



Wastewater treatment plant

## Sustainability

The contract addressed sustainability and should result in a sustainable Iraqi Army facility.

## Aviation Base Building in Kirkuk, Iraq SIGIR-PA-06-040

The objective of the aviation base building project was to construct a hangar, fuel tanks, and an operations building at an air base to support and train Iraqi Air Force personnel. The SIGIR team determined that the completed new construction project was consistent with original task order objectives. The aviation building and operations center facilities were in use for their intended purposes at the time of the assessment.

## What We Found

The project consisted of new construction and the contract and task order required submission and approval of design drawings and

specifications for the new construction. Based on the review of contractor and the AFCEE project files, the design was sufficient to complete these projects to Iraqi standards.

The contract's SOW required the contractor to prepare a site-specific quality program plan for AFCEE review and approval. The contractor submitted a construction quality control plan to the U.S. government. The contractor did provide daily quality control reports, test results, and invoices that provided adequate detail to the U.S. government.

The U.S. government's quality assurance program was not adequate. It appeared that there was limited, if any, oversight by either USACE or AFCEE for the aviation hangar and barracks/operations center building. According to the U.S. Air Force personnel attached to the end users of this project, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Squadron of the Iraqi Air Force, the quality assurance was, at best, "questionable" and, at worst, non-existent. As a result, significant deficiencies

were not identified and corrected before sign-off and turnover to the Iraqi Air Force—most notably an electrical fire in the aviation hangar.

At the time of the SIGIR assessment, construction was complete on the hangar, and there was a pending list of deficiencies to be repaired under warranty. SIGIR found problems, such as leaks at the windows and discrepancies with the plumbing, electrical system, and general workmanship. The contract did contain requirements for final inspections and warranties, which should resolve the construction deficiencies identified.

### **Sustainability**

The contract satisfactorily addressed sustainability, and the completed project should result in an aviation and operations facility that is both operational and sustainable. The contract included the turnover of the operation and maintenance manuals, as-built drawings, local procurement of parts and equipment, technical training of personnel, a one-year warranty for all equipment and operations, and providing spare repair parts for one year. The contractor worked with the Iraqi Ministry of Housing and Construction for design and support.



Interior of aviation hangar with Iraqi aircraft



Exterior view of aviation hangar

## Limited On-site Inspection Program

The limited on-site inspection program is the second component in SIGIR's program for inspecting construction at specific sites. This program is an important part of SIGIR's efforts to ensure the broadest possible coverage of all construction sites in Iraq.

The limited on-site inspection program involves conducting more general on-site inspections of project construction sites, noting deficiencies, assessing overall progress, and taking photographs. The information is subsequently analyzed for contract compliance, shared with program management, and used to identify locations for more detailed engineering assessments.

Since the program began in September 2005, SIGIR has conducted limited on-site

inspections at 97 projects. This section summarizes and analyzes 55 of the projects for which limited on-site inspections were completed in the quarter that ended December 31, 2005. SIGIR is currently analyzing the remaining 42 projects and plans to present them in the July 2006 Quarterly Report.

The 55 projects analyzed and reported this quarter include 22 border posts, 3 educational facilities, 6 medical facilities, 21 public safety projects, and 3 transportation projects in northeast Iraq and throughout southern Iraq. Table 3-4 lists the individual projects being reported this quarter. Table 3-5 lists the 42 projects that will be analyzed and reported next quarter. Figure 3-2 shows the approximate locations of all 97 projects assessed.

## PROJECT SURVEYED, ANALYZED, AND REPORTED THIS QUARTER

PCO PROJECT NUMBER	PROJECT NAME	GOVERNORATE
11943	Clinic in Thi-Qar at Sukkar	Thi-Qar
19220	Police Station Checkpoint–Islah Shebayish D 409	Thi-Qar
19218	Police Station Checkpoint–Suk Ash Shuyuck D408	Thi-Qar
19219	Police Station Checkpoint–Tallil Lahem D407	Thi-Qar
19990	Police Station–Suk Al Shiyouk D144	Thi-Qar
10630	School #1800425, al Shatrah School	Thi-Qar
10613	School #1800809, Intifadha	Thi-Qar
10588	School #1800869, Al-Salam School	Thi-Qar
17867	Thi-Qar Village Roads, Segment 3 Hahin Al Dukhi (7.1 km)	Thi-Qar
11941	Clinic in Thi Qar Al Zahra	Thi-Qar
10072	South Site Fire Station New Nasiriyah	Thi-Qar
10318	Maternity & Pediatric Hospital (Al - Nasiraya)	Thi-Qar
12781	Border Post–As Sulaymaniyah #03	Sulaymaniyah
20560	Border Post–As Sulaymaniyah #53	Sulaymaniyah
12787	Border Post–As Sulaymaniyah #29	Sulaymaniyah
20567	Border Post–As Sulaymaniyah #57	Sulaymaniyah
20568	Border Post–As Sulaymaniyah #65	Sulaymaniyah
20565	Border Post–As Sulaymaniyah #45	Sulaymaniyah
12840	Border Post–As Sulaymaniyah #20	Sulaymaniyah
12141	Border Post–Basrah #14 Al Mutawwi'ah	Basrah
12144	Border Post–Basrah #12 Kut Al Bandar	Basrah
12801	Border Post–As Sulaymaniyah #10	Sulaymaniyah
12145	Border Post–Basrah #11 Khut Abu Ikab Reno	Basrah
12842	Border Post–As Sulaymaniyah #21	Sulaymaniyah
12161	Border Post–Basrah #04 - Kut Ubayd	Basrah
20569	Border Post–As Sulaymaniyah #64 - Sele	Sulaymaniyah
12802	Border Post–As Sulaymaniyah #11	Sulaymaniyah
1270	Al Diwanayah Maternity & Children's Hospital (Qadissiya)	Qadissiyah
17783	Basrah Village Roads Segment 2 Talha (3.5 km)	Basrah
12800	Border Post–As Sulaymaniyah #9	Sulaymaniyah
12856	Border Post–As Sulaymaniyah #24	Sulaymaniyah
12142	Border Post–Basrah #13 - Anajin E Divan	Basrah
12149	Border Post–Basrah #10 - Ras Al Bishah	Basrah
11897	Clinic in Najaf–Hai Kinda	Najaf
19217	Police Station–Checkpoint–Tampa-Jackson–D405	Thi-Qar
20347	Police Station–TSU Barracks Phase I-D414	Thi-Qar
18243	Police Station–Al Huwayr–Al Madinah–B044	Basrah
20333	Police Station–Al Nassiriyah–Anti-crime IPA–D156	Thi-Qar

PCO PROJECT NUMBER	PROJECT NAME	GOVERNORATE
19222	Police Station–Checkpoint–Nasir–D411	Thi-Qar
18346	Police Station–Diwaniya–Traffic Police–Q066	Qadissiyah
19114	Police Station–Al Nassiriyah–Police Intelligence–D145	Thi-Qar
19221	Police Station–Checkpoint–Nassiriyah Prison–D410	Thi-Qar
12137	Border Post–Basrah #17–Al Haddidayah	Basrah
18241	Police Station–Al Mdeina–B029	Basrah
19480	Police Station–Al Quibla–B043	Basrah
18263	Police Station–AZ Zubayr–B038	Basrah
21251	Basrah Railway Station Rehabilitation	Basrah
11866	Clinic in Basrah–Hai Al Hussein	Basrah
19223	Police Station–Checkpoint–Fajr–D412	Thi-Qar
18248	Police Station–Al Qurnah–Police Station–B024	Basrah
12138	Border Post–Basrah #16–Kushk	Basrah
18268	Police Station–Al Faw–B033	Basrah
18223	Police Station–Abu-Al-Khasib–B032	Basrah
18273	Police Station–Safwan–B040	Basrah
20562	Border Post–As Sulaymaniyah #39–Awakurti	Sulaymaniyah

TABLE 3-4


PROJECT SURVEYED THIS QUARTER AND PROJECTS TO BE ANALYZED  
AND REPORTED NEXT QUARTER

PCO PROJECT NUMBER	PROJECT NAME	GOVERNORATE
12827	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #16	Sulaymaniyah
12836	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #19	Sulaymaniyah
20570	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #40	Sulaymaniyah
20571	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #49	Sulaymaniyah
12831	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #17	Sulaymaniyah
20573	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #62	Sulaymaniyah
12835	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #18	Sulaymaniyah
20575	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #41	Sulaymaniyah
18362	Police Station–Al Kut HQ	Wassit
21263	Thi-Qar Railway Station Rehabilitation (Nassriya)	Thi-Qar
19187	Police Station–Al Kut Traffic Police HQ	Wassit
19189	Police Station–Al Kut	Wassit
19181	Police Station–Checkpoint HQ Khanzarrah	Wassit
19179	Police Station–Al Kut Emergency Swat	Wassit
12786	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #06	Sulaymaniyah
20558	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #48	Sulaymaniyah
12809	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #32	Sulaymaniyah
12834	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #34	Sulaymaniyah
12884	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #26	Sulaymaniyah
19111	Police Station–Al Uropa W020	Wassit
19227	Police Station–Al Hayy HQ W015	Wassit
19779	Police Station–Qadisiyah HQ Q117	Qadissiya
20576	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #54	Sulaymaniyah
12807	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #12	Sulaymaniyah
20572	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #59	Sulaymaniyah
20577	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #61	Sulaymaniyah
16124	Najaf Teaching Hospital Phase I Parsons	Najaf
11913	Construct Clinic in Najaf–Al Uroba	Najaf
18334	Police Station–Jamhuri Q075	Qadissiya
20324	Police Station–Babail Special Missions Units Q128	Qadissiya
19117	Police Station–Attika Jail Q125	Qadissiya
19873	Najaf Teaching Hospital–GRS Portion Phase II	Najaf
10309	Maternity and Pediatric Hospital (Al-Najaf)	Najaf
12695	Border Post–Wassit #11	Wassit
19175	Police Station–Al Hayferiyah W005	Wassit

PCO PROJECT NUMBER	PROJECT NAME	GOVERNORATE
12826	Border Post–Wassit #06	Wassit
19230	Police Station–Bashier W047	Wassit
17789	Basrah Village Roads	Basrah
1861	Al Hasheme Substation	Wassit
12855	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #23	Sulaymaniyah
12850	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #22	Sulaymaniyah
20574	Border Post–Sulaymaniyah #43	Sulaymaniyah

TABLE 3-5

## LIMITED ASSESSMENTS





Cut bank with no stabilization at border post

## Ground Project Surveys

SIGIR-PA-06-048

From September 3, 2005 to December 5, 2005, SIGIR conducted 55 limited on-site inspections. These limited on-site inspections focused on the Facilities and Transportation sector and included border control, education, medical and public safety facilities, roads, and railways. The overall objectives of the limited on-site inspections were to provide summary information on overall project progress and identify deviations from contract requirements.

SIGIR quality control and quality assessment teams performed the limited on-site inspections. The teams produced and forwarded a brief summary report to a SIGIR engineer/auditor team for review. The review of those reports, as well as contracting documents, provided the basis for the conclusions



Exterior wall of border post



Bathroom fixtures at border post

presented in our summary report, SIGIR-PA-06-048.

**Location coordinates.** SIGIR obtained coordinates for each project during the limited on-site inspections. SIGIR compared the project locations submitted by GRD-PCO against the actual location, as determined during the site visit. Of the 55 GRD-PCO submitted location sites:

- 31 were within 300 m of the actual site location.
- 9 were between 300 and 1,000 m.
- 2 were between 1 and 3 km.
- 13 were greater than 13 km from the actual location.

GRD-PCO officials acknowledged errors in their grid coordinate database.

**Border Posts.** SIGIR conducted ground project surveys of 22 border forts located along the Iraq-Iran border. Seventeen of the border forts were constructed through a single contract and five through another contract.

Contract requirements for 17 of the 22 border forts were to include an exterior compound wall with vehicle gate, four elevated guard posts, one watch tower, perimeter lighting, one operations building with three offices, secured arms room, communications room, toilet/shower room, kitchen/dining area, electrical generator, water storage, and septic system. At the time of the ground survey, 17 were complete or near complete and functional. However, only 7 of the 17 border forts had perim-

eter security systems, gates, berms, or walls installed. Concrete quality was sometimes poor, and inconsistent surfaces in concrete and plaster finishing were common in the buildings and other structures. Numerous sites lacked retaining walls to prevent degradation of the embankments created by site leveling.

Based on discussions with local personnel at the border forts at the time of the site visits, SIGIR found that the day-to-day users—the border police—were unaware of a plan for maintenance and logistical support for the border posts, and received little if any training in maintaining the generator and septic systems. Logistical needs, such as fuel and water delivery, were lacking at some border posts. The generators lacked protection from drifting snow, and some outdoor electrical fixtures lacked proper insulation against rainwater.

SIGIR requested copies of contract documents for the remaining five border forts included in our surveys; however, the MNSTC-I was unable to identify or locate the contract(s) for these projects. As a result, SIGIR was unable to determine the project objectives, SOW, or design specifications.

All five of these border forts were of poor quality construction and showed no signs of any recent maintenance. Although small generators were located at the five border forts, fuel storage was not available. Electrical and water systems were consistently either inoperable or needed repair. These projects will be further evaluated by SIGIR Inspections next quarter.

**Education Facilities.** SIGIR conducted limited on-site inspections at three school projects in the governorate of Thi-Qar. The primary focus of the projects was to repair or replace sanitary and storm sewer works, plumbing, electrical and mechanical systems, and the facility structure and security.

The quality of workmanship at the three schools assessed appears low. Materials used appeared to be substandard, although the contract required industrial-type equipment. Renovation was superficial in some areas, as demonstrated by painting interior and exterior walls without first repairing the walls. At the time of the ground survey, the schools were still in need of significant work.

**Medical Facilities.** SIGIR conducted limited on-site inspections of six medical facilities located in the governorates of Basrah, Qadis-

siya, Najaf, and Thi-Qar (two maternity and pediatric hospitals and four clinics). The overall objective of the maternity and pediatric hospital projects was to provide new, repair, or replace prioritized building systems and to provide new authorized equipment. The overall objective of the clinic projects was to provide for the design and construction of a standard model health care center with two variations: the first, a clinic with teaching facilities and the second, a clinic with emergency and labor facilities.



Concrete courtyard



Broken tiles in school classroom



Cracks in school's outer wall



Renovated hallway at one hospital project



Containerized reverse osmosis unit with storage tanks

At the time of the SIGIR site visits, renovations were ongoing at both hospitals. Based on a review of the project surveys, SIGIR noted no significant deficiencies. Minor deficiencies include poor interior finish, staining on the ceiling and floors (indicating water leakage, either from pipes or from the roof), floors requiring repair, and power cables inappropriately passing through a window into the electrical room at one of the hospitals.

New construction was in progress at all four of the PHCs where limited on-site inspections were conducted. Structural concrete beams, columns, and slabs were either complete or in progress at all the projects. Based on a review of the project surveys, SIGIR noted no significant deficiencies.

**Public Safety Facilities.** SIGIR conducted limited on-site inspections of 21 public safety projects (20 police stations/checkpoints and 1 fire station). The projects were or will be completed under various contracts awarded to Iraqi contractors. The overall objective for the police station projects was to renovate the existing facilities or construct new facilities. The overall objective for the fire station was to construct a fire station that would accommodate 20 firefighters and 11 daytime administrative staff members.

The SOW for 13 police stations required new construction or renovation of building(s) and/or facilities located on an existing/new site in Iraq. The construction included a masonry security wall around the compound, berms, vehicle and personnel gates, guard towers,



Exterior front of a primary health care clinic



Construction of columns and footers

driveways and a parking area, sidewalks, plumbing, electrical and mechanical work, roof, ceiling, door, windows, walls, floors, and interior and exterior painting, as well as the purchase and installation of a diesel powered backup generator. SIGIR observed completed or ongoing renovation and/or new construction work at all the locations surveyed. Our assessment determined that the quality of electrical, plumbing, and finishing work at a majority of the projects surveyed was deficient.

The construction services work for seven police checkpoint projects included a checkpoint plot plan, checkpoint support station, covered parking stall for the commander, generator shed, sunshade islands and checkpoints, perimeter wall, break room, and checkpoint guard towers. SIGIR observed completed or ongoing renovation and/or new construction work at all the locations surveyed. In gen-

eral, the quality of construction of the police checkpoints was better than the police stations. However, our assessment did note deficiencies in the quality of electrical, plumbing, and finishing work at several of the police checkpoint facilities.

The SOW for the firehouse project included general building construction, structural, electrical, plumbing, heating and air conditioning, flooring, roofing, painting, administration and support areas, parking lots, pedestrian/vehicular circulation, and additional security to include perimeter controls, standoffs, and blast protection, as required.

The SIGIR team observed constructed structural concrete columns, beams, and elevated slabs on the ground, first, and second floor of the fire station. Several columns were wrapped with burlap, presumably for curing purposes. Review of photos showed no areas of



Electrical circuit breaker panel with burn mark



Police Station construction



Perimeter security wall with concertina wire and guard post



Deteriorating parapet around exterior roof drain



Exterior of checkpoint building



Exterior of road checkpoint



Fire station under construction

segregation, though SIGIR did not document the entire facility. Interior and exterior block walls were partially complete with external plastering in progress. Installation of window frames on the first floor rear of the building was ongoing. SIGIR noted no discrepancies.

**Transportation Projects.** SIGIR conducted limited on-site inspections of three transportation projects: two road construction projects in Basrah and Thi-Qar, and a railway station rehabilitation in Basrah.

The overall objective of the two road construction projects was to complete 19 km of paved rural village roads located throughout the governorate of Basrah and 7.1 km of paved rural village roads located throughout the governorate of Thi-Qar.

## What We Found

At the Basrah road project locations, the survey team verified road construction was in progress at the time of the visit. Installation of the sub-base and asphalt surface appeared to be consistent with the design requirements. Additional road surface and shoulder work was still required at the time of the visit. SIGIR did not note any major discrepancies. The Thi-Qar road project was reported to be 100% complete, but this could not be verified by the survey team. SIGIR observed recent road grading in the vicinity of the project; however, new asphalt was not in place. This project will be further evaluated by an in-depth SIGIR Inspections team during the next quarter.

The Basrah Railway Station renovation project was in progress at the time of the limited on-site inspection. Placement of exterior patio brick over sand base was



Asphalt surface of Basrah road project



Graded surface of Thi-Qar road project



Manholes and excavation work



Installation of brickwork

partially complete. The survey team observed brick and cement manholes and trenches between the manholes. Minor electrical work had also begun. SIGIR noted that manholes were of poor quality, wiring on the exterior of the building lacked conduit, and in some places wiring hung freely and passes through windows. Tiles were also missing from the hanging ceiling.

### Aerial Project Survey Program


Based in Washington, D.C., the SIGIR Satellite Imagery Group conducts aerial assessments of U.S.-funded reconstruction project sites throughout Iraq. SIGIR project assessment

teams in Iraq use this information and analysis to evaluate project sites that are inaccessible because of the security situation or are located in remote locations. The teams also use this information to verify project locations and provide follow-up information on previously evaluated reconstruction sites. SIGIR shares this information with U.S. government contracting officials in Iraq. Figure 3-3 shows the approximate locations of aerial imagery assessments for the first quarter of 2006.

SIGIR has a continuing partnership with two other federal agencies that specialize in aerial satellite imagery analysis, the NGA and the NGIC.

#### AERIAL IMAGERY ASSESSMENTS

Figure 3-3  
**APPROXIMATE LOCATIONS OF  
AERIAL IMAGERY ASSESSMENTS  
1ST QUARTER 2006**





Images 1 and 2. Provided by NGA, the imagery shows progress of An Najaf Governorate road segment 2 between August 25, 2004 (left) and July 31, 2005 (right). The image on the left is before roadway construction, and the image on the right shows the completed asphalt road segment.



Image 3. Example of imagery provided this quarter by NGIC helping to confirm locations of border forts in Iraq. Pictured above is a border fort in the southern region of Iraq near the Iraq-Iran border. A visual assessment of the imagery provided shows no visual indicators that the border fort does not meet contract specifications.



Image 4. Example of imagery provided this quarter by NGIC. Pictured above is a completed border fort in the northern region of Iraq on the Iraq-Iran border. A visual assessment of the imagery shows no visual indicators that the border fort does not meet contract specifications.

This quarter, SIGIR asked NGA to provide imagery products of border forts and road construction projects throughout Iraq. NGA responded with imagery products and exploitation of 24 border forts and five segments of road construction projects to the SIGIR Satellite Imagery Group. An example of the imagery provided by NGA is shown in Images 1 and 2. The images are of the An Najaf Governorate road segment 2, pre- and post-construction.

NGA noted several issues conducting imagery searches for the road segments, particularly the difficulty of determining grid coordinates because the roads are not easily identifiable or distinguishable. Of the five road segments assessed, two were complete and the amount of paving appeared to meet contract provisions; two are in progress and the amount of paving should meet contract provisions when complete. One, road segment 3 in the Thi-Qar governorate, shows no signs of work started.

This quarter, NGA provided imagery analysis of 24 border forts along Iraq's border with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. The amount of construction at all but six appeared to meet the contract provisions, and three sites were located at significantly different locations than the grid coordinates provided (all were complete and the amount of construction appeared to meet contract provisions). Of the six projects

that were incomplete, one project is still underway. Three have one or more buildings outside of the perimeter wall/berm. One project does not have a perimeter wall/berm, and one project has only one observation tower; all other border forts have four towers.

SIGIR also requested this quarter that NGIC provide imagery products of border forts and various building projects located throughout Iraq. NGIC responded by providing 15 imagery products to the SIGIR Satellite Imagery Group for analysis and exploitation. Examples of imagery provided by NGIC are shown in Images 3 and 4.

#### **SIGIR SATELLITE IMAGERY GROUP ANALYSIS**

SIGIR also has its own imagery analysts, who use commercial satellite imagery libraries to gather imagery for analysis and exploitation and conduct comparison with other products contained in SIGIR Ground Survey reports.

This quarter, SIGIR satellite imagery analysts have produced 14 imagery products and written 11 project assessments. These project assessments were passed to the SIGIR Inspections group in Baghdad for further review and action/distribution. Notable findings for these assessments include:

- Six of the eleven sites assessed appeared to be in compliance with the contract provisions. (See imagery examples Images 5, 6, 7 and 8.)
- Two border fort sites did not have retaining walls, which would prevent soil erosion when it rains and protect against avalanches during the snowy winter season.
- One police station had a missing perimeter wall.
- Two police stations could not be fully assessed because contract files lacked sufficient information. There are no visual indicators to show that these project sites are not in compliance.
- Two police stations could not be differentiated because there was not sufficient information available.
- One border fort could not be identified because SIGIR Contractor Support reports provided incorrect geo-coordinates.

In both of these reports, SIGIR identified site contract nonconformities and limited contract information as significant issues, and has passed this information on to the responsible agencies.

In partnership with NGA and NGIC, SIGIR imagery analysts have completed 112 satellite imagery assessments to date; 58 assessments were completed this quarter. The SIGIR imagery section continues to help deployed SIGIR staff in Iraq to accomplish their challenging mission by providing them the best imagery available.

The remaining three imagery products obtained could not be analyzed.



Images 5 and 6. Comparison of imagery showing progress made at a public health clinic in southern Iraq between January 16, 2005 (left) and December 27, 2005 (right). The image on the left shows the initial ground preparation for construction. The image on the right shows the final leveling of soil around the clinic, which was noted as a deficiency in an earlier Ground Project Survey visit.



Images 7 and 8. Comparison of imagery showing progress made at another public health clinic in southern Iraq between March 22, 2005 (left) and November 11, 2005 (right). The imagery on the left shows the ground preparation before construction, and the image on the right shows the completed structure of the clinic. There were no visual indicators that the project was behind schedule or that it would not meet contract requirements.



## SIGIR INVESTIGATIONS

During this quarter, SIGIR launched a number of initiatives that led to a series of extensive investigations into alleged fraud and corruption in the use and expenditure of U.S.-controlled funds for Iraq reconstruction. Specifically, a SIGIR undercover operation resulted in the arrest of an American translator accused of bribery in a kickback scheme.

With 72 matters currently under investigation and a heavy investigative presence in Baghdad, SIGIR continues to pursue investigative leads in Iraq and throughout the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. Cooperation from SIGIR Audits and from a number of U.S. government agencies in Iraq—including the Joint Contracting Command and U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Division—continues to generate quality cases involving alleged contract fraud and financial malfeasance. SIGIR's investigative activities are creating an appropriate deterrent to illegal behavior in Iraq.

### Guilty Pleas

Contractor Philip Bloom and CPA Regional Comptroller Robert Stein recently pleaded guilty, culminating a significant SIGIR criminal investigation case involving a bribery, fraud, conspiracy, and a money-laundering scheme that defrauded the Coalition Provisional Authority-South Central Region (CPA-SC) in Hilla, Iraq, of millions of dollars.

This quarter the plea agreements

and accompanying criminal information were unsealed concerning Bloom and Stein. Bloom admitted that from December 2003 to December 2005, he and Stein—along with other public officials, including several U.S. Army officers—conspired to rig bids on federally funded contracts being awarded by the CPA-SC so that all of the contracts were awarded to Bloom.

The total value of the contracts awarded to Bloom exceeded \$8.6 million. Bloom admitted paying Stein and other public officials more than \$2 million in money and gifts; in return, they used their official positions to award contracts to Bloom and his companies. Bloom, Stein, and others facilitated numerous wire transfers of money that were the proceeds of the fraudulently awarded bids (and at least \$2 million in stolen money from the CPA) to conceal the source and origin of the funds.

Bloom faces up to 40 years in prison and a fine of \$750,000. Under the terms of his plea agreement, he must pay \$3.6 million in restitution and forfeit \$3.6 million in assets. Stein faces a maximum penalty of 30 years in prison



Philip Bloom



Robert Stein



Armored vest bribery investigation—an undercover special agent was offered money in exchange for the contract to produce 1,000 armored vests.

and a fine of \$250,000. Both men remain in custody, awaiting sentencing.

### Sting Operation Yields Arrest

During this reporting period, one of several new SIGIR investigative initiatives resulted in an arrest. A U.S. civilian translator employed by a U.S. Army subcontractor working in Iraq was arrested by SIGIR investigators on a charge of offering a bribe. The defendant was arrested at Dulles International Airport while returning from Iraq. He was charged with offering to bribe a foreign official under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

According to a criminal complaint filed in U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia, the defendant offered an Iraqi police official approximately \$60,000 in exchange for

assistance with the purchase of approximately 1,000 armored vests and a sophisticated map printer for approximately \$1 million. The complaint alleges that the defendant later made final arrangements for purchase of these items, offering a \$28,000–\$35,000 bribe to a SIGIR undercover special agent posing as a procurement officer for the multinational Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) in Iraq.

SIGIR investigators conducted the undercover sting operation within the Embassy compound in Baghdad and coordinated the effort to lure the target back to the United States for arrest.

The maximum sentence for a charge of violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is five years in prison plus a \$100,000 fine (or twice the gross gain, whichever is greater). This SIGIR case is being prosecuted jointly by the Fraud and Public Corruption Section of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia and the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division, Department of Justice.

### Debarments and Suspensions

SIGIR has formed many partnerships to detect and deter criminal activity in the Iraq reconstruction effort. In addition to the continued success of the Special Investigative Task Force for Iraq Reconstruction (SPITFIRE), SIGIR has partnered with the U.S. Army's Procurement Fraud Branch to further protect the procurement system in the reconstruction effort. Currently, the Army Procurement Fraud Program has taken action to suspend and/or

Weaponry seized from thieves in the United States. SIGIR facilitated the return of this property to the Iraqi Minister of Interior.



A contracting officer due to leave Iraq within two days was found in possession of \$670,664, for which he had no record of origin or existence. These funds were seized for evaluation and subsequent return to the DFI.



debar ten individuals and three companies associated with contracts awarded for Iraq reconstruction or Army support contracts directly related to Iraq.

In addition, the Procurement Fraud Branch is working with SIGIR, the Department of Justice (DoJ), the U.S. Army Major Procurement Fraud Unit (MPFU-CID), and other agencies to prepare additional cases to prevent contractors engaged in fraudulent activities from receiving additional work on Iraq reconstruction and support contracts.

Since its designation as Executive Agent for CPA contracting support in June 2003, the U.S. Army has been actively ensuring the integrity of contractors performing Iraqi reconstruction and of related support contracts. The Army's Suspension and Debarment Program is committed to ensuring that these

contracts are awarded to and performed by honest, ethical contractors with the ability to successfully perform this important work.

### Seizures, Forfeitures, and Cost Savings/Avoidance

As a result of successful criminal investigations and other actions, SIGIR has seized, to date, and recovered assets valued at \$13,011,304. In the January 2006 Report, SIGIR began detailing these seized and criminally forfeited assets, including vehicles, cash, jewelry, watches, real estate, an airplane, cameras, commemorative coins, weapons, presentation boxes, and associated military equipment.

SIGIR investigators are responsible for several investigations that revealed major financial/contractual discrepancies or irregularities. These investigations have resulted

in cost savings/cost avoidance in the use of \$4,828,464 of reconstruction funds. Cost savings can be defined as benefits realized by eliminating a planned expenditure, such as a budgeted or contractual expense. Cost avoidance realizes benefits of avoiding a relatively certain future expenditure, though the projected expenditure has not been budgeted or obligated.

Crime Trends

SIGIR continues to track crime trends in reported violations. Table 3-6 presents the 72 ongoing investigations by investigative category. The category “other” includes computer crimes, administrative inquiry, and assistance to other law enforcement agencies.

CASE ALLEGATIONS OPENED OR CONVERTED SINCE JANUARY 2006

INVESTIGATIVE CATEGORY	NUMBER OF VIOLATIONS
Theft/Larceny	17
Bribery/Kickbacks/Gratuities	15
False Claims/Improper Billing	9
Embezzlement	6
Contract Fraud/Contract Irregularities	14
Computer Crimes	1
Suspicious Death(s)	1
Proprietary Information	2
Waste and Abuse	2
Other	5
Total	72

TABLE 3-6

Other SIGIR Partners

SIGIR continues to work closely with other law enforcement agencies on corruption issues in Iraq. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) have fully integrated a number of important criminal investigations with the original members of SPITFIRE, including the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Department of Homeland Security (DHS); U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Division (CID), Internal Revenue Service; and Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of State (DoD OIG).

SIGIR has partnered in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq with CID—the only other law enforcement agency on the ground in Iraq investigating fraudulent activities. Recent investigations by SIGIR have also required coordination with military and civilian counter-intelligence units both in Iraq and the United States. SIGIR has also rekindled its coordination to support DoD OIG operational effort from its new satellite office in Qatar.

Investigative Initiatives

SIGIR has several promising investigative initiatives underway. Most cannot be reported in public documents, but one outreach program, begun by SIGIR this reporting period, is the monitoring of currency transfer systems. Efforts are on track to provide guidance for identifying and reporting suspicious transactions.

## SIGIR HOTLINE

The SIGIR Hotline facilitates reporting of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and reprisal in all programs associated with Iraq reconstruction funded by the U.S. taxpayer. SIGIR Hotline transfers to the appropriate entity all cases that are not related to the IRRF or to programs and operations of the former Coalition Provisional Authority CPA. The SIGIR Hotline receives walk-in, telephone, mail, fax, and online contacts from people in Iraq, the United States, and throughout the world.

### First Quarter Reporting

As of March 31, 2006, the SIGIR Hotline had initiated 470 Hotline cases, and 49 are currently open. A summary of these cases is provided in Table 3-7.

### New Cases

During this reporting period, the SIGIR Hotline has received 21 new complaints, classified in these categories:

- 15 on fraud
- 3 on abuse
- 2 on mismanagement
- 1 on waste

The SIGIR Hotline receives most reports of alleged fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and reprisal by electronic mail. The SIGIR's 21 new Hotline complaints were received by these means:

- 16 by electronic mail
- 2 by SIGIR Hotline phone calls
- 2 transfers from the DoD OIG Hotline
- 1 by conventional mail

### Closed Cases

During this quarter, 16 Hotline cases were closed:

- 13 referred to other inspectors general

#### SUMMARY OF SIGIR HOTLINE CASES

##### OPEN CASES

Investigations	33
Inspections	9
Audit	7
<b>Total Open</b>	<b>49</b>

##### CLOSED CASES

	1 <sup>ST</sup> QTR 2006	CUMULATIVE*
Transferred	0	115
Inspections	0	77
Dismissed	2	72
Referred	13	58
Investigations	1	46
Assists	0	43
Audit	0	4
FOIA	0	4
OSC Review	0	2
<b>Total Closed</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>421</b>
<b>Cumulative* Open &amp; Closed</b>		<b>470</b>

\*Cumulative totals cover the period since the SIGIR Hotline began operations—from March 24, 2004, to March 31, 2006.

TABLE 3-7

- 2 dismissed for lack of sufficient information
- 1 complaint closed because SIGIR Investigations had an ongoing case based on similar allegations
- 2 sent to DoS OIG
- 1 sent to U.S. Air Force OIG
- 1 sent to MNSTC-I OIG
- 1 sent to GRD-PCO
- 1 sent to DCAA

### Referred Complaints

After a thorough review, 13 complaints were referred to outside agencies for resolution:

- 4 sent to JCC-I/A OIG
- 3 sent to MNF-I OIG

## SIGIR LESSONS LEARNED INITIATIVE

SIGIR's Lessons Learned Initiative focuses on three areas that continue to impact the Iraq reconstruction program:

- human capital management
- contracting and procurement
- program and project management

The purposes of this initiative are to use expert forums and research to identify the significant challenges facing the U.S. reconstruction mission in Iraq, to develop actionable recommendations that enhance ongoing efforts, and to inform future U.S. reconstruction and stabilization operations.

### Human Capital Report

In February 2006, SIGIR released *Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Human Capital Management*. The report is the product of SIGIR audits, other research, and the Lessons Learned Forum held in September 2005 at Johns Hopkins University's Washington, D.C. campus. The document identifies and discusses four key "pillars" in effectively managing human resources:

- policy alignment
- workforce planning
- recruitment
- continuity

The report is available at the Web site: [www.sigir.mil](http://www.sigir.mil).

### Contracting and Procurement Report

In December 2005, SIGIR hosted two Lessons Learned forums to evaluate the procurement and contracting processes associated with Iraq reconstruction. The first panel—held at the George Washington School of Law in Washington, D.C.—gathered senior officials from key U.S. government agencies and distinguished members of the academic and independent research communities. SIGIR conducted a second panel of executives from a broad spectrum of industry service providers supporting the reconstruction mission in Iraq; this meeting was held at the Professional Services Council in Arlington, Virginia.

The SIGIR report, *Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement*, is scheduled for release in late spring 2006. The study examines the establishment and evolution of contracting policies, procedures, and systems to address challenges in:

- strategy and planning
- policies and processes
- human capital

### Program and Project Management Report

The third Lessons Learned report focuses on program and project management of the U.S.-led reconstruction mission, based on a forum held on April 12, 2006, at the National Defense University. The panel included senior

U.S government officials, academics, and industry executives. SIGIR researchers are completing the final phase of their research for this initiative.

The program and project management report will examine the evolution of the key agencies chartered to oversee the reconstruction effort, including the lessons learned from their collective experience during these time periods:

- *Pre-War, ORHA, and Early CPA* (Fall 2002 to September 2003)
- *CPA* (September 2003 to June 2004)
- *IRMO* (July 2004 to present)

The final report, *Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management*, is expected to be released during the summer of 2006.

## SIGIR WEB SITE

In January 2006, SIGIR redesigned the Web site, [www.sigir.mil](http://www.sigir.mil), adding new sections and making it easier for users to access information. During this reporting period, these were the highlights of activity on the SIGIR Web Site:

- More than 250 users visited the SIGIR Web site per day, up from 150 last quarter.
- 89% of the users were from within the United States. The other 11% were from more than 30 different countries, mainly the Middle East (1.28%) and Western Europe (6.76%).
- The Arabic language section of the site received more than 750 visits.
- A significant percentage of visitors to the SIGIR Web site came from government agencies, most notably DoD and DoS.
- Users visited the SIGIR Reports section most often.
- The most frequently downloaded documents were the SIGIR January 2006 Report to Congress and the Lessons Learned Human Capital report.

## ANTICORRUPTION INITIATIVE

During this reporting period, the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad established an Anticorruption Working Group (ACWG), which meets weekly to create a strategy and a plan to help combat corruption in Iraq. To identify a baseline of activity, the ACWG developed an inventory of the Embassy's anticorruption initiatives.

Members of these organizations serve as representatives to the ACWG<sup>13</sup>:

- Economic Counselor, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad (Chair)
- Political Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad
- Political-Military Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad
- Public Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad
- Foreign Commercial Service (FCS), U.S. Embassy-Baghdad
- IRMO Liaison to Commission on Public Integrity (CPI)
- Department of Justice (DoJ)
- U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
- Office of Inspector General, U.S. Depart-

ment of Defense (DoD OIG)


- International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL)
- U.S. Department of Treasury (Treasury)
- Strategic Effects, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)
- Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I)

Figure 3-4 shows the flow of corruption cases to the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA), the Iraqi Ministry Inspectors General, and the CPI through the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI).

### Iraq's Anticorruption Programs Inventory

Table 3-8 identifies the U.S.-funded anticorruption programs, as of February 21, 2006. According to the ACWG members who put this inventory together, the timeframe for the funds and programs stated may only be planned or estimated.

Figure 3-4  
**ANTICORRUPTION ACCOUNTABILITY ORGANIZATIONS  
PROCESS FLOWCHART**



## U.S.-FUNDED ANTICORRUPTION PROGRAMS

Programs	Funded	Description
Central Criminal Court of Iraq	\$0.00	Media Visit to CCCI
	12,000	Exchange Project Promoting Rule of Law
<b>CCCI Total</b>	<b>\$12,000</b>	
Commission on Public Integrity	\$0.00	Press Office Training, Spokesman Training, Briefing Senior Advisors on Media Techniques
	0.00	PAS Had PA Advisor in Commission for 6 Months
	12,000	Exchange Project—Accountability in Government and Business
	4,600,000	CPI Investigators Training—Independent Unit of Iraq
	2,140,000	Education Outreach—Education Material
	1,500,000	Security and Investigation
	3,000,000	Security and Investigative Equipment (Weapons/Ammo/Tactical Equipment)
<b>CPI Total</b>	<b>\$11,252,000</b>	
Board of Supreme Audit	\$0.00	CPA Advisor to BSA and Audit Course
<b>BSA Total</b>	<b>\$0.00</b>	
Iraqi Ministry Inspectors General	\$309,000,000	Ministry of Defense Inspector General
	160,000	Government Ethics
	180,000	Internal Audit
	0.00	Contracting Procurement Ministry Policy
	260,000	International GAAP
	0.00	Press Conference Awareness
<b>IG Total</b>	<b>\$309,600,000</b>	
Civil Society Organizations	\$36,000	Civil Society Training and Exchange Program Human Rights Advocacy and Awareness
<b>CSO Total</b>	<b>\$36,000</b>	
Other	\$0.00	Media Monitoring
	228,000	Various Exchange Programs—Promoting Rule of Law, Judicial Reform, and Journalism
	0.00	MOI Ethics and Leadership Center
	0.00	IAF Ethics and Leadership Center
	43,000,000	Iraq Civil Society and Media Program
	140,000	Financial Management
	280,000	E-government and IT Management
	0.00	World Bank Legal Framework
<b>Other Total</b>	<b>\$43,648,000</b>	
<b>TOTAL PROGRAM FUNDS</b>	<b>\$364,548,000</b>	

Source: Strategic Effects Liaison Officer, MNF-I

Table 3-8

## USAID Anticorruption Program

USAID created the Iraq Civil Society Program (ICSP) on anticorruption. Based on briefing charts created in February 2006, USAID has an anticorruption strategy and has taken steps that have produced these results:

- 105 anticorruption workshops
- 2,500 members
- 655 technical assistance sessions
- 116 documented actions
- 1 million Iraqis reached (est.)
- 101 grants (\$1 million)

USAID's strategy is to raise the awareness of anticorruption initiatives throughout the country, using these methods:

- television/radio spots
- workshops
- conferences and forums
- print media, posters
- billboards with hotline numbers
- mobile theaters
- surveys/studies

USAID strategy identifies these future initiatives:

- Expand and intensify anticorruption awareness-raising campaigns—especially television and radio spots.
- Establish partnering relationships.
- Expand television and radio campaigns.
- Collaborate with Iraqi and international organizations: National Ministries, Transparency International.

## Iraq, Jordan Sign UN-backed Audit Agreement

On April 5, 2005, Iraq signed a United Nations (UN)-sponsored agreement with the Audit Board of Jordan in a “much-needed step” to modernize the fight against corruption, according to the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The UNDP described the agreement as a “landmark” scheme and said it would improve Iraq's audit bureau in its efforts to combat allegations of corruption and financial mismanagement. The \$4.8 million project is brokered and financed by UNDP-Iraq through international funding and will take 18 months to be completed, the statement said.

For more information about this initiative, see the UNDP Web site: <http://www.uniraq.org>.

## President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency

On February 10, 2006, the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency received a briefing addressing the development of an Iraqi national academy of integrity for the inspectors general, CPI, and BSA as leading the war on “a culture of corruption....”

## SIGIR/DoS OIG Joint Survey of the Embassy Anticorruption Initiative

The ACWG established U.S. priorities for anticorruption efforts, and a joint U.S. Iraq anticorruption working group has also been established, but the effectiveness of these programs and of international efforts requires fur-

ther examination. Thus, SIGIR and DoS OIG have announced a joint survey of the U.S. anti-corruption initiative to help the U.S. Embassy-Bagdad establish the necessary metrics, benchmarks, and leading practices. The objective of the survey is to provide comparative sources to measure progress of the Embassy Anticorruption

tion Strategy and to attempt to establish a listing of activities undertaken by others to assist the Iraqis in their anticorruption efforts. The strategy here is to identify where synergy can be positive and to identify gaps and overlaps of ongoing or planned programs and activities.







# Other Agency Oversight

OTHER AGENCY AUDITS

OTHER AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS

SECTION

# 4



The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) formed the Iraq Accountability Working Group (IAWG) to provide coordination of audit efforts in Iraq. The forward-deployed audit staffs of the various federal agencies with audit presence in Iraq use the IAWG to coordinate audits, share Iraq relief and reconstruction data, minimize audit disruption to clients, and avoid duplicative efforts.

SIGIR also formed the Iraq Inspectors General Council (IIGC)<sup>1</sup> in March 2004 to provide a forum for discussion of oversight in Iraq and to enhance the collaboration and cooperation among the inspectors general of the agencies that oversee the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). Representatives of member organizations meet quarterly to exchange details about current and planned audits, to identify opportunities for collaboration, and to minimize redundancies.

The most recent meeting was held on February 15, 2006. The organizations in attendance included:

- Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG)
  - Department of State Office of Inspector General (DoS OIG)
  - U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG)
  - Government Accountability Office (GAO)
  - Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
  - Department of Army Office of the Inspector General (Army OIG)
  - U.S. Army Audit Agency (USAAA)
  - U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
- Each quarter, SIGIR requests updates from member organizations on their completed, ongoing, and planned oversight activities. This section summarizes the audits and investigations reported to SIGIR this quarter by these agencies:
- DoD OIG
  - DoS OIG
  - USAID OIG
  - GAO
  - DCAA
  - USAAA
  - Department of the Treasury (Treasury)
  - Department of Commerce (DoC)
  - Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS)
  - Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

## OTHER AGENCY AUDITS

This section summarizes oversight report activity of other U.S. agencies during this reporting period (see Table 4-1).

For a complete list of audits and reviews on Iraq reconstruction by all entities, see Appendix F.

### Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

This quarter, DoD OIG performed limited audit activities related to Iraq relief and reconstruction. DoD OIG has established a field office in Qatar to provide oversight, audit, inspection, and investigative support to ongoing DoD operations in southwest Asia. The office is being staffed with eight personnel from DoD OIG. As of March 31, 2006, DoD

#### RECENT OVERSIGHT REPORTS OF OTHER U.S. AGENCIES, AS OF MARCH 31, 2006

	AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	REPORT DATE	REPORT TITLE
1	DoS OIG	AUD/IQO-06-17	February 2006	Application of Agreed-upon Procedures Relating to DECO, Inc., Task Order No. SALMEC-04-F-0996
2	DoS OIG	AUD/CG/06-20	March 2006	Independent Accountant's Report on the Application of Agreed-Up Procedures on Indirect Cost Rates Proposed by Scholastic, Inc.
3	DoS OIG	AUD/IQO-06-16	February 2006	Application of Agreed-upon Procedures of Department of State Procurement Competitions To Support Armored Vehicles in Iraq
4	USAID OIG	E-267-06-002-P	February 16, 2006	Audit of USAID/Iraq's Non-expendable Property
5	GAO	GAO-06-428T	February 8, 2006	Rebuilding Iraq: Stabilization Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges
6	USAAA	A-2006-0046-ALA	January 31, 2006	Audit of Fund Accountability for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 2 (IRRF 2)
7	USAAA	A-2006-0090-ALE	March 31, 2006	Follow-up II of Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and Quick Response Fund (QRF)
8	USAAA	A-2006-0047-ALL	January 11, 2006	Base Closure Process in the Iraq Area of Operations
9	USAAA	A-2006-0081-ALL	March 17, 2006	Unliquidated Obligations, Audit of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Operations in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom
10	Treasury	OIG-06-029	March 23, 2006	Review of Treasury Activities for Iraq Reconstruction

TABLE 4-1

OIG has six employees in Qatar. In addition, one DoD OIG evaluator is assigned to assist the Ministry of Defense Inspector General in Iraq full time.

### **COMPLETED AUDITS AND REVIEWS**

DoD OIG did not report any completed audits for this quarter.

### **ONGOING AUDITS AND REVIEWS**

Ten audits and reviews are ongoing, four of which started this quarter.

#### **Audit of Equipment Status of Deployed Forces within U.S. Central Command** (PROJECT NO. D2006-D000LA-0092.00)

The project was announced on November 17, 2005. The objectives of this audit are to determine whether units deployed to Iraq have been equipped to meet mission requirements. Specifically, auditors will evaluate whether units were provided the required items of equipment and whether equipment modifications satisfied mission requirements. The team will review the management control program as it relates to the overall objective. The audit team departed on March 19, 2006, for temporary duty to southwest Asia to conduct field work. They will deploy to several countries in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, including Iraq and Afghanistan, to evaluate the status of equipment of deployed forces.

#### **Antideficiency Act Investigation of the Operation and Maintenance Appropriation Account 2142020 and 2152020** (PROJECT NO. D2005FD-0300)

The investigation was requested by the Army Inspector General on a potential Antideficiency Act (ADA) violation that occurred when Army personnel funded a prison in Camp Bucca, Iraq. The objective is to determine whether an ADA violation occurred. All witness interviews have been completed and interviews of potential subjects have been started.

#### **Review of the U.S. Government's Relationship with the Iraqi National Congress** (PROJECT NO. D2005-DINTEL-0122)

The objective is to respond to a request from the House Appropriations Committee. Specific objectives are classified. DoD OIG is preparing a draft report to be published in April 2006.

#### **Detainee Abuse Oversight Review** (PROJECT NO. IPO2004-C005)

This is a review of all closed DoD criminal and non-criminal investigations into all allegations of detainee abuse. The objective is to evaluate the investigative sufficiency of the investigations initiated into allegations of detainee abuse, including death cases. The formal draft was distributed on March 1, 2006, with comments due after 30 days. DoD OIG expects to publish the final report in May 2006.

### **Review of Detainee/Prisoner Abuse Investigations and Reviews**

(PROJECT NO. D2004-DINT01-0174)

DoD OIG continues to provide oversight of the investigations and reviews conducted into detainee abuse allegations and detention operations in Iraq. The auditors have completed an assessment of the 13 senior-level reports on detainee abuse. The agency has coordinated a discussion draft and received comments. DoD OIG is preparing a draft report to be published in April 2006.

### **DoD OIG Support to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense OIG**

(PROJECT NO. D2006-DIPoE3-0038.000)

This project provides expert advice, mentoring, assistance, and training to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense Inspector General and his staff regarding IG duties, operations, and activities. Integral to the project is the DoD OIG's assistance to the Ministry of Defense Inspector General and the development of the processes to cooperate and collaborate with other Iraqi IG offices, as well as the U.S. Embassy Anticorruption Working Group and the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office.

### **Information Operations in Southwest Asia**

(PROJECT NO. D2006-D000LA-0139)

The project was announced on February 7, 2006; this audit is a congressional request. The overall objective is to evaluate Information Operations activities of U.S. Central Com-

mand and U.S. Special Operations Command. Specifically, DoD OIG will review the use of private contractors, including the Lincoln Group, in conducting information operations activities.

### **Follow-up to Department of State/Department of Defense Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training**

(DoS REPORT NO. ISP-IQO-05-72/  
DoD REPORT NO. IE-2005-002)

This follow-up evaluation will assess progress toward implementation of the 30 recommendations in the original July 15, 2005 interagency report. DoD is responsible for 21 recommendations, DoS for 7, and 2 are shared responsibility between DoD and DoS. The responses from the DoD offices of primary responsibility were due on March 31, 2006.

### **Auditor Training for Iraq Ministry of Defense IG Auditors**

(PROJECT NO. D2005-DIPOAI-0236)

The Assistant Inspector General for Audit Policy and Oversight is developing training that can be given to the Ministry of Defense IG auditors.

### **Department of State Office of Inspector General**

Since the SIGIR January 30, 2006 Report, DoS OIG has completed three audits. Two projects are still ongoing. As of March 31, 2006, DoS OIG has no auditors in Iraq.

**COMPLETED AUDITS****Application of Agreed-Upon Procedures  
Relating to DECO, Inc. Task Order No.  
SALMEC-04-F-0996**

(AUD/IQO-06-17, FEBRUARY 2006)

The DoS Bureau of Administration, Office of Logistics Management, Office of Acquisitions Management (A/LM/AQM), requested that DoS OIG perform certain agreed-upon procedures with the objectives of determining (1) whether DECO's loaded hourly rates on task order no. SALMEC-04-F-0996 duplicated what the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) paid as direct travel reimbursement for the period August 2, 2004, to May 31, 2005, and (2) whether DECO's policies for including costs in the hourly rate complied with the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Part 31. Under the terms of the task order, DECO was to provide security monitoring services at construction sites in Baghdad, Iraq.

DoS OIG found that DECO's loaded hourly rates did not duplicate what OBO paid as direct travel reimbursement. However, DECO's policies for including costs in the hourly rate did not always comply with FAR, Part 31. As a result, DoS OIG questioned costs of \$13,458. Of that amount, DoS OIG classified \$12,808 as unallowable and \$650 as unsupported because of either lack or inadequacy of documentation. DoS OIG recommended that A/LM/AQM require DECO to reimburse DoS for unallowable costs and to provide additional documentation for the unsupported costs.

**Independent Accountant's Report on the  
Application of Agreed-Upon Procedures  
on Indirect Cost Rates Proposed by  
Scholastic, Inc.**

(AUD/CG/06-20, MARCH 2006)

In response to a request from the DoS Bureau of Administration, Office of Logistics Management, Office of Acquisitions Management (A/LM/AQM), the DoS OIG contracted with L.F. Harris & Associates, an independent public accounting firm, to perform certain agreed-upon procedures on Scholastic's indirect cost rates for the fiscal years ended May 31, 2004, and May 31, 2005. The objective of the engagement was to determine whether the rates and cost principles complied with OMB Circular A-122, Cost Principles for Non-Profit Organizations. The cooperative agreement with Scholastic provided for the distribution of books and teacher training in Iraq and other countries of the Middle East.

Harris reported that Scholastic's general ledger system did not capture direct and indirect expenses in a manner that effectively identified appropriate indirect cost pools as required by OMB Circular A-122. However, Scholastic maintained comprehensive and detailed support for its program expenses, which enabled Harris to compute the corporation's indirect cost rates for its fiscal years ended May 31, 2005, and 2004. The independent accountant recommended that A/LM/AQM require Scholastic to develop an Indirect Cost Allocation Plan in conformance with OMB Circular A-122 and FAR Part 31.2 and to maintain a Job Cost Accounting System.

**Application of Agreed-Upon Procedures of Department of State Procurement Competitions to Support Armored Vehicles in Iraq**  
(AUD/IQO-06-16, FEBRUARY 2006)

To coordinate the acquisition planning, procurement, and assignment of vehicles to posts, DoS established an Armored Vehicles Program. DoS OIG engaged Regis & Associates, PC, to perform agreed-upon procedures of the procurement process for armoring services, specialized armored vehicles, and ballistic glass, focusing on DoS Iraq operations. The agreed-upon procedures were to determine whether acquisition plans were prepared and whether the procurements, which totaled nearly \$43.4 million, were adequately competed and performed in accordance with the provisions of the FAR and Department of State Acquisition Regulation (DoSAR). For two of the three procurement actions reviewed—armoring services and ballistic glass—no acquisition plans were found in the solicitation records. DoSAR requires that any domestic requirement exceeding \$5 million be supported by a formal, written acquisition plan. Two of the solicitations reviewed exceeded \$5 million, and therefore DoS OIG recommended that DoS require written advanced acquisition plans.

With regard to the vehicle armoring services, DoS executed the justifications for less than full and open competition in accordance with the provisions of the FAR and DoSAR. With regard to the procurements for ballistic glass, DoS identified adequate competition. Although

the current armoring contracts are almost two years beyond their expiration date, DoS efforts to sponsor prospective bidders that require facility security clearances have justified the delays. This proactive approach should increase competition. Except as noted, DoS performed each acquisition review in accordance with the provisions of FAR and DoSAR. DoS OIG suggested that A/LM/AQM review existing contracts to identify any requirements expected to lengthen the procurement process and begin the new solicitation process earlier to accommodate those requirements. A/LM/AQM agreed and is to conduct a random sampling of acquisition plans for procurements exceeding \$5 million to assess their impact.

## ONGOING AUDITS

### Agreed-Upon Procedures Related to Selected DynCorp Invoices

DoS OIG is performing agreed-upon procedures related to selected DynCorp invoices. The objectives of this attestation are to determine whether the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has a process to effectively review and approve invoices from DynCorp for the support of the Jordan-Iraq Police Training Center (JIPTC); to identify best practices for reviewing and approving invoices that other organizations use, which INL could adopt to improve operations; and to determine whether invoices provided by DynCorp in FY 2005 for the support of JIPTC

are adequately supported. Fieldwork is almost complete and a final report is expected in June.

### **Survey of INL Funding**

DoS OIG and SIGIR are performing a joint survey to determine funding for Iraqi-related activities by DoS INL. The primary objectives are to: (1) identify funding received and expended by INL that was earmarked for Iraq, and (2) evaluate INL accounting procedures for those funds. The survey scope covers funding received, obligated, and expended from October 1, 2002, through December 31, 2005. A final report is expected in May 2006.

### **U.S. Agency for International Development**

Since the SIGIR January 30, 2006 Report, USAID OIG completed one audit and started four audits to determine if USAID/Iraq's local governance activities are achieving their intended outputs. One audit started last quarter is still ongoing. USAID OIG has seven auditors in Iraq as of March 31, 2006.

### **COMPLETED AUDITS**

In addition to the USAID OIG audits discussed below, DCAA completed 4 financial audits for the USAID OIG of costs incurred under various contracts that the USAID OIG issued to USAID/Iraq with a USAID OIG transmittal letter. These audits covered \$54.1 million in USAID funds. These audits contained questioned costs of \$1.3 million. At the end of the

reporting period, 13 DCAA audits were in process, performed at the request of USAID OIG.

### **Audit of USAID/Iraq's Non-Expendable Property**

(E-267-06-002-P, ISSUED FEBRUARY 16, 2006)

The objective of this audit was to determine if USAID/Iraq managed its nonexpendable property in accordance with agency guidelines. The audit found that USAID/Iraq property valued at \$23.5 million in its nonexpendable property database was not managed in accordance with USAID guidance. The audit could not verify that a projected \$21.3 million was correctly valued in the database, nor the existence of a projected \$2.9 million in nonexpendable property included in the database. Furthermore, mission vehicles valued at \$2.3 million were not properly safeguarded. The report contains recommendations to improve USAID/Iraq's management of its nonexpendable property.

### **ONGOING AUDITS**

#### **Audit of USAID/Iraq's Local Governance Activities**

The objective of the audit is to determine whether USAID/Iraq's local governance is achieving the intended outputs.

#### **Audit of USAID's Transition Initiatives in Iraq**

The objective of the audit is to determine whether USAID transition initiatives in Iraq achieve the intended outputs.

### **Audit of USAID/Iraq's Security Controls Over Their Financial Management and General Support Systems**

The objective of the audit is to determine whether USAID/Iraq implements minimum security controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial management and general support systems as required by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

### **Audit of USAID/Iraq's Agriculture Reconstruction and Development Program**

The objective of the audit is to determine whether USAID/Iraq's agriculture activities are achieving their intended outputs and whether USAID/Iraq is accurately measuring the impact of its agriculture activities on the daily lives of Iraqis.

### **Audit of USAID/Iraq's Civil Society Activities**

The objective of the audit is to determine whether USAID/Iraq's civil society activities are achieving the intended outputs.

### **Government Accountability Office**

Since the SIGIR January 30, 2006 Report, GAO has issued one report and has 19 ongoing audits on Iraq reconstruction, 6 of which are new audits.

### **COMPLETED REPORTS**

#### **Rebuilding Iraq: Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges** (GAO-06-428T, ISSUED FEBRUARY 8, 2006)

The United States, along with coalition partners and various international organizations, has undertaken a challenging and costly effort to stabilize and rebuild Iraq following multiple wars and decades of neglect by the former regime. This enormous effort is taking place in an unstable security environment, concurrent with Iraqi efforts to transition to its first permanent government. The U.S. goal is to help the Iraqi government develop a democratic, stable, and prosperous country, at peace with itself and its neighbors—a partner in the war against terrorism, enjoying the benefits of a free society and a market economy.

In this testimony, GAO discusses two challenges: (1) that the United States faces in its rebuilding and stabilization efforts and (2) that the Iraqi government faces in financing future requirements.

This statement is based on four reports that GAO has issued to Congress since July 2005 and recent trips to Iraq. Since July 2005, GAO has issued reports on (1) the status of funding and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, focusing on the progress achieved and challenges faced in rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure; (2) U.S. reconstruction efforts in the water and sanitation sector; (3) U.S. assistance for the January 2005 Iraqi elections; and (4) U.S. efforts to stabilize the security situation in Iraq (this is a classified report).

## ONGOING CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED GAO ENGAGEMENTS

### United Nations Oil for Food: Oversight and Accountability (320320, INITIATED JANUARY 2005)

United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 986 established the Oil-for-Food (OFF) program in 1996 to allow Iraq to use oil revenues to purchase certain goods after sanctions were imposed in 1990 after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The overall objectives of the humanitarian assistance program were to prevent Iraq from having weapons of mass destruction while allowing Iraq to use its oil revenues to import food, medicine, and other needed supplies.

The GAO, other congressional investigators, the Defense Intelligence Agency Iraq Survey Group, and others have reported that Iraq gained billions in illicit revenues through smuggling and corruption. Allegations have also surfaced about misconduct by UN and contractor personnel involved in the program. In October 2004, Congress mandated that the GAO review the program [Public Law (P.L.) 108-375]. These are the key questions being answered in this engagement:

- What were the management and oversight roles of the various entities involved in the OFF program?
- How did these entities carry out their management and oversight responsibilities?
- Were there weaknesses in the structure and internal controls of the program that enabled the former Iraqi regime to gain illicit revenues?

### DoD Policies on Deployment of Civilians (350733, INITIATED AUGUST 2005)

DoD's involvement in contingency operations has increased significantly in recent years. With the ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, DoD is increasingly reliant on civilian personnel to provide essential support to accomplish the mission. DoD reportedly has deployed thousands of federal civilian employees in support of military operations in Iraq. This engagement aims to answer these key questions:

- To what extent do DoD and its components comply with the law and policies on deployment of civilian personnel to Iraq and Afghanistan?
- What are the lessons learned by DoD from the deployment of civilian personnel to Iraq and Afghanistan?
- How do the mission, roles, and compensation for deployed civilian personnel compare with those for military personnel?

### Contract Award Procedures for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts (INITIATED MARCH 2006)

This engagement aims to answer this question:

- What actions have DoD, DoS, and USAID taken to ensure that contracts and task orders for Iraq reconstruction were competitively awarded from FY 2004 to the present?

### **DoD's Health Care Policies and Benefits for Civilians Deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq**

(350829, INITIATED MARCH 2006)

With the ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, DoD is increasingly reliant on civilian personnel to accomplish the mission. This engagement aims to answer these key questions:

- To what extent has DoD established health surveillance and medical treatment policies for DoD civilians deployed, what policies have the military services and selected defense agencies implemented, and how have they carried out these policies?
- How do the compensation and benefits for deployed DoD civilians compare with those for active duty military members deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq?
- What lessons has DoD learned in deploying DoD civilians in support of contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq?

### **Iraqi Contract Cost Questioned or Unsupported**

(INITIATED APRIL 2006)

This engagement aims to address these key questions:

- What are the DCAA audit findings on questioned or unsupported costs in contracts for security and reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan?
- What actions have been taken by DoD to resolve disputes with contractors regarding questioned and unsupported cost audit findings?

- To what extent have funds been withheld from contractors?

### **GAO-INITIATED ENGAGEMENTS (PURSUANT TO COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S AUTHORITY) RELATED TO IRAQ**

#### **Availability of Armored Trucks during Operation Iraqi Freedom**

(ARMY— 350658/ MARINE CORPS—350785, INITIATED MARCH 2005)

Prior reviews of logistics activities in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) showed that DoD's supply system was unable to effectively meet warfighter needs by failing to provide a number of critical supplies and equipment, including protective items (such as body armor and armored Humvees). More recently, reports have surfaced in the media and in DoD that troops in Iraq also lacked adequate numbers of armored trucks and other vehicles. This engagement aims to address these key questions:

- To what extent has the need for truck armor been met?
- What were the primary causes for any armored truck shortages?
- What actions, if any, has DoD taken to improve the availability of armored trucks to U.S. forces in Iraq and for future operations?

#### **Iraq Energy**

(320383, INITIATED NOVEMBER 2005)

Restoration of the oil and power sectors in Iraq is central to the development of a stable

society. This engagement will address these key questions:

- What is the nature and extent of funding devoted to oil and electricity sector reconstruction?
- What are U.S. program goals and how does the U.S. measure progress in achieving these goals?
- What factors have affected the implementation of the U.S. program?
- What challenges have affected the Iraqi government's ability to develop the oil and electricity sectors?

#### **National Strategy for Iraq**

(320401, INITIATED DECEMBER 2005)

The President issued a new national strategy for Iraq in November 2005. This engagement will assess the strategy's goals, scope, performance measures, and costs. This engagement aims to address these questions:

- What is the U.S. government strategy for stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq?
- To what extent does the new strategy include the desirable elements of an effective strategy?
- What key challenges could affect the implementation of the U.S. strategy?

#### **Management of Iraq Reconstruction**

(320402, INITIATED DECEMBER 2005)

In 2004, Congress appropriated \$18.4 billion to support stabilization and rebuilding efforts in Iraq. Some of this money was awarded to 12 U.S. "design-build" contractors to repair and rebuild key infrastructure. Recent DoS reports

indicate that a large share of the remaining work will be shifted to local Iraqi firms to reduce costs and accelerate project completions. This engagement aims to address these questions:

- What is the status of U.S. efforts to rebuild key infrastructure in Iraq?
- What challenges have been encountered in this rebuilding effort?
- What alternative strategies, if any, are being used to complete work in each sector?

#### **U.S. Efforts to Stabilize Iraq and Develop Security Forces**

(320366, INITIATED SEPTEMBER 2005)

DoD has reported that the criteria for withdrawing coalition forces from Iraq are conditions-based, including the development of Iraqi security forces and the progress in developing national governance and economic structures and the rule of law. This engagement aims to address these key questions:

- What is the current multinational force strategy for transferring security missions to Iraqi security forces?
- What progress is being made to meeting the conditions for the transition and what are the challenges?
- What are current trends in the security situation in Iraq?

#### **Use of Contractors on the Battlefield**

(350739, INITIATED SEPTEMBER 2005)

Contractors are known to be providing a wide array of support to U.S. forces in Iraq. In a June 2003 report, GAO identified a number of

issues associated with the use of contractors on the battlefield and recommended actions to improve oversight of and planning for the use of contractors. This effort will update the June 2003 report and assess DoD actions to address both the recommendations and congressional reporting requirements. This engagement aims to address these key questions:

- What progress has DoD made in addressing the issues raised in the June 2003 report?
- What is DoD doing to address the issues and concerns raised in legislative requirements in past National Defense Authorization Acts, as well as in Title XVI of the House version of this year's bill?
- How much visibility do commanders have over the contract support they are receiving? Beyond the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), what types of support are being provided by contractors (e.g., weapons system maintenance, intelligence analysis)?
- Have contractors been able to provide the needed numbers of workers with the right skills to get the job done and, if not, what are the workarounds and what has been the impact of any staffing shortfalls?
- What do commanders see as unresolved issues/problems associated with contractor support?

### **Vetting Processes Used by Contractors Who Support Deployed Forces**

(350732, INITIATED SEPTEMBER 2005)

The military is increasingly reliant on contractors to provide support for deployed forces. This engagement aims to address these questions:

- To what extent do DoD contracts require that contractor employees supporting deployed U.S. forces be vetted and what standards and procedures has DoD established?
- How do contractors vet their employees and consider key factors such as identifying individuals who pose a national security risk, have a criminal history, or have been convicted or accused of human rights violations?
- What difficulties, if any, do contractors encounter when vetting Americans, nationals from European Union countries, and host-country nationals, and what role does the U.S. government play in assisting contractors?

### **Logistics Support for the Stryker Vehicle and Stryker Brigade**

(350742, INITIATED SEPTEMBER 2005)

DoD has deployed Stryker Brigades to Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) and may make additional deployments. GAO will review their logistics support. This engagement aims to address these key questions:

- How effective has maintenance support been, and how does it compare with the logistics plan?

- What have been the force protection arrangements for the contractors who provide maintenance support?
- What adjustments, if any, is the Army planning for contractor-supported maintenance?
- What other logistical support activities were provided by contractors for the Stryker Brigades in Iraq?

#### **Accountability, Maintenance, Utilization, and Strategy for OIF Stay-Behind Equipment**

(350737, INITIATED NOVEMBER 2005)

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, vast quantities of equipment items were used in-theater and are being retained for possible use by follow-on forces. The Army National Guard alone has reportedly left more than \$1.5 billion worth of its equipment, consisting of 80,000 items. Prepositioned Army equipment is also still in use. This engagement aims to address these questions:

- Do DoD, CENTCOM, and the military services have visibility over stay-behind equipment?
- What is the condition of the equipment, and is it being maintained to meet CENTCOM's and the services' requirements?
- What is DoD's strategy for utilizing or disposing of the equipment?

#### **Securing Sensitive Sites Containing High Explosives**

(350770, INITIATED NOVEMBER 2005)

Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, concerns were raised about the security of sensitive

sites that contained high explosives and other lethal materials. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that 350 tons of explosives were missing from an Iraqi facility that was supposedly under U.S. control. This engagement aims to address these questions:

- To what extent does DoD include securing sensitive sites containing high explosives and other lethal materials in operational planning, doctrine, and concepts of operations?
- What assumptions, priorities, and options did DoD adopt about the security of such sites during the Iraqi invasion and previous operations?
- What lessons has DoD learned related to these sites and how can those lessons be applied in future operations?

#### **Iraqi Support Capabilities**

(350790, INITIATED FEBRUARY 2006)

According to the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, U.S. troop levels in Iraq will decrease over time as Iraqis assume more responsibilities for themselves. Critical to this effort is the development of an Iraqi Security Force (ISF) logistical, command and control, and intelligence capability. This engagement aims to address these questions:

- What is the status of efforts to develop ISF logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities?
- How is U.S. planning synchronized with plans for the drawdown of U.S. forces?
- What metrics are in place to measure progress?

### **Improving Joint Force Protection Capability for Deployed Ground Forces**

(350794, INITIATED FEBRUARY 2006)

U.S. ground forces and their equipment are being attacked with nontraditional weapons, such as improvised explosive devices. GAO and others have reported on the lack of protective equipment—body armor and armored vehicles—to effectively protect U.S. forces in Iraq from this threat. Future operations will more than likely include more of these types of threats. This engagement aims to address the following questions:

- What actions have DoD and the military services taken to improve the protection of military personnel and equipment during military operations?
- To what extent does DoD have a comprehensive force-protection strategy to ensure that the various programs and initiatives of the services and DoD are being coordinated to eliminate duplication of efforts and ensure that they meet joint requirements?

### **Accountability for Equipment Provided to Iraqi Forces**

(320411, INITIATED MARCH 2006)

This engagement aims to address these questions:

- What were the requirements for managing and maintaining accountability for U.S.-funded equipment provided to Iraqi Security Forces before October 1, 2005?
- How did the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq manage and account for equipment purchased with U.S. funds

for Iraqi Security Forces prior to October 2005?

### **Adequacy of FY 2006 Funding for the Global War on Terrorism**

(350801)

GAO is undertaking a series of reviews on the costs of operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This engagement will examine the adequacy of GWOT funding in FY 2006. These key questions will be addressed:

- What progress has been made in improving the reliability of reported war costs since GAO's September 2005 report (GAO-05-882)?
- How does supplemental appropriations funding intended for GWOT in FY 2006 compare to the military services' projected obligations?

### **Defense Contract Audit Agency**

DCAA plans and performs work on a fiscal year basis. Table 4-2 shows both the Iraq-related audits closed during FY 2005 and the audits closed, opened, and planned in FY 2006 (as of March 31, 2006).

DCAA's services include professional advice to acquisition officials on accounting and financial matters to assist them in the negotiation, award, administration, and settlement of contracts.

In addition to DCAA's involvement in the negotiation and award of contracts, significant resources are also dedicated to overseeing the allowability, allocability, and reasonableness

## DCAA AUDITS RELATED TO IRAQ FOR FY 2005 AND FY 2006 (AS OF MARCH 31, 2006)

DESCRIPTION OF AUDIT AREA	FY 2005 CLOSED	FY 2006 CLOSED	FY 2006 OPEN	FY 2006 PLANNED
Price Proposals <sup>1</sup>	186	56	17	2
Agreed-upon Procedures Price Proposal <sup>2</sup>	50	9	3	0
Other Special Requested Audits <sup>3</sup>	190	82	131	9
Incurred Cost <sup>4</sup>	8	5	75	100
Labor Timekeeping <sup>5</sup>	82	39	38	27
Internal Controls <sup>6</sup>	59	17	42	42
Preaward Accounting Survey <sup>7</sup>	20	10	3	0
Purchase Existence and Consumption <sup>8</sup>	19	6	13	10
Other <sup>9</sup>	92	48	105	57
<b>Total</b>	<b>706</b>	<b>272</b>	<b>427</b>	<b>247</b>

## Notes:

<sup>1</sup>Price Proposals – Audits of price proposals submitted by contractors in connection with the award, modification, or repricing of Government contracts or subcontracts

<sup>2</sup>Agreed-Upon Procedures Price Proposal – Evaluation of specific areas, including actual labor and overhead rates and/or cost realism analysis, requested by customers in connection with the award of Government contracts or subcontracts

<sup>3</sup>Other Special Requested Audits – Audit assistance provided in response to special requests from the contracting community based on identified risks

<sup>4</sup>Incurred Cost – Audits of costs charged to Government contracts to determine whether they are allowable, allocable, and reasonable

<sup>5</sup>Labor Timekeeping – Audits to determine if the contractor consistently complies with established timekeeping system policies and procedures for recording labor costs

<sup>6</sup>Internal Controls – Audits of contractor internal control systems relating to the accounting and billing of costs under Government contracts

<sup>7</sup>Preaward Accounting Survey – Preaward audits to determine whether a contractor's accounting system is acceptable for segregating and accumulating costs under Government contracts

<sup>8</sup>Purchase Existence and Consumption – The physical observation of purchased materials and services and related inquiries regarding their documentation and verification of contract charges

<sup>9</sup>Other – Significant types of other audit activities including financial capability audits and Cost Accounting Standards compliance audits

TABLE 4-2

of incurred and billed costs. Procedures that govern the costs incurred in-country are also tested through reviews of contractor timekeeping, subcontract management, and cash management/disbursement. Finally, to ensure that adequate internal controls are in place regarding the contractor's policies and procedures, DCAA performs audits associated with critical internal control systems, with an emphasis on estimating, subcontract management, and billing systems.

### U.S. Army Audit Agency

USAAA has completed four audits since the SIGIR January 30, 2006 Report and has one audit in progress. The agency currently has 14 auditors in Iraq and Kuwait working on the LOGCAP audit.

#### COMPLETED AUDITS

##### **Audit of Fund Accountability for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund-2 (IRRF2)**

(PROJECT CODE A-2006-0046-ALA,  
ISSUED JANUARY 31, 2006)

At the request of the former Acting Secretary of the Army, USAAA reviewed the Project and Contracting Office's (PCO's) fund control and accountability over FY 2004 IRRF monies. USAAA also reviewed PCO's fund control over Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funds used for administrative expenses. PCO is responsible for managing and overseeing a majority of the \$18.4 billion in IRRF monies appropriated by Congress in FY 2004.

This report focuses on these objectives:

- Did PCO's financial management system and processes have the controls needed to make sure commitments, obligations, and disbursements were accurately recorded?
- Did PCO have adequate controls in place to make sure operating costs were properly recorded?

PCO's financial management system and processes were generally effective for ensuring the accurate recording of commitments, obligations, and disbursements. PCO used the Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS) as its main accounting and financial system to record and track PCO's financial transactions. The system has several internal controls to ensure only authorized transactions are processed. PCO established general guidance, which incorporated some of the processes and controls of CEFMS and the regulatory guidance of DoD financial management. However, control weaknesses existed related to handling military interdepartmental purchase requests and nonconstruction contract payments, making Iraqi vendor payments, and performing fund-status reviews.

In addition, although PCO generally had adequate controls to ensure that operating costs were properly recorded, USAAA did identify some areas for improvement. Some supporting documentation was lacking, but PCO properly developed the FY 2005 operating budget estimate of \$329.5 million. PCO accurately recorded contract costs and properly supported the costs, but needed to improve the timeliness and coding of contract transactions. PCO accurately recorded payroll

costs, but needed to improve how timecards were submitted, approved, and reconciled. Additionally, although the PCO was generally effective at reviewing the fund status of its operating budget, it needed to monitor fund status at a budget line item level. USAAA also identified at least \$12.4 million in unused payroll funds that should be used to offset other budget requirements.

Strengthening these controls should give Army leadership added assurances that PCO is accurately recording and reporting commitments, obligations, and disbursements.

During the audit, PCO was proactive and initiated several actions to improve controls over fund accountability.

#### **Follow-up II of Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and Quick Response Fund (QRF)**

(PROJECT: A-2006-0090-ALE,  
ISSUED MARCH 31, 2006)

Through its J-8 Comptroller, MNSTC-I managed, completed, and disbursed funding for CERP and QRF projects. Command's actions were consistent with the charter and implementing guidance for the humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements of the Iraqi people and to train and equip the Iraqi Security Forces. MNSTC-I had adequate oversight and documentation:

- For 63 of 124 completed CERP projects and maintained oversight over the 61 projects that were still open.
- For 403 of 681 completed QRF projects and maintained oversight for 222 projects that

were still valid. Command was researching 43 projects, but could decommit the remaining 13 projects.

MNSTC-I also ensured that documentation for funding transferred to other organizations for QRF projects was properly completed, unit acceptance documents were received and updated, and the information was accurately captured in management reports.

USAAA's review of QRF projects also showed that MNSTC-I could cancel and deobligate 13 projects, valued at almost \$814,000, and apply that amount to other projects.

USAAA also followed up on the prior report (A-2005-0332-ALE, September 30, 2005, Follow-up Audit of Commander's Emergency Response Program and Quick Response Fund, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq). MNSTC-I implemented the recommendations in the report; the corrective actions fixed the conditions identified; and Command had a system to track compliance with the recommendations.

#### **Base Closure Process in the Iraq Area of Operations**

(AUDIT REPORT A-2006-0047-ALL,  
ISSUED JANUARY 11, 2006)

The Multi-National Force-Iraq (the Corps) had adequate policies and procedures in place to ensure that appropriate documentation is prepared and funding requirements are evaluated when closing forward operating bases within the Iraq area of operations. The Corps was still refining some roles and responsibilities,

but had adequate systems in place to identify unique issues associated with each base closing. However, with the upcoming significant reduction in forward operating bases, the Corps should consider establishing a full-time team to oversee the day-to-day base closure process.

### **Unliquidated Obligations, Audit of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Operations in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom**

(AUDIT REPORT A-2006-0081-ALL,  
ISSUED MARCH 17, 2006)

This report addresses USAAA's audit of unliquidated obligations as they relate to task order 59 of the current LOGCAP contract. USAAA conducted this audit as part of the multi-location audit of LOGCAP Operations in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. USAAA performed the audit at the request of the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq.

Task Order 59 authorizes the LOGCAP contractor to provide base camp services, accommodations and life support services, and selected Combat Support/Combat Service Support functions to Army units at various locations in Iraq. USAAA reviewed obligations recorded under the task order to determine whether any obligated funds could be deobligated and made available for other uses.

Based on the process used to obligate funds to fund work ordered under Task Order 59, USAAA identified no funds that were available for deobligation and available for other uses. Specifically, Command obligated funds for this

task order incrementally on an "as needed" basis. As a result, the amount of funds obligated closely approximated the funds expended to date for work performed under the task order.

Based on USAAA's review of available information in May 2005, it appears about \$644 million will need to be obligated to complete work under the task order. To make sure that work doesn't exceed approved funding levels, the contractor was working with the Army to determine which costs approved by the Army, but yet to be incurred by the contractor, should be canceled. Although the Army was aware that it would incur some additional costs before the task order was closed out (primarily due to late billings from the contractor due to late billings from subcontractors), it appears some of the additional costs (about \$280 million) were unexpected and could potentially involve cost overruns by the contractor. Maintaining better visibility over contractor work and expenditures in the theater, and more accurate and timely cost reporting by the contractor, should provide more assurance that similar issues don't occur in the future.

### **ONGOING AUDITS**

#### **Audit of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)**

(PROJECT CODE A-2005-ALS-0340.000)

The Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq requested this audit. Preliminary audit planning began on January 3, 2005, and audit work began in Kuwait and Iraq on May 3, 2005 (in-country work was delayed at Command's

request). The audit focuses on evaluating the adequacy of LOGCAP throughout the Iraq area of operations. The specific objectives include answering these questions:

- Are services acquired under the LOGCAP contract reasonable and cost-effective solutions for satisfying force requirements?
- Are adequate management structures in place to plan, acquire, and manage services obtained under the LOGCAP contract?
- Is the contract administration over LOGCAP work in Iraq adequate?
- Are adequate internal controls in place over LOGCAP operations in Iraq, especially those areas highly susceptible to fraud, waste, and abuse?
- Does adequate information exist to enable higher levels of management to provide sufficient oversight over LOGCAP operations in Iraq?

USAAA auditors are traveling to operating bases in Iraq, principal sites of contractor operations in Kuwait, and the prime contractor's home office in Houston, Texas. USAAA has received authority from DoD OIG (Auditing) to audit DCAA in relation to its LOGCAP contract administration operations in Iraq and Kuwait, and Defense Logistics Agency in relation to its food service operations in support of the Iraq area of operations. USAAA has issued or is completing reports focusing on conversion of LOGCAP statements of work to sustainment contracts; unliquidated obliga-

tions for Task Order 59; and program management in operations, base closure process, non-tactical vehicles, distribution operations, food supply operations, clothing issue facilities, warehouse staffing, and dining facility operations. USAAA has ongoing audits of sustainment contracting practices in Kuwait, contract administration management, controls over bulk petroleum inventories, and management of contract labor assigned to supply operations.

## Department of the Treasury

Treasury has completed one audit since SIGIR's January 30, 2006 Report. As of March 31, 2006, Treasury had no auditors in Iraq.

### COMPLETED AUDITS

#### Review of Treasury Activities for Iraq Reconstruction

(OIG-06-029, ISSUED MARCH 23, 2006)

The objectives of the audit were to:

- Identify Treasury activities and funding involving Iraq relief and reconstruction.
- Determine the completeness and accuracy of the information provided by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in its reports to SIGIR regarding its activities for Iraq reconstruction.

The findings from this audit include:

- Treasury provides technical assistance and support to modernize the Iraqi banking system.

- The financial information provided by Treasury to SIGIR fairly presented the fund-use status of the reconstruction activities: Treasury obligated \$32.9 million out of \$35.1 million apportioned to the reconstruction programs, and disbursed \$26.3 million as of February 28, 2006. The report contained no recommendations.

### **Department of Commerce**

During this period, the Department of Commerce initiated no new cases and did not close any cases involving Iraq reconstruction and relief projects.

## OTHER AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS

SIGIR regularly coordinates with other government agencies conducting investigations in Iraq.

### U.S. Agency for International Development

#### CLOSED INVESTIGATIONS

USAID did not close any cases during this quarter.

#### ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS

USAID currently has six ongoing investigations carried over from last quarter and one case that was opened during this period. As of March 31, 2006, USAID has one investigator in Iraq. The following are brief descriptions of each case:

- A USAID contractor is alleged to have submitted false and/or fraudulent costs associated with work in Iraq. In addition, information was developed indicating that this contractor may have used USAID funds to make improper payments to Iraqi government officials.
- Employees of a USAID contractor are alleged to have solicited kickbacks in exchange for the awarding of subcontracts for work in Iraq.
- Information was received regarding irregularities on USAID contracts in Iraq.
- An anonymous source claimed that the owner of a local Iraqi company had inflated the cost of a project financed by USAID.

- Allegations of kickbacks were received involving a former USAID employee.
- Allegations of misconduct were received involving a USAID employee stationed in Iraq.
- Information was received that a contractor employee may have misallocated project funds and converted them to private use.

### Defense Criminal Investigative Service

Defense Criminal Investigative Service, in coordination with SIGIR, is continuing investigations regarding Iraqi reconstruction funds and activities. In addition, DCIS continues investigations on the expenditure of DoD funds in the region. Table 4-3 provides a summary of cases, categorized by status and category.

### Department of State Inspector General

During this reporting period, the DoS OIG did not open any new investigations into activities relating to the IRRE. DoS OIG continues to have two open cases that are being worked jointly with SIGIR. A third case was closed last period with no action, and a fourth one is scheduled to be closed with no action. During the reporting period, DoS OIG received three hotline complaints from SIGIR, two of which did not merit investigation. The third hotline complaint provided by SIGIR was briefed to the DOJ Task Force, and it was determined that no investigative activity will be conducted at the current time. One manager is assigned as

## STATUS OF DCIS INVESTIGATIONS

INVESTIGATIVE STATUS	CONFLICT OF INTEREST	COUNTERFEIT	WEAPONS RECOVERY/ SECURITY	FALSE CLAIMS/ STATEMENTS	THEFT/ DRUGS	BRIBERY/ CORRUPTION
Open				1		
Closed	2	3	6	2	20	9
Totals	2	3	6	3	20	9

TABLE 4-3

contact point for the DOJ Task Force relating to SIGIR cases. DoS OIG has no criminal investigators assigned to Iraq and is providing investigative support locally from its office in Rosslyn, Virginia.

### Federal Bureau of Investigation

The FBI Washington Field Office has joined SIGIR; the Department of Justice; the Internal Revenue Service; the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; and DoS as a member of the Special Investigative Task Force for Iraq Reconstruction (SPITFIRE).

### CLOSED INVESTIGATIONS

No cases were closed during the period.

### ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS

FBI has been working closely with SIGIR on these ongoing cases:

#### Custer Battles, LLC

(46A-WF-228740)

This case deals with Custer Battles submitting false invoices to CPA to increase profits.

#### DYNCORP

(46H-WF-2314545)

This case deals with a DynCorp International employee who pled guilty to theft of government property in a case involving the issuance of unauthorized military passes to friends. The employee will be sentenced on April 25, 2006.

## ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

This section contains all of the abbreviations and acronyms found in the SIGIR Quarterly Report to the Congress.

ACRONYMS	DEFINITIONS
A/LM/AQM	Office of Logistics Management, Office of Acquisitions Management
ABOT	Al Basrah Oil Terminal
ACWG	Anti-corruption Working Group
ADA	Antideficiency Act
AFRN	Advanced First Responder Network
ARDI	Agricultural Reconstruction and Development Program for Iraq
ASRB	Accounting Standards Review Board
ASP	Ammunition Supply Point
ATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
ATO	Administrative Task Order
BIA	Basrah International Airport
BIAP	Baghdad International Airport
BPD	Barrels Per Day
BSA	Board of Supreme Audit
CAP	Community Action Program
CAP-IG	Combined Action Program-Inspector General
CCCI	Central Criminal Courts Iraq
CEFMS	Corps of Engineers Financial Management System
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CFN	Consolidated Fiber Network
CHRRP	Commanders Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Program
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CPA-IG	Coalition Provisional Authority-Inspector General
CPA-OPS	Coalition Provisional Authority-Operations
CPA-PMO	Coalition Provisional Authority-Program Management Office

## ACRONYMS & DEFINITIONS

ACRONYMS	DEFINITIONS
CPA-SC	Coalition Provisional Authority-South Central
CPATT	Civilian Police Assistance Training Team
CPI	Commission on Public Integrity
CPS	Cluster Pump Station
CQC	Contractor's Quality Control
CRS	Congressional Research Service
DAD	Donor Assistance Database
DBA	Defense Base Act
DCAA	Defense Contract Audit Agency
DCIS	Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DFARS	Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
DFAS	Defense Finance & Accounting Service
DFI	Development Fund for Iraq
DFID	Department for International Development
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIILS	Defense Institute of International Legal Studies
DLA	Division Level Agents
DoC	Department of Commerce
DoD	Department of Defense
DoD OIG	Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
DoL	Department of Labor
DoJ	Department of Justice
DoS	Department of State
DoS OIG	Department of State Office of Inspector General
DoSAR	Department of State Acquisition Regulation
DoT	Department of Transportation
DRL	Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
DRSO	Defense Reconstruction Support Office
EAC	Estimate At Completion
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECON	Department of State, U.S. Mission Iraq, Economic Affairs
EP	Engineering and Procurement
EPC	Engineering, Procurement, and Construction
EPCA	Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance
EPSS	Electrical Power Security Service
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
FARs	Federal Acquisition Regulations

ACRONYMS	DEFINITIONS
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
FSSC	Focused Stabilization of Strategic Cities
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GOSP	Gas-Oil Separation Plant
GRD	Gulf Region Division
GRD-PCO	Gulf Region Division and Project and Contracting Office
GSM	Global System for Mobil Communications
GWOT	Global War On Terrorism
HDD	Horizontal Directional Drilling
HFO	Heavy Fuel Oil
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services
HVAC	Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
IAF	Iraqi Armed Forces
IASD	Iraq Association of Securities Dealers
IAWG	Iraq Accountability Working Group
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICS	Iraqi Corrections Service
IDA	International Development Association
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IFC	Iraq Freedom Congress
IFF	Iraq Freedom Fund
IG	Inspector General
IIG	Iraqi Interim Government
IIGC	Iraq Inspectors General Council
IIMS	Iraq Infrastructure Management System
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau
IPOG	Iraq Policy and Operations Group
IRFFI	International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq
IRG	International Resources Group
IRMO	Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
IRMS	Iraq Reconstruction Management System
IRR	Iraqi Republic Railway
IRRF	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
IRRF 1	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund-\$2.4B IRRF set up in P.L. 108-11
IRRF 2	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund-funded with \$18.6B (\$18.4B after subtracting \$210M fund assistance for Jordan, Liberia, and Sudan) in P.L. 108-106
ISC	Iraq Securities Commission

## ACRONYMS & DEFINITIONS

ACRONYMS	DEFINITIONS
ISF	Iraqi Security Force
ISFF	Iraq Security Forces Fund
ISRB	Iraqi Strategic Review Board
ISX	Iraq Stock Exchange
IT	Information Technology
ITG	Iraqi Transitional Government
ITPC	Iraqi Telephone and Post Company
ITWG	Information Technology Working Group
JASG-C	Joint Area Support Group-Central
JCC-I/A	Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan
JIPTC	Jordon-Iraq Police Training Center
KBR	Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.
LGP	Local Governance Programs
LOGCAP	Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program
MANPADS	Man-Portable Air Defense System
MIPR	Military Inter-departmental Purchase Request
MMPW	Ministry of Municipality and Public Works
MMR	Measles, Mumps, and Rubella
MNF-I	Multi-National Force-Iraq
MNSTC-I	Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
MPFU	Major Procurement Fraud Unit
MSCFD	Million Standard Cubic Feet Per Day
NCMC	National Communications and Media Comission
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NDS	National Development Strategy
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGIC	National Ground Intelligence Center
NGL/LPG	Natural Gast Liquids/Liquefied Petroleum Gas
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NRRRF	Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund
O&M	Operations & Maintenance
OBO	Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OFF	Oil For Food
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OMA	Operations and Maintenance, Army
OMB	Office of Management and Budget

ACRONYMS	DEFINITIONS
OPF	Oil Protection Force
OTA	Office of Technology Assessment
P.L.	Public Law
P.L. 108-106	As amended by P.L. 108-375, mandates the independent and objective conduct and supervision of audits relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
P.L. 108-375	The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2005, enacted on October 29, 2004
PAR	Project Assessment Report
PCO	Project and Contracting Office
PHC	Primary Health Care
PIF	Project Identification Form
PMO	Program Management Office
PPA	Project Partnership Agreements
PRDC	Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees
Public Law 108-106 (P.L. 108-106)	\$87.5 B appropriation measure passed 11/6/03 that includes CPA-IG creation and \$18.6B (\$18.4B after subtracting \$210M fund assistance for Jordan, Liberia, and Sudan) Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
Public Law 108-11 (P.L. 108-11)	First \$74 B appropriation measure that included the \$2.475 B Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
QA	Quality Assurance
QRF	Quick Response Fund
R3P	Rapid Regional Response Program
REA	Request for Equitable Adjustment
RIE	Restore Iraqi Electricity
RIO	Restore Iraqi Oil
RISE	Revitalization of Iraq Schools and Stabilization of Education
RRRP	Rapid Regional Response Program
SBA	Stand-By Arrangement
SCIS	State Company for Internet Services
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
SIB	Strategic Infrastructure Battalion
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SIRIS	SIGIR Iraq Reconstruction Information System
SOW	Statement of Work
SPITFIRE	Special Investigative Task Force for Iraq Reconstruction
SSAA	System Security Authorization Agreement
T&C	Transportation and Communications
TDY	Temporary Duty
TPD	Tons Per Day

## ACRONYMS & DEFINITIONS

ACRONYMS	DEFINITIONS
TRA	Transition Readiness Assessment
Treasury	United States Department of Treasury
UN	United Nations
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USAAA	United States Army Audit Agency
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAID OIG	United States Agency for International Development Office of the Inspector General
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
U.S. Embassy-Baghdad	United States Embassy located in Baghdad
U.S. Mission-Iraq	U.S. Mission-Iraq assumed authority after the Coalition Provisional Authority transferred governance authority to the Iraqi Governing Council on June 30, 2004.
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
WBIF	World Bank Iraq Trust Fund
WSSP	Water Sector Sustainment Program

## ENDNOTES

This section contains the endnotes for the Quarterly Report to Congress. They are listed numerically and consecutively within each section, both in the Report and in the following section.

### Section 1: SIGIR Observations

<sup>1</sup>U.S. citizen deaths in Iraq are compiled by DoS under Public Law 107-228 § 204(c). U.S. military personnel and government officials are excluded from these reports. The U.S. citizen deaths shown in Figure 1-1 are an approximate subset of the total DBA death claims.

### Section 2: Uses of Funding: Status Reports by Sector

<sup>1</sup>Projects in this sector are drawn from the Department of State *Section 2207 Report's* two sections on Security and Justice and Justice, Public Safety, and Civil Society, with the exception of Democracy, which is included in SIGIR's sector on democracy, education and private sector development. The SIGIR security and justice sector combines these two sectors, focusing on soldiers and police officers trained and fielded, facilities constructed, and support for security forces and ministerial capacity development initiatives. For information about the definitions of these and other sectors, see Appendix H.

<sup>2</sup>Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, April 2006, Appendix I, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup>Department of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," February 17, 2006, p. 48.

<sup>4</sup>Speech by President George W. Bush, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, March 13, 2006, p. 8.

<sup>5</sup>Deleted

<sup>6</sup>Deleted

<sup>6a</sup>Vetting comments from DRSO to SIGIR, received on April 25, 2006.

<sup>7</sup>Deleted

<sup>8</sup>Deleted

<sup>9</sup>GRD-PCO, "Facilities and Transportation Sector," received from GRD-PCO on March 24, 2006, p. 2.

<sup>10</sup>GRD-PCO Bi-weekly Situation Report, April 4, 2006, p. 16.

<sup>11</sup>GRD-PCO Bi-weekly Situation Report, March 20, 2006, p. 20.

<sup>12</sup>GRD-PCO Bi-weekly Situation Report, April 4, 2006, p. 28.

<sup>13</sup>GRD-PCO Bi-weekly Situation Report, March 20, 2006, pp. 14-15.

<sup>14</sup>GRD-PCO Bi-weekly Situation Report, April 4, 2006, p. 28.

<sup>15</sup>Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, April 2006, Appendix I, p. 23.

<sup>16</sup>Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, April 2006, Appendix I, p. 13.

<sup>17</sup>Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, April 2006, Appendix I, pp. 20-21.

<sup>18</sup>Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, April 2006, Appendix I, pp. 29-30.

- <sup>19</sup> Department of State, "Iraq Weekly Status Report," April 5, 2006, p. 7.
- <sup>20</sup> Vetting comments from DRSO to SIGIR, received on April 20, 2006.
- <sup>21</sup> Department of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," February 17, 2006, p. 40.
- <sup>22</sup> Department of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," July 2005, p. 13; According to DoD: "MNF-I has also implemented, in partnership with the Ministry of Defense, a program to embed Military Transition Teams at the battalion, brigade, and division level. These teams provide Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) to MNC-I identifying areas of progress and shortcomings, ultimately leading to those individual units being ready to assume independent control of their area of responsibility. These assessments take into account a variety of criteria similar to but not identical to what the U.S. Army uses to evaluate its units' operational readiness by focusing on personnel, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics, equipment, and leadership." Overall, operational units are assessed as capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations independent of coalition forces (Level 1); capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with coalition enablers (Level 2); or capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations only when operating alongside Coalition units (Level 3); Level 1, 2, and 3 units are all engaged in operations against the enemy.
- <sup>23</sup> Department of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," February 17, 2006, p. 37.
- <sup>24</sup> Department of State, "Iraq Weekly Status Report," March 15, 2006, p. 5.
- <sup>25</sup> GRD-PCO Daily Situation Report, April 19, 2006, p. 7.
- <sup>26</sup> Jeremy M. Sharp, "Iraq's New Security Force: The Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influence," Congressional Research Service, January 12, 2006, pp. 1-2.
- <sup>27</sup> Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq, 2005," March 8, 2006, pp. 4.
- <sup>28</sup> Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq, 2005," March 8, 2006, p. 5.
- <sup>29</sup> Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq, 2005," March 8, 2006, p. 10.
- <sup>30</sup> Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq, 2005," March 8, 2006, p. 6.
- <sup>31</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, April 2006, Appendix 1, p. 2.
- <sup>32</sup> World Bank Economic and Social Development Unit for the Middle East Department, "Rebuilding Iraq: Economic Reform and Transition," February 2006, p. 20.
- <sup>33</sup> GAO 06-428T, "Rebuilding Iraq – Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges: Statement of Joseph Christoff (Director, International Affairs and Trade)," February 8, 2006, p. 4.
- <sup>34</sup> Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2006, p. 8.
- <sup>35</sup> Department of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," February 17, 2006, p. 35.
- <sup>36</sup> Department of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," February 17, 2006, p. 48-49.
- <sup>37</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix 1, p. 1.
- <sup>38</sup> Department of State chart for SIGIR Oil Export Revenue Graphic.
- <sup>39</sup> Deleted
- <sup>40</sup> Department of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," February 17, 2006, p. 44.

- <sup>41</sup> Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” March 7, 2006, p. 6.
- <sup>42</sup> Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” February 17, 2006, p. 44.
- <sup>43</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, April 2006, Appendix I, p. 3.
- <sup>44</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, January 2006, Appendix I, p. 4.
- <sup>45</sup> Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” February 17, 2006, p. 44.
- <sup>46</sup> “On-the-Record Telephone Briefing with Ambassador Speckhard,” February 9, 2006, pp. 3-4.
- <sup>47</sup> Department of Defense News Briefing with Major General Rick Lynch, April 13, 2006.
- <sup>48</sup> Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” February 17, 2006, p. 28.
- <sup>49</sup> Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” March 7, 2006, p. 6.
- <sup>50</sup> United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, p. vi.
- <sup>51</sup> White House Office of the Press Secretary, Press Release, December 15, 2003. Available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031215.html>
- <sup>52</sup> United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, p. 18.
- <sup>53</sup> Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, Public Law 108-106, November 6, 2003, 117 Stat. 1225.
- <sup>54</sup> GRD-PCO, “Facilities and Transportation Sector,” received by SIGIR on March 24, 2006, p. 6.
- <sup>55</sup> SIGIR, Audit 06-011: “Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects,” April 2006.
- <sup>56</sup> Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” March 22, 2006, p. 13.
- <sup>57</sup> Vetting comments from GRD-PCO to SIGIR, received on April 21, 2006, and follow-up phone conversation with GRD-PCO on April 21, 2006.
- <sup>58</sup> Department of State/USAID/GRD-PCO response to SIGIR data request, received on March 29, 2006.
- <sup>59</sup> Vetting comments from GRD-PCO to SIGIR, received on April 21, 2006.
- <sup>60</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, April 2006, p. 93.
- <sup>61</sup> Deleted
- <sup>62</sup> GRD-PCO Daily Situation Report, April 11, 2006, p. 6.
- <sup>63</sup> NEA/USAID/GRD-PCO response to SIGIR data request, received on March 29, 2006.
- <sup>64</sup> Vetting response from GRD-PCO to SIGIR data request, received on April 21, 2006.
- <sup>65</sup> Deleted
- <sup>66</sup> Deleted
- <sup>67</sup> Deleted
- <sup>68</sup> Deleted
- <sup>69</sup> United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, p. 17.
- <sup>70</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2005 – Iraq, pp. 30-31.
- <sup>70a</sup> United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, p. 17.
- <sup>71</sup> Deleted
- <sup>72</sup> NEA/USAID/GRD-PCO response to SIGIR data request, received on March 29, 2006.
- <sup>73</sup> GRD-PCO Biweekly Situation Report, March 17, 2006, pp. 13.
- <sup>74</sup> Deleted
- <sup>75</sup> NEA/USAID/GRD-PCO response to SIGIR data request, received on March 29, 2006.
- <sup>76</sup> Deleted
- <sup>77</sup> Deleted

- <sup>78</sup> NEA/USAID/GRD-PCO response to SIGIR data request, received on March 29, 2006.
- <sup>79</sup> USAID, Email to SIGIR, April 7, 2006.
- <sup>80</sup> Department of State response to SIGIR data request, received on March 30, 2006.
- <sup>81</sup> Department of State response to SIGIR data request, received on March 30, 2006.
- <sup>82</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2005 – Iraq, pp. 29-30.
- <sup>83</sup> CIA, World Factbook – Iraq, January 10, 2006.
- <sup>84</sup> This report combines two subsectors of the Department of State (DoS) Section 2207 Report: Transportation and Communications; and Roads, Bridges, and Construction. For information about the definitions of these and other sectors, see Appendix H.
- <sup>85</sup> Congressional Research Service, “Iraq’s Economy: Past, Present, Future,” Report RL 21944, June 3, 2003, p. 29.
- <sup>86</sup> Transport was estimated to need \$2 billion; Telecommunication was estimated to need \$1.38 billion. United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, pp. 26, 28.
- <sup>87</sup> Transportation and telecommunications was allocated \$500 million; Roads, Bridges, and Construction was allocated \$370 million (Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, Public Law 108-106, November 6, 2003, 117 Stat. 1225).
- <sup>88</sup> GRD-PCO, Email to SIGIR, April 10, 2006.
- <sup>89</sup> USAID, Contract No. SPU-C-00-04-00001-00, awarded January 4, 2004. Available online at [http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/pdf/Bechtel\\_II.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/pdf/Bechtel_II.pdf)
- <sup>90</sup> Deleted
- <sup>91</sup> Deleted
- <sup>92</sup> Deleted
- <sup>93</sup> GRD-PCO, “Facilities and Transportation Sector,” received by SIGIR on March 24, 2006, pp. 7-8, 10.
- <sup>94</sup> GRD-PCO, “Response to SIGIR request dated February 25, 2006,” received by SIGIR on March 29, 2006, p. 9.
- <sup>95</sup> United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, p. 25.
- <sup>96</sup> Deleted
- <sup>97</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2005 – Iraq, 2005, p. 34.
- <sup>98</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, January 2006, pp. 81-82.
- <sup>99</sup> GRD-PCO, Email to SIGIR, April 10, 2006.
- <sup>100</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, p. 83.
- <sup>101</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, pp. 81-82.
- <sup>102</sup> GRD-PCO response to SIGIR data request, received on March 29, 2006.
- <sup>103</sup> Deleted
- <sup>104</sup> IRMO, Weekly Status report, March 28, 2006, p. 4.
- <sup>105</sup> United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, p. 23.
- <sup>106</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, p. 82.
- <sup>106a</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, p. 83.
- <sup>107</sup> IRMO, Information Memorandum from Acting IRMO Director to Deputy Chief of Mission, April 19, 2006.

- <sup>108</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, p. 83.
- <sup>109</sup> GRD-PCO, “Response to SIGIR request dated February 25, 2006,” received by SIGIR on March 29, 2006, p. 10.
- <sup>110</sup> IRMO, Information Memorandum from Acting IRMO Director to Deputy Chief of Mission, April 19, 2006.
- <sup>111</sup> IRMO, Weekly Status Report, March 14, 2006, p. 5.
- <sup>112</sup> United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, pp. 23-24.
- <sup>113</sup> IRMO, Information Memorandum from Acting IRMO Director to Deputy Chief of Mission, April 19, 2006.
- <sup>114</sup> Department of State, Email to SIGIR, April 6, 2006.
- <sup>115</sup> IRMO, Information Memorandum from Acting IRMO Director to Deputy Chief of Mission, April 19, 2006.
- <sup>116</sup> Congressional Research Service, “Iraq’s Economy: Past, Present, Future,” Report RL 21944, June 3, 2003, p. 30.
- <sup>117</sup> United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, pp. 23-24.
- <sup>118</sup> Deleted
- <sup>119</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2005 – Iraq, 2005, p. 33.
- <sup>120</sup> GRD-PCO response to SIGIR data request, received on March 29, 2006.
- <sup>121</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, pp. 80-81.
- <sup>122</sup> Department of State, Email to SIGIR, April 6, 2006.
- <sup>123</sup> United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, pp. 23-24.
- <sup>124</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2005 – Iraq, 2005, p. 33.
- <sup>125</sup> IRMO, Information Memorandum from Acting IRMO Director to Deputy Chief of Mission, April 19, 2006.
- <sup>126</sup> Deleted
- <sup>127</sup> IRMO, Weekly Status Report, March 28, 2006, p. 4.
- <sup>128</sup> United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, p. 23.
- <sup>129</sup> Congressional Research Service, “Iraq’s Economy: Past, Present, Future,” Report RL 21944, June 3, 2003, p. 38.
- <sup>130</sup> United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, p. 23.
- <sup>131</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2005 – Iraq, 2005, p. 33.
- <sup>132</sup> Deleted
- <sup>133</sup> Deleted
- <sup>134</sup> GRD-PCO response to SIGIR data request, received on March 29, 2006.
- <sup>135</sup> GRD-PCO response to SIGIR data request, received on March 29, 2006.
- <sup>136</sup> GRD-PCO, “Facilities and Transportation Sector,” received by SIGIR on March 24, 2006, p. 8.
- <sup>137</sup> GRD-PCO response to SIGIR data request, received on March 29, 2006.
- <sup>138</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, April 2006, p. 85.
- <sup>139</sup> GRD-PCO response to SIGIR data request, received on March 29, 2006.
- <sup>140</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, April 2006, p. 86.
- <sup>141</sup> IRMO, Information Memorandum from Acting IRMO Director to Deputy Chief of Mission, April 19, 2006.
- <sup>142</sup> Department of State, Iraq Weekly Status Report, March 15, 2006, p. 15; Department of State

- Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, p. 85; Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, April 2006, p. 87.
- <sup>143</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, pp. 86-87.
- <sup>144</sup> Congressional Research Service, "Iraq's Economy: Past, Present, Future," Report RL 21944, June 3, 2003, p. 30, p. 38.
- <sup>145</sup> USAID, Completed Projects: Telecommunications, December 29, 2005. Available online at <http://www1.usaid.gov/iraq/accomplishments/telecom.html>
- <sup>146</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, April 2006, p. 87.
- <sup>147</sup> Vetting comments from Department of State/USAID/GRD-PCO to SIGIR, April 21, 2006.
- <sup>148</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2005 – Iraq, 2005, pp. 34-35.
- <sup>149</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Executive Summary, January 2005, p. 6.
- <sup>150</sup> Office of Management and Budget *Section 2207 Report*, January 2004, p. 78.
- <sup>151</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2005 – Iraq, 2005, p. 35.
- <sup>152</sup> IRMO, Weekly Status Report, March 14, 2006, p. 20.
- <sup>153</sup> Department of State, Email to SIGIR, April 6, 2006.
- <sup>154</sup> SIGIR has begun to analyze the progress of important services and governance work in Iraq. SIGIR has designated the democracy, education, and private sector development sector for analyzing work in these DoS *Section 2207 Report* sectors: private sector development; education, refugees, human rights, and governance; democracy; and education construction projects in roads, bridges, and construction. For information about the definitions of these and other sectors, see Appendix H.
- <sup>155</sup> Education was estimated to need \$4.8 billion; employment creation was estimated to need \$785 million; finance and private sector development was estimated to need \$777 million; and government institutions, rule of law, civil society, and media were estimated to need \$387 million (United Nations/World Bank, "Joint Iraq Needs Assessment," October 2003, pp. 16, 20, 40, 42, 43, 50).
- <sup>156</sup> Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, Public Law 108-106, November 6, 2003, 117 Stat. 1225.
- <sup>157</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, p. 38; according to USAID, \$30 million of this funding increase went to USAID (PRT/PC) Local Government Support and Community Support Programs, while the other \$8.5 million went to DoS election support initiatives.
- <sup>158</sup> Congressional Research Service, "Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance," July 5, 2005, p. 22.
- <sup>159</sup> Deleted
- <sup>160</sup> Deleted
- <sup>161</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, p. 39.
- <sup>162</sup> Deleted
- <sup>163</sup> USAID, Contracts and Grants, updated on September 21, 2005. Available online at <http://www1.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/>
- <sup>164</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, p. 45.
- <sup>165</sup> Deleted
- <sup>166</sup> Deleted
- <sup>167</sup> Department of State, Press Briefing, April 13, 2006.

- <sup>168</sup> USAID response to SIGIR data request, received on March 15, 2006.
- <sup>169</sup> USAID, Accomplishments Fact Sheet, no date. Available online at <http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/accomplishments/>; USAID response to SIGIR data request, received on March 15, 2006.
- <sup>170</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, April 2006, p. 42.
- <sup>171</sup> Deleted
- <sup>172</sup> Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” March 22, 2006, p. 8.
- <sup>173</sup> USAID response to SIGIR data request, received on March 15, 2006.
- <sup>174</sup> USAID response to SIGIR data request, received on March 15, 2006.
- <sup>175</sup> Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” March 1, 2006, p. 14.
- <sup>176</sup> Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” March 22, 2006, p. 14.
- <sup>177</sup> Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” March 8, 2006, p. 14.
- <sup>178</sup> Deleted
- <sup>179</sup> Deleted
- <sup>180</sup> USAID, Contracts and Grants, updated on September 21, 2005. Available online at <http://www1.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/>
- <sup>181</sup> Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” March 1, 2006, p. 14.
- <sup>182</sup> United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, p. 14.
- <sup>183</sup> United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, pp. 1-4, 14.
- <sup>184</sup> GRD-PCO response SIGIR data request, received on dated March 29, 2006, p. 6.
- <sup>185</sup> USAID, “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq,” February 19, 2003, p. 11.
- <sup>186</sup> Department of State, *Section 2207 Report*, Executive Summary, April 2006, p. 18.
- <sup>187</sup> USAID response to SIGIR data request, received on April 19, 2006; out of the 2,943 schools completed by USAID, 2,358 of these used IRRF 1-funding, while the remaining 585 schools used IRRF-2 funds. This final tally of USAID projects differs from that reached by the April Section 2207 Report, which reported that USAID had completed 3,000 schools with IRRF-funding. This discrepancy was not resolved at the time of publication.
- <sup>188</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, April 2006, p. 18.
- <sup>189</sup> USAID, “Weekly Status Report,” March 17, 2006, p.8.
- <sup>190</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, pp. 104-105.
- <sup>191</sup> Deleted
- <sup>192</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, pp. 110-111.
- <sup>193</sup> USAID, Contracts and Grants, updated on September 21, 2005. Available online at <http://www1.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/>
- <sup>194</sup> Department of Treasury Office of Inspector General, Audit Report 06-029, “International Assistance Programs: Review of Treasury Activities for Iraq Reconstruction,” March 23, 2006.
- <sup>195</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, p. 110.
- <sup>196</sup> USAID, Contracts and Grants, updated on September 21, 2005. Available online at <http://www1.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/>
- <sup>197</sup> IRMO, Information Memorandum from Acting IRMO Director to Deputy Chief of Mission, April 19, 2006.
- <sup>198</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, pp. 99-102.
- <sup>199</sup> Deleted
- <sup>200</sup> Department of State, *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, p. 95.

- <sup>201</sup> Deleted
- <sup>202</sup> Department of State, *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, April 2006, p. 98.
- <sup>203</sup> USAID, "Iraq Reconstruction: A brief overview," September 14, 2005. Available online at <http://www2.usaid.gov/iraq/accomplishments/>
- <sup>204</sup> Department of State, *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, April 2006, p. 103.
- <sup>205</sup> GRD-PCO notes that this rate will change because the number of projects may increase as the projects are defined and tasked (Vetting comments from GRD-PCO, received on April 20, 2006).
- <sup>206</sup> According to GRD-PCO, 96 GRD-PCO projects have yet to start (Vetting comments from GRD-PCO, received on April 20, 2006). GRD-PCO says that the number of projects in the sector increases as they are defined and tasked. SIGIR data comes from the IRMO Rollup file on IRMS, March 31, 2006, which includes GRD-PCO data.
- <sup>207</sup> Vetting comments from GRD-PCO, received on April 20, 2006.
- <sup>208</sup> Vetting comments from GRD-PCO, received on April 20, 2006. GRD-PCO notes that this does not include the Ambassador's deferred and reinstated projects and projects currently funded from FFP cost savings.
- <sup>209</sup> USACE-GRD, "Reconstruction Continues in Iraq," October 2, 2005.
- <sup>210</sup> USACE-GRD, "Bi-Weekly Situation Report," March 3, 2006, p. 42; USACE-GRD, "Daily Situation Report," January 8, 2006, pp. 1 and 3.
- <sup>211</sup> GRD-PCO, Email to SIGIR, April 10, 2006.
- <sup>212</sup> Vetting comments from GRD-PCO, received on April 20, 2006.
- <sup>213</sup> USACE-GRD, "Bi-Weekly Situation Report," February 20, 2006.
- <sup>214</sup> GRD-PCO, Email to SIGIR, April 10, 2006.
- <sup>215</sup> GRD-PCO, Email to SIGIR, April 10, 2006.
- <sup>216</sup> Department of State, "Iraq Weekly Status Report," March 30, 2005, p. 13.
- <sup>217</sup> IRMO, "Weekly Status Report," March 28, 2006, p. 2.
- <sup>218</sup> Department of State, "Iraq Weekly Status Report," March 29, 2006, p. 12.
- <sup>219</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, April 2006, pp. 53-54.
- <sup>220</sup> Deleted
- <sup>221</sup> IRMO, "Weekly Status Report," March 28, 2006, p. 2.
- <sup>221a</sup> Vetting comments from Department of State, received on April 21, 2006.
- <sup>222</sup> World Bank, "Rebuilding Iraq: Economic Reform and Transition," February 2006, p. 7.
- <sup>223</sup> IEEE Spectrum, "Re-Engineering Iraq," February 2006, p. 3.
- <sup>224</sup> World Bank, "Rebuilding Iraq: Economic Reform and Transition," February 2006, p. 7.
- <sup>225</sup> IEEE Spectrum, "Re-Engineering Iraq," February 2006, p. 3.
- <sup>226</sup> Defense Reconstruction Support Office, "Summary and Technical Report Iraqi Electricity Sector," April 22, 2005, p. 35.
- <sup>227</sup> Defense Reconstruction Support Office, "Summary and Technical Report Iraqi Electricity Sector," April 22, 2005, p. 7.
- <sup>228</sup> Joint U.S.-Iraqi electricity Action Plan, March 12, 2006, p. 8.
- <sup>229</sup> Joint U.S.-Iraqi electricity Action Plan, March 12, 2006, p. 8.
- <sup>230</sup> GRD-PCO, Email to SIGIR, April 10, 2006.
- <sup>231</sup> Vetting comments from GRD-PCO, received on April 20, 2006.

- <sup>232</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, p. 66.
- <sup>233</sup> Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” February 22, 2006 and March 1, 2006 reports.
- <sup>234</sup> USACE-GRD, “Bi-Weekly Situation Report,” April 3, 2006, p. 9 for EP information; Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS) as of March 31, 2006 for EPC information. PCO reports one descope EPC project, bringing their tally down to 59. This information, however, was not updated in the IRMS database.
- <sup>235</sup> GRD-PCO response to SIGIR data request on April 12, 2006.
- <sup>236</sup> GRD-PCO, “Bi-Weekly Situation Report,” March 20, 2006, p. 8.
- <sup>237</sup> Vetting comments from GRD-PCO, received on April 20, 2006; last quarter, PCO reported to SIGIR that the ABOT task order was 31% complete. A drop to 30% after the contractor undertook a Value Engineering exercise and several projects underwent scope changes to remain within schedule and budget.
- <sup>238</sup> GRD-PCO, “Bi-Weekly Situation Report,” March 6, 2006, p. 9.
- <sup>239</sup> GRD-PCO response to SIGIR data call on April 10, 2006.
- <sup>240</sup> GRD-PCO, “Bi-Weekly Situation Report,” April 3, 2006, p. 10.
- <sup>241</sup> IRMO, “Weekly Status Report,” March 28, 2006, p. 7.
- <sup>242</sup> GRD-PCO response on March 19, 2006 to SIGIR data request of February 25, 2006, attachment 4a, pp. 1-3; the ABOT metering system was initially assessed in the GRD-PCO response to SIGIR’s data call as being 47% complete, but was later labeled 29.9% complete because of reassessments of scope and weightings, according to an April 10, 2006 PCO response to a SIGIR data call.
- <sup>243</sup> Vetting comments from GRD-PCO, received on April 20, 2006.
- <sup>244</sup> GRD-PCO, “Bi-Weekly Situation Report,” April 3, 2006, p. 11.
- <sup>245</sup> Deleted
- <sup>246</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, p. 66.
- <sup>247</sup> GRD-PCO, “The Oil Story of Iraq,” March 2006, p. 17.
- <sup>248</sup> Deleted
- <sup>249</sup> Deleted
- <sup>250</sup> GRD-PCO response on March 19, 2006 to SIGIR data request of February 25, 2006, attachment 4a, pp. 1-3.
- <sup>251</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, April 2006, Appendix 1, p. 67.
- <sup>252</sup> GRD-PCO, “The Oil Story of Iraq,” March 2006, p. 18.
- <sup>253</sup> Deleted
- <sup>254</sup> GRD-PCO, “Oil Sector Consolidated Results Update Meeting (SCRUM),” April 6, 2006, p. 16.
- <sup>255</sup> Vetting comments from GRD-PCO, received on April 20, 2006.
- <sup>256</sup> GRD-PCO, “The Oil Story of Iraq,” March 2006, p. 21.
- <sup>257</sup> GRD-PCO, “Bi-Weekly Situation Report,” March 20, 2006, p. 9.
- <sup>258</sup> GRD-PCO response on March 19, 2006, to SIGIR data request of February 25, 2006, pp. 8-10.
- <sup>259</sup> The DoE Country Analysis Brief (CAB) indicates the range for the pre-war production metric is between 2.5 and 2.6 million BPD (p. 3). From 1999 to 2001, production averaged 2.5 million BPD. It fell to 2.0 million BPD in 2002, but slowly crept back up toward 2.5 million BPD before the war, peaking at 2.58 million BPD.

<sup>260</sup> Deleted

<sup>261</sup> International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Request for Stand-By Arrangement—Staff Report; Staff Supplement; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director

for Iraq,” January 2006, p. 3.

<sup>262</sup> IRMO data reported by SIGIR auditing team.

<sup>263</sup> DOS-NEA response to SIGIR data request on April 21, 2006.

<sup>264</sup> Deleted

<sup>265</sup> DOS-NEA response to SIGIR data request on April 21, 2006.

<sup>266</sup> IRMO data reported by SIGIR auditing team.

<sup>267</sup> Deleted

<sup>268</sup> Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” March 15, 2006, p. 21.

<sup>269</sup> According to a SIGIR interview conducted with a U.S. government oil expert, bad weather in the Persian Gulf affects the use of tugboats at ABOT. The Ministry of Transportation owns 6 tugboats and they are based at Umm Qasr, which is about an 8-hour trip from ABOT. During bad weather, the Ministry of Transportation keeps the tugboats docked, making them unavailable to service cargo ships at ABOT waiting to load crude for export. The tankers cannot berth to receive the cargo and, in conjunction with mandatory inspections for all ships in the 3,000 mile exclusion zone, result in significant delays that force southern to shut in production because of low storage capacity on shore. The delays also result in demurrage compensation for shippers waiting to pick up cargo at ABOT. The Ministry of Oil is currently in the process of procuring its own tugboats.

<sup>270</sup> International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Request for Stand-By Arrangement—Staff Report; Staff Supplement; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Iraq,” January 2006, p. 10; In the IMF Arrangement with Iraq, Iraqi budget projections estimate that 1.65 MBPD will be exported at a cost of \$46.60 per barrel.

<sup>271</sup> IRMO, “Weekly Status Report,” April 11, 2006, p. 10.

<sup>272</sup> Deleted

<sup>273</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, April 2006, p. 67.

<sup>274</sup> Deleted

<sup>275</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, January 2006, p. 65; DoS hours of power graphic.

<sup>276</sup> Deleted

<sup>277</sup> Energy Intelligence Group, “Three Years Later, Iraq’s Oil Sector Remains in Crisis,” Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, March 27, 2006.

<sup>278</sup> World Bank, “Rebuilding Iraq: Economic Reform and Transition,” February 2006, p. 16.

<sup>279</sup> World Bank, “Rebuilding Iraq: Economic Reform and Transition,” February 2006, p. 7.

<sup>280</sup> Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” March 7, 2006, p. 6.

<sup>281</sup> “Energy Sector Action Plan Summer Targets – Electricity and Oil,” March 12, 2006, p. 21.

<sup>282</sup> Department of State *Section 2207 Report*, Appendix I, April 2006, pp. 67-68.

<sup>283</sup> World Bank, “Rebuilding Iraq: Economic Reform and Transition,” February 2006, p. 7.

<sup>284</sup> IRMO, “Oil and Natural Gas End State Goals,” May 21, 2005, p. 6.

<sup>285</sup> Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” March 21, 2006, p. 10.

- <sup>286</sup> Deleted
- <sup>287</sup> “Embassy Anti-Corruption Strategy,” December 28, 2005, p. 2.
- <sup>288</sup> “Embassy Anti-Corruption Strategy,” December 28, 2005, p. 1.
- <sup>289</sup> Kenneth Pollack and the Iraqi Policy Working Group, “A Switch in Time: A New Strategy for America in Iraq,” Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, February 2006, p. 54.
- <sup>290</sup> “On-the-Record Telephone Briefing with Ambassador Speckhard,” February 9, 2006, p. 10.
- <sup>291</sup> “Embassy Anti-Corruption Strategy,” December 28, 2005, p. 2.
- <sup>292</sup> Deleted
- <sup>293</sup> Deleted
- <sup>294</sup> Deleted
- <sup>295</sup> Vetting comments from GRD-PCO, received on April 20, 2006.
- <sup>296</sup> USAID response to SIGIR data request, received on March 24, 2006.
- <sup>297</sup> Also referred to as Erbil Ifraz Water Supply Project.
- <sup>298</sup> USACE-GRD, “Bi-Weekly Situation Report,” February 20, 2006, p. 11.
- <sup>299</sup> USACE-GRD, “Bi-Weekly Situation Report,” March 17, 2006, p. 12; USACE-GRD, “Bi-Weekly Situation Report,” April 1, 2006, p. 14.
- <sup>300</sup> USACE-GRD, “Bi-Weekly Situation Report,” April 1, 2006, p. 14.
- <sup>301</sup> USACE-GRD, “Bi-Weekly Situation Report,” February 20, 2006, p. 10.
- <sup>302</sup> IRMO, Information Memorandum from Acting IRMO Director to Deputy Chief of Mission, April 19, 2006.
- <sup>303</sup> Vetting comments from GRD-PCO, received on April 20, 2006.
- <sup>304</sup> USACE-GRD, “Bi-Weekly Situation Report,” March 17, 2006, p. 12.
- <sup>305</sup> GRD-PCO response to SIGIR data request, received on March 24, 2006.
- <sup>306</sup> Vetting comments from GRD-PCO, received on April 20, 2006.
- <sup>307</sup> USAID response to SIGIR data request, received on March 24, 2006.
- <sup>308</sup> GRD-PCO, Responses to Questions from SIGIR, March 19, 2006, p. 3.
- <sup>309</sup> USAID, “Strategy For Water And Land Resources In Iraq: Inception Report,” December 2005, p. 1.
- <sup>310</sup> Deleted
- <sup>311</sup> Some U.S. projects in the water sector do not directly add capacity to the water or sanitary system. Projects like expansion of distribution networks or rehabilitation of storage tanks are not captured in this metric. (IRMO, “Metrics – Measuring the Impacts of Reconstruction Efforts,” December 2005, p. 2)
- <sup>312</sup> Deleted
- <sup>313</sup> Department of State response to SIGIR data request, received on March 24, 2006, p. 6.
- <sup>314</sup> UN/World Bank, “Joint Needs Assessment,” October 2003, p. 21.
- <sup>315</sup> Department of Defense, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” November 17, 2003, p. 11.
- <sup>316</sup> GAO estimated that by 2003 the production level of water was 60% in urban areas and 50% in rural areas—enough to serve 14 million people. GAO noted that much of the water was lost because of leakage and contamination (GAO 05-872, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water Efforts Need Improved Measures for Assessing Impact and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities,” September 2005, p. 5.) GRD-PCO cited these same figures in a sector history of the

water sector (GRD-PCO, “History of the Water Sector,” received on January 13, 2006). USAID estimated that 50% of the population was served by water treatment plants (USAID, Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq, February 2003, p. 3). The UN and World Bank estimated that pre-war water levels declined in some governorates by as much as 50% since 2000. In 2000 roughly 19 million people had access to water; 9.5 million people had access under the worst-case scenario of all governorates decreasing by 50% (UN/World Bank, “Joint Needs Assessment,” October 2003, p. 21). The U.S. Embassy in Iraq reported a pre-war level of 5.5 million people, which appears to be an outlier from the other figures (Department of State, “Reconstruction Progress in Iraq,” November 30, 2005).

<sup>317</sup> GRD-PCO, Email to SIGIR, April 10, 2006.

<sup>318</sup> USAID response to SIGIR data request, received on March 24, 2006.

<sup>319</sup> GRD-PCO response to SIGIR data request, received on March 24, 2006.

<sup>320</sup> GRD-PCO, Email to SIGIR, April 10, 2006.

<sup>321</sup> Vetting comments from GRD-PCO, received on April 20, 2006.

<sup>322</sup> USAID response to SIGIR data request, received on March 24, 2006.

<sup>323</sup> Deleted

<sup>324</sup> GRD-PCO, Email to SIGIR, April 10, 2006.

<sup>325</sup> Department of State, Iraq Weekly Status, January 4, 2006, and March 29, 2006.

<sup>326</sup> Government disbursements are funds that have left government treasuries. Assistance channeled through organizations such as the IRFFI trust funds and NGOs will take additional time to be disbursed in Iraq. Although the pace of disbursement has the potential to increase as more donors establish their implementation mechanisms, actual disbursements will depend on Iraq’s stability.

<sup>326a</sup> Embassy of Japan, Economic Section Email.

<sup>326b</sup> Available online at <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/>

<sup>326c</sup> Available online at <http://www.aedi-eida.gc.ca/iraq>

<sup>326d</sup> Available online at <http://www.usaid.gov.au>

<sup>326e</sup> European Commission Delegation and Baghdad Email

<sup>326f</sup> Available online at <http://www.irffi.org>

<sup>326g</sup> Department of State 2207 Report, Appendix II

<sup>326h</sup> SIGIR interview with Department of State NEA-I

<sup>327</sup> A concessional loan is provided to poor countries, lending at interest rates below the market and with an extended grace period. These loans are also known as soft loans.

### Section 3: SIGIR Oversight

<sup>1</sup> Section 2207 of P.L. 108-106 requires a report from the Office of Management and Budget to Congress every three months that updates the proposed uses of all IRRF funds on a project-by-project basis, including estimates of the cost required to complete each project.

<sup>2</sup> Effective December 4, 2005, PCO was merged with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division (GRD), to form GRD-PCO.

<sup>3</sup> Effective December 4, 2005, PCO was merged with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf

Region Division, to form GRD-PCO.

- <sup>4</sup> Army organizations have an alpha/numeric designator that identifies their various command functions (for example, G-2 = Intelligence, G-4 = Logistics). The Communications and Information Technology function is identified by G-6.
- <sup>5</sup> Three of the six recommendations were made to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq.
- <sup>6</sup> When the draft of this report was published, a modification to this contract extended it for a short period to address an expanded statement of work. This included automating the contract file documentation. The extension also addressed excusable delays as a result of Iraqi government holidays.
- <sup>7</sup> GRD-PCO Management of the Transfer of IRRF-funded Assets to the Iraqi Government, SIGIR-05-028 (January 24, 2006).
- <sup>8</sup> GRD-PCO Management of the Transfer of IRRF-funded Assets to the Iraqi Government, SIGIR-05-028 (January 24, 2006).
- <sup>9</sup> SIGIR estimated that the amount of definitized cost of task order 7 associated with the PHC projects is 64 percent or \$70,400,000. IR estimated that the amount of definitized cost of task order 7 associated with the PHC projects is 64 percent or \$70,400,000.
- <sup>10</sup> SIGIR-05-027, "Methodologies for Reporting Cost-to-Complete Estimates," January 27, 2006.
- <sup>11</sup> In addition to 49 Primary Health Care Centers under Task Order 0011, the Primary Health Care Center contract included Task Orders 0004 and 0012, which authorized the construction of 41 Primary Health Care Centers in the central region of Iraq and 60 Primary Health Care Centers in the southern region of Iraq, respectively. Therefore, the total number of Primary Health Care Centers originally to be completed under Contract W914NS-04-D-0006 was to be 150. The task orders were subsequently modified to provide for only 141 Primary Health Care Centers.
- <sup>12</sup> Honeycombing refers to the voids left in the concrete because of the failure of the mortar to effectively fill the spaces among coarse aggregate particles (American Concrete Institute).
- <sup>13</sup> ACWG Members Source: Strategic Effects Liaison Officer, MNF-I

## Section 4: Other Agency Oversight

- <sup>1</sup>IIGC members: SIGIR (Chair), DoS IG (Co-Vice Chair), DoD IG (Co-Vice Chair), Army IG, USAID IG, Treasury IG, DoC IG, DCAA, USAAA, GAO (observer member), USACE Chief Audit Executive (observer member)

## Appendix I: Financial Impact of SIGIR Operations

- <sup>1</sup> Numbers are provided in aggregate. Individual tracking is done on a case level and maintained by SIGIR AIG for Investigations.

APPENDIX NAME	PAGE NUMBER
<b>APPENDIX A: STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS</b>	<b>A – 1</b> (on CD)
<b>APPENDIX B: U.S. APPROPRIATED FUNDS</b>	<b>B – 1</b> (on CD)
<b>APPENDIX C: IRAQ RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION FUND APPORTIONMENTS BY AGENCY</b>	<b>C – 1</b> (on CD)
<b>APPENDIX D: IRAQI FUNDS OBLIGATED FOR RECONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY BY CPA</b>	<b>D – 1</b> (on CD)
<b>APPENDIX E: COMPLETED SIGIR AUDITS</b>	<b>E – 1</b> (on CD)
<b>APPENDIX F: SUMMARY OF U.S. OVERSIGHT IN IRAQ</b>	<b>F – 1</b> (on CD)
<b>APPENDIX G: CONTRACTS</b>	<b>G – 1</b> (on CD)
<b>APPENDIX H: SECTOR CROSS-REFERENCE</b>	<b>H – 1</b> (on CD)
<b>APPENDIX I: FINANCIAL IMPACT OF SIGIR OPERATIONS</b>	<b>I – 1</b> (on CD)



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## STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

This appendix cross-references the pages of this Report to the reporting requirements under Public Law 108-106, Section 3001 (amended by Section 1203).

# APPENDIX A

SECTION	STATUTE	SIGIR ACTION	PAGE #
SUPERVISION			
Section 3001(e)(1)	The Inspector General shall report directly to, and be under the general supervision of, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.	Report to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.	1-222
DUTIES			
Section 3001(f)(1)	It shall be the duty of the Inspector General to conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of the treatment, handling, and expenditure of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, and of the programs, operations, and contracts carried out utilizing such funds, including—	Review appropriated funds. Programs, operations, contracts using appropriated funds.	107-196, App. B, App. G
Section 3001(f)(1)(A)	The oversight and accounting of the obligation and expenditure of such funds;	Review obligations and expenditures of appropriated funds.	App. B, App. C, App. D
Section 3001(f)(1)(B)	The monitoring and review of reconstruction activities funded by such funds;	Review reconstruction activities funded by appropriations.	1-196
Section 3001(f)(1)(C)	The monitoring and review of contracts funded by such funds;	Review contracts using appropriated funds.	107-196, App. G
Section 3001(f)(1)(D)	The monitoring and review of the transfer of such funds and associated information between and among departments, agencies, and entities of the United States, and private and nongovernmental entities;	Review internal and external transfers of appropriated funds.	107-196, App. B
Section 3001(f)(1)(E)	The maintenance of records on the use of such funds to facilitate future audits and investigations of the use of such funds.	Maintain audit records.	107-196, App. F
Section 3001(f)(2)	The Inspector General shall establish, maintain, and oversee such systems, procedures, and controls as the Inspector General considers appropriate to discharge the duty.	Establish, maintain, and oversee systems, procedures, and controls.	107-196
Section 3001(f)(3)	In addition, the Inspector General shall also have the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978.	Duties as specified in IG Act.	N/A
Section 3001(f)(4)(A)(B)&(C)	The Inspector General shall coordinate with, and receive the cooperation of, each of the following: The Inspector General of the Department of State, The Inspector General of the Department of Defense, and The Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development.	Coordination with IGs of State, DoD & USAID.	199-222
PERSONNEL, FACILITIES, AND OTHER RESOURCES			
Section 3001(h)(4)(A)	Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance from any department, agency, or other entity of the Federal Government, the head of such entity shall, insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing law, furnish such information or assistance to the Inspector General, or an authorized designee.	Expect support as requested.	15-196
REPORTS			
Section 3001(i)(1)	Not later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal-year quarter, the Inspector General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report summarizing for the period of that quarter and, to the extent possible, the period from the end of such quarter to the time of the submission of the report, the activities of the Inspector General and the activities under programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. Each report shall include, for the period covered by such report, a detailed statement of all obligations, expenditures, and revenues associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Iraq, including the following –	Report – 30 days after the end of each calendar quarter. Summarize activities of IG. Detailed statement of all obligations, expenditures, and revenues.	1-222
Section 3001(i)(1)(A)	Obligations and expenditures of appropriated funds.	Obligations and expenditures of appropriated funds.	App. B
Section 3001(i)(1)(B)	A project-by-project and program-by-program accounting of the costs incurred to date for the reconstruction of Iraq, together with the estimate of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the United States Agency for International Development, as applicable, of the costs to complete each project and each program.	Project-by-project and program-by-program accounting of costs. Estimate cost to complete each project or program.	15-104, App. C, App. D

SECTION	STATUTE	SIGIR ACTION	PAGE #
Section 3001(i)(1)(C)	Revenues attributable to or consisting of funds provided by foreign nations or international organizations, and any obligations or expenditures of such revenues.	Revenues, obligations, and expenditures of donor funds.	92-104
Section 3001(i)(1)(D)	Revenues attributable to or consisting of foreign assets seized or frozen, and any obligations or expenditures of such revenues.	Revenues, obligations, and expenditures of funds from seized or frozen assets.	App. D
Section 3001(i)(1)(E)	Operating expenses of agencies or entities receiving amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund.	Operating expenses of agencies or any organization receiving appropriated funds.	App. B
Section 3001(i)(1)(F)	In the case of any contract described in paragraph I (2) (*see Section 3001 (i) (2) below)		N/A
Section 3001(i)(1)(F)(i)	The amount of the contract or other agreement;	Amount of each contract or other agreement.	App. G
Section 3001(i)(1)(F)(ii)	A brief discussion of the scope of the contract or other agreement;	Brief discussion of each contract scope.	App. G
Section 3001(i)(1)(F)(iii)	A discussion of how the contracting department or agency identified, and solicited offers from, potential contractors to perform the contract, together with a list of the potential contractors that were issued solicitations for the offers.	Discussion of: how potential contractors were identified, how offers were solicited, and a list of contractors that were issued solicitations.	App. G
Section 3001(i)(1)(F)(iv)	The justification and approval documents on which was based the determination to use procedures other than procedures that provide for full and open competition.	Justification and approval documents for contracts that were not full and open competitions.	App. G
Section 3001(i)(2)	A contract described in this paragraph is any major contract or other agreement that is entered into by any department or agency of the United States Government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund with any public or private sector entity for any of the following purposes:	Describes a contract.	N/A
Section 3001(i)(2)(A)	To build or rebuild physical infrastructure of Iraq.	Describes a contract.	N/A
Section 3001(i)(2)(B)	To establish or reestablish a political or societal institution of Iraq.	Describes a contract.	N/A
Section 3001(i)(2)(C)	To provide products or services to the people of Iraq.	Describes a contract.	N/A
Section 3001(i)(3)	The Inspector General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress semiannual reports meeting the requirements of Section 5 of the Inspector General Act of 1978. The first such report for a year, covering the first six months of the year, shall be submitted not later than July 31 of that year, and the second such report, covering the second six months of the year, shall be submitted not later than January 31 of the following year.	Shall be submitted not later than July 31 of that year, and the second such report.	N/A
Section 3001(i)(4)	The Inspector General shall publish each report under this subsection in both English and Arabic on the Internet Website of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.	SIGIR will take final written report in electronic format, translate and post to Website; encourage the DoD and State to link to SIGIR Website.	
Section 3001(i)(5)	Each report under this subsection may include a classified annex if the Inspector General considers it necessary.	If necessary, develop a classified annex.	N/A
REPORT COORDINATION			
Section 3001(j)	The Inspector General shall also submit each report under subsection (i) to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.	Submit report to Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.	04/30/2006

## U.S. APPROPRIATED FUNDS

This appendix provides an accounting of U.S. appropriated funds under these laws:

- P.L. 108-11, April 16, 2003
- P.L. 108-106, November 6, 2003
- P.L. 108-287, August 5, 2004
- P.L. 109-13, May 11, 2005
- P.L. 109-148, January 4, 2005
- P.L. 109-102, January 4, 2005

### U.S. Appropriated Funds under Public Law 108-11

In April 2003, Congress passed P.L. 108-11 which included bilateral economic assistance for Iraq:

- the Iraq Relief Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 1) was created. P.L. 108-4 identified 12 sectors to be funded and appropriated to the Department of State, AID, Treasury, DoD and HHS...
- establish the Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund (NRRRF) “for expenses necessary, in and around Iraq, to address emergency fire fighting, repair of damage to oil facilities and related infrastructure...”

P.L. 108-11 also funded the daily operations of CPA until P.L. 108-106 was passed in November 2003. Although CPA ceased operations on June 28, 2004, contractual payment of obligations resulting from contracts awarded by the CPA during its tenure are still being fulfilled. Most of the funds (55%) allocated in P.L. 108-11 were used for the rehabilitation of Iraqi infrastructure—primarily oil production and electricity generation. Other major uses include

humanitarian relief, governance initiatives, and health and social services.

Table B-1 provides the status of P.L. 108-11 funds by agency.

Tables B-2 and B-3 provide the status of P.L. 108-11 funds by program and by objective.

### Commander’s Assistance Programs under Public Laws, 108-287, 109-13, and 109-148

Military assistance programs continue to play a vital role in the reconstruction of Iraq. In a secure environment, area commanders can develop the necessary relationships with Iraqi civic leaders to initiate crucial projects. Initially funded with Iraqi assets [seized assets and Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) funds], the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) received its first U.S. appropriated funds in August 2004, with the passage of P.L. 108-287. Subsequent additional funding for CERP was provided under Section 9007 of P.L. 108-13 and in P.L. 109-148. In addition, the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) funded a similar CERP-equivalent program, but not subject to U.S. oversight.

### Commander’s Emergency Response Program

CERP is a program that allows coalition military commanders to rapidly respond to urgent humanitarian, relief, and reconstruction needs in their geographic areas of responsibility. Specifically exempt from the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), CERP projects are relatively

small—less than \$500,000—and meet these kinds of needs:

- repair and refurbishment of water and sewer lines
- clean highways through removal of waste and debris
- transportation of water to remote villages
- purchase of equipment for local police stations
- upgrade schools and clinics
- purchase school supplies
- remove ordnance from public places (including schools)
- refurbish playgrounds, youth centers, libraries, other recreational facilities, and mosques

The aim of CERP is more tactical than strategic, with a focus on smaller-scale, highly visible projects that yield immediate benefits and nurture positive relations with the local populace.

For a summary of CERP expenditures, see Table B-4.

Table B-5 provides a profile of selected CERP projects funded by U.S. appropriations and a small segment of those funded by the DFI.

Commanders Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Program and Iraqi Reconstruction Assistance Program

In response to an Iraqi demand to match the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) grants for CERP, a separate program, the Commanders Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Program (CHRRP) was created. CHRRP was funded out of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 2) monies, requiring adherence to the FAR. The IIG initially funded CHRRP for \$86 million in response to a U.S. request.

This was increased by an additional \$50 mil-

STATUS OF SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION, P.L. 108-11, AS OF MARCH 31, 2006 (Millions)

SOURCE	AGENCY	APPORTIONED	OBLIGATED	EXPENDED
IRRF 1	DoD	\$802.0	\$800.6	\$790.6
	USAID	1,781.4	1,781.3	1,662.3
	DoD IRRF 1	518.3	514.4	501.8
	DoS	125.4	125.4	116.0
	Treasury	6.0	6.0	4.8
	USTDA	5.0	5.0	2.8
	Subtotal	2,436.1	2,432.1	2,287.7
Non-IRRF P.L. 108-11	USAID	411.8	391.1	389.1
	DoS	66.0	66.0	60.4
	Subtotal	477.8	457.1	449.5
IFF	CPA-OPS	352.4	440.5	406.2
	New Iraqi Army	51.2	51.2	49.8
	Subtotal	403.6	491.7	456.0
Total		\$4,119.5	\$4,181.5	\$3,983.8

Note: Data not formally reviewed or audited.

TABLE B-1

**STATUS OF P.L. 108-11 IRRF1 FUNDS BY PROGRAM AND BY USAID STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES,  
AS OF MARCH 31, 2006** (Millions)

AGENCY	PROGRAM NAME	APPORTIONED	OBLIGATED	EXPENDED
IRRF1 Funds				
USAID	Restore Critical Infrastructure	\$1,124.4	\$1,124.4	\$1,020.4
	Improve Efficiency & Accountability of Government	174.7	174.7	174.7
	Food Aid: Office of Food for Peace	124.8	124.8	124.8
	Support Education Health and Social Services	118.5	118.5	111.9
	Relief: Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance	70.5	70.5	65.1
	Office of Transition Initiatives	69.8	69.7	68.8
	Expand Economic Opportunity	65.9	65.9	64.8
	Program Support & Development of Gulf Region	18.0	18.0	17.7
	Administrative Expenses	14.9	14.9	13.9
	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>1,781.5</i>	<i>1,781.4</i>	<i>1,662.1</i>
DoD	Restore Iraq Electricity (RIE)	300.0	299.9	299.9
	Restore Iraq Oil (RIO)	166.0	162.7	161.0
	First Responder Network/DIILS	52.3	51.8	40.9
	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>518.3</i>	<i>514.4</i>	<i>501.8</i>
DoS	Police/Prison Programs	61.5	61.5	55.5
	Relief Efforts	27.0	27.0	26.9
	Law Enforcement	24.6	24.6	21.4
	Humanitarian Demining	12.3	12.3	12.3
	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>125.4</i>	<i>125.4</i>	<i>116.1</i>
Treasury	Technical Assistance	6.0	6.0	4.8
	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>6.0</i>	<i>6.0</i>	<i>4.8</i>
U.S. Trade and Dev. Agency	Technical Assistance/Training	5.0	5.0	2.8
	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>5.0</i>	<i>5.0</i>	<i>2.8</i>
<b>Total IRRF1 Funds</b>		<b>\$2,436.2</b>	<b>\$2,432.2</b>	<b>\$2,287.6</b>

Note: Data not formally reviewed or audited

**TABLE B-2**

lion on December 30, 2004. The U.S. matching CHRRP fund was initially set at \$86 million; however, this was adjusted to \$84 million in February 2005. Iraqi government projects must be selected from a project list approved by the Iraqi government and the Multi-National Force-Iraq.

For a summary of CHRRP and Iraqi government data, see Table B-6.

In the July 2005 *Section 2207 Report*, DoS reported that the U.S. government made \$241 million available for coordination with the Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees (PRDC) for these programs:

- \$80 million in CERP funds
- \$161 million in USAID-administered Community Action Program and USAID Local Governance Program funds

## APPENDIX B

### STATUS OF P.L. 108-11 NRRRF AND NON-IRRF 1 FUNDS BY PROGRAM AND BY USAID STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, AS OF MARCH 31, 2005 (Millions)

AGENCY	PROGRAM NAME	APPORTIONED	OBLIGATED	EXPENDED
<b>NRRRF Funds</b>				
DoD	Restore Iraq Oil	\$802.0	\$800.6	\$790.6
<b>Total NRRRF Funds</b>		<b>\$802.0</b>	<b>\$800.6</b>	<b>\$790.6</b>
<b>Non-IRRF1 Funds</b>				
USAID	Food Aid: Office of Food for Peace	\$138.1	\$118.5	\$117.7
	USDA <sup>a</sup>	106.8	106.8	106.8
	Restore Critical Infrastructure	51.6	51.6	51.6
	Support Education Health and Social Services	34.0	34.0	33.8
	Relief: Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance	33.1	32.2	31.6
	Operating Expenses	23.7	23.5	23.3
	Program Support & Development of Gulf Region	10.6	10.6	10.6
	Improve Efficiency & Accountability of Government	8.9	8.9	8.9
	Expand Economic Opportunity	5.0	5.0	5.0
	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>411.8</i>	<i>391.1</i>	<i>389.3</i>
DoS	Coalition Support	66.0	66.0	60.4
	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>66.0</i>	<i>66.0</i>	<i>60.4</i>
<b>Total Non-IRRF1 Funds</b>		<b>\$477.8</b>	<b>\$457.1</b>	<b>\$449.7</b>

Note: Data not formally reviewed or audited.

<sup>a</sup> Funds appropriated to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, then transferred to USAID.

TABLE B-3

FUND SOURCE	TOTAL PROGRAM FUNDING	CUMULATIVE FUNDS OBLIGATED	CUMULATIVE FUNDS DISBURSED
Seized Assets	\$180.2	\$178.5	\$177.4
U.S. Appropriated FY 2004 P.L. 108-106	140.0	137.4	128.2
U.S. Appropriated FY 2005 P.L. 108-287 P.L. 108-375 P.L. 108-447 P.L. 109-13	718.00	716.0	445.2
U.S. Appropriated FY 2006 P.L. 109-148	375.0	*	*
DFI	368.1	360.2	353.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$1,781.3</b>	<b>\$1,392.01</b>	<b>\$1,104.01</b>

Note: Data not formally reviewed or audited.

<sup>a</sup> FY 2006 CERP obligated and disbursed totals not included.

TABLE B-4

SELECTED CERP PROJECTS BY TYPE, 3<sup>RD</sup> QUARTER ENDING MARCH 31, 2006

PROJECT TYPE	PROJECT TOTAL	COMPLETED PROJECTS	ESTIMATED FUNDS
Agriculture	3	2	\$160,950
Battle Damage Repair	37	21	\$535,010
Civic Cleanup Activities	74	32	\$1,854,802
Civic Support Vehicles	16	6	\$1,775,651
Condolence Payments	288	122	\$4,933,050
Economic, Financial, and Management Improvements	28	8	\$2,321,103
Education	154	43	\$5,595,233
Electricity	88	31	\$2,658,974
Food Production and Distribution	3	1	\$65,110
Healthcare	84	18	\$4,136,218
Infrastructure Hardening	8	1	\$1,496,218
Irrigation	12	1	\$2,421,313
Other Humanitarian or Reconstruction	54	28	\$18,283,776
Repair of Civic or Cultural Facilities	30	9	\$676,667
Rule of Law and Governance	31	15	\$2,090,838
Telecommunication	45	20	\$1,569,666
Transportation	142	56	\$5,992,639
Water and Sanitation	191	39	\$16,994,799
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,288</b>	<b>453</b>	<b>\$73,589,092</b>

Note: Data not formally reviewed or audited.

TABLE B-5

## IRRF 2 Funds under Public Law 108-106

On November 6, 2003, Congress passed P.L. 108-106 to provide \$18.4 billion for the IRRF to address the extensive requirements for Iraq reconstruction identified before the war and during the summer and fall of 2003. The act mandates specific sector aid funding totals, with limitations on the transfer of funds among sectors without congressional notification or, in the case of larger modifications, without congressional approval. Apportioned funds are restricted to five departments or agencies: the Department of Defense (DoD), DoS, USAID, Department of the Treasury (Treasury), and the Department of Health and

Human Services (HHS).

As of March 31, 2006, these were the IRRF totals:

- \$18.44 billion (100% ) had been apportioned.
- \$17.23 billion (93.43% ) had been committed.
- \$16.31 billion (88.45%) had been obligated.
- \$11.49 billion (62.31% ) had been expended.

Figure B-1 shows the current totals for IRRF 2.

Of the \$18.44 billion that has been apportioned, slightly less than \$10 billion of the funds have been apportioned to construction projects, \$6 billion have been apportioned to non-construction projects, and nearly \$1 billion were apportioned for democracy building.

CHRRP AND IRAQI GOVERNMENT FUNDS, AS OF MARCH 31, 2006 (Millions)

FUND SOURCE	TOTAL PROGRAM FUNDING	CUMULATIVE FUNDS OBLIGATED	CUMULATIVE FUNDS DISBURSED
CHRRP Projects	\$84.0	\$83.9	\$47.5
Iraqi Government Projects	\$136.0	\$12.9	\$98.9
Total	\$220.0	\$96.8	\$146.4

Note: Data not formally reviewed or audited.

TABLE B-6

As of March 31, 2006, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reports current IRRF appropriations as:

- DoD, \$13.07 billion (70.88% of the \$18.439 billion total)
- USAID, \$3.00 billion (16.28%)
- DoS, \$1.18 billion (6.40%)
- Treasury, \$390 million (2.12%) (including \$352.7 million in Iraqi debt relief)
- United States Institute of Peace, \$10 million (.05%)

Appendix C details IRRF apportionments by agency.

The current funding status for IRRF 2—with corresponding commitments, obligations, and expenditures—is outlined in Table B-7.

IRRF Funding Changes

Since September 2004, a number of major reallocation efforts have occurred. On December 31, 2004, the first major reallocation shifted \$1.94 billion from the water and sanitation sector and \$1.07 billion from the Electricity sector to the Security sector (\$1.8 billion), the Justice sector (\$461 million), the Education sector (\$80 million), and the Private Employment Development sector (\$660 million). An additional \$450 million were reallocated entirely within the oil sector.

In December 2004, an additional \$457 million were reallocated to meet emerging needs in the electricity sector (\$211 million) and to provide post-battle damage reconstruction and rehabilitation in Sadr City, Najaf, Samarra,




Figure B-1  
**STATUS OF FUNDING**  
\$ Billions  
Source: DoS Iraq Weekly  
Status report, 03/29/06

## IRRF2 PROGRAM STATUS, AS OF MARCH 31, 2006 (Millions)

SECTOR	2207 REPORT SPENDING PLAN	APPORTIONED	COMMITTED	OBLIGATED	EXPENDED
Security & Law Enforcement	\$5,036.0	\$5,036.0	\$4,935.1	\$4,882.5	\$4,397.5
Electric Sector	4,220.0	4,220.0	4,037.1	3,496.1	2,071.2
Water Resources and Sanitation	2,131.1	2,131.1	1,666.4	1,547.7	913.6
Justice, Public Safety, and Civil Society	1,315.9	1,315.9	1,206.7	1,183.6	8,21.9
Democracy	1,033.9	1,033.9	977.4	977.2	661.9
Oil Infrastructure	1,735.6	1,735.6	1,626.1	1,541.2	844.8
Private Sector Employment Development	805.3	805.3	788.9	782.4	601.9
Health Care	739.0	739.0	724.9	668.1	420.7
Transportation and Telecommunications Projects	465.5	465.5	447.0	419.5	249.5
Education, Refugees, Human Rights, and Governance	410.0	410.0	348.8	341.9	245.4
Roads, Bridges, and Construction	333.7	333.7	312.8	308.2	175.3
Administrative Expense	213.0	213.0	159.7	159.7	84.2
<b>Total by Sector</b>	<b>\$18,439.0</b>	<b>\$18,439.0</b>	<b>\$17,230.9</b>	<b>\$16,308.1</b>	<b>\$11,487.9</b>
Construction			9,937.5	9,217.6	5,955.6
Non-construction			6,315.9	6,113.2	4,870.5
Democracy			970.1	969.6	661.9
<b>Total by Program</b>			<b>\$17,223.5</b>	<b>\$16,300.4</b>	<b>\$11,488.0</b>

Note: Data not formally reviewed or audited.

TABLE B-7

and Fallujah (\$246 million). In March 2005, an additional \$832 million were reallocated for management initiatives. The management initiatives included money for operations and maintenance programs at various power and water plants, urgent work in the electrical and oil sectors, and cost growth incurred by design-build contractors. The DoS July 2005 *Section 2207 Report* reallocated \$255 million for PRDCs, security forces, and election support. In the DoS October *Section 2207 Report*, \$63 million in program reallocations were dedicated to three program activities that required Congressional notification. In preparation for the December elections, \$35 million were reallocated to increase short-

term work opportunities for Iraqis in several areas. Another \$15 million were reallocated to increase awareness regarding civil society, electoral and constitutional processes. In addition, \$3 million helped to increase participation by women in the political process. The balance was dedicated to an electricity transmission project in the governorate of Sulaymaniyah. In the DoS January *Section 2207 Report*, \$104 million were submitted to Congress for reallocation. The reallocation increased funding for programs such as democracy building, ministerial capacity building, and focused stabilization. In the April *Section 2207 report*, \$20 million was reallocated from Democracy Building Activities, and \$4.96 million trans-

ferred from the Economic Support Fund into the Marla Ruzicko Iraq War Victims Fund.

### U.S. Appropriated Funds under Public Law 109-13: Iraq Security Forces Fund

P.L. 109-13 provided \$5.391 billion for the Iraq Security Forces Fund, to remain available until December 31, 2006. This law supports the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), funding the provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to transfer these funds to appropriations for military personnel, operation and maintenance, and other areas.

### Operating Expenses

Under P.L. 108-106, as amended, SIGIR is

required to report information on the operating expenses funded by IRRF for U.S. government agencies or departments involved with the reconstruction of Iraq. Table B-9 provides the status of operating funds derived from the IRRF for each agency with operational activities in Iraq. Data provided for FY 06 is not yet complete. IRRF funds can be apportioned only to DoD, DoS, Treasury, USAID, and HHS; therefore, other organizations receive funds through one of those five organizations. This table does not include mission direct operating expenses.

Since the establishment of U.S. Mission-Iraq and the transfer of governance authority on June 28, 2004, various groups involved with Iraq reconstruction have received support from the budget of U.S. Mission-Iraq. This support is outside the SIGIR's IRRF reporting requirements.

#### FINANCIAL STATUS OF IRAQ SECURITY FORCES FUND, P.L. 109-13, AS OF MARCH 31, 2006 (Millions)

SECTOR	APPORTIONED	COMMITTED	OBLIGATED	DISBURSED
<b>Ministry of Defense Forces</b>				
Sustainment	\$614.0	\$588.0	\$434.0	\$230.0
Infrastructure	1,152.0	1,015.0	688.0	336.0
Equipment and Transportation	1,640.0	910.0	741.0	264.0
Training and Operations	144.0	106.0	91.0	27.0
<b>Ministry of Interior Forces</b>				
Sustainment	195.0	135.0	101.0	65.0
Infrastructure	340.0	304.0	150.0	69.0
Equipment and Transportation	233.0	208.0	186.0	34.0
Training and Operations	893.0	801.0	644.0	566.0
Quick Response Fund	145.0	84.0	78.0	57.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$5,356.0</b>	<b>\$4,151.0</b>	<b>\$3,113.0</b>	<b>\$1,648.0</b>

Note: Data not formally reviewed or audited.

TABLE B-8

## AGENCY-SPECIFIC IRRF-FUNDED OPERATING EXPENSES, AS OF MARCH 31, 2006 (IN MILLIONS)

AGENCY	FY 2006 APPROPRIATED	FY 2006 OBLIGATED	FY 2006 EXPENDED	FY 2005 APPROPRIATED	FY 2005 OBLIGATED	FY 2005 EXPENDED	FY 2004 APPROPRIATED	FY 2004 OBLIGATED	FY 2004 EXPENDED
DoD <sup>a</sup>	\$ 0.2	\$ 0.2	\$ 0.2	\$ 12.8	\$ 12.8	\$ 11.9 <sup>b</sup>	\$ 198.9	\$ 198.9	\$ 52.6
USACE	0	0	0	0.1	0	0.4	12.6	9.3	6.4
Treasury	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.1
DHS	0	0	0	3.9	2.5	2.5	0	0	0
DoJ <sup>c</sup>	0	0	0	61.0	75.1	63.0	75.0	12.5	6.2
DoS <sup>d</sup>	0	0	0	NA	2.7	2.2	NA	3.0	2.5
HHS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DoT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DoC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DoL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USDA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IRRF 2	IRRF 2	IRRF 2	IRRF 2	IRRF 2	IRRF 2	IRRF 1	IRRF 1	IRRF 1
	Appropriated	Obligated	Expended	Appropriated	Obligated	Expended	Appropriated	Obligated	Expended
USAID <sup>e</sup>	\$ 0	\$ 0	\$ 0	\$ 154.2	\$ 153.4	\$ 133.5	\$ 38.6	\$ 38.5	\$ 37.3

Note: Data not formally reviewed or audited. These operating expenses do not include mission-direct operating expenses.

<sup>a</sup>The majority of FY 2005 operating expenses cover PCO campus rehabilitation, which will be reclassified as reconstruction assets by 2007. This does not include logistics costs directed in FY 2005 by OMB as program costs for goods.

<sup>b</sup>FY 2005 expenditures include funds disbursed from FY 2004 obligated.

<sup>c</sup>Includes partial update only from DoJ.

<sup>d</sup>Figures provided for DoS INL only. Allocated figures not available.

<sup>e</sup>USAID reported information by fund type, not by fiscal year.

TABLE B-9

STATUS OF SUPPLEMENTAL IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING, P.L. 108-106,  
AS OF MARCH 31, 2006 (Millions)

SOURCE	APPROPRIATED	APPORTIONED	COMMITTED	OBLIGATED	EXPENDED
IRRF 2	\$18,439.0	\$17,894.4	\$16,968.1	\$15,263.9	\$10,061.6
CPA-OPS	768.8	768.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
IRMO	139.2	139.2	139.0	139.0	123.7
SIGIR	75.0	44.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$19,422.0</b>	<b>\$18,846.6</b>	<b>\$17,107.1</b>	<b>\$15,402.9</b>	<b>\$10,185.3</b>

Note: Data not formally reviewed or audited.

TABLE B-10

Since its inception as the Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General (CPA-IG), SIGIR tracked the operational expenses of the CPA. CPA daily operations from April to November 6, 2003, were initially supported by the IFF, which was created by P.L. 108-11 in April 2003. From November 6, 2003, to June 28, 2004, CPA operations were funded from P.L. 108-106.

As U.S. Mission-Iraq became operational and the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office assumed the duties of CPA, \$105.75 million was transferred from CPA's P.L. 108-106 appropriation to DoS to fund these operations. The status of these transferred funds is included in Table B-10, which is an update of the status of those funds as of March 31, 2006. Congress also authorized the funding of CPA-IG operations (now SIGIR) with \$75 million from the 2004 Defense-wide operations and maintenance appropriations.

### **Sources and Uses of Funding for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Data Clarification**

SIGIR compiled data on the sources, uses, and status of Iraq reconstruction funds from OMB, Defense Finance and Accounting Service, U.S. Army, DoS, USAID, Treasury, DoD Washington Headquarters Service, MNC-I, U.S. Trade and Development Agency, IMF, and World Bank. SIGIR analyzed the data for reasonableness and consistency across sources of data. SIGIR did not review or audit the processes, controls, or systems in place at the providing agency or organization. SIGIR accepted the validity of the data provided and believes that the presentation of sources and uses of funds in this Report is a reasonable compilation of the status of Iraq relief and reconstruction funding through March 31, 2006 (unless an alternative date is noted).

## IRAQ RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION FUND APPORTIONMENTS BY AGENCY

This appendix presents a table that details the apportionment of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) allocations of funds by agency. The source of this data is the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and reflects both the new *Section 2207 Report* allocations requested by the Department of State (DoS) and the latest round of OMB apportionment.


As of March 31, 2006, OMB apportioned these IRRF funds:

- Department of Defense (DoD), \$13.437 billion (13.44% of the \$18.439 billion total)
- U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), \$3.09 billion (16.76%)
- DoS, \$1.303 billion (7.07%)
- Treasury, \$391 million (2.12%) (includes \$352.7 million in Iraqi debt relief)
- United States Institute of Peace (USIP), \$10 million (.05%)

Figure C-1 shows OMB-apportioned IRRF funds.

Figure C-1

**OMB APORIONED FUNDS**  
\$ Billions as of March 2006



Note: data not formally reviewed or audited

IRAQ RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION FUND (IRRF) – APPORTIONMENT

MILLIONS OF DOLLARS	Category	DOD			USAID			STATE			TREASURY			USIP			TOTAL		
		January 2006 Allocation	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action
Security & Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement	5,036.0	4,252.1	(14,600)	4,237,500	32.0	0.0	32.0	0.0	766.5	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	5,050.6	(14,600)	5,036,000
	Police Training and Technical Assistance	2,296.2	1,534.7	(2,000)	1,532,689	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	763.5	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2,298.2	(2,000)	2,296,189
Border Enforcement	Border Enforcement	1,806.4	1,044.9	(2,000)	1,042,895	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	763.5	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1,808.4	(2,000)	1,806,395
	Facilities Protection Services	436.8	436.8	0.000	436,794	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	436.8	0.000	436,794
National Security	National Security	53.0	53.0	0.000	53,000	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	53.0	0.000	53,000
	Iraqi Armed Forces	2,620.8	2,633.4	(12,600)	2,620,811	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2,633.4	(12,600)	2,620,811
of which:	Iraqi Armed Forces	1,776.2	1,788.8	(12,600)	1,776,153	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1,788.8	(12,600)	1,776,153
	IAF Facilities	730.8	730.8	0.0	730,842	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	730.8	0.000	730,842
IAF Operations and Training	IAF Equipment	614.4	628.6	(14,200)	614,382	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	628.6	(14,200)	614,382
	IAF Operations and Training	430.9	429.3	1,600	430,929	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	429.3	1,600	430,929
Iraqi National Guard	Iraqi National Guard	681.7	674.7	7,000	681,658	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	674.7	7,000	681,658
	Operations and Personnel	224.6	224.6	0.0	224,558	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	224.6	0.000	224,558
Equipment	Equipment	91.6	91.6	0.0	91,600	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	91.6	0.000	91,600
	Facilities	365.5	358.5	7,000	365,500	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	358.5	7,000	365,500
Iraqi Security Forces Quick Response Program	Iraqi Security Forces Quick Response Program	163.0	170.0	(7,000)	163,000	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	170.0	(7,000)	163,000
	Nonproliferation, Export Control, and Border Security	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.0	0.000	3,000
Focused Stabilization	Focused Stabilization	30.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	30.0	0.0	30.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	30.0	0.000	30,000
	Commanders' Humanitarian Relief & Reconstruction	86.0	84.0	2.0	84,000	2.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	86.0	0.000	86,000
Justice, Public Safety Infrastructure, and Civil Society	Justice, Public Safety Infrastructure, and Civil Society	2,349.8	1,012.1	2,000	1,014,136	957.0	0.0	957.0	305.9	62,800	368,664	0.000	0.000	0.000	10,000	0.000	2,285.0	64,800	2,349,800
	Other Technical Investigative Methods	5.0	5.0	0.0	5,000	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	5.0	0.000	5,000
Witness Protection Program	Witness Protection Program	37.0	2.0	0.0	2,000	0.0	0.0	0.0	35.0	0.0	35,000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	37.0	0.000	37,000
	Penal Facilities	87.0	87.0	0.0	87,000	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	87.0	0.000	87,000

\$210M will be transferred from DOD to INL via 632(b)

IRAQ RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION FUND (IRRF) – APPORTIONMENT

MILLIONS OF DOLLARS	Category	DOD			USAID			STATE			TREASURY			USIP			TOTAL			Comments		
		January 2006 Allocation	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action			
Reconstruction and Modernization of Detention Facilities		167.0	123.0	2.000	125.036	0.0	0.0	0.0	42.0	0.000	41.964	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	165.0	2.000	167.000	0.00	DOD/DOS with some 632(b) transfers to DOJ.
Facilities Protection, Mine Removal, Fire Service and Public Safety Facility and Equipment Repairs		287.2	204.0	0.000	204.000	0.0	0.0	0.0	74.0	9.200	83.200	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	278.0	9.200	287.200	0.00	
of which:																						
Facilities Repair		89.0	89.0		89.000						0.000							89.0	0.000	89.000	0.00	
		115.0	115.0		115.000						0.000							115.0	0.000	115.000	0.00	
		83.2	0.0		0.000	0.0	0.0	0.0	74.0	9.200	83.200	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	74.0	9.200	83.200	0.00	
Public Safety Training and Facilities		219.5	219.5	0.0	219.500	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	219.5	0.000	219.500	0.00	
National Security Communications Network		106.5	106.5	0.0	106.500	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	106.5	0.000	106.500	0.00	
Rule of Law		109.8	14.5		14.500	15.0	15.0	15.0	26.7	53.600	80.254							56.2	53.600	109.754	0.00	
Investigations of Crimes Against Humanity		128.0	98.6		98.600	5.0	5.0	5.0	24.4		24.400	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	128.0	0.000	128.000	0.00	
Judicial Security and Facilities		159.0	152.0	(0.000)	152.000	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	0.000	7.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	159.0	(0.000)	159.000	0.00	
Democracy Building Activities		1,033.8	0.0		0.000	937.0	937.0	937.0	96.8		96.846	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1,033.8	0.000	1,033.846		
U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP)		10.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	10.000	10.000	10.0	0.000	10.000	0.00		
Electric Sector		4,220.0	3,177.1	142,797	3,319,869	900.1	0.0	900.1	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	4,077.2	142,797	4,220.017	0.00		
		1,608.2	913.0	0.425	913.447	694.8	694.8	694.8	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1,607.8	0.425	1,608.240	0.00		
		1,151.8	1,009.0	142,797	1,151,822	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1,009.0	142,797	1,151.822	0.00		
Network Infrastructure		1,289.4	1,084.0		1,084.025	205.4	205.4	205.4	0.0		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1,289.4	0.000	1,289.379			
Automated Monitoring and Control System		127.0	127.0		127.000	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	127.0	0.000	127.000	0.00		
Security		43.6	44.0	(0.425)	43.575	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	44.0	(0.425)	43.575	0.00		
		1,735.6	1,723.0	12.600	1,735.600	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1,723.0	12.600	1,735.600	0.00		
Oil Infrastructure																						
Infrastructure		1,713.1	1,700.5	12.600	1,713.100	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1,700.5	12.600	1,713.100	0.00		
6/6: DOD will MIPR \$2M from DODPCO to TDA for oil sector study per JEC.																						

IRAQ RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION FUND (IRRF) – APPORTIONMENT

MILLIONS OF DOLLARS	Category	DOD		USAID		STATE		TREASURY		USIP		TOTAL	
		January 2006 2207 Allocation	Previously Appportioned Action	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Appportioned Action	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Appportioned Action	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Appportioned Action	2nd Qtr. Revised Action
Emergency Supplies of Refined Petroleum Products	22.5	22.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.5	0.0
	2,131.1	1,416.2	312.007	1,728.233	402.9	0.0	402.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1,819.1	312.007
<b>Water Resources and Sanitation</b>													
Public Works Projects	1,759.2	1,146.1	232.855	1,378.918	380.3	0.0	380.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1,526.3	232.855
Potable Water	1,445.9	962.9	196.155	1,159.042	286.9	0.0	286.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1,249.7	196.155
Water Conservation	31.0	31.0	0.0	31.000	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	31.0	0.0
Sewerage	271.4	152.2	36.700	188.876	82.5	0.0	82.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	234.7	36.700
Other Solid Waste Management	10.9	0.0	0.0	0.000	10.9	0.0	10.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.9	0.0
Water Resources Projects	371.9	270.2	79.152	349.315	22.6	0.0	22.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	292.8	79.152
Pumping Stations and Generators	179.9	100.4	56.900	157.304	22.6	0.0	22.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	123.0	56.900
Irrigation and Drainage Systems	7.6	36.6	(29.004)	7.581	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	36.6	(29.004)
Major Irrigation Projects	66.4	50.2	16.252	66.423	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.2	16.252
Dam Repair, Rehab, and New Construction	82.6	57.6	25.004	82.607	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	57.6	25.004
Umm Qasr to Basra Water Pipeline and Treatment Plant	35.4	25.4	10.000	35.400	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.4	10.000
Basra Channel Flushing	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>Transportation &amp; Telecommunications Projects</b>													
Civil Aviation	465.5	400.5	(5.000)	395.508	70.0	0.0	70.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	470.5	(5.000)
Umm Qasr Port Rehab	75.7	75.7	0.0	75.663	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	75.7	0.0
Railroad Rehab and Restoration	45.0	45.0	0.0	45.000	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	45.0	0.0
Iraqi Telecom and Postal Corporation	189.3	189.3	0.0	189.345	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	189.3	0.0
Iraqi Communications Systems	20.0	20.0	0.0	20.000	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	0.0
Consolidated Fiber Network	45.5	45.5	0.0	45.500	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	45.5	0.0
Iraqi Communications Operations	70.0	70.0	0.0	70.000	70.0	0.0	70.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	70.0	0.0
Roads, Bridges, and Construction	333.7	311.4	0.0	311.414	22.3	0.0	22.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	333.7	0.0

IRAQ RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION FUND (IRRF) – APPORTIONMENT

MILLIONS OF DOLLARS	Category	DOD			USAID			STATE			TREASURY			USIP			TOTAL		
		January 2006 2207 Allocation	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action
Public Buildings Construction and Repair		127.0	119.7	7.3	119.700	7.3	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	127.000	0.000	0.00
	Roads & Bridges	206.7	191.7	15.0	191.714	15.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	206.714	0.000	0.00
Health Care		739.0	654.0	85.0	654.000	85.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	739.000	0.000	0.00
	Nationwide Hospital and Clinic Improvements	404.0	404.0	0.0	404.000	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	404.000	0.000	0.00
Equipment Procurement and Modernization		285.0	250.0	35.0	250.000	35.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	285.000	0.000	0.00
	Pediatric Facility in Basra	50.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	50.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	50.000	0.000	0.00
Private Sector Development		805.3	15.6	5.000	20.600	396.5	0.0	0.000	0.000	10.000	0.000	10.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	800.3	5.000	0.00
	Expand Network of Employment Centers	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	8.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	8.000	0.000	0.00
Vocational Training		75.1	0.0	0.000	0.000	75.1	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	75.136	0.000	0.00
	Business Skills Training	40.2	7.5	3.200	10.700	29.5											37.0	3.200	0.00
Micro-Small-Medium Enterprises		40.8	8.1	(3.200)	4.900	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	10.000	0.000	10.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	(3.200)	40.800	0.00	\$25M transferred to USAID DA for OPIC; \$0.9M transferred to DA for OPIC on 12/8.
	Institutional Reforms	85.0			0.000	85.0			85.0					85.0	0.000	0.000	85.000	0.00	
Agriculture		105.0		5.000	5.000	100.0			100.0					100.0	5.000	0.000	105.000	0.00	
	Market Based Reforms	98.9			0.000	98.9			98.9					98.9	0.000	0.000	98.864	0.00	
Housing Rehabilitation Grants		0.0												0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	
	Iraqi Debt Forgiveness	352.3	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	352.3	352.278	0.00	\$360 million transferred to Treasury Debt account (instead of Treasury's IRRF account) 12/8; 12/6: \$7,722,361 back from Treasury from unused debt.
Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Democracy, and Governance		410.0	20.8	0.000	20.840	191.6	0.0	0.000	168.475	29.100	0.000	29.100	0.000	0.000	0.000	27.000	410.000	0.00	

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### IRAQ RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION FUND (IRRF) – APPORTIONMENT

Millions of Dollars	DOD		USAID		STATE		TREASURY		USIP		TOTAL			
	January 2006-2007 Allocation	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action	Total to Date	Previously Apportioned	2nd Qtr. Revised Action		
Migration & Refugee Assistance	186.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	77.0	82.0	27.000	109.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	27.000	186.000	0.00
Property Claims Tribunal	10.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.0	10.0	0.000	10.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	10.0	10.000	0.00
Governance	40.0				2.1	37.9		37.900				40.0	40.000	0.00
Banking System Modernizations	30.0	0.9		0.900	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	29.100	0.000	29.100	30.0	30.000	0.00
Human Rights	15.0	1.9		1.940	1.5	11.6		11.575	0.000	0.000	0.000	15.0	15.000	0.00
Education	99.0	18.0		18.000	81.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	99.0	99.000	0.00
Civic Programs	10.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	10.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	10.0	10.000	0.00
Ministerial Capacity Bldg.	20.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	20.0	20.000	0.00
USAID Administrative Expenses	29.0				29.0							29.0	29.000	
Administrative Expenses for CPA Successor	184.0				3,086.4	1,213.8	89.800	1,303.639	39.100	0.000	39.100	17,894.4	18,439.000	0.0
06/13/05: Apportioned via 632(a) \$184M to State D&CP account for follow-on to CPA operating costs, per FY04 supp language.														

NOTE: TOTALS MAY NOT ADD DUE TO ROUNDING

## IRAQI FUNDS OBLIGATED FOR RECONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY BY CPA

This appendix responds to Section 3001 (i)(l)(D) of P.L. 108-106, to report on “foreign [Iraqi] assets seized or frozen.”

During the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) period, Iraqi funds were used for many reconstruction projects. These funds fell into three categories—seized, vested, and Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) deposits:

- Seized funds were former Iraqi regime monies confiscated by coalition forces.
- Vested funds were Iraqi funds in U.S. banks that were frozen by executive order, vested in the U.S. Treasury, and authorized for use to benefit the people of Iraq.
- The DFI was created by the CPA, and the United Nations (UN) concurred in May 2003 (United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1483). Proceeds from Iraqi oil sales, repatriated assets from the United States and other nations, and deposits from unencumbered Oil for Food (OFF) program funds were all to be deposited in the DFI.

Since the transfer of governance authority to Iraq on June 28, 2004, the DFI—although maintained as a separate account in the New York Federal Reserve Bank—belongs to the Iraqi government. However, the Minister of Finance has agreed to allow the Gulf Region Division-Project and Contracting Office (GRD-PCO) to continue to manage contracts signed with CPA and a sub-account of the DFI was created to fund these projects.

### Seized Funds

Coalition military forces seized \$926.8 million in funds from the former Iraqi regime. Current Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) accounting systems indicate that \$898.4 million (96.9%) were obligated in the CPA period and \$868.5 million (93.7%) expended as of December 31, 2005. U.S. Army accounting officials have not reconciled or fully audited the totals for seized funds. Most seized assets were used for:

- Non-ministry repairs of Iraqi infrastructure and humanitarian assistance;
- Iraqi ministry operations;
- Rapid Regional Response Program (RRRP or R3P);
- Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP); and
- Fuel products (propane, diesel, heating oil, etc.) for the Iraqi civilian population.

For a detailed list of seized funds program expenditures, see Table D-1.

### Vested Funds

In response to a UN resolution passed after the first Gulf War, the United States froze Iraqi assets (UNSCR 661, August 1990; Presidential Executive Order 12817 of October 23, 1992). Presidential Executive Order 13290 of March 20, 2003, vested frozen funds for use in Iraq during the CPA period. As of December 31, 2005, \$1.724 billion had been transferred for

## SEIZED CURRENCY, AS OF MARCH 31, 2006

PROGRAM CATEGORY	CEILINGS	OBLIGATIONS	DISBURSEMENTS
Non-ministry Repair/Reconstruction/Humanitarian Assistance	\$337,275,547	\$326,529,838	\$302,789,902
Ministry Operations	\$263,051,462	\$262,732,709	\$262,720,899
Brigade Commanders Discretionary Fund & CERP	\$200,128,000	\$198,594,023	\$198,401,036
Benzene and Liquid Propane Gas Purchase	\$90,000,000	\$87,184,330	\$87,184,330
Stipend Pay	\$31,000,000	\$30,837,109	\$30,837,109
Iraqi Constitutional Convention IT Support	\$3,823,000	\$0	\$0
Ministry of Finance–MANPADS Weapons Buyback Program	\$1,500,000	\$715,325	\$457,225
Undistributed Disbursements			\$2,085,786
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$926,778,009</b>	<b>\$906,593,334</b>	<b>\$884,476,287</b>

TABLE D-1

use in Iraq, of which \$1.705 billion (98.87%) had been obligated and \$1.689 billion (98%) had been expended, according to current accounting records provided by DFAS. Vested funds were used primarily for:

- Iraqi civil servant salaries, pensions, and individual relief payments
- Iraqi ministry operations
- repair and reconstruction

Although most frozen Iraqi assets were vested and sent to Iraq, a balance of \$396.6 million remained. The U.S. government transferred \$208.6 million to the DFI and set aside \$128 million for perfected judgments.

For a detailed list of expenditures from vested funds, see Table D-2.

## Development Fund for Iraq

The DFI was established by CPA with UN con-

## VESTED ASSETS, AS OF MARCH 31, 2006

PROGRAM CATEGORY	CEILINGS	OBLIGATIONS	DISBURSEMENTS
Salaries Regular Payments Iraqi	\$1,009,825,000	\$1,009,275,275	\$1,006,383,958
Ministry Operations	\$375,555,000	\$364,457,311	\$356,818,300
Non Ministry Repair	\$129,532,000	\$124,756,110	\$120,501,206
Regular Pension Payments	\$99,510,000	\$99,509,995	\$99,509,995
Salaries Emergency Payments	\$79,924,000	\$78,841,040	\$78,826,590
Mobile Radios (Emergency)	\$15,800,000	\$15,800,000	\$15,424,582
Hospital Generators	\$9,000,000	\$9,000,000	\$8,197,645
Emergency Projects <200k	\$2,475,000	\$2,474,705	\$2,474,705
Fire Stations	\$2,186,000	\$1,239,965	\$1,094,965
Stipend Pay	\$190,000	\$89,480	\$0
Other Salaries Special Workers	\$134,000	\$133,620	\$133,620
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$1,724,131,000</b>	<b>\$1,706,506,111</b>	<b>\$1,690,365,566</b>

TABLE D-2

currence in May 2003 to serve as the primary financial vehicle to channel revenue from Iraqi oil sales, unencumbered OFF deposits, and repatriated Iraqi assets to the relief and reconstruction of Iraq.

### DFI Transition Sub-account

After transfer of governance authority on June 28, 2004, the Iraqi Minister of Finance authorized the U.S. government to disburse against DFI-funded contracts awarded by the CPA. For this purpose, a separate sub-account, the “Central Bank of Iraq/Development Fund for Iraq/Transition,” was created at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to enable payment for work on those contracts. In addition to the Federal Reserve funds, cash has been provided to enable payment in Iraq for those projects that require this method of payment.

On June 15, 2004, the Iraqi Minister of Finance designated the Director of the Program Management Office (now the GRD-PCO) to administer and make payments on those DFI contracts:

- entered into before June 28, 2004
- not secured by a letter of credit
- that did not exceed the limit of \$800 million.

This initial limit was intended as a first step toward financing continuity for these contracts because their overall liability substantially exceeds this amount. The Ministry of Finance increased the amount provided to the DFI transition sub-account to meet contract obligations at his discretion.

A total of \$217.7 million of DFI cash was in the possession of CPA officials when governance authority was transferred to the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG). An additional \$84 million of Iraqi funds passed through the DFI sub-account to U.S. military units to fund a matching grant by the ITG (Commander’s Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Program). This transfer was executed for ease of currency disbursement and is not part of the execution of DFI sub-account contracts.

In December 2004, outstanding DFI sub-account liabilities were estimated at \$3.5 billion. Because of the \$3.017 billion provided by the ITG, this created an unfunded liability of \$486.8 million. In a 2005 *Section 2207 Report*, Department of State revised this liability to \$42 million.

Table D-3 provides the DFI fund status and balance, as of March 31, 2006.

**DFI SUB-ACCOUNT FUND STATUS, AS OF MARCH 31, 2006** (Millions)

<b>SOURCES OF FUNDS</b>	<b>BANK</b>	<b>CASH</b>
Beginning Balance	\$800.0	\$217.7
New Income Additional IIG Funds	\$2,000.0	
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$2,800.0</b>	<b>\$217.7</b>
<b>USES OF FUNDS</b>	<b>BANK</b>	<b>CASH</b>
Allocated and Paid	\$2,205.1	\$181.9
Allocated and Unpaid	\$622.3	\$0.00
<b>DFI Balance</b>	<b>\$622.3</b>	<b>\$35.8</b>

TABLE D-3

## COMPLETED SIGIR AUDITS

This appendix contains a list of completed audits on Iraq Reconstruction activities from Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) as of March 31, 2006.

### SIGIR AUDITS COMPLETED, AS OF MARCH 31, 2006

	AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	REPORT TITLE	DATE
1	SIGIR	04-001	Coalition Provisional Authority Coordination of Donated Funds	JUNE 25, 2004
2	SIGIR	04-002	Management of Personnel Assigned to the CPA in Baghdad	JUNE 25, 2004
3	SIGIR	04-003	Federal Deployment Center Forward Operations at the Kuwait Hilton	JUNE 25, 2004
4	SIGIR	04-004	Task Orders Awarded By Afcee In Support Of Cpa (Procure)	JULY 28, 2004
5	SIGIR	04-005	Award of Sector Design-build Construction Contracts	JULY 23, 2004
6	SIGIR	04-006	Corporate Governance for Contractors Performing Iraq Reconstruction Efforts	JULY 21, 2004
7	SIGIR	04-007	Oil For Food Cash Controls for the Office of Project Coordination in Erbil, Iraq	JULY 26, 2004
8	SIGIR	04-008	Coalition Provisional Authority Control Over Seized and Vested Assets	JULY 30, 2004
9	SIGIR	04-009	CPA Comptroller Cash Management Controls Over Dfi	JULY 28, 2004
10	SIGIR	04-011	Control of Materiel Assets of the CPA in Baghdad	JULY 26, 2004
11	SIGIR	04-013	Coalition Provisional Authority's Contracting Processes Leading Up To and Including Contract Award	JULY 27, 2004
12	SIGIR	05-001	Cpa Control Of Appropriated Funds	OCTOBER 22, 2004
13	SIGIR	05-002	Final Accountability and Control of Materiel Assets of the CPA Kuwait	OCTOBER 25, 2004
14	SIGIR	05-003	Final Memo Report-task Order 0044	NOVEMBER 23, 2004
15	SIGIR	05-004	Oversight Of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries Through the NBP	JANUARY 30, 2005
16	SIGIR	05-005	Compliance With Contract No. W911s0-04-c-0003 Awarded to Aegis Defence Services Limited	APRIL 20, 2005
17	SIGIR	05-006	Control of Cash Provided to South Central Iraq	APRIL 30, 2005
18	SIGIR	05-007	Administration Of Irrf Contract Files	APRIL 30, 2005
19	SIGIR	05-008	Administration of Contracts Funded by the Development Fund for Iraq	APRIL 30, 2005
20	SIGIR	05-009	Reconciliation Of Reporting Differences of the Source of Funds Used on Contracts After June 28, 2004 (Memo)	JULY 08, 2005

## APPENDIX E

	AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	REPORT TITLE	DATE
21	SIGIR	05-010	Interim Briefing To The Project And Contracting Office - Iraq And The Joint Contracting Command - Iraq on the Audit of The Award Fee Process	JULY 26, 2005
22	SIGIR	05-011	Cost-to-complete Estimates and Financial Reporting for the Management of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund	JULY 26, 2005
23	SIGIR	05-012	Policies and Procedures Used For Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Project Management - Construction Quality Assurance	JULY 22, 2005
24	SIGIR	05-013	Controls over Equipment Acquired by Security Contractors	SEPTEMBER 09, 2005
25	SIGIR	05-014	Management of Commander's Emergency Response Program for Fiscal Year 2004	OCTOBER 13, 2005
26	SIGIR	05-015	Management of Rapid Regional Response Program Grants in South-central Iraq	OCTOBER 25, 2005
27	SIGIR	05-016	Management of the Contracts And Grants Used To Construct and Operate the Babylon Police Academy	OCTOBER 26, 2005
28	SIGIR	05-017	Award Fee Process for Contractors Involved in Iraq Reconstruction	OCTOBER 25, 2005
29	SIGIR	05-018	Acquisition of Armored Vehicles Purchased Through Contract W914ns-05-m-1189	OCTOBER 21, 2005
30	SIGIR	05-019	Attestation Engagement Report Concerning the Award of Non Competitive Contract Daca63-03-d-0005 To Kellogg, Brown And Root Services, Inc.	SEPTEMBER 30, 2005
31	SIGIR	05-020	Management of the Contracts, Grant, and Micropurchases Used to Rehabilitate the Karbala Library	OCTOBER 26, 2005
32	SIGIR	05-021	Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs – Cost-to-Complete Estimate Reporting	OCTOBER 24, 2005
33	SIGIR	05-022	Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs	OCTOBER 24, 2005
34	SIGIR	SIGIR-05-023	Audit of the U. S. Reconstruction Gap in Iraq	JANUARY 23, 2006
35	SIGIR	SIGIR-05-024	Management of the Mansuria Electrical Reconstruction Project	JANUARY 23, 2006
36	SIGIR	SIGIR-05-025	Management of the Commander's Emergency Response Program for Fiscal Year 2005	JANUARY 23, 2006
37	SIGIR	SIGIR-05-026	Fact Sheet on the Use of the \$50 Million Appropriation to Support the Management and Reporting of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund	JANUARY 27, 2006
38	SIGIR	SIGIR-05-027	Methodologies for Reporting Cost-to-complete Estimates	JANUARY 27, 2006
39	SIGIR	SIGIR-05-028	Grd-pco Management of the Transfer of Irrf-funded Assets to the Iraqi Government	JANUARY 24, 2006
40	SIGIR	SIGIR-05-029	Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund Activities	JANUARY 26, 2006
41	SIGIR	SIGIR-06-002	Prompt Payment Act: Analysis of Expenditures Made from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund	FEBRUARY 03, 2006
42	SIGIR	06-001	Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program: The Evolution of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System	April 2006

	AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	REPORT TITLE	DATE
43	SIGIR	06-003	Review of Data Entry and General Controls in the Collecting and Reporting of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund	April 2006
44	SIGIR	06-004	Changes in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program Activities—October through December 2005	April 2006
45	SIGIR	06-005	Follow-up on Recommendations Made in SIGIR Audit Reports Related to Management and Control of the Development Fund for Iraq	April 2006
46	SIGIR	06-006	Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq: Management of the Transfer of IRRF-funded Assets to the Iraqi Government	April 2006
47	SIGIR	06-007	U.S. Agency for International Development: Management of the Transfer of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government	April 2006
48	SIGIR	06-008	Development Fund for Iraq—Cash Accountability Review: Joint Area Support Group-Central	April 2006
49	SIGIR	06-009	Review of Task Force Shield Programs	April 2006
50	SIGIR	06-010	Review of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Reconciliation of the Iraqi Armed Forces Seized Assets Fund	April 2006
51	SIGIR	06-011	Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects	April 2006
52	SIGIR	06-012	Development Fund for Iraq Cash Accountability Review: Joint Area Support Group-Central/Falluja	April 2006
53	SIGIR	06-013	Briefing to the International Advisory and Monitoring Board for Iraq: Management Controls Over the Development Fund for Iraq	April 2006
54	SIGIR	06-015	Iraqi Armed Forces Seized Assets Fund: Review of Contracts and Financial Documents	April 2006
55	SIGIR	06-016	Interim Audit Report on the Review of the Equipment Purchased for Primary Healthcare Centers Associated with Parsons Global Services, Contract Number W914NS-04-D-0006	April 2006

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## SUMMARY OF U.S. OVERSIGHT IN IRAQ

This appendix contains a list of completed audits, reports, and testimonies on Iraq Reconstruction activities, as of March 31, 2006, released by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and these six agencies:

- (1) U.S. Army Audit Agency (USAAA)
- (2) Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG)
- (3) Department of State Office of Inspector General (DoS OIG)
- (4) Government Accountability Office (GAO)
- (5) U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG)
- (6) Department of Treasury Office of Inspector General (Treasury OIG)

The audits from this list are further categorized according to the sector of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) that they cover and the types of recommendations made.

This appendix does not include the SIGIR audits released after March 31, 2006. For the most recent SIGIR audits, see the SIGIR audits section of this report.

## ALL COMPLETED AUDITS BY ALL AGENCIES

AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
1	DoD-OIG D-2004-057	03/18/2004	Contracts Awarded for Coalition Provisional Authority by Defense Contracting Command - Washington	01. Examine contracting procedures used by DCC-W to award selected contracts for CPA.	01. We recommend that the Deputy Secretary of Defense designate an office within the Department of Defense to study existing DoD post-war strategy and establish responsibilities, policies, and procedures for the rapid acquisition of necessary goods and services in support of any future post-war occupation or relief operations. 02. We recommend that the Commander, Defense Contracting Command- Washington: a. Analyze the seven ongoing contracts for subject matter experts and determine the liability to the Government if the contracts are terminated. For contracts having no or limited liability to the Government terminate immediately. Terminate all contracts at the end of current contract period. 03. We recommend that the Commander, Defense Contracting Command- Washington: b. Complete the documentation of contracts awarded for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance/Coalition Provisional Authority required by the Federal Acquisition Regulations and ensure that each future contract is awarded in accordance to applicable regulations and that all contract documentation is prepared. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the DoD IG website: <a href="http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/index.html">http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/index.html</a> )	01. DoD did not adequately plan for the acquisition support required by ORHA/CPA to perform its mission. a. Did not establish firm contract requirements. b. Misused GSA schedules. c. Awarded personal services contracts prohibited by FAR. d. Allowed out-of-scope activity. e. Did not perform or support price reasonableness determinations. f. Conducted inadequate surveillance of awarded contracts.
2	DoD-OIG D-2005-045	05/09/2005	Operations and Maintenance Funds for the FY 2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Allocated to the Defense Logistics Agency	01. To evaluate accounting controls and procedures, as well as the validation and oversight of contingency operation costs incurred by the DoD agencies supporting the Global War on Terrorism.	Not Available (FOUO)	Not Available (FOUO)
3	DoD-OIG D-2005-053	04/29/2005	Operations and Maintenance Funds for the FY 2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Allocated to the Defense Information Systems Agency	01. To evaluate accounting controls and procedures, as well as the validation and oversight of contingency operation costs incurred by DoD agencies supporting the Global War on Terrorism.	Not Available (FOUO)	Not Available (FOUO)
4	DoD-OIG D-2006-010	10/28/2005	Contract Surveillance for Service Contracts	01. Our overall audit objective was to evaluate whether the Government provided sufficient contract oversight for service contracts to ensure that contractors performed in accordance with the contract. Specifically, we examined whether personnel were appointed to monitor contractors' performance, contractors' work was adequately monitored, contractors performed in accordance with contractual obligations, and contractor performance was properly documented for future use. We also evaluated the management control programs as they applied to the overall objective.	01. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics: a. Emphasize to senior contracting officials and program managers the requirement to develop quality assurance surveillance plans for monitoring contractor performance and costs of service contracts. The plans must be prepared in conjunction with the preparation of the statement of work and must specify all work requiring surveillance. The plan should include coordination with DCAA to ensure surveillance activities involving contract costs, such as floor checks, will be performed to the extent and frequency deemed necessary. b. Ensure that program office officials are sufficiently trained on the preparation of quality assurance surveillance plans for service contracts that emphasize the use of metrics for measuring contractor performance. c. To avoid any duplication of effort, ensure that contract and program office personnel coordinate with the DCAA office that has responsibility for voucher review for all. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the DoD IG website: <a href="http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/index.html">http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/index.html</a> )	01. Contracting officials and requiring activity personnel did not provide sufficient oversight for service contracts to ensure that contractors were performing in accordance with contract specifications.

## ALL COMPLETED AUDITS BY ALL AGENCIES

AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
5	DoD-OIG IE-2005-002/ISP- IQO-05-72	07/15/2005	DoS/DoD Interagency Evaluation of Iraqi Police Training	01. Evaluate the U.S. government- funded (appropriated funds) programs in accomplishing the training and equipping of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) 02. Examine the effectiveness of coordination and cooperation between Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD) activities for developing, implementing, and conducting training for the IPS.	01. Coalition authorities should plan and implement training focused on qualitative standards rather than on the numbers of trained IPs. This redefinition of objectives should be made explicit in a revised mission statement for CPATT. (Action: MNF-I in coordination with MNSTC-I and Embassy Baghdad.) 02. Coalition and Mission Iraq officials should support and encourage efforts by the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) to strengthen MOI control over the IPS through re-centralization of administrative processes and development of relevant SOPs. (Action: MNSTC-I and Embassy Baghdad.) 03. A working group of qualified instructors, specifically to include Iraqi representation, should design a range of courses suitable to the training needs of in-service IPS personnel. Mutually established parameters for candidate selection should be integral to this process. Changes in curricula for IP training must be negotiated in advance with the MOI and be implemented only after Iraqi agreement to such changes. (Action: MNSTC-I in consultation with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.) 04. Coalition authorities should pursue agreement with the MOI to incorporate the existing Emergency Response Unit, Bureau of Dignitary Protection, and 4 Provincial SWAT units into the Public Order Battalions, Special Police Commando Units, and Mechanized Brigades. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad.) (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the DoD IG website: <a href="http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/index.html">http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/index.html</a> )	01. Although the IPS is not yet capable of single-handedly meeting the security challenges, relevant Coalition training efforts have resulted in a qualified success. 02. Recruitment and vetting procedures are faulty. 03. Most of the IPS training programs have been designed and executed by the Coalition with insufficient input from Iraqi leaders. 04. Emphasis on numbers overshadows the attention that should be given to the qualitative performance of those trained. 05. Within present budget constraints, the Iraqi MOI cannot fund the ministry's existing staff of about 170,000, let alone the additional numbers projected for training. 06. MOI officials are not enthusiastic about training Iraqis at the JPTC. 07. Iraqi officials, notably to include the Minister of Interior, are adamant that henceforth training of raw recruits should be suspended in favor of in-service training. (Due to space constraints, some findings have been left out. To view the complete set of findings, please access the official document found on the DoD IG website: <a href="http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/index.html">http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/index.html</a> )
6	DoS-OIG 03311- 2005D1790009	05/01/2005	Audit of Cost-Plus Contract for Police Training	None	None	None
7	DoS-OIG 04141- 2005B17900005	08/01/2005	Billed Costs Under Task Orders Submitted By RONCO (Demining)	None	None	None
8	DoS-OIG 3311- 2005K17900015	07/22/2005	Application of Agreed-Upon Procedures to Calculate Daily Life Support Rates Under LOGCAP T0100	None	None	None
9	DoS-OIG AUD/CG/06-20		Independent Accountant's Report on the Application of Agreed-Upon Procedures on Indirect Cost Rates Proposed by Scholastic, Inc.	01. To determine whether the rates and cost principles were in compliance with OMB Circular A-122, Cost Principles for Non-Profit Organizations	01. Harris reported that Scholastic's general ledger system did not capture direct and indirect expenses in a manner that effectively identified appropriate indirect cost pools as required by OMB Circular A-122. However, Scholastic maintained comprehensive and detailed support for its program expenses, which enabled Harris to compute the corporation's indirect cost rates for its fiscal years ended May 31, 2005, and 2004. The independent accountant recommended that ALMA/AM require Scholastic to develop an Indirect Cost Allocation Plan in conformance with OMB Circular A-122 and the Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 31.2 and maintain a Job Cost Accounting System.	01. Harris reported that Scholastic's general ledger system did not capture direct and indirect expenses in a manner that effectively identified appropriate indirect cost pools as required by OMB Circular A-122. However, Scholastic maintained comprehensive and detailed support for its program expenses, which enabled Harris to compute the corporation's indirect cost rates for its fiscal years ended May 31, 2005, and 2004. The independent accountant recommended that ALMA/AM require Scholastic to develop an Indirect Cost Allocation Plan in conformance with OMB Circular A-122 and the Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 31.2 and maintain a Job Cost Accounting System.
10	DoS-OIG AUD/CG-04-41	07/01/2004	Fact Sheet on Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation	N/A	None	N/A

## ALL COMPLETED AUDITS BY ALL AGENCIES

AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
DoS-OIG	AUD/CG-05-18	02/15/2005	Survey of Department of State's Funding for Iraq	01. Identify and quantify funding received by DoS earmarked for Iraq. Ascertain methods or instruments used to convey funds, and compile inventory of auditable entities.	None	None
DoS-OIG	AUD/IO-04-47	09/01/2004	Review of Department of State Procurement Competitions to Support the Iraqi Police Training Program	01. Review compliance w/contract competition and award procedures associated with the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) procurement actions supporting training Iraqi police.	None	01. Contracting personnel followed applicable regulations and procedures. 02. However, SOW for initial action did not accurately describe services required.
DoS-OIG	AUD/IO-04-48	09/01/2004	Review of Cashiering Operations at Embassy Baghdad	01. Review Embassy's limited cashiering operations and specifically evaluate internal controls related to cashiering operation at US Embassy, Baghdad including adequacy of funds advanced to cashier.	None	01. No formal agreement w/DoD for services currently being performed by US Army. 02. No policies/procedures for Embassy Baghdad/Iraqi Support Unit Amman coordination/support. 03. No full-time IM specialist dedicated to providing support to offices in chancery.
DoS-OIG	AUD/IO-05-13	01/01/2005	Agreed-Upon Procedures of Daily Direct Labor, Aerial Support Equipment & Indirect Expense Rates Proposed by Blackwater Security Consultants, Contractor's Accounting System & Timekeeping Procedures	01. Definization support to contract number S-AQMPPD-04-D-0061 (BWSC).	None	01. Lack of time sheets, employee certification and approval. 02. Lack of written procedures for timesheets. 03. Allocation of Indirect Costs. 04. Costs by Contract Lin Item - ODCs. 05. Payroll and Labor Recording. 06. Inadequate/unreliable data. 07. Inconsistencies between the Proposal and Accounting System
DoS-OIG	AUD/IO-05-16	03/01/2005	Review of Agreed-Upon Procedures for the Verification of Excessive Fuel Charges in Support of JIPTC	None	None	None
DoS-OIG	AUD/IO-05-24	03/28/2005	Agreed-Upon Procedures Review of Indirect Rates and Equipment Delivery Charge Proposed by [a Department Contractor] and Review of Accounting System	01. At the request of the Department, the DoS OIG performed this review.	None	01. The DoS OIG did not take exception to the proposed indirect rates or equipment delivery charge, but had reservations as to whether the equipment delivery charge was properly treated as an indirect expense. 02. The DoS OIG had similar reservations about treating the project management office as an indirect expense because the proposed staffing might not be consistent with the level of effort needed, which was not known at the time of the review. 03. The DoS OIG also found that the contractor did not have a contract cost accounting system in place.
DoS-OIG	AUD/IO-06-16		Application of Agreed-Upon Procedures of Department of State Procurement Competitions to Support Armored Vehicles in Iraq	01. To determine whether acquisition plans were prepared and whether the procurements, which totaled about \$43.4 million, were adequately completed and performed in accordance with the provisions of the FAR and DOSAR.		01. With regard to the vehicle armoring services, the Department executed the justifications for less than full and open competition in accordance with the provisions of FAR and DOSAR. 02. With regard to the procurements for ballistic glass, the Department identified adequate competition.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
18	DoS-OIG	AUD/IOO-06-17	Application of Agreed-Upon Procedures Relating to DECO, Inc., Task Order No. SALMEC-04-F-0996	01. Whether DECO's loaded hourly rates on Task Order No. SALMEC-04-F-0996 duplicated what the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) paid as direct travel reimbursement for the period August 2, 2004, to May 31, 2005. 02. Whether DECO's policies for including costs in the hourly rate complied with FAR, Part 31. Under the terms of the task order, DECO was to provide construction site security monitoring services in Baghdad, Iraq.	None	01. OIG found that DECO's loaded hourly rates did not duplicate what OBO paid as direct travel reimbursement. However, DECO's policies for including costs in the hourly rate did not always comply with FAR, Part 31. As a result, OIG questioned costs totaling \$13,458. Of that amount, OIG classified \$12,808 as unallowable and \$650 as unsupported because of either inadequate or a lack of documentation. OIG recommended that AUM/AQM require DECO to reimburse the Department for unallowable costs and provide additional documentation for the unsupported costs. 02. In response to a request from the Department of State's Bureau of Administration, Office of Logistics Management, Office of Acquisitions Management (AUM/AQM), The Department's Office of Inspector General contracted with L.F. Harris & Associates, an independent public accounting firm, to perform certain agreed-upon procedures on Scholastic, Inc.'s indirect cost rates for its fiscal years ended May 31, 2005, and 2004. The objective of the engagement was to determine whether the rates and cost principles were in compliance with OMB Circular A-122, Cost Principles for Non-Profit Organizations. The cooperative agreement with Scholastic provided for the distribution of books and teacher training in Iraq and other countries of the Middle East. (Due to space constraints, some findings have been left out. To view the complete set of findings, please access the official document found on the DoS IG website: <a href="http://www.state.gov">http://www.state.gov</a> )
19	DoS-OIG	IBO/IOO-A-05-02	Review of Radio Sawa Support to Transition in Post-Saddam Iraq	01. Determine if USAID funds used effectively to enhance dissemination of humanitarian information. 02. Determine if BBG successfully launched 3 program components of interagency agreement: establishing stringer network, airing programs addressing humanitarian and reconstruction efforts, and conducting audience research.	01. We recommend that Embassy Baghdad establish a memorandum of agreement with the U.S. Army to ensure that it continues to provide the embassy with cashing services as needed. 02. We recommend that Embassy Baghdad develop and publish post-specific policies and procedures that cover all cashing operations, including accommodation exchange, cash advances, Foreign Service national payroll, and other cashing services. 03. We recommend that Embassy Baghdad establish a system for providing coverage by an information management specialist at the chancery to assist the consular section and the cashing unit until a full-time specialist is assigned.	01. BBG did not use funds to enhance dissemination of reports as expected and therefore, funding plan not completed. 02. BBG partially met the principal requirements of the interagency agreement: setting up a Radio Sawa stringer network in Iraq, broadcasting humanitarian programming, and initiating audience research. 03. BBG did not provide periodic performance reports or purchase specific equipment.
20	DoS-OIG	ISP-IOO-05-53	Review of Off-Site Support to Embassy Baghdad	N/A	None	N/A
21	DoS-OIG	ISP-IOO-05-57	Review of Staffing Embassy Baghdad	N/A	None	N/A
22	DoS-OIG	ISP-IOO-05-61	Review of Staffing Process at Embassy Baghdad's New Embassy Compound	None	None	None

## ALL COMPLETED AUDITS BY ALL AGENCIES

AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
23	DoS-OIG ISP-IQO-06-01	10/01/2005	Inspection of Rule-of-Law Programs, Embassy Baghdad	01. OIG surveyed U.S.-funded rule-of-law programs in Iraq to determine how effectively the programs address these multiple components of Iraq's justice sector.	01. Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with the Bureaus of Human Resources, Near Eastern Affairs, and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, should designate a senior officer to be the rule-of-law coordinator with DGHR, NEA, and INL. 02. Embassy Baghdad should designate the rule-of-law coordinator as the clearinghouse for current developments in rule of law in Iraq, with responsibility for periodic reporting on the status of rule-of-law activities, including those undertaken by Coalition members, for use by the Chief of Mission and officials in Iraq and the United States. (Action: Embassy Baghdad) (Due to space constraints, some findings have been left out. To view the complete set of findings, please access the official document found on the DoS IG website: <a href="http://www.state.gov">http://www.state.gov</a> )	01. A fully integrated approach to justice-sector reform in Iraq is essential and does not exist at present. An approved, integrated, adjustable strategic plan would sharpen the debate and shape the thoughts of policymakers for each stage of the process.
24	DoS-OIG IT-IQO-05-04	05/01/2005	Survey of Iraq IT Waivers	None	None	None
25	DoS-OIG IT-IQO-05-06	08/01/2005	Embassy Baghdad Communications Security Evaluation	None	None	None
26	GAO GAO-03-1088	09/01/2003	MILITARY OPERATIONS Fiscal Year 2003 Obligations Are Substantial, but May Result in Less Obligations Than Expected	01. To examine the adequacy of funding for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), we reviewed: The President's fiscal year 2003 budget request for supplemental appropriations. 02. Applicable laws and accompanying reports appropriating funds for GWOT. 03. DoD reports on the obligation of funds.	01. GAO recommends that the Department of Defense (DOD) take several actions to ensure that the fiscal year 2003 funds appropriated for GWOT are fully utilized, including that the Secretary of Defense review the services' spending plans before transferring additional funds from the Iraqi Freedom Fund to ensure the funds will be obligated as planned. GAO also suggests that, given the results of this review, Congress not provide the \$1.4 billion requested by the President for DOD in fiscal year 2004 for continued support of Operations Desert Spring and Northern and Southern Watch since DOD canceled them.	01. While funds obligated by DOD for GWOT, including the war with Iraq, in fiscal year 2003 are substantial, about \$39 billion through June 2003, the funds appropriated by Congress appear to be sufficient for fiscal year 2003, and some of the services may not obligate all of the funds they were appropriated for fiscal year 2003.
27	GAO GAO-03-792R	05/15/2003	Rebuilding Iraq	01. Based on others studies, Asks questions as to the oversight of Iraq Reconstruction.	None	N/A
28	GAO GAO-04-1006	09/14/2004	Foreign Regimes' Assets: The US Faces Challenges in Recovering Assets, but Has Mechanisms That Could Guide Future Assets	01. This report describes the approach the U.S. government uses to recover foreign regimes' assets. 02. Examines the challenges the United States faces in recovering foreign regimes' assets. 03. Examines the mechanisms the United States has used to recover Iraqi assets and their applicability to future efforts.	01. The Departments of the Treasury and State should work with U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies to improve the accuracy and completeness of account identifying information needed by financial institutions to identify and freeze assets of foreign regimes. 02. The Department of the Treasury should seek legislative authority, if necessary, to enhance OFAC's ability to ensure financial institution compliance with sanctions by allowing financial regulators to share complete information from their examinations with OFAC. 03. The Departments of the Treasury and State should develop and document a compilation of lessons learned from the current effort to recover Iraq's assets that could assist in appropriately institutionalizing and leveraging all mechanisms available for future efforts.	01. U.S. agencies may not be able to readily obtain accurate and complete information on targeted entities, such as the spelling of names, addresses, and dates of birth. Financial institutions can also lack complete identifying information on their clients. 02. The laws of some foreign governments complicate the ability of overseas branches of U.S. financial institutions to comply with OFAC regulations. In these situations, the U.S. government encourages the relevant foreign governments to allow U.S. financial institutions to freeze or transfer assets in a manner consistent with U.S. law or Treasury issues a license to allow U.S. financial institutions to comply with local laws. 03. OFAC's ability to monitor financial institutions' compliance with its regulations is limited because it relies on financial regulators to monitor financial institutions' OFAC compliance programs.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
29	GAO-04-1031	09/01/2004	MILITARY PERSONNEL DoD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve Force Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues	01. This review specifically examined the extent to which: DoD's implementation of a key mobilization authority and personnel policies affect reserve force availability. 2. The Army was able to execute its mobilization and demobilization plans efficiently. 3. DoD can manage the health of its mobilized reserve forces.	01. GAO recommends that DoD develop a strategic framework with personnel policies linked to human capital goals, update planning assumptions, determine the most efficient mobilization support options, update health guidance, set a timeline for submitting health assessments electronically, and improve medical oversight.	01. DoD's implementation of a key mobilization authority to involuntarily call up reserve component members and personnel policies greatly affects the numbers of reserve members available to fill requirements. 02. The Army was not able to efficiently execute its mobilization and demobilization plans, because the plans contained outdated assumptions concerning the availability of facilities and support personnel.
30	GAO-04-305R	12/18/2003	Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of Logistics Activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom (Briefing)	01. To study a number of issues related to logistics support to deployed forces.	None	01. Although major combat operations during the initial phases of OIF were successful, our preliminary work indicated that there were substantial logistics support problems in the OIF theater.
31	GAO-04-484	04/01/2004	OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM Long-standing Problems Hampering Mail Delivery Need to Be Resolved	01. GAO was directed to review mail delivery to troops stationed in the Middle East. In this report, GAO assesses: The timeliness of mail delivery to and from troops in Operation Iraqi Freedom. 02. How mail delivery issues and problems during this operation compared with those experienced during Operations Desert Shield/Storm in 1991. 03. Efforts to identify actions to resolve problems in establishing mail operations for future contingencies.	01. GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense: implement a new system to accurately track, calculate, and report postal transit times 2. Consolidate lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom and develop and implement a specific course of action to resolve them.	01. The timeliness of mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom cannot be accurately assessed because the Department of Defense (DoD) does not have a reliable, accurate system in place to measure timeliness. 02. In general, DoD's transit time and test letter data show that mail delivery fell within the current wartime standard of 12 to 18 days. However, the methodology used to calculate transit times significantly understated actual delivery times. 03. GAO conducted discussion groups with a non-representative sample of 127 service members who served in theater. More than half reported they were dissatisfied with mail delivery, underscoring the negative impact it can have on troop morale.
32	GAO-04-559	04/01/2004	State Dept. Issues affecting Iraq National Congress	01. GAO was asked to review: The history of the Department of State's funding of INCSE broadcasting activities 02. The key issues affecting State's funding decisions.	None	01. Through their inability to work together to restart Liberty TV, State and INCSE missed a chance to reach the Iraqi people at critical times prior to and during the March 2003 war in Iraq.
33	GAO-04-562T	03/24/2004	MILITARY PREPOSITIONING Observations on Army and Marine Corps Programs During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Beyond (Testimony)	01. This testimony describes: The performance and availability of Army and Marine Corps prepositioned equipment and supplies to support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 02. Current status of the stocks and plans to reconstitute them. 03. Key issues facing the military as it reshapes these programs to support DoD's force transformation efforts.	None	01. The importance of prepositioned stocks was dramatically illustrated during OIF. While they faced some challenges, the Army and Marine Corps relied heavily on prepositioned combat equipment and supplies to decisively defeat the Iraqi military. They both reported that prepositioned stocks were a key factor in the success of OIF. 02. Much of the prepositioned equipment is still being used to support continuing operations in Iraq. 03. In the near term, the Army and Marines must necessarily focus on supporting ongoing OIF operations. While waiting to reconstitute its program, the Army also has an opportunity to address shortfalls and modernize remaining stocks.
34	GAO-04-579T	03/18/2004	Recovering Iraq's Assets: Preliminary Observations on US Efforts and Challenges	N/A	None	N/A

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
35	GAO-04-605	06/01/2004	Rebuilding Iraq - Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management Challenges	01. GAO determined whether agencies had complied with competition requirements in awarding new contracts and issuing task orders and evaluated agencies' initial efforts in carrying out contract administration tasks.	01. We recommend that the Secretary of the Army take the following four actions: Review the out-of-scope task orders for Iraqi media and subject matter experts issued by the Defense Contracting Command-Washington and take any necessary remedial actions. 02. Ensure that any future task orders under the LOGCAP contract for Iraq reconstruction activities are within the scope of that contract. 03. Address and resolve all outstanding issues in connection with the pending justifications and Approvals for the contracts and related task orders used by the Army Corps of Engineers to restore Iraq's electricity infrastructure. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the GAO website: <a href="http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html">http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html</a> )	01. Agencies used sole-source or limited competition approaches to issue new reconstruction contracts, and when doing so, generally complied with applicable laws and regulations. 02. Agencies did not, however, always comply with requirements when issuing task orders under existing contracts.
36	GAO-04-651T	04/07/2004	UNITED NATIONS Observations on the Oil for Food Program	01. GAO reports on its estimates of the revenue diverted from the program. 02. Provides preliminary observations on the program's administration. 03. Describes some challenges in its transfer to the CPA. 04. Discusses the challenges Iraq faces as it assumes program responsibility.	None	01. Inadequate oversight and corruption in the Oil for Food Program raise concerns about the Iraqi government's ability to import and distribute Oil for Food commodities and manage at least \$32 billion in expected donor reconstruction funds.
37	GAO-04-668	05/01/2004	MILITARY OPERATIONS DoD's Fiscal Year 2003 Funding and Reported Obligations in Support of the Global War on Terrorism	01. This report continues the review of fiscal year 2003 by analyzing obligations reported in support of the Global War on Terrorism and reviews whether the amount of funding received by the military services was adequate to cover DoD's obligations for the war from October 1, 2002, through September 30, 2003. GAO will also review the war's reported obligations and funding for fiscal year 2004.	None	01. In fiscal year 2003, DoD reported obligations of more than \$61 billion in support of the Global War on Terrorism. 02. GAO's analysis of the obligation data showed that 64 percent of fiscal year 2003 obligations reported for the war on terrorism went for Operation Iraqi Freedom. 03. Among the DoD components, the Army had the most obligations (46 percent); and among appropriation accounts the operation and maintenance account had the highest level of reported obligations (71 percent).
38	GAO-04-730T	04/28/2004	UNITED NATIONS Observations on the Management and Oversight of the Oil for Food Program	01. GAO reports on its estimates of the illegal revenue acquired by the former Iraqi regime in violation of UN sanctions. 02. Provides observations on program administration. 03. Describes the challenges facing the CPA and the Iraqi government in administering remaining contracts. 04. Discusses potential issues for further investigation.	None	01. Summaries of internal audit reports pointed to some concerns regarding procurement, coordination, monitoring, and oversight and concluded that OIP had generally responded to audit recommendations.
39	GAO-04-746R	05/25/2004	Report on Iraq Transitional Law	01. Review the following: The time frames and Iraqi governmental structures established by the transitional law. 02. Arrangements in the law for the U.S.-led multinational force, Iraqi security forces, and militias. 03. mechanisms in the law for resolving disputes over property and territories within Iraq.	None	01. The transitional law does not specify how the interim government is to be formed or structured, but states that the interim government will govern in accordance with an annex to be developed. 02. The transitional law contains some provisions addressing two of the key challenges facing the interim and transitional governments—maintaining a unified Iraq and ensuring its security—but many issues remain open.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
40	GAO	GAO-04-831R	05/27/2004	Financial Services: Post-hearing Questions Regarding Recovering Foreign Regimes' Assets (Testimony)	N/A	N/A
41	GAO	GAO-04-854	07/01/2004	MILITARY OPERATIONS DoD's Extensive Use of Logistics Support Contracts Requires Strengthened Oversight	<p>01. As requested, GAO assessed DoD's planning in its use of logistics support contracts in contingency operations; determined whether DoD has had contract oversight processes that are adequate to ensure that quality services were provided in an economical and efficient manner.</p> <p>02. Assessed the extent to which DoD provided trained personnel qualified to oversee its contractors.</p>	<p>01. Emphasize to the heads of DOD components the need to comply with guidance to identify operational requirements that are to be provided by contractors early in the planning process and involve the contractor in the planning, where practicable. If security concerns prevent the involvement of the contractor, direct that unclassified statements of work be developed and provided to the contractor.</p> <p>02. Direct the service secretaries to establish teams of subject matter experts who will periodically travel to locations where contractor services are being provided by logistics support contracts to evaluate and make recommendations on (1) the appropriateness of the services being provided, (2) the level of services being provided, and (3) the economy and efficiency with which the services are being provided.</p> <p>03. Implement a department-wide lessons learned program that will capture the experiences of others who have used logistics support contracts. This system should include lessons learned from operations as well as lessons learned and best practices documented by DOD's audit agencies.</p> <p>04. Develop and implement training courses for commanding officers and other senior leaders who are deploying to locations with contractor support. Such training should provide information on the role of commanders and others in the contracting process. Specifically, the training should provide instruction on (1) developing and documenting requirements, (2) ensuring that contractors perform in a cost-effective manner, and (3) assessing contractors' performance. The training should also include information on the limits of commanders' authority vis-à-vis contractors and include information on the roles and responsibilities of DCMA and other oversight agencies.</p>
42	GAO	GAO-04-869T	06/15/2004	Contract Management: Contracting for Iraq Reconstruction and Global Logistics Support (Testimony)	N/A	N/A
43	GAO	GAO-04-880T	06/16/2004	UNITED NATIONS Observations on the Oil for Food Program and Iraq's Food Security	<p>01. GAO reports on its estimates of the illegal revenue acquired by the former Iraqi regime in violation of UN sanctions.</p> <p>02. Provides observations on program administration .</p> <p>3. Describes the current and future challenges in achieving food security</p>	<p>01. Evolving policy and implementation decisions on the food distribution system and the worsening security situation have affected the movement of food commodities within Iraq.</p>

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
44	GAO-04-902R	06/01/2004	Rebuilding Iraq - Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues	01. This report focuses on issues associated with resources, security, governance, and essential services.	None	01. Several key challenges will affect the political transition, the pace and cost of reconstruction, and the type of assistance provided by the international community. These include the unstable security environment, the evolving capacity of the Iraqi institutions to govern and secure the country, the availability and coordination of international assistance, and the need for adequate oversight. 02. Given the instability and uncertainty in Iraq, there are also questions about what options and contingency plans are being developed to address these ongoing and future challenges.
45	GAO-04-915	07/01/2004	MILITARY OPERATIONS Fiscal Year 2004 Costs for the Global War on Terrorism Will Exceed Supplemental, Requiring DoD to Shift Funds from Other Uses	01. GAO reviewed the adequacy of current funding for fiscal year 2004 war-related activities. 02. Actions DoD is undertaking to cover anticipated shortfalls, if any. 03. GAO is also making observations on efforts to require greater accountability to the Congress on the use of funds appropriated to DoD for contingency operations.	01. GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense revise DOD cost reporting guidance so that large amounts of obligations are not shown in miscellaneous categories.	01. GAO's analysis suggests that anticipated costs will exceed the supplemental funding provided for the war by about \$12.3 billion for the current fiscal year. 02. DoD and the services are taking a variety of actions to cover anticipated shortfalls in their war-related funding. These actions include taking steps to reduce costs, transferring funds among appropriations accounts, and deferring some planned activities to use those funds to support the war. 03. GAO's past work has shown that current cost reporting includes large amounts of funds that have been reported as obligated in miscellaneous categories and thus provide little insight on how those funds have been spent.
46	GAO-04-953T	07/08/2004	UNITED NATIONS Observations on the Oil for Food Program and Areas for Further Investigation	01. GAO reports on estimates of the illegal revenue acquired by the former Iraqi regime in violation of UN sanctions 02. Provides some observations on the administration of the program. 03. Suggests areas for additional analysis and summarizes the status of several ongoing investigations.	None	01. Ongoing investigations of the Oil for Food Program may wish to further examine how the structure of the program enabled the Iraqi government to obtain illegal revenues, the role of member states in monitoring and enforcing the sanctions, actions taken to reduce oil smuggling, and the responsibilities and procedures for assessing price reasonableness in commodity contracts.
47	GAO-05-120	11/01/2004	DEFENSE HEALTH CARE Force Health Protection and Surveillance Policy Compliance Was Mixed, but Appears Better for Recent Deployments	01. GAO was asked in November 2003 to also determine the extent to which the services met DoD's policies for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and, where applicable, compare results with OEF/OIG. 02. What steps DoD has taken to establish a quality assurance program to ensure that the military services comply with force health protection and surveillance policies.	01. Overall compliance with DoD's force health protection and surveillance policies for servicemembers that deployed in support of OIF varied by service, installation, and policy requirement. 02. Overall, Army and Air Force compliance for sampled servicemembers for OIF appears much better compared to OEF and OIG. 03. The Marine Corps installations examined generally had lower levels of compliance than the other services; however, GAO did not review medical records from the Marines or Navy for OEF and OIG. 04. In January 2004, DoD established an overall deployment quality assurance program for ensuring that the services comply with force health protection and surveillance policies, and implementation of the program is ongoing from the Marines or Navy for OEF and OIG.	01. Overall compliance with DoD's force health protection and surveillance policies for servicemembers that deployed in support of OIF varied by service, installation, and policy requirement. 02. Overall, Army and Air Force compliance for sampled servicemembers for OIF appears much better compared to OEF and OIG. 03. The Marine Corps installations examined generally had lower levels of compliance than the other services; however, GAO did not review medical records from the Marines or Navy for OEF and OIG. 04. In January 2004, DoD established an overall deployment quality assurance program for ensuring that the services comply with force health protection and surveillance policies, and implementation of the program is ongoing from the Marines or Navy for OEF and OIG.

## ALL COMPLETED AUDITS BY ALL AGENCIES

AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
GAO	GAO-05-125	02/01/2005	MILITARY PAY Gaps in Pay and Benefits Create Financial Hardships for Injured Army National Guard and Reserve Soldiers	01. Provide perspective on the nature of pay deficiencies in the key areas of overall environment and management controls, processes, and systems. 02. GAO also assessed whether recent actions the Army has taken to address these problems will offer effective and lasting solutions.	01. GAO makes 20 recommendations for immediate actions including (1) establishing comprehensive policies and procedures, (2) providing adequate infrastructure and resources, and (3) making process improvements to compensate for inadequate, stovepiped systems. 02. In addition, GAO recommends 2 actions, as part of longer term system improvement initiatives, to integrate the Army's order writing, pay, personnel, and medical eligibility systems.	01. Injured and ill Reserve component soldiers—who are entitled to extend their active duty service to receive medical treatment—have been inappropriately removed from active duty status in the automated systems that control pay and access to medical care. 02. The Army's process for extending active duty orders for injured soldiers lacks an adequate control environment and management controls.
GAO	GAO-05-201	04/01/2005	INTERAGENCY CONTRACTING Problems with DoD's and Interior's Orders to Support Military Operations	01. We reviewed the process that the Department of Defense (DoD) used to acquire interrogation and certain other services through the Department of the Interior to support military operations in Iraq. On behalf of DoD, Interior issued 11 task orders, valued at over \$66 million, on an existing contract.	01. A number of corrective actions are already underway, such as clarifying policies and adding training requirements. GAO makes recommendations on steps that Interior and DoD should take to further refine their efforts.	01. DoD, faced with an urgent need for interrogation and other services in support of military operations in Iraq, turned to the Department of the Interior for contracting assistance. Numerous breakdowns occurred in the issuance and administration of the orders for these services. 02. A lack of effective management controls—in particular insufficient management oversight and a lack of adequate training—led to the breakdowns. 03. In response to the above concerns, Interior and DoD have taken actions to strengthen management controls.
GAO	GAO-05-233	02/01/2005	Progress in Implementing the Services Acquisition Reform Act (SARA)	01. GAO was asked to report on progress in implementing SARAs provisions.	None	01. Just over a year after the enactment of SARA, progress made on regulations, guidance, and other implementing actions varies. 02. While nearly all the key provisions of SARA are being implemented, some provisions are further along than others.
GAO	GAO-05-275	04/01/2005	DEFENSE LOGISTICS Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations	01. Assessing what supply shortages were experienced by U.S. forces in Iraq between October 2002 and September 2004 and what impact the shortages had on their operations. 02. What primary deficiencies in the supply system contributed to any identified supply shortages. 03. What actions DoD has taken to improve the timely availability of supplies for current and future operations.	01. This report contains several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense directing that actions, such as ensuring the accuracy of Army war reserve requirements and developing and exercising deployable distribution capabilities, be taken to improve DoD's system for supplying items to U.S. forces.	01. U.S. troops experienced shortages of seven of the nine items GAO reviewed. 02. The documented impact of these shortages varied between combat units. 03. GAO identified five systemic deficiencies that contributed to shortages of the reviewed items, including inaccurate Army war reserve spare parts requirements and ineffective distribution.
GAO	GAO-05-280R	04/29/2005	Defense Base Act Insurance	01. The objectives of our review were to: Identify the cost to the U.S. government of insurance coverage purchased under DBA. 02. To assess the act's implementation.	None	01. It is difficult to determine whether all DBA insurance is purchased in a cost-effective manner or if agencies' implementation challenges hinder their effectiveness in providing workers' compensation coverage under DBA. 02. Lack of reliable information on numbers of contractors and cost of DBA insurance restricts the ability of agencies to make informed decisions on purchasing strategies for DBA. 03. Additionally, confusion over when DBA applies and difficulty in enforcing DBA and processing claims remain largely unresolved problems, despite actions taken by agencies. 04. Finally, new challenges, such as growing numbers of contractors, have arisen since 1941, when DBA was passed.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
53	GAO-05-293	05/01/2005	DEFENSE MANAGEMENT Processes to Estimate and Track Equipment Reconstitution Costs Can Be Improved	01. GAO reviewed this process for the fiscal year 2004 supplemental budget to determine the extent to which the process produced reliable estimates of reconstitution requirements in the fiscal year 2004 supplemental budget. 02. Whether DoD is accurately tracking and reporting reconstitution costs.	None	01. DoD's two-phased process to develop its fiscal year 2004 equipment reconstitution cost estimates contained weaknesses that produced errors which may result in misstatements of future-year reconstitution cost requirements. 02. The model DoD used to estimate costs in the first phase of the process generated unreliable estimates DoD has not accurately tracked and reported its equipment reconstitution cost because the services are unable to segregate equipment reconstitution from other maintenance requirements as required.
54	GAO-05-328	03/17/2005	Defense Logistics - High Level DoD Coordination is Needed to Further Improve the Management of the Army's LOGCAP Contract	01. This report assesses the extent to which the Army is taking action to improve the management and oversight of LOGCAP and whether further opportunities for using this contract effectively exist.	01. To make more effective use of LOGCAP we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions: - Designate a LOGCAP coordinator with the authority to participate in deliberations and advocate for the most effective and efficient use of the LOGCAP contract. Areas where we believe this coordinator should provide oversight include (1) reviewing planning for the use of LOGCAP to ensure it is in accordance with Army doctrine and guidance; (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the GAO website: <a href="http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html">http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html</a> )	01. First, although DoD continues to agree with our July 2004 recommendation to create teams of subject matter experts to review contract activities for economy and efficiency, it has not done so yet because the need to respond to statutory requirements took precedence. 02. The second area needing attention is the coordination of contract activities between DoD components involved with using LOGCAP.
55	GAO-05-346T	02/15/2005	UNITED NATIONS Oil for Food Program Audits	01. GAO provides information on United Nations' Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) background, structure, and resources. 02. Highlights the findings of the internal audit reports. 03. Discusses limitations on the audits' coverage.	None	01. OIOS' audits and summary reports revealed deficiencies in the management and internal controls of the Oil for Food Program. However, OIOS did not examine certain headquarters functions—particularly OIP's oversight of the contracts for central and southern Iraq that accounted for 59 percent or almost \$40 billion in Oil for Food proceeds. 02. UN management and the Office of the Iraq Program prevented OIOS from reporting its audit results directly to the Security Council.
56	GAO-05-392T	03/02/2005	UNITED NATIONS Sustained Oversight Is Needed for Reforms to Achieve Lasting Results	01. GAO provides observations on areas for UN reform based on our 2004 report and our continuing review of the Oil for Food program, including our analysis of internal audit reports and other documents.	None	01. The United Nations needs sustained oversight at all levels of the organization to achieve lasting results on its reform agenda. 02. At the program level, management reviews that compare actual performance to expected results are critical elements of effective oversight and accountability. 03. A strong internal audit function provides additional oversight and accountability through independent assessments of UN activities, as demonstrated by audits of the U.N Oil for Food program.
57	GAO-05-431T	03/14/2005	Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police	01. GAO provides preliminary observations on the strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police forces. 02. The data on the status of forces. 03. Challenges that the Multi-National Force in Iraq faces in transferring security missions to these forces.	None	01. The multinational force is taking steps to address these challenges, such as developing a system to assess unit readiness and embedding US forces within Iraqi units. 02. However, without reliable reporting data, a more capable Iraqi force, and stronger Iraqi leadership, the Department of Defense faces difficulties in implementing its strategy to draw down U.S. forces from Iraq.

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# APPENDIX F

AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
58	GAO-05-680R	06/27/2005	Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas	<p>01. This report discusses the extent to which OSD has provided sufficient guidance to overseas regional commands to meet the reporting requirements contained in congressional mandates and as suggested by GAO</p> <p>02. Overseas regional commands complied with the reporting requirements and in doing so, provided information in a complete, clear, and consistent manner</p> <p>03. Whether improvements in guidance and reporting were needed.</p>	<p>01. We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that are intended to make future comprehensive master plans more complete, clear, and consistent to facilitate annual review and oversight by Congress and other users of the plans.</p>	<p>01. The scope of OSD's guidance issued to date generally exceeded the reporting requirements established by Congress for the comprehensive master plans and included most additional reporting elements previously recommended by us, except for residual value.</p> <p>02. The overseas regional commands generally complied with the reporting requirements defined by OSD, and by extension of Congress, but varied in the extent to which they provided complete, clear, and consistent information in their master plans.</p>
59	GAO-05-737	07/28/2005	Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed To Improve Use of Private Security Providers	<p>01. GAO evaluated the extent to which U.S. agencies and contractors acquired security services from private providers,</p> <p>02. The U.S. military and private security providers developed a working relationship, and</p> <p>03. U.S. agencies assessed the costs of using private security providers on reconstruction contracts.</p>	<p>01. To assist contractors operating in hostile environments in obtaining security services required to ensure successful contract execution, we recommend that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development, explore options that would enable contractors to obtain such services quickly and efficiently. Such options may include, for example, identifying minimum standards for private security personnel qualifications, training requirements and other key performance characteristics that private security personnel should possess; establishing qualified vendor lists; and/or establishing contracting vehicles which contractors could be authorized to use.</p> <p>02. To ensure that MNF-I has a clear understanding of the reasons for blue on white violence, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Combatant Commander, U.S. Central Command, to direct the Commander, MNF-I, to further assess all of the blue on white incidents to determine if the procedures outlined in the December 2004 order are sufficient. Furthermore, if the procedures have not proven to be effective, we recommend that the Commander, MNF-I, develop additional procedures to protect both U.S. military forces and private security providers.</p> <p>(Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the GAO website: <a href="http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html">http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html</a>)</p>	<p>01. Overall, GAO found that contractors replaced their initial security providers on more than half the 2003 contracts it reviewed. Contractor officials attributed this turnover to various factors, including the absence of useful agency guidance.</p> <p>02. Despite the significant role played by private security providers in enabling reconstruction efforts, neither the Department of State, nor DOD nor the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have complete data on the costs of using private security providers.</p> <p>03. GAO found that the cost to obtain private security providers and security-related equipment accounted for more than 15 percent of contract costs on 8 of the 15 reconstruction contracts it reviewed.</p>
60	GAO-05-775	08/11/2005	Defense Logistics: DOD Has Begun to Improve Supply Distribution Operations, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain These Efforts	<p>01. DoD has undertaken logistics improvement initiatives, but has not achieved a logistics system responsive to the asymmetric threat DoD now faces. Prior logistics transformation efforts lacked an overarching plan to tie numerous service initiatives to DoD's strategic logistics objectives.</p> <p>1. To what extent has DoD defined the desired end state for its initiatives and identified goals, resources, and timeframes?</p> <p>02. How successful have logistics initiatives been to date and what are the challenges/barriers for broader implementation?</p> <p>(Due to space constraints, some objectives have been left out. To view the complete set of objectives, please access the official document found on the GAO website: <a href="http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html">http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html</a>)</p>	<p>01. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions: Clarify the responsibilities, accountability, and authority between the DPO and Defense Logistics Executive;</p> <p>02. Issue a directive to institute these clarifications;</p> <p>03. Direct that improvements be made in DOD's logistics transformation strategy; and</p> <p>04. Address underfunding of new communications and tracking systems.</p>	<p>01. Although DOD has made progress in addressing supply distribution problems, the department's ability to make coordinated, systemic improvements that cut across the multiple organizations involved in the distribution system is stymied because of problems in defining who has accountability and authority for making such improvements and because the current strategy to transform logistics does not provide a clear vision to guide and synchronize future distribution improvement efforts.</p> <p>02. Two of DOD's five distribution initiatives GAO reviewed have been successful enough to warrant application to future operations, but the future of the other three is less certain because they lack funding or other support.</p>

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
61	GAO-05-79	01/01/2005	ARMY NATIONAL GUARD Inefficient, Error-Prone Process Results in Travel Reimbursement Problems for Mobilized Soldiers	<p>01. GAO was asked to determine: The impact of the recent increased operational tempo on the process used to reimburse Army Guard soldiers for travel expenses and the effect that travel reimbursement problems have had on soldiers and their families.</p> <p>02. The adequacy of the overall design of controls over the processes, human capital, and automated systems relied on for Army Guard travel reimbursements.</p> <p>(Due to space constraints, some objectives have been left out. To view the complete set of objectives, please access the official document found on the GAO website: <a href="http://www.gao.gov/docssearch/pastweek.html">http://www.gao.gov/docssearch/pastweek.html</a>)</p>	<p>01. GAO makes 23 recommendations to address Army Guard travel reimbursement weaknesses in the areas of process, human capital, and systems.</p> <p>02. GAO also recommends that DOD ensure that its longer term system improvement efforts include complete and lasting solutions to the identified weaknesses.</p>	<p>01. Mobilized Army Guard soldiers have experienced significant problems getting accurate, timely, and consistent reimbursements for out-of-pocket travel expenses.</p> <p>02. Guard soldiers in our case study units reported a number of problems they and their families endured due to delayed or unpaid travel reimbursements, including debts on their personal credit cards, trouble paying their monthly bills, and inability to make child support payments.</p> <p>03. With respect to human capital, GAO found a lack of oversight and accountability and inadequate training.</p>
62	GAO-05-872	09/07/2005	Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures for Assessing Impact and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities	<p>01. Assessment of U.S. activities in the water and sanitation sector including the funding and status of U.S. activities.</p> <p>02. U.S. efforts to measure progress, implementation of reconstruction activities, and</p> <p>04. the sustainability of U.S. - funded projects.</p>	<p>01. Secretary of State should establish and monitor improved indicators and measures that assess how U.S. efforts are improving water and sanitation services in Iraq and</p> <p>02. Work with Iraqi ministries to assess and obtain the resources needed to operate and maintain facilities.</p>	<p>01. State has set broad goals for providing essential services in Iraq, but the lack of sound performance data and measures for the water and sanitation sector present challenges in determining the impact of U.S. projects.</p> <p>02. USAID-funded surveys report that Iraqis experience low levels of access and satisfaction with water and sanitation services.</p> <p>03. Poor security and management challenges have adversely affected the U.S. water and sanitation reconstruction program, leading to project delays and increased costs.</p> <p>04. Other factors that impede progress and increase cost include lack of agreement on project scope, staffing turnover, inflation, unanticipated site conditions, and uncertain ownership of project sites.</p>
63	GAO-05-876	07/28/2005	Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction	<p>01. Report provides information on the funding applied to the reconstruction effort and</p> <p>02. U.S. activities and progress made in the oil, power, water, and health sectors and key challenges that these sectors face.</p>	None	<p>01. The U.S. has completed projects in Iraq that have helped to restore basic services, such as rehabilitating oil wells and refineries, increasing electrical generation capacity, restoring water treatment plants, and reestablishing Iraqi basic health care services.</p> <p>02. Reconstruction efforts continue to face challenges such as rebuilding in an insecure environment, ensuring the sustainability of completed projects, and measuring program results.</p>

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS	
64	GAO	GAO-05-882	09/21/2005	Global War on Terrorism: DOD Needs to Improve the Reliability of Cost Data and Provide Additional Guidance to Control Costs	01. Assess whether DoD's reported war costs are based on reliable data. 02. The extent to which DoD's existing financial management policy is applicable to war spending, and 03. Whether DoD has implemented cost controls as operations mature.	01. Undertake a series of steps to ensure that reported GWOT costs are reliable, 02. Expand its financial management regulation for contingency operations to include contingencies as large as GWOT, and 03. Establish guidelines to control costs.	01. GAO found numerous problems in DoD's processes for recording and reporting costs for GWOT; raising significant concerns about the overall reliability of DoD's reported cost data. 02. Further complicating the data reliability issue is the fact that DoD has not updated its policy to address GWOT spending. 03. While individual commands have taken steps to control costs and DoD policy generally advises its officials of their financial management responsibilities to ensure the prudent use of contingency funding, DoD has not established guidelines that would require all commands involved in GWOT to take steps to control costs and to keep DoD informed of those steps and their success.
65	GAO	GAO-05-932R	09/07/2005	Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 2005 Elections	01. Report provides information on U.S. assistance to Iraq for the elections and 02. Improvements in the elections process that participating organizations identified for future elections.	None	01. Conference participants identified elections management, media involvement in the elections process, and voter education as areas needing improvement. 02. In addition, participants suggested that the IECI develop a way to address regional differences in voter education.
66	GAO	GAO-06-179T	10/18/2005	REBUILDING IRAQ: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results, and Maintaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and Sustainable Progress	01. In this testimony, GAO discusses: The funding used to rebuild and stabilize Iraq 02. The challenges that the United States faces in its rebuilding and stabilization efforts.	None	01. The United States faces three key challenges in stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq: The security environment and the continuing strength of the insurgency have made it difficult for the United States to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces and to engage in rebuilding efforts. 02. Inadequate performance data and measures make it difficult to determine the overall progress and impact of U.S. reconstruction efforts. 03. The U.S. reconstruction program has encountered difficulties with Iraq's ability to maintain new and rehabilitated infrastructure projects and to address maintenance needs in the water, sanitation, and electricity sectors.
67	GAO	GAO-06-428T	02/08/2006	Rebuilding Iraq: Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges	01. To discuss the challenges that the United States faces in its rebuilding and stabilization efforts 02. To discuss the challenges that the Iraqi government faces in financing future requirements.	01. Secretary of State address this issue of measuring progress and impact in the water and sanitation sector.	01. The security environment and the continuing strength of the insurgency have made it difficult for the United States to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces and progressively draw down U.S. forces. The security situation in Iraq has deteriorated since June 2003, with significant increases in attacks against Iraqi and coalition forces. In addition, the security situation has affected the cost and schedule of rebuilding efforts. The State Department has reported that security costs represent 16 to 22 percent of the overall costs of major infrastructure projects.  (Due to space constraints, some findings have been left out. To view the complete set of findings, please access the official document found on the GAO website: <a href="http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html">http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html</a> )

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	AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
68	SIGIR	04-001	06/25/2004	Coalition Provisional Authority Coordination of Donated Funds	01. Determine whether the CPA processes by which reconstruction priorities are established and approved provide adequate transparency and coordination in the allocation of donated funds to the reconstruction of Iraq.	01. We recommend the CPAs Senior Advisor coordinate with the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation to document procedures to identify and track projects to be funded from donated funds, account for donated equipment and material, and submit quarterly updates on the progress of projects financed with donated funds. 02. We also recommend the CPA Senior Advisor coordinate with the CPA Program Management Office to develop and document a Memorandum of Understanding that describes how the offices will share information on reconstruction projects.	01. No process developed for tracking or coordinating internationally funded projects w/other CPA reconstruction efforts. 02. There was little guidance provided to the Iraq Ministries on maintaining adequate supporting documentation that describe the reconstruction efforts to be funded from donated funds.
69	SIGIR	04-002	06/25/2004	Management of Personnel Assigned to the CPA in Baghdad	01. Determine whether CPA had control over and insight into the number of civilians assigned to CPA in Baghdad, including both U.S. Government and contractor personnel and whether there were lessons to be learned from CPA's management of civilian personnel in a post-war coalition environment.	None	01. CPA/HRM-Forward did not have accurate account of civilian personnel assigned to its operations. 02. Factors inhibiting accurate information A. existence of multiple entry POE into CPA Baghdad, B. failure of organizations within CPA to follow published procedures regarding in/out-processing, C. short-term nature of assignments, D. absence of interlinked civilian personnel database.
70	SIGIR	04-003	06/25/2004	Federal Deployment Center Forward Operations at the Kuwait Hilton	01. Determine whether the CPA efficiently and effectively operated FDC-Forward. Specifically, objectives were to: Determine whether FDC-Forward met the purpose for which it was established by Department of Army Execution Order 02. Established policy to limit the use of FDC-Forward facility to authorized personnel.	01. We recommend that the CPA Deputy Chief of Staff Require the Administration Contract Officer (ACO) to conduct a detailed review of contractor cost reports. 02. We recommend that the CPA Deputy Chief of Staff relocate living quarters for the Director, RSO&I from an individual room in the main hotel to a room in a villa, saving \$101,000 annually. 03. We recommend that the CPA Deputy Chief of Staff relocate the medical and equipment issue functions from the office locations in the main hotel to a room in a villa saving \$171,000 annually. 04. We recommend that the CPA Deputy Chief of Staff relocate Contractor employees supporting the CPA from individual rooms in the main hotel to rooms in a villa saving over \$2,853,000 annually. 05. We recommend that the CPA Deputy Chief of Staff relocate the FDC briefings, administrative office of the Director RSO&I, and the contractor's Material Control office from the main hotel to a room in a villa saving, at least, \$323,000 annually. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the SIGIR website: <a href="http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx">http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx</a> )	01. FDC-Forward met purpose established by DAEO. 02. No CPA policy existed for usage leading to inefficient use of CPA resources. Specifically, CPA failed to: A. Provide adequate oversight of operations to ensure cost limited to authorized users. B. established defined policy identifying persons eligible to use FDC facilities.
71	SIGIR	04-004	07/28/2004	Task Orders Awarded by AFCEE in Support of CPA (Procure)	01. Evaluate policies and procedures used by the CPA, the CPA Program Management Office (PMO), and AFCEE to award Iraqi reconstruction task orders under the AFCEE Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ) contracts. Specifically, we evaluated those policies and procedures associated with acquisition planning, source selection, use of free and open competition, and contract negotiation.	01. The CPA's successor agency with responsibility for reconstruction of Iraq should execute a Memorandum of Agreement with AFCEE to clarify the scope of projects that AFCEE is expected to support. The MOA should specify contractor requirements (such as small or minority businesses) and define mutual contract administration responsibilities. As necessary, the MOA should be updated so that it accurately reflects the business relationship between the CPA's successor and AFCEE.	01. AFCEE's role has expanded beyond the original role envisioned by DoD and the CPA which was the urgent reconstruction supporting the New Iraqi Army (\$238.6M). 02. AFCEE has awarded \$439M task orders supporting NIA and also awarded 3 T/Os (\$42M) unrelated to NIA support.
72	SIGIR	04-005	07/23/2004	Award of Sector Design-Build Construction Contracts	01. Evaluate procedures used when awarding sector contracts. Specifically, evaluated whether competitive procedures used to award contracts to rebuild Iraqi infrastructure.	None	01. Except that competition generally limited to designated countries, DoD Components used competitive procedures required by FAR to award Design-Build contracts for each sector.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
73	SIGIR 04-006	07/21/2004	Corporate Governance for Contractors Performing Iraq Reconstruction Efforts	01. Determine adequacy and effectiveness of corporate self-governance programs of contractors awarded contracts on task orders funded by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for the Defense and Reconstruction of Iraq.	None	01. Review of five major contracts reveal that viable programs exist at each of those contractors.
74	SIGIR 04-007	07/26/2004	Oil For Food Cash Controls for the Office of Project Coordination in Erbil, Iraq	01. Determine if CPA established and implemented appropriate policies and procedures for accounting, controlling, and monitoring the transfer of \$1.5B in cash to the Kurdish Regional Government as part of OFF program.	01. We recommend that the Deputy General of the Office of Project Coordination obtain, review, validate, and approve cash transfer procedures for the use of local foreign-national couriers before contracting for those types of services.	01. CPA did establish and implement appropriate policies and procedures for accounting, controlling and monitoring transfer of cash to the Kurdish Govt. 02. However, CPA did not obtain, validate, review, and approve cash transfer procedures for using foreign-national couriers to transfer cash w/in Erbil.
75	SIGIR 04-008	07/30/2004	Coalition Provisional Authority Control Over Seized and Vested Assets	01. Determine whether the CPA implemented effective safeguards to ensure accountability and control for the seized and vested assets. Specifically, our objectives were to determine whether the CPA had adequate and effective policies and procedures in place to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in the management of seized and vested funds; in the allocation, distribution, and controls of Iraqi non-cash assets; and whether all seized and vested assets were used for the benefit of the Iraqi people.	01. The Facilities Management Office review all outstanding receipts for borrowed assets and determine where the assets are located. Ensure that the personnel signed as being responsible for the assets have not redeployed and that the locations of the assets are known. 02. The Facilities Management Office provide the Ministry of Culture with hand receipts for seized assets signed out by individuals or organizations. 03. The Comptroller's office ensure seized and vested payment files contain documentation approving the use and disbursement of funds.	01. Facilities Management Office personnel did not adequately manage, secure, and safeguard non-cash assets in compliance w/CPA established policies and procedures. Inventory was not performed to determine non-cash assets in CPA custody.
76	SIGIR 04-009	07/28/2004	CPA Comptroller Cash Management Controls Over DFI	01. Determine whether CPA instituted and used appropriate policies and procedures in accounting for, handling, monitoring and controlling cash.	01. We recommend that the Director of the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, the successor to the Coalition Provisional Authority, require the Comptroller to establish adequate internal controls including: 1. Implement a single set of existing standards such as the DoD FMR to control the use of DFI. 02. Standardize the requirements for clearing the funds. 03. Establish oversight of the division level agents. 04. Provide clear guidance on CERP and R3P Fund accountability. 05. Implement consistency between guidance and agent appointment letters.	01. CPA created policies that did not establish effective funds control and accountability over \$600M in DFI funds held as cash. Specifically: Proper cash accountability was not maintained. 02. Physical security was inadequate. 03. Fund agent records were not complete. 04. Fund managers' responsibilities and liabilities were not properly assigned.
77	SIGIR 04-011	07/26/2004	Control of Materiel Assets of the CPA in Baghdad	01. Evaluate the effectiveness of policies, procedures, and property accountability measures used to account for and control materiel at CPA branch offices, headquarters, and warehouse locations.	01. We recommend the Commander, Defense Contract Management Agency, Iraq ensure an accurate property control system analysis is performed after ongoing corrective actions are completed. 01. We recommend the Commander, Defense Contract Management Agency, Iraq conduct a thorough review of Coalition Provisional Authority property in Baghdad, Iraq to locate the missing property. Upon completion of the review, the Defense Contract Management Agency should seek to recover the cost of missing equipment from the responsible personnel. Further, the Defense Contract Management Agency should initiate appropriate recovery actions from Kellogg Brown & Root, if it failed to fulfill its contractual obligations.	01. Inadequate / missing property accounting procedures in place. Specifically, KBR could not account for 34% of property items surveyed. Furthermore 6.9% of property items on hand were not recorded on hand receipts and 28.8% hand receipts were either not on file or had not been prepared. 02. KBR did not effectively manage government property as it did not properly control CPA property items and its property records were not sufficiently accurate or available to account for CPA equipment items. 03. Project that property valued at more than \$18.6M was not accurately accounted for.

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78	SIGIR	04-013	07/27/2004	Coalition Provisional Authority's Contracting Processes Leading Up To and Including Contract Award	01. Evaluate the procedures used by the CPA Contracting Activity to award contracts. Specifically, evaluate policies and procedures associated with acquisition planning, source selection, use of competition, and contract negotiations.	01. We recommended the Head of Contracting Activity request the Defense Contract Audit Agency perform a post-award audit of contract DABV01-03-C-0015, the National Currency Exchange Program.	01. Contract files were missing and/or incomplete. 02. Contract officers did not always ensure that contract prices were fair and reasonable, contractors were capable of meeting delivery schedules, and payments were made in accordance with contract requirements. CPA Contracting Activity did not issue standard operating procedures or develop an effective contract review, tracking, and monitoring system. 03. CPA not able to accurately report number of contracts actually awarded and inability to demonstrate the transparency required of the CPA when it awarded contracts using DFI funds.
79	SIGIR	05-001	10/22/2004	CPA Control of Appropriated Funds	01. Examine whether processes used to identify, review, and validate requirements were reasonable and supportable.	None	01. CPA had adequate controls to identify, review, and validate the proposed uses of appropriated funds for its operational requirements and that those funds were approved for the purposes intended.
80	SIGIR	05-002	10/25/2004	Final Accountability and Control of Materiel Assets of the CPA Kuwait	01. Evaluate the effectiveness of policies, procedures, and property accountability measures used to account for and control materiel at CPA branch offices, headquarters, and warehouse locations.	01. We recommend the Commander, Defense Contract Management Agency, Iraq: Reevaluate the Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., Logistics Civil Augmentation Program III property control system to determine that procedures exist to ensure the accuracy and effectiveness of the system and have been properly implemented. If not, identify corrective actions to be taken by Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., and suspend approval of the system until those corrective actions have been implemented. 02. We recommend the Commander, Defense Contract Management Agency, Iraq: Ensure an accurate property control system analysis is performed after ongoing corrective actions are completed. 03. We recommend the Commander, Defense Contract Management Agency, Iraq: Conduct a thorough review of Coalition Provisional Authority property in Kuwait and Iraq to locate the unaccounted for or missing property. Upon completion of the review, the Defense Contract Management Agency should seek to recover the cost of missing equipment from the responsible personnel. Further, the Defense Contract Management Agency should initiate appropriate recovery actions from Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., if it failed to fulfill its contractual obligations.	01. IG projected that KBR could not account for 42.8% of property items valued at more than \$3.7M. Cause: KBR did not effectively manage government property. Specifically, KBR did not properly control CPA property items. KBR records were not sufficiently accurate or available. As a result, we projected that property valued at more than \$1.1 million was not accurately accounted for or was missing.
81	SIGIR	05-003	11/23/2004	Final Memo Report-Task Order 0044	01. Determine whether CPA management efficiently and effectively managed the LOGCAP III contract to provide for logistics and life support for personnel assigned to the CPA mission.	None	01. The ACO did not receive sufficient or reliable cost information to effectively manage TO 0044 02. The lack of certified billing or cost and schedule reporting systems hampered the ACO from effectively monitoring contract costs. 03. Due to the lack of contractor provided detailed cost information to support actual expenses incurred, resource managers were unable to accurately forecast funding requirements to complete TO 0044.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
82	SIGIR	05-004	01/30/2005	Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the NBP	01. Determine whether the CPA established and implemented adequate managerial, financial, and contractual controls over DFI disbursements provided to interim Iraqi ministries through the national budget process.	01. The CPA provided less than adequate controls for approximately \$8.8 billion in DFI funds provided to Iraqi ministries through the national budget process. Specifically, the CPA did not establish or implement sufficient managerial, financial, and contractual controls to ensure DFI funds were used in a transparent manner. Consequently, there was no assurance the funds were used for the purposes mandated by Resolution 1483.
83	SIGIR	05-005	04/20/2005	Compliance with Contract No. W91150-04-C-0003 Awarded to Aegis Defence Services Limited	01. Determine whether the contractor is complying with the terms of the contract. Specifically, determine whether the contractor is providing adequate services, valid documentation, and proper invoices as required in the contract.	01. Aegis did not fully comply with all requirements in five areas of the contract. Specifically, Aegis did not provide sufficient documentation to show that all of its employees who were issued weapons were qualified to use those weapons or that its Iraqi employees were properly vetted to ensure they did not pose an internal security threat. 02. Also, Aegis was not fully performing several specific responsibilities required by the contract in the areas of personal security detail qualifications, regional operations centers, and security escorts and movement control. 03. Further, we identified deficiencies in the monitoring of the contract by the Project and Contracting Office (PCO).
84	SIGIR	05-006	04/30/2005	Control of Cash Provided to South Central Iraq	01. Determine whether disbursing officers in selected locations in southern Iraq complied with applicable guidance and properly controlled and accounted for DFI cash assets and expenditures.	01. The DFI Account Manager's office did not maintain full control and accountability for approximately \$119.9 million of DFI cash issued to South-Central Region paying agents in support of RRRP projects. 02. South-Central Region paying agents and the DFI Account Manager cannot properly account for or support \$96.6 million in cash and receipts.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS	
85	SIGIR	05-007	04/30/2005	Administration of IRRF Contract Files	01. Evaluate whether contracts awarded by the PCO for Iraq relief and reconstruction efforts contain adequately prepared statements of work, clearly negotiated contract terms, and specific contract deliverables.	01. We recommend that the Commander, Joint Contracting Command - Iraq, or Director, Project and Contracting Office, respectively: Ensure that hardcopy and electronic contract files are properly maintained to attain availability, completeness, consistency, and reliability of the files. 02. Develop and implement transitional operating procedures to ensure the efficient transition of contract files between departing and successor contracting officers. 03. Establish a public email account to enable multiple contracting officers to electronically access contract solicitation information. 04. Ensure that a reliable network server provides access to electronically filed contract documentation, and for transmitting and receiving email communications. 05. Implement the Standard Procurement System for automated contract administration capability. 06. Prepare administrative contract modifications to correct duplicate contract award numbers. 07. Verify and correct all instances of deficiencies detected as a result of the audit paying specific attention to database errors such as the identification of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund and non-Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund funded contracts.	01. The 37 contracts and associated contract files reviewed at PCO CA, valued at more than \$184 million, were not being adequately maintained to fully support transactions relating to the performance of contract administration processes. 02. Further, the PCO CA could not produce 21 percent, or 10 of the 48 randomly selected contract files for review.
86	SIGIR	05-008	04/30/2005	Administration of Contracts Funded by the Development Fund for Iraq	01. Determine whether the PCO complied with the Minister of Finance, Iraqi Interim Government, memorandum, Administration of Development Fund for Iraq (DFI)-Funded Contracts, June 15, 2004. Specifically, determine whether the Director, PCO, effectively implemented the assigned responsibilities under the Memorandum to monitor and confirm contract performance, certify and/or make payments, and administer contracts or grants funded with monies from the DFI.	01. We recommend that the Chief of Mission of the United States Embassy Baghdad and Commander, Multi-National Force - Iraq: Define and assign the Project and Contracting Office and Joint Area Support Group-Central Comptroller roles, responsibilities, and methods to effectively manage and accurately determine the current value of obligations, payments, and unpaid obligations for Development Fund for Iraq contracts. 02. Direct the assessment of comptroller and financial management tasks to determine if existing functions could incorporate or support management responsibilities for the Development Fund for Iraq. At a minimum, establish government or contractor positions to perform accounts payable tasks for Development Fund for Iraq funds to include maintaining a history of individual payments and current contract balances by individual contract. 03. Provide the Project and Contracting Office and the Joint Area Support Group-Central Comptroller with automated accounting and contracting systems to maintain accounting, disbursing, and contract records for the Development Fund for Iraq. A centralized database or system should be acquired and used to assemble and maintain accurate and reliable historical records. 04. We recommend that The Director, Project and Contracting Office, and the Joint Area Support Group-Central Comptroller develop and coordinate standard procedures, controls, and organizational functions needed to maintain Development Fund for Iraq records, paying particular attention to the necessary controls and adequate documentation needed to effectively monitor and administer contracts funded by the Development Fund for Iraq. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the SIGIR website: <a href="http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx">http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx</a> )	01. The PCO did not fully comply with the requirements described in the memorandum from the Iraqi Interim Government Minister of Finance to the Director, PMO, to monitor DFI contract administration. 02. The PCO and the JASG-C Comptroller could not accurately identify the current value of obligations, payments, and unpaid obligations for DFI contracts. However, cash payments appeared to be made in a timely manner. 03. Additionally, the PCO lacked the necessary controls and adequate documentation to effectively perform its responsibilities to monitor and administer contracts funded by the DFI.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
87	SIGIR	05-009	07/08/2005	Reconciliation of Reporting Differences of the Source of Funds Used on Contracts After June 28, 2004 (Memo)	01. The overall objective of this audit was to determine whether contracts awarded after June 28, 2004, and identified as funded by the DFI, were actually funded by the DFI or were instead funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). 02. A secondary objective was to report to the fund managers the necessary actions that may be needed to correct the obligation amounts, the current data files, and other actions as appropriate.	None  01. We concluded that the 48 contracts reviewed disclosed no instances of incorrect obligations of DFI funds. In 39 contracts, the obligations of DFI occurred before June 28, 2004. Obligations for the remaining 9 contracts did not cite DFI funds but rather U.S. funds appropriated by the Congress. The obligation documents for the 6 contracts identified as the Multi-National Corps-Iraq cited Commanders' Emergency Response Program funds and the other 3 contracts cited the IRRF as the source of the funding 02. We also concluded that the JCC-I current contract data files were not accurate and not adequately supported. Our review showed that 48 of the 69 contracts contained data entry errors in documenting the date of the contract award or the source of the funding. 03. There were 21 contracts that could not be located.
88	SIGIR	05-010	07/26/2005	Interim Briefing to the Project and Contracting Office - Iraq and the Joint Contracting Command - Iraq on the Audit of the Award Fee Process	01. Our over-arching objective is to determine whether award fees are adequately reviewed, properly approved, and awarded according to established standards.	01. The PCO-I and the JCC-I have been proactive in implementing corrective actions. 02. Opportunity to leverage award fee pool by applying an alternate methodology (e.g. Cubic scale) to determine award fees. That encourages contractors to demonstrate quality efforts toward accomplishing the tasks and functions cited in the contract to reward performance excellence 03. Document appointments in the contract files made for the AFEB Chairperson, the AFEB board members, and performance monitors. 04. Comply with the award fee plan to ensure that: - monthly assessments are performed - self-assessments are obtained from the contractors, where required - meetings with the contractors to discuss the monthly evaluations are documented 05. Centralize all award fee documentation.  01. Evaluation criteria was subjective with few metrics being used. Defined metrics would include specified time periods, acceptable error rates, etc. 02. The effect of stated evaluation criteria without established definable metrics could result in over-inflated contractor performance evaluations.
89	SIGIR	05-011	07/26/2005	Cost-to-Complete Estimates and Financial Reporting for the Management of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund	01. The specific objective of this first audit in this series was to determine whether those information systems and the data contained in those systems used by the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office and the Project and Contracting Office to monitor Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund projects were adequately reliable and sufficiently coordinated among those organizations to ensure the accurate, complete, and timely reporting to senior government officials and the Congress on the use of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund funds.	01. We recommend that the Director, Project and Contracting Office: a. Complete the integration of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System database with the Project and Contracting Office Oracle Project Accounting interface. b. Finalize and update, on a project-by-project basis, the current and best estimate of costs required to complete each project. 02. We recommend that the Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office require that current and best estimate for cost-to-complete information be provided for inclusion in the Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the SIGIR website: <a href="http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx">http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx</a> )  01. The Section 2207 Report for April 2005, compiled by the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, did not meet the congressionally mandated requirement to include estimates, on a project-by-project basis, of the costs required to complete each project. 02. The accuracy of the \$7.9 billion of Department of Defense obligations reported on the Secretary of the Army Report issued March 27, 2005, could not be verified.
90	SIGIR	05-012	07/22/2005	Policies and Procedures Used for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Project Management - Construction Quality Assurance	01. The objective of this audit was to identify the policies, procedures, and internal controls established by U.S. government organizations for monitoring and reviewing Iraq reconstruction projects.	None  01. The Project and Contracting Office and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the two major organizations involved in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund projects, have issued written policies and procedures for establishing and managing construction quality management programs for reconstruction projects funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund.

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91	SIGIR	05-013	09/09/2005	Controls over Equipment Acquired by Security Contractors	01. The objective of this audit was to determine whether controls over equipment acquired by security contractors were established, implemented, and are effective. Specifically, we proposed to examine selected contracts to determine whether requirements for the acquisition of equipment were valid, adequately supported, properly approved, and the equipment was accounted for and safeguarded. During the course of our audit, we narrowed the scope of the audit to focus on property accountability.	None	01. We determined that the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) had established contract procedures regarding government property in July 2004. 02. Additionally, we determined that the JCC-IA government property administrator reinforced the need for the application of these procedures in letters to contracting chiefs in September 2004.
92	SIGIR	05-014	10/13/2005	Management of Commander's Emergency Response Program for Fiscal Year 2004	01. The overall objective of this audit was to evaluate the adequacy of controls over Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. Specifically, SIGIR sought to determine whether: 1. Fund allocation procedures were adequate 2. Funds were used for intended purposes 3. Financial records were accurately maintained and supported.	None	01. SIGIR concluded that, while CERP-appropriated funds were properly used for their intended purposes, overall controls over CERP processes required improvement. Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and Department of Defense (DoD) controls over the distribution of appropriated funds were not consistently followed, and the required tracking documents were not consistently used to ensure accountability of projects.
93	SIGIR	05-015	10/25/2005	Management of Rapid Regional Response Program Grants in South-Central Iraq	01. The overall audit objective was to determine whether disbursing officers in selected locations in southern Iraq complied with applicable guidance and properly controlled and accounted for Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) cash assets and expenditures.	01. We recommend that the United States Ambassador to Iraq determine the party responsible for collecting the overpaid grant amounts and direct the responsible individual to take action to seek reimbursement for the overpaid grant amounts. 02. We recommend that the Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, ensure proper authorization and oversight of the grant approval and administrative processes for all existing and future grants. 03. We recommend that the Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan require contracting officers, for all existing and future grants: a. Follow the Department of Defense 3210.6-R, Grants and Agreements, for the award and administration of grants b. Require grant recipients to provide receipts for all expenditures c. Require monthly reports from the grant recipients detailing expenditures and achievements d. Ensure regular site-visits to the grant recipient location e. Require reports at the end of the grant to assess the performance of the grantee and to document the outcome of the grant in relation to the grant goals. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the SIGIR website: <a href="http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx">http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx</a> )	01. SIGIR found that South-Central Region personnel, under the direction of the CPA, did not effectively manage 74 grants awarded through the Rapid Regional Response Program (R3P) amounting to \$20.8 million. 02. SIGIR could not determine how grant recipients actually used the cash that South-Central Region distributed through the R3P. 03. Based on the documentation examined during the review, SIGIR concluded that the South-Central Region failed to manage its R3P grant program.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
94	SIGIR	05-016	10/26/2005	Management of the Contracts and Grants Used To Construct and Operate the Babylon Police Academy	<p>01. The overall audit objective was to determine whether disbursing officers in selected locations in southern Iraq complied with applicable guidance and properly controlled and accounted for DFI cash assets and expenditures.</p> <p>01. We recommend that the Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, ensure that established policies and procedures for authorizing, awarding, and consolidating contracts and grants are effectively implemented and followed and that complete files to support transactions made for contracts and grants are maintained.</p> <p>02. We recommend that the Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan: a. Ensure that established policies and procedures for awarding, and consolidating contracts and grants are effectively implemented and followed. b. Ensure that established policies and procedures for monitoring contract and grant performance are effectively implemented and followed. c. Ensure that purchased equipment is delivered and construction is completed. d. Maintain complete files to support transactions made for contracts and grants.</p> <p>03. We recommend that the Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central, ensure that established policies and procedures for disbursing funds obtained through the Development Fund for Iraq for contracts and grants are effectively implemented and followed, that funds are disbursed for intended purposes, and that complete files to support transactions made for contracts and grants are maintained.</p>	<p>01. South-Central Region personnel, under the direction of CPA, did not comply with applicable guidance and did not properly manage approximately \$7.3 million of R3P funds.</p>
95	SIGIR	05-017	10/25/2005	Award Fee Process for Contractors Involved in Iraq Reconstruction	<p>01. The objective of this audit was to determine whether award fees provided to contractors performing IRRF-funded projects are adequately reviewed, properly approved, sufficiently substantiated, and awarded according to established standards.</p> <p>01. We recommend that the Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command - Iraq/Afghanistan: Ensure that the appointments of the members of the Award Fee Evaluation Board, specifically the Chairperson of the board, the board members (both voting and non-voting), and the contract performance monitors are documented.</p> <p>02. Continue to revise award fee plans to more clearly identify the specific award fee evaluation criteria for assessing contractor performance by providing clearer metrics and more quantifiable criteria that permit better performance evaluations.</p> <p>03. Continue to review and modify the current contracts to utilize a method of applying the award fee to provide additional incentive for contractors to achieve quality results.</p> <p>04. Ensure that the Award Fee Determination Officer's and the Award Fee Evaluation Board's recommendations and determinations are fully documented as to their rationale.</p>	<p>01. After reviewing the award fee files, SIGIR found that the Award Fee Evaluation Board recommendations and determinations of fees were not documented in sufficient detail to show that the integrity of the award fee determination process had been maintained. Thus, the documentation SIGIR reviewed in contract files was insufficient to substantiate the award fees that were approved.</p>
96	SIGIR	05-018	10/21/2005	Acquisition of Armored Vehicles Purchased Through Contract W914NS-05-M-1189	<p>01. Determine whether adequate procurement practices were used to acquire armored vehicles.</p> <p>02. Determine whether the government received appropriate value for the money spent.</p> <p>01. We recommend that the Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq: Ensure that requirements are appropriately and accurately defined to procurement officers, including the technical specifications, during the acquisition process.</p> <p>02. Obtain an independent inspection of the condition of the vehicles to determine whether those vehicles are non-conforming to the contract's terms and specifications.</p> <p>3. Obtain legal advice to determine what actions are available should the vehicles be found to be non-conforming to the contract's terms and specifications.</p> <p>04. Locate the missing vehicle and have it inspected for conformance to the contract's terms and specifications.</p>	<p>01. SIGIR concluded that MNSTC-I purchased seven armored Mercedes-Benz vehicles that did not have the required level of armored protection.</p> <p>02. In addition, MNSTC-I could not locate one of the vehicles after delivery was made. Thus SIGIR concluded that MNSTC-I may have paid \$945,000 for armored vehicles that will not meet the purpose intended and may not be available for use.</p>

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS	
97	SIGIR	05-019	09/30/2005	Attestation Engagement Report Concerning the Award of Non Competitive Contract DACA63-03-D-0005 to Kellogg, Brown and Root Services, Inc.	<p>01. The overall objectives of this attestation engagement were to determine whether adequate documentation existed that: A non-competitive contract was justified;</p> <p>02. A fair and reasonable price was obtained;</p> <p>03. The contracting official had the authority to enter into a non-competitive contract;</p> <p>04. Goods and services received and paid for under the contract were the goods and services provided for in the contract; and</p> <p>05. The total amount of disbursements under the contract did not exceed the total contract amount.</p>	None	<p>01. The non-competitive award of contract number DACA63-03-D-0005 to Brown, and Root Services, a division of Kellogg, Brown and Root, was properly justified.</p> <p>02. The contract is a cost-plus award-fee (CPAF) indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract. Final determination of fair and reasonable price is not made until the final incurred cost audit by the Defense Contract Audit Agency.</p> <p>03. The only individual authorized by United States Code, Title 41, Section 253 to approve non-competitive contracting actions in excess of \$50 million is the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology). The Justification and Approval for the contract was signed by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology).</p> <p>04. The goods and services received and paid for with DFI funds under the contract were the goods and services provided for in the contract.</p> <p>05. The total amount of DFI fund disbursements under the contract did not exceed the total amount obligated for the contract.</p>
98	SIGIR	05-020	10/26/2005	Management of the Contracts, Grant, and Micropurchases Used To Rehabilitate the Karbala Library	<p>01. The overall audit objective was to determine whether disbursing officers in selected locations in southern Iraq complied with applicable guidance and properly controlled and accounted for DFI cash assets and expenditures.</p>	<p>01. We recommend that the United States Ambassador to Iraq recover specifically the \$154,000 in rescinded grant funds remaining on deposit, any other funds related to the rescinded grant, and funds that exceeded the contracted amount and return the recovered funds to the Iraqi government.</p> <p>02. We recommend that the Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, ensure that established policies and procedures for authorizing, awarding, and consolidating contracts and grants are effectively implemented and followed and that complete files to support transactions made for contracts and grants are maintained.</p> <p>03. We recommend that the Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command- Iraq/Afghanistan: a. Ensure that established policies and procedures for awarding and consolidating contracts and grants are effectively implemented and followed. b. Ensure that established policies and procedures for monitoring contract and grant performance are effectively implemented and followed. c. Ensure that repairs were completed, purchased equipment and services were delivered, and work was performed. d. Maintain complete files to support transactions made for contracts and grants.</p> <p>4. We recommend that the Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central, ensure that established policies and procedures for disbursing funds obtained through the Development Fund for Iraq for contracts and grants are effectively implemented and followed, that funds are disbursed for intended purposes, and that complete files to support transactions made for contracts and grants are maintained.</p>	<p>01. South-Central Region personnel, under the direction of the CPA, did not comply with applicable guidance and did not properly manage R3P funds provided through 5 contracts, 1 grant, and 33 micro-purchase contracts used to rehabilitate the Library.</p>

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
99	SIGIR	05-021	10/24/2005	Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs -- Cost-to-Complete Estimate Reporting	01. The objective of this audit was to determine the adequacy of procedures and processes used to estimate and report the costs to complete for projects funded with IRRF funds.	01. IIRMO has made important progress in securing improved reporting on cost-to-complete data and has an action plan in place to provide such data on a continuing basis.
100	SIGIR	05-022	10/24/2005	Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs	01. Did the U.S. organizations responsible for managing the IRRF establish adequate plans and programs for the transition and sustainment of construction and non-construction projects? 02. Did these organizations establish the budgets, funding sources, and detailed transitional guidelines necessary to ensure that adequate training, materials, and supplies are provided to the Iraqi government and its citizens to enable them to perform operations and maintenance on construction and non-construction projects placed under their control?	01. SIGIR found that IIRMO has made progress in identifying and addressing the challenges of sustaining IRRF projects, which directly affects the larger challenge of sustaining a democratic and viable government in Iraq. 02. There is a growing recognition that the Iraqi government is not yet ready to take over the management and funding of the infrastructure developed through IRRF projects. 03. In addition, U.S. funding for sustainment is limited, and the amounts budgeted by the Iraqi government do not appear to be sufficient to ensure sustainment of completed reconstruction projects. (Due to space constraints, some findings have been left out. To view the complete set of findings, please access the official document found on the SIGIR website: <a href="http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx">http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx</a> )
101	SIGIR	SIGIR-05-023	Audit of the U. S. Reconstruction Gap in Iraq	01. The overall objective of this audit is to determine: How were the plans and expectations for the IRRF carried out? 02. How effective were the U.S. government agencies in carrying out those plans and meeting the expectations? 03. SIGIR will also attempt to identify any causes that diverted execution of those plans and what the U.S. government did in response.	01. We recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq recover specifically the \$571,823 that was overpaid on 11 contracts; 02. We recommend that the Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command - Iraq/Afghanistan establish adequate and required documentation to record the receipt and disposal of all purchased property; 03. We recommend that the Commander, Joint Area Support Group - Central, require paying agents to obtain proper contract approval documentation prior to making disbursements.	01. South-Central Region personnel, under the direction of Coalition Provisional Authority, did not effectively manage 907 contracts and 1212 micro-purchase contracts awarded through the Rapid Regional Response Program in the amount of \$88.1 million; 02. 4 projects, using 20 contracts (2.2%) and several contract modifications, totaling approximately \$9.1 million, appeared to have had the requirements split to keep the contract awards under the \$500,000 approval threshold to circumvent the required reviews; 03. 158 contracts (17.4%) totaling approximately \$16.3 million, were either not competitively awarded or lacked documentation that showed a competitive process had taken place and 26 contract files (3%), totaling approximately \$2.6 million, did not contain a signed contract; 04. 11 contracts (1.2%), totaling more than \$5.6 million, were issued without proper authorization and 38 contracts (4.2%), totaling approximately \$7 million, were awarded after the transfer of responsibility for the Development Fund for Iraq to the Iraqi government on June 28, 2004.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
102	SIGIR-05-024	01/23/2006	Management of the Mansuria Electrical Reconstruction Project	01. To evaluate the effectiveness of project management and the monitoring and controls exercised by administrative contracting officers. 02. To assess the management control over the project by USAID and the IRMO.		01. The Mansuria Project resulted from the February 2004 task order, issued by the CPA-PMO, in response to a request by the Iraq Ministry of Electricity. The task order directed USAID to proceed with development and construction of electrical generation facilities in the area of Baghdad, Iraq. The approved estimated direct cost of the resulting Mansuria Project job order was \$381.3 million. The project was subsequently cancelled with the final job order direct costs currently estimated to be \$62.7 million as of December 22, 2005.
103	SIGIR-05-025	01/23/2006	Management of the Commander's Emergency Response Program for Fiscal Year 2005	01. Implemented controls to effectively manage FY 2005 CERP projects, funds, and records 02. Effectively coordinated CERP projects where appropriate, with DoS and USAID to optimize available resources for the sustainment of projects and the reconstruction of Iraq	01. Conduct a thorough examination of all FY 2005 CERP funds and projects to account for project status reporting errors. In addition, if it is determined that funds were inappropriately obligated against the FY 2005 appropriation, MNF-I should initiate a de-obligation from FY2005 funds and re-obligate projects with the appropriate funds. 02. Conduct a quarterly review of the CERP to ensure the data contained within its project tracking tool is valid and is as consistent as possible with the data for project obligations in Army financial systems. 03. Clarify and enforce existing guidance on the collection of required project records. MNF-I should conduct quarterly review of project records to improve the management of project files. MNF-I should also consider developing a plan to provide training for all current and future MNF-I units on project documentation requirements and how to maintain and store these records. 04. Formalize the process of coordinating CERP projects with the DoS and the USAID where the CERP is used in conjunction with other reconstruction programs, particularly those projects that are of strategic importance. 05. Coordinate plans and funding for the sustainment of large CERP construction projects; and projects that have strategic value with the DoS.	01. MNF-I utilized several processes to improve the management of the CERP in FY 2005. Specifically, MNF-I: a. Implemented three processes within its chain of command to effectively align CERP projects with the strategic objectives of its Campaign Plan b. Required all subordinate units to report the status of projects and funds twice a month to MNC-I, and for MNC-I to consolidate these reports and provide them to MNF-I c. Centralized the collection and management of project records at MNC-I, and required the MSCs to turn in their records for completed projects at the end of each month 02. MNF-I's actions to effectively coordinate CERP projects with DoS and USAID varied in FY 2005. The primary methods of coordinating the CERP with DoS and USAID took place in the weekly Coordinated Embassy Reconstruction Team meeting in the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
104	SIGIR-05-026	01/27/2006	Fact Sheet on the Use of the \$50 Million Appropriation to Support the Management and Reporting of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund	01. To determine whether the \$50 million appropriated by Congress was used appropriately and in an efficient and effective manner.		01. \$50 million was initially apportioned by the OMB to DoD as Operating Expenses of the Coalition Provisional Authority 02. The Department of the Army obligated \$26.2 million in FY 04 under the sub-account Reporting and made disbursements of \$9.2 million in FY 2004 and \$9.7 million in FY 2005, with the remaining \$7.3 million remaining obligated for additional disbursements under the Reporting sub-account requirement. (Due to space constraints, some findings have been left out. To view the complete set of findings, please access the official document found on the SIGIR website: <a href="http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx">http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx</a> )

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
105	SIGIR-05-027	01/27/2006	Methodologies For Reporting Cost-To-Complete Estimates	01. To determine the adequacy of methodologies used to estimate and report the costs to complete for projects funded with IRRF.	01. Director, IRMO, required to take the following actions: a. Formalize its cost-to-complete action plan by issuing a formal policy to finalize consistent procedures across all supporting IRRF organizations for the collection and compilation of the costs-to-complete information. B. In the next DoS Section 2207 Report, provide data to Congress on the adequacy of cost-to-complete methodologies in the other sectors. 02. Commanding General, Gulf Region Division, require the GRD-PCO sector management to: a. Finalize the draft of official written guidance covering the methodology, including roles and responsibilities, for generating cost-to-complete report. B. Ensure that the decision not to use computer modeling in the calculation of cost-to-complete is updated and reflected in all current and future guidance C. Develop a thorough review process to eliminate errors in the reporting spreadsheet. The review process should be written into the guidance. D. Create and maintain a permanent central file to document the calculation of estimates-at-completion (EAC) by project. The requirement to create and maintain the central file should be written into the guidance. E. Develop policies to define significant scope changes. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the SIGIR website: <a href="http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx">http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx</a> )	01. For the DoD, GRD-PCO and MNSTC-I, as well as the USAID failed to estimate and report reliable and transparent cost-to-complete information for IRRF projects - F&T sector. MNSTC-I did not submit a report for the September 30, 2005, PAR, and GRD-PCO and USAID submitted reports with errors that were significant enough to undermine users' confidence in the reporting.
106	SIGIR-05-028	01/24/2006	GRD-PCO Management Of The Transfer Of IRRF-Funded Assets To The Iraqi Government	01. The overall objective of this audit was to determine whether the U.S. government organization responsible for managing IRRF projects have developed and approved policies and procedures for transferring the of dollars worth of assets purchased, renovated and constructed with IRRF funds to the Government of Iraq and its citizens.	01. We recommend that the Commanding General, Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers direct the GRD-PCO, in coordination with the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, to complete the development of a common policy and process facilitating the transfer of completed project assets to the Government of Iraq.	01. Effective asset recognition and transfer requires that assets be properly accepted by the U.S. government, accounted for, and then formally transferred to the Government of Iraq. PCO-GRD officials told us they are in the process of developing, in coordination with the IRMO and others, a common process and policy facilitating the transfer of assets to the Government of Iraq and estimate that these policies and plans will be completed by March 31, 2006, contingent upon the Government of Iraq's participation and concurrence.
107	SIGIR-05-029	01/26/2006	Challenges Faced In Carrying Out Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund Activities	01. Determine the effectiveness of U.S. agencies in carrying out plans for Iraq reconstruction activities 02. Identify the reasons, if any, for changes in plans.	None	01. Challenges in Implementing the IRRF Program: 1) Security costs have been higher than anticipated, 2) Strategy changes have had a large impact on Iraq plans, 3) The need for large-scale sustainment activities was not foreseen, 4) Some IRRF administrative expenses were not considered in initial plans, 5) Initial plans were imprecise. 02. Measures for Determining Project Impact: 1) Significant funding change means that many of the originally planned projects will not be completed. 2) Lack of detailed and accurate baseline data on the actual status of the sectors prior to the start of reconstruction activity.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
108	SIGIR-06-002	02/03/2006	Prompt Payment Act: Analysis Of Expenditures Made From The Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund	01. The objective of this audit was to determine whether expenditures by U.S. government organizations responsible for the management of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund were made in compliance with the Prompt Payment Act and other applicable policies and regulations.	01. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) identify and monitor interest penalty payments from Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund to ensure that Army organizations managing Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund funds consistently meet established Army goals.	01. During fiscal year 2005, approximately \$1.4 million in interest penalty payments were made by the Army against IRRF disbursements of about \$5.275 billion made by DoD organizations because of late payment of contractor invoices 02. Army managers did not place sufficient emphasis on the identification and resolution of problems associated with high interest penalty payments; particularly the late receipt of required supporting documentation for the payment of invoices provided by the PCO-GRD, a subordinate command of the USACE, or certain vendors 03. Interest penalties paid to contractors from the IRRF appropriation reduced, dollar-for-dollar, the availability of funds appropriated for the reconstruction of Iraq and for the benefit of the Iraqi people.
109	Treasury OIG	03/23/2006	Review of Treasury Activities for Iraq Reconstruction	01. Identify Treasury activities and funding involving Iraq relief and reconstruction. 02. Determine the completeness and accuracy of the information provided by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in its reports to SIGIR regarding its activities for Iraq reconstruction.	01. Treasury provides technical assistance and support to modernize the Iraqi banking system. 02. The financial information provided by Treasury to SIGIR fairly presented the fund-use status of the reconstruction activities: Treasury obligated \$32.9 million out of \$35.1 million apportioned to the reconstruction programs, and disbursed \$26.3 million as of February 28, 2006.	01. Treasury provides technical assistance and support to modernize the Iraqi banking system. 02. The financial information provided by Treasury to SIGIR fairly presented the fund-use status of the reconstruction activities: Treasury obligated \$32.9 million out of \$35.1 million apportioned to the reconstruction programs, and disbursed \$26.3 million as of February 28, 2006.
110	USAAA	A-2004-0305-FFG	05/18/2004	Time Sensitive Report, Audit of Vested and Seized Assets, Operation Iraqi Freedom	01. Audit concerning accountability over non-cash assets. Specifically: Were adequate procedures and controls in place and operating to properly secure and account for vested and seized assets in a manner consistent with appropriated fund accounting. 02. Did adequate audit trails exist to support on hand balance of vested and seized asset account.	01. Serious problems exist with accountability and security of non-cash seized assets: CPA did not maintain adequate controls to ensure accountability. 02. DoD guidance regarding accountability of seized assets not followed.
111	USAAA	A-2004-0438-ANVL	08/12/2004	Definitization of Task Orders for LOGCAP	01. Evaluate overall management of contracts under LOGCAP. Specifically, evaluate timeliness of definitization of task orders under LOGCAP.	01. Concluded definitization of TOs for Contract Number DAAA09-02-D-0007 was not timely. 02. Establishment of the definitization office greatly improved the controls. 03. However, the process of the contractor submitting the cost proposals needed to be improved.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS	
112	USAAA	A-2005-0043-ALE	11/24/2004	LOGCAP Kuwait	<p>01. To evaluate the overall management of the LOGCAP contract.</p> <p>02. To evaluate the procedures in place to control costs under LOGCAP contracts.</p> <p>03. To evaluate the management of assets used in conjunction with LOGCAP contracts—assets contractors acquired and assets the government provided to contractors.</p>	<p>01. Have the program management office issue instructions for performance-based statements of work to the LOGCAP Support Unit in Southwest Asia. Make sure the instructions include specific guidance for preparing performance requirement summaries and performance assessment plans. Also, determine how Defense Contract Management Agency is developing its performance assessment plans to make sure customer requirements are satisfied.</p> <p>02. Direct the Program Management Office and the procuring contracting officer to reinforce the reporting requirements on each subsequent statement of work and to review and use the reports as intended.</p> <p>03. Delegate administrative contract authority to Defense Contract Management Agency with the contractor's notice to proceed, as appropriate at the time of the task order award.</p> <p>04. Develop goals and objectives as well as standing operating procedures that identify roles and responsibilities and provide meaningful instructions for contingency operations.</p> <p>(Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the USAAA website: <a href="http://www.hqda.army.mil/aaaweb/">http://www.hqda.army.mil/aaaweb/</a>)</p>	<p>01. The contract for LOGCAP needed better management.</p> <p>02. Controls over contract costs needed improvement during task order planning. Costs could have been reduced by at least \$40M</p> <p>03. The Army didn't fully account for more than \$77 million worth of government-furnished property used in conjunction with the contract.</p>
113	USAAA	A-2005-0078-FFG	03/02/2005	Coalition Provisional Authority Travel Procedures	<p>01. Were appropriate management controls over the travel process from order generation to voucher settlement in place and operating.</p> <p>02. Were fund control procedures adequate to ensure obligations were complete and accurate, and disbursements were made in a timely manner to clear unliquidated obligations</p> <p>03. Did the plan to transition the travel functions of the CPA Representative to other agencies on June 30, 2004 provide sufficient detail and coverage to minimize any disruption in support to CPA personnel and to close out open actions.</p>	None	<p>01. Management controls not always in place/operating.</p> <p>02. Identified 3 control weaknesses related to travel voucher processing.</p> <p>03. Fund control procedures not adequate to ensure complete and accurate accounting records for obligations and disbursements. Accounting records were incomplete / contained errors.</p> <p>04. Transition plan was prepared and in sufficient detail.</p>
114	USAAA	A-2005-0095-FFG	02/16/2005	Vested & Seized Assets, Operation Iraqi Freedom	<p>01. Were adequate procedures and controls in place and operating to properly secure and account for vested and seized assets.</p> <p>02. Did adequate audit trails exist to support the onhand balance of the vested and seized asset accounts.</p>	<p>01. Incorporate the 31 July 2003 memorandum on procedures for vested and seized assets as a permanent part of the DOD Financial Management Regulation to ensure guidance will be available for future contingency operations.</p> <p>02. Develop a standing operating procedure for filing documents in theater that lists all required documents that must be retained to support disbursement transactions.</p> <p>03. Establish controls and procedures to maintain a suitable area for retaining all required supporting documentation for disbursement transactions.</p> <p>04. Make sure that all disbursement vouchers for transactions using vested and seized assets are scanned and sent to Defense Finance and Accounting Service-Rome on a daily basis.</p>	<p>01. USA did properly secure and account for seized cash and metal bars.</p> <p>02. CPA did not maintain adequate controls over non-cash belongings.</p> <p>03. Adequate audit trails did not exist.</p>

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS	
115	USAAA	A-2005-0173-ALE	05/02/2005	Commanders' Emergency Response Program and Quick Response Fund	01. Were funds for the Commanders' Emergency Response Program and Quick Response Fund received, accounted for, and reported in accordance with applicable laws and regulations? 02. Were disbursements consistent with the intent of the charter or implementing guidance?	01. We recommended that MNSTC-I: Issue command policy designating authorized approving officials for purchase requests and commitments. 02. Deobligate funding for an armor vehicle panel project, valued at \$59,000, funded through the Quick Response Fund. 03. Coordinate with the 336th Finance Brigade to reconcile disbursements monthly. 04. Establish an internal auditor position within the command group reporting directly to the commanding general. 05. Update the standing operating procedures to require the maintenance of all supporting documentation (such as purchase requests, contracts, receiving reports, and vouchers) in program project files.	01. Yes. Overall, MNSTC-I's J8 Comptroller administered funds according to applicable guidance in the form of fragmentary orders, standing operating procedures, laws, and regulations. 02. Yes. Overall, disbursements were processed consistent with funding guidance.
116	USAAA	A-2005-0194-ALA	05/26/2005	Project Management Support of Iraq Reconstruction PCO	01. The overall objective is to determine if the Army and the PCO have put controls and sound business processes in place to mitigate previously identified high-risk areas.	01. We recommended the Director, Project and Contracting Office: Make sure all DoD-managed contracts awarded with FY 04 IRRF are loaded into the Standard Procurement System and tie to the Corps' system. 02. Receive and distribute all FY 04 IRRF DOD funding. 03. Develop metrics for measuring program status by projects and sectors. 04. Monitor definitization schedule slippages and coordinate with sector program managers to identify available remedies. 05. Obtain a legal review of the linear responsibilities matrix to make sure contractor tasks aren't inherently governmental functions. 06. Obtain a legal review of the corporate affiliations of the seven support contractors and design-build contractors to determine if a conflict of interest exists. 07. Modify the award fee plans to clarify the evaluation criteria, eliminate the rollover provision, add metrics, and eliminate "good faith effort".	01. We found that the Army and the PCO have put many controls in place to mitigate previously identified high-risk areas. However, additional actions are needed to strengthen controls. 02. Although the PCO established controls for monitoring and measuring obligations, additional controls were needed to account for all DoD obligations and to measure the progress of the FY 04 IRRF program. 03. The PCO established controls to help definitize contracts in a timely manner, but those controls weren't fully effective. 04. The PCO's controls for using program management support contractors were generally effective, but additional controls were needed to reduce the risk associated with (i) contractors performing inherently governmental functions, (ii) real or perceived conflicts of interests with contractors overseeing contractors, and (iii) award fee plans.
117	USAAA	A-2005-0332-ALE	09/30/2005	Follow-up of Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) and Quick Response Fund (QRF)	01. Were funds for the Commanders' Emergency Response Program and Quick Response Fund received, accounted for, and reported in accordance with applicable laws and regulations? 02. Were projects managed, completed, and funds disbursed consistent with the charter or implementing guidance? 03. Did Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq implement the recommendations from the prior report and did the corrective actions fix the problem? 04. Did Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq implement an effective follow-up system for tracking the implementation of corrective actions until full completion?	01. We recommended that MNSTC-I: Require J-7 Engineers to review all Quick Response Fund construction projects or the reasonableness of costs before the J-8 Comptroller approves the projects. 02. Reduce three purchase requests by about \$537,000. 03. Establish proponents for management oversight over projects for both programs, review projects each month, and adjust the projects as needed. 04. Review the validity of all open projects for both programs and cancel those found to be invalid. 05. Reconcile the Developmental Fund for Iraq and the Iraqi Army Funds (Seized Assets). Report discrepancies to the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction.	01. The Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I) received, accounted for, and reported funds according to applicable laws, regulations, and guidance. Commanders' Emergency Response Program and Quick Response Fund projects met the intent of program guidance. 02. Command personnel demonstrated adequate oversight over administrative processes and processed cash disbursements properly for both programs. 03. However, MNSTC-I needed to ensure that its personnel reviewed Quick Response Fund projects for reasonableness and tracked the status of military interdepartmental purchase requests.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
118	USAAA A-2006-0046-ALA	01/31/2006	Audit of Fund Accountability for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund-2 (IRRF2)	01. Did the PCO's financial management system and processes have the controls needed to make sure commitments, obligations, and disbursements were accurately recorded? 02. Did the PCO have adequate controls in place to make sure operating costs were properly recorded?	01. Determine the status of funds distributed to other Federal activities and establish written procedures for maintaining visibility of these funds. 02. Review Accounts Payable reports and follow up on outstanding invoices and receiving reports. 03. Require the Finance Director to conduct triannual reviews in accordance with the Financial Management Regulation, and provide a signed confirmation statement. 04. Maintain documentation that fully supports operating budget line item estimates. 05. Improve and formalize the process of recording operating costs. 06. Reconcile the payroll expenses charged to the operating budget. 07. Perform monthly fund status reviews of each operating costs' budget line item and reallocate any excess funds. Reallocate the \$12.4 million in unused civilian payroll budget to the unfinanced security requirement.	01. The PCO's financial management system and processes were generally effective for ensuring the accurate recording of commitments, obligations, and disbursements. However, control weaknesses existed related to handling Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests (MIPRs) and nonconstruction contract payments, and performing fund status reviews. 02. While we found that the PCO generally had adequate controls to ensure operating costs were properly recorded, we did identify some areas needing improvement.
119	USAAA A-2006-0047-ALL	01/11/2006	Base Closure Process in the Iraq Area of Operations	01. Our audit objective for this audit report was to determine if the Corps had adequate policies and procedures in place to ensure that appropriate documentation is prepared and funding requirements are evaluated when closing forward operating bases within the Iraq area of operations.	01. Consider establishing a full-time team staffed with representatives from the appropriate Corps staff sections whose sole purpose is to monitor base closings and resolve day-to-day issues.	01. During our audit, the Corps was implementing its base closing policies and procedures. The recent closings were mainly small bases that didn't require extensive planning or funding to close. The Corps recognized that upcoming base closings would involve significantly larger bases and would require greater planning and contractor assistance. As a result, the Corps was refining already established procedures to ensure efficient closings in the future.  (Due to space constraints, some findings have been left out. To view the complete set of findings, please access the official document found on the USAAA website: <a href="http://www.hqda.army.mil/aaaavetb/">http://www.hqda.army.mil/aaaavetb/</a> )
120	USAAA A-2006-0081-ALL	03/17/2006	Unliquidated Obligations, Audit of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Operations in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom	01. The objective addressed in this report was to review obligations recorded under task order 59 of the current LOGCAP contract to determine whether any obligated funds could be deobligated and made available for other uses.	01. For the Commander, Multi-National Forces Iraq; for the Commander, Multi-National Corps Iraq; and for the Commander, U.S. Army Field Support Command: Obtain the list of all costs approved, but not yet incurred by the contractor (These costs are listed in the Estimate to Complete column of the contractor's cost report.) Conduct a coordinated review of these requirements to ensure the requirements are still valid. 02. For the Commander, U.S. Army Field Support Command: Request the Defense Contract Audit Agency to evaluate the policies, procedures, and accuracy of the contractor's biweekly cost report.	01. Based on the process used to obligate funds to fund work ordered under task order 59, we identified no funds that were available for deobligation and available for other uses. Specifically, command obligated funds for this task order incrementally on an as needed basis. As a result, the amount of funds obligated closely approximated the funds expended to date for work performed under the task order. Based on our review of available information, it appears about \$644 million will need to be obligated to complete work under this task order a significant amount of which was unknown to the Army until the contractor submitted its most recent cost report. We believe the Army needs better visibility over the contractor's current and planned expenditures. We plan to address this issue in a separate report on program management.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
121	USAAA A-2006-0090-ALE	03/31/2006	Follow-up Audit II of the Commander's Emergency Response Program and Quick Response Fund	01. To determine whether projects managed, completed, and funds disbursed were consistent with the charter or implementing guidance. 02. To determine whether the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq implement: (1) The recommendations from the prior report and did the corrective actions fix the problem; (2) An effective follow-up system for tracking the implementation of corrective actions until full completion.	01. Direct the J-8 Comptroller to review the monthly procurement logs and contact the field contracting officers when the required information isn't provided for assigned projects. Command should decommit and deobligate project funding if requirements are no longer required. 02. Request a workload study for the J-8 Comptroller's Office and field contracting officers to determine if the organization is adequately staffed to perform mission.	01. MNSTC-I, through its J-8 Comptroller managed, completed, and disbursed funding for CERP and QRF projects. Commands actions were consistent with the charter and implementing guidance for meeting the humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements of the Iraqi people and for training and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces. 02. MNSTC-I implemented the recommendations, and the corrective actions it took fixed the conditions identified in the prior report.
122	USAID-OIG A-000-04-003-P	05/19/2004	Capping Report on Audit of USAID's Compliance with Federal Regulations in Awarding the Iraq Phase I Contracts	01. Did USAID comply with federal regulations in awarding the Iraq contracts. 02. What improvements can be made to the process.	01. We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Management instruct the Office of Procurement to develop a standardized illustrative budget, including standardized line item definitions, to be used in its requests for proposals and to require the use of this standardized format in the cost proposals submitted to USAID by its offerors. 02. We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Management instruct the Office of Procurement to: (a) develop and implement a standard checklist of significant documentation and procurement steps for contracts awarded using other than full and open competition, and (b) develop a policy to maintain and update the checklist on a recurring basis.	01. Inadequate documentation of market research relating to available/qualified contractors. 02. Failure to obtain and document legal analysis regarding possible conflict of interest with contractors. 03. Failure to notify and debrief non-award bidders. 04. Failure to document mitigation of unfair competitive advantage.
123	USAID-OIG A-000-04-004-P	09/23/2004	Audit of USAID's Compliance with Federal Regulations in Awarding Iraq Basic Education Phase II Contract	01. Did USAID comply with FAR in awarding the Iraq Basic Education Phase II Contract.	None	01. For the areas reviewed, we determined that USAID complied with applicable federal regulations in awarding the Iraq Basic Education Phase II Contract.
124	USAID-OIG A-267-05-005-P	01/06/2005	Audit of USAID's Compliance with Fed. Regulations in Awarding the Contract to Kroll Security Services Inc.	01. Did USAID comply with FAR in awarding the contract for security service in Iraq.	01. We recommend that USAID's Chief Acquisition Officer issue a notice reminding all Bureau of Management, Office of Acquisition and Assistance personnel that adequate and complete documentation must be prepared and retained in all procurements when using less than full and open competition. This documentation should adequately explain the contractor selection and why multiple contractors could not or were not considered for the procurement. 02. We recommend that USAID's Chief Acquisition Officer issue a notice to all Bureau of Management, Office of Acquisition and Assistance personnel reminding them that procurements for USAID activities are subject to all federal procurement requirements. Specifically, the reminder should cover the proper preparation of letter contracts in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation along with examples of fully compliant letter contracts prepared in the past by USAID. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the USAID website: <a href="http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/">http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/</a> )	01. USAID did not adequately document use of less than full/open competition. 02. Obtained security services using letter contract that did not meet FAR requirements. 03. Incurred multiple potential funds control violations. 04. Purchased armored vehicles that did not meet USG armoring standards.
125	USAID-OIG E-266-04-001-P	03/19/2004	Audit of USAID's Results Data for Its Education Activities in Iraq	01. Has USAID accurately reported data and results for its education activities in Iraq.	01. We recommend that USAID/Iraq develop procedures to verify data included in reports prior to the issuance of the reports to ensure the data reported is accurate.	01. The data was reported inaccurately (education activities).

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
USAID-OIG	E-266-04-002-P	06/03/2004	Audit of USAID/Iraq's Infrastructure Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Program	01. Are USAID/Iraq's infrastructure and rehabilitation activities performed by Bechtel on schedule to achieve planned outputs.	01. Establish procedures ensuring that Bechtel National, Inc. submit an environmental review, and where applicable, an environmental assessment, with each request for the issuance of a job order, or that USAID/Iraq obtain a formal written determination exempting the program activities from USAID's environmental procedures, and obtain an acceptable environmental review for the existing job orders for which one is required. 02. Develop and document procedures to ensure that a job order specific plan is submitted and approved, for each job order requiring one, prior to the commencement of construction, and obtain an acceptable job order specific plan for the eight job orders for which a job order specific plan was not prepared. 03. We recommend that USAID/Iraq develop documented procedures which address the handling of charges in excess of the job order approved amount. 04. We recommend that USAID/Iraq complete and implement job order closeout procedures to close out job orders in a timely manner.	01. Mission's management controls related to infrastructure rehabilitation projects need improvements. 02. Inadequate environmental reviews prior to start of construction. 03. Job order specific plans (JOSPs) not submitted as required. 04. Completed job orders not closed.
USAID-OIG	E-266-04-003-P	08/06/2004	Audit of USAID's Compliance with Federal Regulations in Awarding Phase II Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, Program Advisors and Oversight Contracts	01. Did USAID comply with FAR in awarding Iraq Phase II Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, Program Advisors and Oversight Contracts.	None	01. For the areas reviewed, we determined that USAID complied with applicable federal regulations in awarding the Iraq Phase II Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, Program Advisors and Oversight Contract.
USAID-OIG	E-266-04-004-P	09/20/2004	Audit of USAID's Iraq's Economic Reform Program	01. Did USAID/Iraq's Economic reform program achieve intended outputs.	01. We recommend that USAID/Iraq implement USAID's documentation management procedures requiring decisions impacting on the design and status of activities to be officially documented in the activity file. 02. We recommend that, for future contracting actions under the Economic Reform Program, USAID/Iraq develop procedures to ensure that contractors furnish monthly financial reports that present a breakdown of the actual level of effort billed for the month by activity	01. Mission needs to improve record keeping procedures for documenting actions, decisions, status. 02. Mission needs to revise contractor reporting requirements.
USAID-OIG	E-267-05-001-P	01/31/2005	Audit of USAID/Iraq's Community Action Program	01. Did USAID/Iraq's Community Action Program achieve intended outputs.	01. We recommend that USAID/Iraq develop and implement a plan of action to improve the integrity of the data in the Community Action Program's Project List in order for it to be a more effective monitoring tool and a more accurate and reliable data source for reporting purposes.	01. CAP achieved intended outputs, but internal controls need to be strengthened to improve CAP monitoring and reporting processes.
USAID-OIG	E-267-05-002-P	02/28/2005	Audit of USAID/Iraq's Health System Strengthening Contract Activities	01. Did USAID/Iraq's Health System Strengthening Contract achieve intended outputs.	01. We recommend that USAID/Iraq develop written procedures covering the review and approval of contractor and Cognizant Technical Officer requests for modifications to future health sector contracts to ensure timely and efficacious disposition of these requests.	01. Activities under this contract did not achieve intended objectives. 02. Contractor did not effectively manage program to ensure activities were completed as scheduled and deliverables effectively produced. 03. Reduction in contractor's cost-ceiling prompted contractor to curtail/cancel activities. 04. Mission needs to improve process for reviewing/approving requests for contract modifications.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
131	USAID-OIG E-267-05-003-P	06/29/2005	Iraq's Electrical Generation Activities	<p>01. Are USAID/Iraq's electrical power sector projects achieving their planned outputs.</p> <p>02. Is USAID/Iraq addressing institutional capacity-building in its projects to rebuild and rehabilitate Iraq's electrical power sector infrastructure.</p>	01. The OIG recommended that USAID develop a multi-year strategy of activities to strengthen the ME's institutional capacity to operate and maintain this infrastructure	<p>01. USAID's electrical power sector projects were not always achieving their intended outputs.</p> <p>02. Of the 22 projects reviewed, 7 (3%) had not or were not achieving their intended outputs for reasons beyond USAID's control.</p> <p>03. Two of the seven projects were impacted by the U.S. government's earlier efforts to reprogram government-wide infrastructure funding from the electrical sector to security and other priority areas, resulting in the cancellation of the two projects.</p> <p>(Due to space constraints, some findings have been left out. To view the complete set of findings, please access the official document found on the USAID website: <a href="http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/">http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/</a>)</p>
132	USAID-OIG E-267-05-004-P	06/30/2005	Iraq's Water/Sanitation Activities	<p>01. Are USAID/Iraq's water and sanitation rehabilitation projects achieving their planned outputs.</p> <p>02. Is USAID/Iraq addressing institutional capacity-building in its projects to rebuild and rehabilitate Iraq's water and sanitation sector infrastructure.</p>	None	<p>01. The audit found that the water and sanitation rehabilitation projects were achieving intended outputs with some exceptions.</p> <p>02. Of the 34 projects reviewed, 30 projects (88%) achieved or were achieving their intended outputs while 4 projects (12%) were not because of security conditions, access to project site problems, and lack of local government cooperation which were beyond the control of the USAID and its implementing partners.</p> <p>03. The USAID addressed the issue of capacity-building in its projects to rebuild and rehabilitate Iraq's water and sanitation infrastructure through the provision of training and operation manuals.</p>
133	USAID-OIG E-267-05-005-P	09/27/2005	USAID/Iraq's Cash Control Procedures	<p>01. Did USAID/Iraq manage its cashing operations in accordance with established regulations, policies, and procedures?</p> <p>02. Did USAID/Iraq properly calculate and disburse cash payroll payments to its foreign service national work force in accordance with established regulations, policies, and procedures?</p>	01. We recommend that USAID/Iraq finalize and implement its draft policy requiring regional offices to accept, in writing, petty cash funds delivered to them by the Mission's cashier's office.	<p>01. With one exception, USAID/Iraq managed its cashing operations in accordance with established regulations, policies, and procedures.</p> <p>02. USAID/Iraq properly calculated and disbursed cash payroll payments to its foreign service national (FSN) workforce for the period of January 1 to May 31, 2005.</p>
134	USAID-OIG E-267-06-002-P	02/16/2006	Audit of USAID/Iraq's Non-Expendable Property	01. To determine if USAID/Iraq managed its non-expendable property in accordance with Agency guidelines.		<p>01. USAID/Iraq property valued at \$23.5 million in its nonexpendable property database was not managed in accordance with USAID guidance</p> <p>02. The audit could not verify that a projected \$21.3 million was correctly valued in the database, nor the existence of a projected \$2.9 million in nonexpendable property included in the database</p> <p>03. Mission vehicles valued at \$2.3 million were not properly safeguarded</p>

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## CONTRACTS

As required in P.L. 108-106, Section 3001 (i)(1)(F), as amended, Table G-1 lists contracting actions funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund that have been entered into the SIGIR Iraq Reconstruction Information System.

APPENDIX G

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contract Type	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
1	4/30/2003	EMTC-00-03-00007/003	\$6,508,060.00	\$2,700,000.00	CFF	USAID	Full & Open	International Resources Group Ltd. (Irg)	Support Usaid In The Overall Planning, Monitoring, Management, And Reporting On Reconstruction Activities
2	5/24/2003	TRN-C-00-03-00054/002	\$9,500,000.00	\$9,500,000.00	CFF LOE	USAID	Full & Open	Steveldoring Services Of America (Ssa)	Seaport Administration
3	5/24/2003	TRN-C-00-03-00054/001	\$1,918,985.00	\$1,918,985.00	CFF	USAID	Full & Open	Steveldoring Services Of America (Ssa)	Seaport Administration
4	6/25/2003	AEF-I-00-00-00024/0008/0	\$20,938,852.00	\$500,000.00	CFF	USAID	Full & Open	Management Systems International	Monitoring & Evaluation Of Technical Assistance Portfolio
5	7/5/2003	DABV01-03-C-0001/000	\$7,966,069.00	\$7,966,069.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Spacelink International, LLC	Mimic Communication Systems
6	7/9/2003	DABV01-03-C-0002/000	\$18,890,092.00	\$18,890,092.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3237	Setup,operate And Maintain The Kirkush Military Base
7	7/14/2003	EMTC-00-03-00007/007	\$2,500,000.00	\$2,500,000.00	CFF	USAID	Full & Open	International Resources Group Ltd. (Irg)	Support Usaid In The Overall Planning, Monitoring, Management, And Reporting On Reconstruction Activities
8	7/16/2003	DABV01-03-C-0003/0001	\$9,000,000.00	\$0.00	FP	CPA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2813	Generators
9	7/18/2003	AEF-I-00-00-00024/0008/01	\$4,500,000.00	\$4,500,000.00	CFF	USAID	Not Available	Management Systems International	Monitoring & Evaluation Of Technical Assistance Portfolio
10	7/30/2003	EMTC-00-03-00007/008	\$6,000,000.00	\$6,000,000.00	CFF	USAID	Full & Open	International Resources Group Ltd. (Irg)	Support Usaid In The Overall Planning, Monitoring, Management, And Reporting On Reconstruction Activities
11	8/1/2003	EEE-R-00-03-00016/003	\$8,000,000.00	\$8,000,000.00	CPAF	USAID	Full & Open	Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (Afcap)	Theater Logistical Support
12	9/10/2003	EEE-R-00-03-00016/004	\$75,000,000.00	\$75,000,000.00	CPAF	USAID	Full & Open	Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (Afcap)	Theater Logistical Support
13	9/25/2003	DACA78-03-D-00042/01	\$110,000,000.00	\$110,000,000.00	CFF-IDIQ	USACE	Limited Competition	Washington International	Contract: Contingency Contract - Iraq To Restore Iraqi Electricity - Mobilization, Security, Planning Project Definition, Life Support For Contractors And Us Army Corps Of Engineers -northern Iraq
14	9/25/2003	DACA78-03-D-00056/01	\$102,000,000.00	\$102,000,000.00	CFF-IDIQ	USACE	Limited Competition	Fluor Intercontinental, Inc.	Project Definition, Life Support For The Usage
15	9/25/2003	DACA78-03-D-00062/01	\$66,000,000.00	\$66,000,000.00	CFF-IDIQ	USACE	Limited Competition	Perini Corporation	Contract: Contingency Contract - Iraq To Restore Iraqi Electricity - Mobilization, Security, Planning Project Definition, Life Support For Contractors And Us Army Corps Of Engineers -northern Iraq
16	10/15/2003	RAN-C-00-04-00020/00	\$36,973,798.00	\$5,000,000.00	CFF	USAID	Full & Open	Development Alternatives Inc	Agriculture Rehabilitation
17	12/29/2003	EMTC-00-03-00007/012	\$10,801,000.00	\$10,801,000.00	CFF	USAID	Full & Open	International Resources Group Ltd. (Irg)	Support Usaid In The Overall Planning, Monitoring, Management, And Reporting On Reconstruction Activities
18	1/4/2004	SPU-C-00-04-00001/0/0	\$1,823,317,492.00	\$18,000,000.00	CFF	USAID	Full & Open	Bechtel	Reconstruction - Phase II
19	1/6/2004	W914NS-04-C-00040/0	\$8,458,350.05	\$3,100,000.00	Cost+Award Fee	CPA	Not Available	Berger/us	Security And Justice Sector Program Management Office
20	1/16/2004	W9126G-04-D-00010/0/0	\$1,200,000,000.00	\$500,000.00	CPAF-IDIQ	USACE	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Restoration Of Southern Oil Fields
21	1/16/2004	W9126G-04-D-00020/0/0	\$800,000,000.00	\$500,000.00	CPAF-IDIQ	USACE	Full & Open	Parsons	Restoration Of Northern Oil Fields
22	1/21/2004	W914NS-05-M-96090/00	\$12,584.00	\$12,584.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 306	Tires
23	1/22/2004	FA8903-04-D-8671/0001/0	\$65,449,199.00	\$65,449,155.00	CFF	DCMA	Not Available	Earth Tech, Inc.	Renovate An Numaniyah Military Base
24	1/22/2004	FA8903-04-D-8671/0001/0	\$65,449,155.00	\$65,449,155.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Earth Tech, Inc.	An Numaniyah Phase I Part A
25	1/22/2004	FA8903-04-D-8676/0008/0	\$46,749,910.00	\$46,749,910.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Shaw Environmental, Inc.	Renovate Al Kasik Army Base In Iraq
26	1/22/2004	FA8903-04-D-8678/0008/0	\$46,749,910.00	\$46,749,910.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Shaw Environmental, Inc.	Renovate Al Kasik Army Base
27	1/22/2004	FA8903-04-D-8675/0001/0	\$26,336,252.00	\$26,336,252.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Parsons	Renovate Tadjil Military Base
28	1/22/2004	FA8903-04-D-8681/0008/0	\$10,279,724.00	\$10,279,724.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Weston	Renovate Um Qsar Naval Base
29	1/3/2004	W914NS-04-D-01000001/0	\$33,064,656.00	\$33,064,656.00	CFF-IDIQ	CPA	Full & Open	Nour Usa	Battalion Sets
30	1/3/2004	FY5866-04-C-00030/00	\$10,332,000.00	\$10,332,000.00	FP	CPA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 362	Body Armor
31	1/3/2004	W914NS-04-D-01000001/0	\$33,064,656.00	\$33,064,656.00	CFF-IDIQ	CPA	Full & Open	Nour Usa	Provide Samples For Approval And Complete Technical For Nearly All Line Item Supplies
32	2/4/2004	W9126G-04-D-00021/0	\$600,000.00	\$600,000.00	CPAF-IDIQ	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	Restoration Of Northern Oil Fields
33	2/6/2004	W912ER-04-D-00041/0/1	\$89,996,565.00	\$89,996,565.00	CPAF	USACE	Full & Open	Fluor Intercontinental, Inc.	Baghdad Generator Rehabilitation
34	2/6/2004	W912ER-04-D-00042/0/0	\$56,281,864.00	\$56,281,864.00	CPAF	USACE	Full & Open	Fluor Intercontinental, Inc.	Baghdad Generator Rehabilitation
35	2/6/2004	W912ER-04-D-00101/0/0	\$33,078,193.00	\$30,973,217.00	CPAF-IDIQ	USACE	Full & Open	Washington Int'l/black And Veatch Joint Venture	Rehabilitation Of Mosul Gas Turbine Power Plant

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
36	2/6/2004	W912ER-04-D-0002/1/0	\$12,705,000.00	\$12,705,000.00	CPAF-IDIQ	USACE	Full & Open	Ch2m Hill/parsons A Joint Venture	Emergency Repairs To The Haditha Dam Hydropower Facility
37	2/6/2004	W912ER-04-D-0004/2/0	\$8,685,868.00	\$8,685,868.00	IDIQ	USACE	Full & Open	Fluor Intercontinental, Inc.	Nariyah Water Intake
38	2/1/2004	DABV01-04-M-2188/0/0	\$9,026,380.08	\$9,026,380.08	FFP	CPA	Full & Open	Ge	Gas Turbine Parts (Al Qudaa)
39	2/1/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0/0	\$0.00	\$0.00	IDIQ CPAF	USACE	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Renovation Of Facilities
40	2/1/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/0/0	(\$500,000.00)	(\$500,000.00)	CPAF-IDIQ	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	Restoration Of Northern Oil Fields
41	2/1/2004	W912ER-04-D-0002/1/01	(\$808,500.00)	(\$808,500.00)	CPAF-IDIQ	USACE	Not Available	Ch2m Hill/parsons A Joint Venture	Emergency Repairs To The Haditha Dam Hydropower Facility
42	2/1/2004	W912ER-04-D-0004/1/01	(\$6,525,205.00)	(\$6,545,205.00)	CPAF	USACE	Not Available	Fluor Intercontinental, Inc.	Baghdad Generator Rehabilitation
43	2/1/2004	W912ER-04-D-0004/2/01	(\$631,699.00)	(\$631,699.00)	CPAF	USACE	Not Available	Fluor Intercontinental, Inc.	Nasiriyah Thermal Power Station Water Intake System Rehabilitation
44	2/1/2004	W912ER-04-D-0004/2/01	(\$4,093,226.00)	(\$4,093,226.00)	CPAF	USACE	Not Available	Fluor Intercontinental, Inc.	Electrical Transmission Line
45	2/1/2004	W912ER-04-D-0010/1/01	(\$2,104,976.00)	\$0.00	CPAF-IDIQ	USACE	Not Available	Washington Int'l/Black And Veatch Joint Venture	Rehabilitation Of Mosul Gas Turbine Power Plant
46	2/1/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/2/0	\$26,250,000.00	\$26,250,000.00	CPAF-IDIQ	USACE	Full & Open	Parsons	Initial Mobilization
47	2/1/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0002/0	\$14,800,000.00	\$14,800,000.00	Not Available	USACE	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Restoration Of Southern Oil Fields
48	2/1/2004	SLMAQM-04-C-0030/0/0	\$1,751,076,575.00	\$0.00	FFP- IDIQ-CPFF	State Department	Full & Open	Dyncorp International LLC	International Police Training, Monitoring, Support
49	2/2/2004	W912ER-04-D-0005/1/0	\$48,271,436.66	\$44,541,371.10	CPAF-IDIQ	USACE	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Emergency Assessment And Rehabilitation Of Substation At Al Arneen And Interconnections With New Baghdad And Mahdiel Substations
50	3/2/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0/0002	\$0.00	(\$500,000.00)	IDIQ CPAF	USACE	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Iraq Infrastructure
51	3/2/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0003/01	\$0.00	\$0.00	IDIQ CPAF	USACE	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Iraq Infrastructure
52	3/4/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0005/0	\$18,000,000.00	\$18,000,000.00	Not Available	USACE	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Life Support Responsibilities For South Camp
53	3/1/2004	W914NS-04-C-0002/0/0	\$114,417,069.00	\$6,300,000.00	Cost+Award Fee	Pentagon Renovation Office	Full & Open	Iraq Power Alliance Joint Venture	Electrical Services Sector Program Management Office
54	3/1/2004	W914NS-04-C-0003/0/0	\$77,623,017.00	\$8,500,000.00	Cost+Award Fee	Pentagon Renovation Office	Full & Open	Ch2m Hill/parsons A Joint Venture	Public Works And Water Sector Program Management Office
55	3/1/2004	W914NS-04-C-0001/0/0	\$63,582,357.00	\$6,900,000.00	Cost+Award Fee	Pentagon Renovation Office	Full & Open	Atc Services, Inc	Overall Oversight To Manage Activities
56	3/1/2004	W914NS-04-C-0005/0/0	\$26,871,646.63	\$4,000,000.00	Cost+Award Fee	CPA	Full & Open	Berger/us	Buildings/health Sector Program Management Offices
57	3/1/2004	W914NS-04-C-0006/0/0	\$21,119,248.60	\$3,100,000.00	Cost+Award Fee	CPA	Full & Open	Berger/us	Communication/transportation Sector Program Manage
58	3/1/2004	W911S0-04-C-0002/0/0	\$19,000,000.00	\$19,000,000.00	FFP Services	ACA	Sole Source	Asrg Airfield And Range Services Inc.	Electrical Power Security Services (Epps)
59	3/1/2004	W911S0-04-C-0002/0/0	\$13,000,000.00	\$19,000,000.00	FFP	NRCC	Not Available	Asrg Airfield And Range Services Inc.	Technical Adequacy Of All Design/drawing, Milestones, Labor, Material, Equipment, Quality Control And Supervision Necessary To Build A Training Facility, Train The Epps, Equip The Epps
60	3/1/2004	W914NS-04-C-0007/0/0	\$41,955,663.00	\$6,800,000.00	Cost+Award Fee	Pentagon Renovation Office	Full & Open	Foster Wheeler	Oil Sector Program Management Offices
61	3/1/2004	W914NS-04-D-0003/1/0	\$1,853,264.00	\$1,653,264.00	CPAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Fluorannec LLC	Provide Services As Described In The Proposal Volume Ii, Technical, Mobilization Task And Mobilization Cost Estimate As Submitted February 5, 2004.
62	3/1/2004	W914NS-04-D-0007/0001/0	\$1,342,196.00	\$1,342,196.00	Cost + Award Fee TO	NAVFAC	Full & Open	Washington Int'l/Black And Veatch Joint Venture	The Contract Will Provide The Supplies And Services As Described In Its February 5, 2004, Volume Ii - Technical Proposal, Mobilization Task, Pages Ii-b-1 Through Ii-b-15 (Excluding Attachment 1 And 2 - Cost Specifics). Purchase Request Number W914ns-w0
63	3/1/2004	W914NS-04-D-0011/0/0	\$17,168,205.00	\$0.00	IDIQ CPATT	CPA	Full & Open	Perini Corporation	Reconstruction Work Associated With Electrical Projects. Transmission/distribution/communications/controls For The Southern Region.
64	3/1/2004	RAN-C-00-04-0002/0/01	\$3,397,156.00	\$3,397,156.00	CPFF	USAID	Full & Open	Development Alternatives Inc.	Agriculture Rehabilitation
65	3/1/2004	W914NS-04-D-0010/1/0	\$2,095,954.00	\$2,095,954.00	CPAF-IDIQ	CPA	Full & Open	Washington International	Provide Services As Described In The Proposal Volume Ii, Technical Mobilization Task And Mobilization Cost Estimate As Submitted February 5, 2004

APPENDIX G

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contract Type	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
66	3/12/2004	W914NS-04-D-00117/0	\$706,485.00	\$706,485.00	CRAF-IDIQ	CPA	Full & Open	Perini Corporation	Provide Services As Described In The Proposal Volume II, Technical, Mobilization Task And Mobilization Cost Estimate As Submitted February 5, 2004.
67	3/14/2004	W914NS-04-D-01020/0	\$46,838,974.20	\$0.00	FFP	CPA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2720	Base Camp Life Support
68	3/14/2004	W914NS-04-D-01020002/0	\$2,141,017.25	\$2,141,017.25	FFP	CPA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2720	Provide Showers And Latrines As Well As Watercraft Maintenance
69	3/14/2004	W914NS-04-D-01022/0	\$2,141,017.25	\$2,141,017.25	CRAF-IDIQ	CPA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2720	Latrines And Showers
70	3/23/2004	W914NS-04-D-00047/0	\$975,060.00	\$975,060.00	CRAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Contract/kiclos/archirodon Joint Venture	Mobilization Of Design-build Construction Contract Capability
71	3/23/2004	W914NS-04-D-00057/0	\$2,487,603.00	\$2,487,603.00	CRAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Lucent Technologies World Services Inc.	Restore, Rebuild, And Develop Communication Projects To Support The Iraq CPA Mission
72	3/23/2004	W914NS-04-D-0008/0001/0	\$1,475,531.00	\$1,475,531.00	Cost + Award Fee TO	CPA	Full & Open	Fluoramec LLC	The Contractor Will Provide The Supplies And Services As Described In Its February 5, 2004, Volume II - Technical Proposal, Mobilization Task, And Clarified In It 9 March 2004 Fpr. Purchase Request Number W914ns-04-01pwmn
73	3/23/2004	W914NS-04-D-00220001/0	\$1,528,041.00	\$1,528,041.00	Cost + Award Fee TO	CPA	Full & Open	Fluoramec LLC	Provide The Supplies And Services Described In The March 9, 2004 Final Revised Proposal, Volume II, Revised Mobilization Task
74	3/23/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/0006/0	\$55,779,999.00	\$55,779,999.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Parsons	Teaching Hospital
75	3/25/2004	W914NS-04-D-00067/0	\$4,000,000.00	\$4,000,000.00	CRAF	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	Building, Housing, And Health Sector Design/ Build Services To Restore, Rebuild, And Develop Public Projects To Support The Iraq Cpa Mission
76	3/26/2004	FA8903-04-D-8690/0002/0	\$19,521,325.00	\$19,521,325.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Laguna Construction Company, Inc.	Ministry Of Defense Headquarters
77	3/26/2004	FA8903-04-D-8690/0002/0	\$19,521,325.00	\$19,521,325.00	CFF	DCMA	Small Disadvantage	Laguna Construction Company, Inc.	Ministry Of Defense Headquarters, Baghdad Iraq.
78	3/26/2004	W914NS-04-D-00097/0	\$2,640,000.00	\$2,640,000.00	CRAF	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	Civil Defense Hq
79	3/26/2004	W914NS-04-D-00097/0	\$3,000,000.00	\$2,640,000.00	CRAF	USACE	Full & Open	Parsons	Provide All Labor, Equipment, Material And Services In Accordance With Statement Of Work And As Described In Contractor's Technical Proposal
80	3/30/2004	517-C-00-04-00106/0/0	\$41,120,016.00	\$2,000,000.00	CFF	USAID	Full & Open	International Resources Group Ltd. (Irg)	Technical Specialists To Assist In The Monitoring And Management Of Reconstruction And Rehabilitation Activities In Iraq
81	4/2/2004	W912ER-04-D-00062/0	\$29,990,956.00	\$28,082,441.00	CRAF-IDIQ	USACE	Full & Open	Odebrecht-austin Joint Venture	Emergency Reconstruction Of Power Lines Between Samediya And New Baghdad And Jazair And Yarmook
82	4/2/2004	FA8903-04-D-8687/0008/02	\$6,087,706.00	\$6,087,706.00	CFF	DCMA	Not Available	Weston	Renovate Umm Qasr Naval Base
83	4/5/2004	W912ER-04-D-00097/0	\$24,921,740.80	\$23,335,811.84	CRAF-IDIQ	USACE	Full & Open	Shaw Centcom Services Ltd	Reconstruction Of Power Lines Between Buzurgan And Old Amara Substations And Rehabilitation Of The Old Amara Substation
84	4/6/2004	SLMAQM-04-C-0030/0/003	\$0.00	\$0.00	FFP- IDIQ-CFF	State Department	Full & Open	Dyncorp International LLC	International Police Training, Monitoring, Support, And Policy
85	4/13/2004	AEP-100-00-00024/0008/03	(\$5,822,524.00)	\$4,038,772.00	CFF	USAID	Not Available	Management Systems International	Monitoring & Evaluation Of Technical Assistance Portfolio
86	4/13/2004	FA8903-04-D-8687/0008/02	\$6,087,706.00	\$6,087,706.00	CFF	DCMA	Not Available	Weston	Renovate Umm Qasr Naval Base
87	4/13/2004	SLMAQM-04-C-0030/0/002	\$811,786.00	\$811,786.00	FFP- IDIQ-CFF	State Department	Full & Open	Dyncorp International LLC	Maintain Cadre Database
88	4/15/2004	FA8903-04-D-8687/0002/40	\$49,808,566.00	\$49,808,566.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Weston	Brigade Facilities Tallil Military Base
89	4/15/2004	FA8903-04-D-8687/0002/40	\$49,808,566.00	\$49,808,566.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Weston	Brigade Facilities Tallil Military Base
90	4/15/2004	FA8903-04-D-8672/0003/0	\$47,500,528.00	\$47,500,528.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Ecc International LLC	New Brigade Kirkuk Military Base
91	4/15/2004	FA8903-04-D-8672/0003/0	\$47,500,528.00	\$47,500,528.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Ecc International LLC	Renovate And Construct New Brigade Kirkuk Military Base
92	4/15/2004	FA8903-04-D-8670/0008/02	\$28,691,237.00	\$28,691,237.00	CFF	DCMA	Not Available	Shaw Environmental, Inc.	Repair Al Kasik Army Base
93	4/15/2004	FA8903-04-D-8676/0008/92	\$28,691,237.00	\$28,691,237.00	CFF	DCMA	Not Available	Shaw	Al Kasik Phases I & II
94	4/15/2004	FA8903-04-D-8669/0006/0	\$23,863,580.00	\$23,863,560.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Amec Earth & Environmental, Inc.	Tadji Army Aviation Base
95	4/15/2004	FA8903-04-D-8669/0006/0	\$23,863,560.00	\$23,863,560.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Amec Earth & Environmental, Inc.	Renovate Tadji Army Aviation Base
96	4/15/2004	FA8903-04-D-8676/0001/50	\$19,491,301.00	\$19,491,301.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Shaw Environmental, Inc.	Renovate Al-Kasik Military Base For Iraqi Armed Forces Phase Iii
97	4/15/2004	FA8903-04-D-8676/0001/50	\$19,491,301.00	\$19,491,301.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Shaw Environmental, Inc.	New Brigade Kirkuk Military Base(Phase II)
98	4/16/2004	FA8903-04-D-8672/0006/1	\$6,155,119.00	\$6,155,119.00	Not Available	AFCEE	Full & Open	Ecc International LLC	Kmrb Utilities, Water Line
99	4/20/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/0/ P0003	\$0.00	\$0.00	IDIQ CRAF	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	Iraq Infrastructure
100	4/22/2004	FA8903-04-D-8672/0008/0	\$34,385,764.00	\$34,385,764.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Ecc International LLC	Renovate And Construct Permanent Utilities At An Numaniyah Military Base

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
101	4/22/2004	FA8903-04-D-8672/0008/0	\$34,385,764.00	\$34,385,764.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Ecc International LLC	Renovate And Construct Permanent Utilities
102	4/23/2004	W91RUS-04-C-0028/0/0	\$7,879,000.00	\$7,879,000.00	FFP	United States Army Contracting Agency	Full & Open	Mci	Digital Cellular System/network
103	4/23/2004	W91RUS-04-C-0028/0/0	\$7,879,000.00	\$7,879,000.00	FFP	ACA	Full & Open	Mci	Cnatt Wireless Voice/data Support
104	4/23/2004	FA8903-04-D-8675/0001/02	\$4,782,102.00	\$4,782,102.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Parsons	Renovate Tadjil Military Base, Renovate New Iraq Army Baghdad Recruiting Station
105	4/24/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/2/0	\$742,450.00	Not Available	CPA	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
106	4/26/2004	FA8903-04-D-8672/0006/0	\$16,957,621.00	\$16,957,621.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Ecc International LLC	Kirkush Military Base
107	4/26/2004	FA8903-04-D-8672/0006/0	\$16,957,621.00	\$16,957,621.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Ecc International LLC	Provide Utilities At Kirkush Military Training Base (Kmtb)
108	4/26/2004	W914WVS-05-M-1114/0/0	\$750.00	\$750.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 429	Arm Bands
109	4/27/2004	FA8903-04-D-8690/0005/0	\$36,314,427.00	\$36,314,427.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Laguna Construction Company, Inc.	Ar-Rastamiyah Military Academy
110	4/28/2004	EMT-C-00-03-00007/0/13	\$34,924,122.00	\$14,275,999.00	CPFF	USAID	Full & Open	International Resources Group Ltd. (Irg)	Support Usaid In The Overall Planning, Monitoring, Management, And Reporting On Reconstruction Activities
111	4/30/2004	W914NS-04-D-0008/PW-007/0	\$27,740,323.00	Not Available	CPA	CPA	Full & Open	Fluoramec LLC	Balad Rooz Water Supply Project
112	4/30/2004	W914NS-04-D-0008/4/0	\$23,740,323.00	\$23,740,323.00	CPA	CPA	Full & Open	Fluoramec LLC	Design And Construct A New Water Supply System Consisting Of A New Water Treatment Plant
113	5/1/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/3/0	\$2,157,618.00	\$2,157,618.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
114	5/1/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/4/0	\$1,762,740.00	\$1,762,740.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
115	5/1/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/5/0	\$1,128,154.00	\$1,128,154.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
116	5/1/2004	W914NS-04-D-0011/2/0	\$17,168,205.00	\$17,168,205.00	CPAF	CPA	Full & Open	Perini Corporation	Barrah Distribution Network
117	5/2/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0011/0	\$5,000,000.00	\$5,000,000.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Restoration Of Southern Oil Fields
118	5/2/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0012/0	\$5,000,000.00	\$5,000,000.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Restoration Of Southern Oil Fields
119	5/2/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/11/0	\$5,000,000.00	\$5,000,000.00	CPA	CPA	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Restore Ngj And Lpg Plants In Southern Iraq To Increased Capacity
120	5/2/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/12/0	\$5,000,000.00	\$5,000,000.00	CPA	CPA	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Restore The Gas Oilid Separation Plants In Southern Iraq
121	5/3/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/2/0	\$5,200,000.00	\$5,200,000.00	CPAF	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	Building, Housing, And Health Sector Design/ Build Services To Restore, Rebuild, And Develop Public Projects To Support The Iraq Cpa Mission
122	5/4/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0013/0	\$2,000,000.00	\$2,000,000.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Restoration Of Southern Oil Fields
123	5/4/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/13/0	\$2,000,000.00	\$2,000,000.00	CPA	CPA	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Restoration Of Infrastructure Related To Downstream Sector Projects In Southern Iraq With The Goal Of Returning Iraqi Oil Production To Pre-war Levels
124	5/4/2004	W914NS-04-D-0003/2/0	\$400,000.00	\$400,000.00	CPAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Fluoramec LLC	Contractor Shall Furnish All Labor, Material, And Equipment Necessary To Perform The Site Assessment In Accordance With The Statement Of Work
125	5/5/2004	W914NS-04-D-0004/2/0	\$9,180,184.00	\$9,180,184.00	CPAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Contract/alc/clarchirodon Joint Venture	Restore, Rebuild, And Develop Transportation Infrastructure Projects To Support The Iraq Cpa Mission
126	5/5/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/5/0	\$590,000.00	\$590,000.00	CPAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Parsons	Gas Oil Separation Plants
127	5/5/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/3/0	\$5,500,000.00	\$5,500,000.00	CPAF-IDIQ	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	Building, Housing, And Health Sector Design/ Build Services To Restore, Rebuild, And Develop Public Projects To Support The Iraq Cpa Mission
128	5/6/2004	FA8903-04-D-8675/0001/03	\$2,673,137.00	\$2,673,137.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Parsons	Renovate Tadjil Military Base, Renovate New Iraq Army Baghdad Recruiting Station
129	5/8/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/6/0	\$28,203,841.00	\$28,203,841.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
130	5/8/2004	W914NS-04-D-0011/2/1	\$0.00	\$0.00	CPA	CPA	Not Available	Perini Corporation	Correct Appropriation Data
131	5/8/2004	W914NS-04-D-0011/T0002/01	\$0.00	\$0.00	IDIQ CPATT	CPA	Full & Open	Perini Corporation	Barrah Distribution Network
132	5/10/2004	W914NS-04-D-0008/3/0	\$7,549,666.00	\$7,549,666.00	FFP	CPA	Full & Open	Fluoramec LLC	New Water Supply System
133	5/11/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/8/0	\$48,818,700.00	\$48,818,700.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
134	5/11/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/7/0	\$40,497,030.00	\$40,497,030.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	

APPENDIX G

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contract Type	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
135	5/11/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/4/0	\$15,000,000.00	\$15,000,000.00	CFAF	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	Building, Housing, And Health Sector Design/Build Services To Restore, Rebuild, And Develop Public Projects To Support The Iraq Cpa Mission
136	5/12/2004	W914NS-04-D-0005/2/0	\$3,300,000.00	\$3,300,000.00	CFAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Lucent Technologies World Services Inc.	Restore, Rebuild, And Develop Communication Projects To Support The Iraq Cpa Mission
137	5/12/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/5/0	\$5,000,000.00	\$5,000,000.00	CFAF/TO	Not Available	Full & Open	Parsons	Repair Utility Infrastructure For The Ministries Of Education And Higher Education Headquarters Complex And Renovate Auditorium
138	5/15/2004	DABV01-04-C-0104/0/0	\$24,100,988.00	\$24,100,988.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2726	Baghdad Public Service Academy Life Support
139	5/15/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/10/0	\$846,115.00	\$846,115.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
140	5/15/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/11/0	\$1,833,250.00	\$1,833,250.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
141	5/15/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/12/0	\$1,057,644.00	\$1,057,644.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
142	5/15/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/13/0	\$1,057,644.00	\$1,057,644.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
143	5/15/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/9/0	\$599,331.00	\$599,331.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
144	5/16/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/14/0	\$9,058,791.00	\$9,058,791.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
145	5/17/2004	RAN-C-00-04-0002/0/02	\$955,756.00	\$955,756.00	CPFF	USAID	Full & Open	Development Alternatives Inc.	Agriculture Rehabilitation
146	5/18/2004	W914NS-05-M-1284/0/0	\$5,500.00	\$5,500.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Metal Wall Lockers
147	5/19/2004	FA8903-04-D-8672/0011/0	\$29,188,920.00	\$29,188,920.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Ecc International LLC	Repair Schools, Governorate Of Muthanna, Thi-qar, Misan, & Vassit, And Renovate Mistry Of Environment Hq Building
148	5/19/2004	FA8903-04-D-8672/0011/0	\$29,188,920.00	\$29,188,920.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Ecc International LLC	Repair Schools
149	5/19/2004	517-C-00-04-00106/0/1	\$7,000,000.00	\$7,000,000.00	CPFF	USAID	Full & Open	International Resources Group Ltd. (Irg)	Make Changes To Funding & Accounting. Data
150	5/19/2004	FA8903-04-D-8677/0017/0	\$5,546,495.00	\$5,546,495.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Tetra International LLC	Renovate Ministry Of Trade Headquarters Buildings
151	5/21/2004	W914NS-04-D-0005/3/0	\$3,500,000.00	\$3,500,000.00	CFAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Lucent Technologies World Services Inc.	Restore, Rebuild, And Develop Communication Projects To Support The Iraq Cpa Mission
152	5/23/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/6/0	\$3,000,000.00	\$3,000,000.00	CFAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Parsons	Return Iraqi Oil Production To Pre-war Levels
153	5/23/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/7/0	\$2,000,000.00	\$2,000,000.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	Restore Pump Stations In Northern Iraq
154	5/24/2004	W914NS-04-D-0004/3/0	\$4,591,000.00	\$4,591,000.00	CFAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Contract/aid/oc/archirodon Joint Venture	Restore, Rebuild, And Develop Transportation Infrastructure Projects To Support The Iraq Cpa Mission
155	5/25/2004	W55HZV-04-D-0181/0001/0	\$120,125,150.07	\$120,125,150.07	FFP/IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Anham Joint Venture	Medium Wheeled Vehicle
156	5/25/2004	FA8903-04-D-8678/0045/0	\$7,599,780.00	\$7,599,780.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Tolstet, Inc.	Rehabilitation Of Karbala And Mandilee Pump Stations
157	5/25/2004	W55HZV-04-D-0181/0001/0	\$0.00	\$120,125,150.07	FFP/IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Anham Joint Venture	Medium Wheeled Vehicle
158	5/26/2004	W914NS-04-D-0004/2/1	\$4.00	\$0.00	CFAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Contract/aid/oc/archirodon Joint Venture	Correct Accounting And Appropriation Data
159	5/26/2004	W914NS-04-D-0004/4/0	\$1,100,000.00	\$1,100,000.00	CFAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Contract/aid/oc/archirodon Joint Venture	Design And Construct Zuba Bridge
160	5/26/2004	W914NS-04-D-0004/5/0	\$5,050,000.00	\$5,050,000.00	CFAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Contract/aid/oc/archirodon Joint Venture	Design And Construct Sheik Sa'ad Bridge
161	5/26/2004	W914NS-04-D-0004/TO002/01	\$0.00	\$0.00	CFAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Contract/aid/oc/archirodon Joint Venture	Security,dose Protection Team, Project Management Team
162	5/26/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/1/1	\$360,000.00	\$360,000.00	Not Available	CPA	Not Available	Parsons	Increase Amount
163	5/27/2004	W914NS-04-D-0005/2/01	(\$250,000.00)	\$0.00	CFAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Lucent Technologies World Services Inc.	Restore, Rebuild, And Develop Communication Projects To Support The Iraq Cpa Mission
164	6/2/2004	W914NS-04-D-0004/10/0	\$580,000.00	\$580,000.00	CFAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Contract/aid/oc/archirodon Joint Venture	Asses And Rehabilitate 11 Railway Stations In The Governorate Of Ninewa
165	6/2/2004	W914NS-04-D-0004/6/0	\$850,000.00	\$850,000.00	CFAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Contract/aid/oc/archirodon Joint Venture	Asses And Rehabilitate 17 Railway Stations In The Governorates Of Basrah And Thi-qar
166	6/2/2004	W914NS-04-D-0004/7/0	\$653,000.00	\$653,000.00	CFAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Contract/aid/oc/archirodon Joint Venture	Asses And Rehabilitate 14 Railway Stations In The Governorates Of Muthanna And Qadisiya
167	6/2/2004	W914NS-04-D-0004/8/0	\$435,000.00	\$435,000.00	CFAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Contract/aid/oc/archirodon Joint Venture	Asses And Rehabilitate 11 Railway Stations In The Governorates Of Baghdad And Babil
168	6/2/2004	W914NS-04-D-0004/9/0	\$796,000.00	\$796,000.00	CFAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Contract/aid/oc/archirodon Joint Venture	Asses And Rehabilitate 23 Railway Stations In The Governorates Of Salah Al-din And Taamim
169	6/3/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/4/01	\$23,448,310.00	\$0.00	CFAF-IDIQ	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	Bajji Power
170	6/3/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0005/01	(\$11,025,250.00)	\$0.00	Not Available	CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Restoration Of Southern Oil Fields

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
171	6/3/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/002	(\$10,000,000.00)	\$0.00	Not Available	CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Restoration Of Southern Oil Fields
172	6/3/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/51		\$0.00		CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Change Accounting And Appropriation Data
173	6/3/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/712		\$0.00		CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Change Accounting And Appropriation Data
174	6/3/2004	W9125G-04-D-0001 (SAME AS ABOVE, AS IN THE FILE)/81				CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Change Accounting And Appropriation Data
175	6/4/2004	FA8903-04-D-867/0047/0	\$3,976,569.00	\$3,976,569.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Toilest, Inc.	Kirkush Mtb Logistics Facility
176	6/4/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8058/0001/0	\$157,571.00	\$157,571.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Altec Industries Inc.	High Lift Truck, Manuals.
177	6/4/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8059/0001/0	\$402,983.00	\$402,983.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Altec Industries Inc.	Aerial Platform Vehicles, Manuals.
178	6/4/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8058/0001/0	\$157,517.00	\$157,517.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Altec Industries Inc.	High Lift Trucks
179	6/4/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8059/0001/0	\$402,983.00	\$402,983.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Altec Industries Inc.	Aerial Platform Vehicles
180	6/4/2004	W914NS-05-M-1328/0/0	\$19,800.00	\$19,800.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Nour Usa	Motorola 360 Vehicle Antennas
181	6/6/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/16/0	\$25,383,457.00	\$25,383,457.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
182	6/7/2004	FA8903-04-D-8671/0001/0002	\$65,449,199.00	\$65,449,199.00	CPFF	DCMA	Not Available	Earth Tech, Inc.	Construction
183	6/7/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0016/0	\$12,000,000.00	\$12,000,000.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Covering Or Contractor's Costs Associated With Security For The Operation In Iraq
184	6/7/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0017/0	\$11,964,401.00	\$11,964,401.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Immediate Assumption Of Life Support Responsibilities For Government And Contractor. Also Provide A Seamless Continuation Of Services Following The Close-out Of Task Order 0002
185	6/7/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0014/0	\$6,000,000.00	\$6,000,000.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Transportation Of Materials, Goods, Equip, And Mobilization In Support Of The Contractor Operations And Provide A Seamless Continuation Of Services Following The Close-out Of Task Order 0002 Under The Same Contract
186	6/7/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0015/0	\$6,000,000.00	\$6,000,000.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Providing A Seamless Continuation Of Services Following The Close-out Of Task Order 0002 And 0005 Under The Same Contract
187	6/7/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/14/0	\$6,000,000.00	\$6,000,000.00		CPA	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Transportation And Mobilization
188	6/7/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/15/0	\$6,000,000.00	\$6,000,000.00		CPA	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Management And Administration
189	6/7/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/16/0	\$12,000,000.00	\$12,000,000.00		CPA	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Security
190	6/7/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/17/0	\$11,964,401.00	\$11,964,401.00		CPA	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Life Support
191	6/8/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0012/01	\$44,595,886.00	\$44,595,886.00	CPAF	CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Restoration Of Southern Oil Fields
192	6/8/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/01/01	\$41,053,323.00	\$41,053,323.00	CPAF	CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Restoration Of Southern Oil Fields
193	6/8/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/6/01	\$27,548,515.00	\$27,548,515.00	CPAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Parsons	Nox Pump Stations
194	6/8/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/7/03	\$24,106,402.00	\$24,106,402.00	Not Available	USACE	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Restoration Of Southern Oil Fields
195	6/8/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/6/1	\$19,335,472.00	\$19,335,472.00	CPAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Parsons	Increase Nte Amount
196	6/8/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/7/1	\$19,335,472.00	\$19,335,472.00	CPAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Parsons	Increase Not To Exceed Amount
197	6/8/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/7/01	\$19,335,472.00	\$19,335,472.00	CPAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Parsons	Modification To Contract Terms Only: Increase Not To Exceed Amount
198	6/8/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/3/01	\$19,255,379.00	\$19,255,379.00	CPAF	CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Restoration Of Southern Oil Fields
199	6/8/2004	W9126G-04-D-0008/002	\$15,336,937.00	\$15,336,937.00	CPAF	CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Restoration Of Southern Oil Fields
200	6/8/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/11/1	\$41,053,323.00	\$41,053,323.00	CPAF	CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Increase Nte Amount
201	6/8/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/12/1	\$44,595,886.00	\$44,595,886.00	CPAF	CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Increase Amount
202	6/8/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/13/1	\$19,255,379.00	\$19,255,379.00	CPAF	CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Increase The Not To Exceed Amount
203	6/8/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/7/3	\$24,106,402.00	\$24,106,402.00	CPAF	CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Increase Amount
204	6/8/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/8/2	\$15,336,937.00	\$15,336,937.00	CPAF	CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Increase Not To Exceed Amount
205	6/8/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/5/01	\$6,521,824.00	\$6,521,824.00	CPAF-IDIQ	CPA	Not Available	Parsons	Gas Oil Separation Plants

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contract Type	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
206	6/8/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/9/0	\$3,000,000.00	\$3,000,000.00	FFP	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	Contract Management And Administration Support
207	6/8/2004	W914NS-04-D-0004/0005/0/1	\$5,089,036.00	\$5,089,036.00	CPAF-IDIQ	PCO	Full & Open	Contract&aid/oc/ardhirodon Joint Venture	Restore, Rebuild, And Develop Transportation Infrastructure Projects To Support The Iraq Cpa Mission
208	6/8/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/0006/0001	\$5,981,345.00	\$5,981,345.00	IDIQ	PCO	Full & Open	Parsons	Teaching Hospital
209	6/8/2004		\$5,982,020.00	\$5,982,020.00	Not Available	CPA	Not Available	Parsons	Increase Amount By Modifying And Adding Clins
210	6/8/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/5/1	\$5,089,036.00	\$5,089,036.00	Not Available	CPA	Not Available	Parsons	Increase Funding And Revise Definition Schedule
211	6/10/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8085/0000/1/0	\$123,954.00	\$123,954.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Komatsu America International Company	Utility Vehicles, Manuals
212	6/10/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8085/0000/1/0	\$123,954.00	\$123,954.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Komatsu America International Company	Utility Vehicles
213	6/11/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/17/0	\$6,916,800.00	\$6,916,800.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
214	6/11/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/18/0	\$2,773,925.00	\$2,773,925.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
215	6/12/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/19/0	\$2,305,600.00	\$2,305,600.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
216	6/12/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/20/0	\$2,305,600.00	\$2,305,600.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
217	6/12/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/21/0	\$3,520,557.00	\$3,520,557.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
218	6/12/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/22/0	\$2,933,812.00	\$2,933,812.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
219	6/13/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/24/0	\$34,584,000.00	\$34,584,000.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
220	6/13/2004	W914NS-04-D-0014/29/0	\$30,000,000.00	\$30,000,000.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
221	6/13/2004	W914NS-04-D-0009/23/0	\$3,746,600.00	\$3,746,600.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
222	6/13/2004	W914NS-04-D-0010/25/0	\$2,161,500.00	\$2,161,500.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
223	6/13/2004	W914NS-04-D-0011/26/0	\$288,200.00	\$288,200.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
224	6/13/2004	W914NS-04-D-0012/27/0	\$2,593,800.00	\$2,593,800.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
225	6/13/2004	W914NS-04-D-0013/28/0	\$5,720,934.00	\$5,720,934.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
226	6/15/2004	W914NS-04-D-0016/31/0	\$8,116,883.00	\$8,116,883.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
227	6/15/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8060/0000/1/0	\$98,900.00	\$98,900.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Ingersoll-rand Company	Manual Compressor, Manuals.
228	6/15/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8060/0000/1/0	\$98,900.00	\$98,900.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Ingersoll-rand Company	Air Compressors
229	6/16/2004	W914NS-04-D-0104/00/1		\$0.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2722	Flights
230	6/16/2004	W914NS-04-D-0104/0/0	\$3,070,148.80	\$0.00	FFP	CPA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2722	Deliver Computers, Computer Equipment, Fax Machines, Satellite Phones, Portable Radios And Software To Various Location Within Iraq
231	6/16/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8084/0000/1/0	\$18,170.00	\$18,170.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	North Shore International Inc.	Utility Vehicles, Manuals
232	6/16/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8084/0000/1/0	\$18,170.00	\$18,170.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	North Shore International Inc.	All Terrain Utility Vehicles
233	6/16/2004	W914NS-04-D-0017/32/0	\$6,087,662.00	\$6,087,662.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
234	6/17/2004	W914NS-04-D-0018/33/0	\$12,987,013.00	\$12,987,013.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
235	6/17/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/1/0/0	\$6,000,000.00	\$6,000,000.00	FFP	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	Security For Operation In Iraq
236	6/17/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/11/0	\$6,585,748.00	\$6,585,748.00	FFP	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	Life Support
237	6/17/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/8/0	\$3,000,000.00	\$3,000,000.00	FFP	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	Transportation And Mobilization
238	6/18/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8010/0/0	\$8,510,480.00	\$0.00	FFP	TACOM Warren	Full & Open	James Worldwide Sales, Inc.	45 Seat Bus
239	6/18/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8770/0000/1/0	\$1,180,813.00	\$1,180,813.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Caterpillar Inc	Caterpillar Forklifts, Manuals
240	6/18/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8770/0000/1/0	\$1,180,813.00	\$1,180,813.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Caterpillar Inc	Forklift Vehicles
241	6/18/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8930/0000/1/0	\$1,700,750.00	\$1,700,750.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Caterpillar Inc	Tractor Vehicle, Manuals
242	6/18/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8061/0000/1/0	\$194,403.04	\$194,403.04	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	H.k. Mullins And Associates, Inc.	Welding Machine, Manuals.
243	6/18/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8061/0000/1/0	\$194,403.04	\$194,403.04	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	H.k. Mullins And Associates, Inc.	Welding Mach 600 Amp Vehicle
244	6/20/2004	W914NS-04-D-0019/34/0	\$7,305,195.00	\$7,305,195.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
245	6/20/2004	W914NS-04-D-0020/25/0	\$4,509,381.00	\$4,509,381.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
246	6/21/2004	W914NS-04-D-0021/36/0	\$36,525,974.00	\$36,525,974.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
247	6/21/2004	W914NS-04-D-0022/37/0	\$3,246,753.00	\$3,246,753.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
248	6/21/2004	W914NS-04-D-0023/380	\$3,246,753.00	\$3,246,753.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
249	6/23/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8059/0001/01	\$0.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Not Available	Altec Industries Inc.	Aerial Platform Vehicles, Manuals.
250	6/23/2004	W914NS-04-D-0024/390	\$901,876.00	\$901,876.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
251	6/24/2004	SLMAQM-04-C-0030/ SAWM/DO4033802	\$188,734,225.85	\$188,734,225.85	FFP- IDIQ-CPPF	State Department	Full & Open	Dyncorp International LLC	International Police Training, Monitoring, Support, And Policy
252	6/24/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8060/0001/01	(\$600.00)	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Not Available	Ingersoll-rand Company	Manual Compressor.
253	6/24/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8061/0001/01	\$0.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Not Available	H.k. Mullins And Associates, Inc.	Welding Machine, Manuals.
254	6/24/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8085/0001/01	\$0.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Not Available	Komatsu America International Company	Utility Vehicles, Manuals
255	6/25/2004	FA8903-04-D-8669/0001/40	\$6,392,139.00	\$6,392,139.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Amec Earth & Environmental, Inc.	Upgrade Electrical
256	6/26/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0021/0	\$10,627,691.00	\$10,627,691.00	Not Available	CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Soc Pump Stations
257	6/26/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/TO0021/0	\$10,627,691.00	\$10,627,691.00	Not Available	CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Restore Crude Oil Pumps In Southern Iraq
258	6/28/2004	FA8903-04-D-8672/000120	\$21,516,768.00	\$21,516,768.00	CPFF	DCMA	Set Aside Small Business	Ecc International LLC	Utility Upgrade And Renovation At Kirkush Military Training Base
259	6/28/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0023/0	\$2,875,000.00	\$2,875,000.00	Not Available	CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Misc Parts And Equipment-opt & Mrc
260	6/28/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/TO0022/0	\$6,200,000.00	\$6,200,000.00	Not Available	CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Upgrades To South Refining Company's Basra Refinery
261	6/28/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/TO0024/0	\$2,500,000.00	\$2,500,000.00	Not Available	CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Pipeline Communications
262	6/28/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/TO0025/0	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00	Not Available	CPA	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Repair Ship Loading Arms At Al Basrah Oil Terminal
263	6/29/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8770/Q/P0001	\$10,100,712.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Caterpillar Inc	Caterpillar Forklifts, Manuals
264	7/1/2004	EPP-C-00-04-00004/2/0	\$56,491,647.00	\$51,809,000.00	Not Available	USAD	Full & Open	Creative Associates	Education, Health And Social Services
265	7/1/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8940/0001/0	\$915,700.00	\$915,700.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Komatsu America International Company	Komatsu Tractor, Manuals.
266	7/1/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8940/0001/0	\$915,700.00	\$915,700.00	Not Available	TACOM Warren	Full & Open	Komatsu America International Company	Tractors
267	7/4/2004	W914NS-04-D-0123/TO011/0	\$23,020.00	\$23,020.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2722	Field Equipment
268	7/5/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/5/2	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00	Not Available	Not Available	Not Available	Parsons	Not To Exceed (Nte) Amount Is Increased
269	7/6/2004	FA8903-04-D-8672/0008/M0001		\$0.00	CPFF	DCMA	Not Available	Ecc International LLC	
270	7/7/2004	EGA-A-00-04-00002/2/0	\$12,089,702.00	\$12,089,702.00	Not Available	USAD	Full & Open	Volunteers In Economic Growth Alliance	Economy, Finance, Agriculture & Rural Economy
271	7/7/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8910/0/0	\$7,124,544.00	\$0.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Volvo Construction Equipment North America Inc	
272	7/7/2004	W56HZV-04-D-0181/0001/00002	\$1,268,798.44	\$1,268,798.44	FFP/IDIQ	TACOM Warren	Full & Open	Anham Joint Venture	Battalion Sets
273	7/7/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8910/0001/0	\$1,834,077.00	\$1,834,077.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Volvo Construction Equipment North America Inc	Volvo Model L120e Cars, Manuals.
274	7/7/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8910/0001/0	\$1,834,077.00	\$1,834,077.00	Not Available	DCMA	Not Available	Volvo Construction Equipment North America Inc	Wheel Loaders
275	7/7/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8800/0001/0	\$308,472.00	\$308,472.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	American Material Handling	Daewoo Forklifts, Manuals
276	7/7/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8800/0001/0	\$308,472.00	\$308,472.00	Not Available	DCMA	Not Available	American Material Handling	Forklift Vehicles
277	7/8/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8062/0001/0	\$191,866.00	\$191,866.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Certified Stainless Service Inc	Truck With Hydrochloric Acid Tank, Manuals
278	7/8/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8062/0001/0	\$191,866.00	\$191,866.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Certified Stainless Service Inc	Trucks
279	7/9/2004	ATP-A-00-04-00014/2/0	\$50,000,000.00	\$23,000,000.00	Not Available	USAD	Full & Open	Cepps Ji-ri	Improved Efficiency & Accountability Of Local Governance

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contract Type	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
280	7/9/2004	W56HZV-04-D-89302/0	\$5,455,674.00	\$5,455,674.00	IDIQ	PCO	Full & Open	Caterpillar Inc	
281	7/9/2004	W56HZV-04-D-80200/0	\$5,775,696.00	\$5,775,696.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Navistar	
282	7/9/2004	W56HZV-04-D-80200/0	\$5,775,696.00	\$5,775,696.00	IDIQ	PCO	Full & Open	Navistar	
283	7/9/2004	W56HZV-04-D-80600002/0	\$321,200.00	\$321,200.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Ingersoll-rand Company	Manual Compressor, Manuals.
284	7/9/2004	W56HZV-04-D-80600002/0	\$321,200.00	\$321,200.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Ingersoll-rand Company	Air Compressors
285	7/12/2004	W56HZV-04-D-805600001/0	\$309,750.00	\$309,750.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	S.c. Roman S.a.	Mobile Cold Storage Truck, Manuals
286	7/12/2004	W56HZV-04-D-805600001/0	\$309,750.00	\$309,750.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	S.c. Roman S.a.	Truck, Mobile Cold Storage Order
287	7/13/2004	W914NS-04-M-01130/0	\$5,238,640.00	\$5,238,640.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Mafeks International LLC	Lpg Container Wagons
288	7/14/2004	W914NS-04-C-90080/0	\$13,693,177.60	\$13,693,177.60	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Ess	
289	7/14/2004	W56HZV-04-D-806700001/0	\$1,375,440.00	\$1,375,440.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Certified Stainless Service Inc	Truck With Fuel Tank Trailer
290	7/14/2004	W56HZV-04-D-807000001/0	\$649,860.00	\$649,860.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Certified Stainless Service Inc	Fuel Tank Trucks
291	7/14/2004	W56HZV-04-D-80130/0	\$6,049,654.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Grove	Crane Vehicle Fitted With Essential Equipment
292	7/14/2004	W56HZV-04-D-806700001/0	\$1,375,440.00	\$1,375,440.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Certified Stainless Service Inc	Semi Fuel Tank, Manuals.
293	7/14/2004	W56HZV-04-D-807000001/0	\$649,860.00	\$649,860.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Certified Stainless Service Inc	Semi Fuel Tank, Manuals
294	7/15/2004	FA8903-04-D-867270006/M0001	\$6,155,119.00	\$6,155,119.00	CPFF	DCMA	Not Available	Ecc International LLC	Water, Sewer And Power Plant
295	7/15/2004	W56HZV-04-D-88000002/0	\$1,158,129.00	\$1,158,129.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	American Material Handling	Daewoo Forklifts, Manuals
296	7/15/2004	W56HZV-04-D-88000002/0	\$1,158,129.00	\$1,158,129.00	Not Available	DCMA	Not Available	American Material Handling	Forklift Vehicles
297	7/15/2004	W56HZV-04-D-7990/0001/0	\$237,051.99	\$237,051.99	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Caterpillar Inc	Caterpillar Forklifts, Manuals
298	7/15/2004	W56HZV-04-D-7990/0001/0	\$237,051.99	\$237,051.99	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Caterpillar Inc	Forklift Vehicles
299	7/16/2004	W56HZV-04-D-0181/0003/0	\$123,555,477.60	\$123,555,477.60	FFP/IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Anham Joint Venture	Trucks, Medium
300	7/16/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8910/T00002/0	\$7,124,544.00	\$7,124,544.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Volvo Construction Equipment North America Inc	Volvo Model L120e Cars, Manuals.
301	7/16/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8910/T00002/0	\$7,124,544.00	\$7,124,544.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Volvo Construction Equipment North America Inc	Wheel Loaders
302	7/16/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8014/1/0	\$2,056,762.00	\$2,056,762.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Altec Industries Inc.	Crane Hydraulic Truck
303	7/16/2004	W56HZV-04-D-88700002/0	\$249,096.00	\$249,096.00	Not Available	DCMA	Not Available	Terex Corporation	Dumper Fitted With Essential Equipment
304	7/16/2004	W56HZV-04-D-88700002/0	\$249,096.00	\$249,096.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Terex Corporation	Dumper, Manuals.
305	7/18/2004	W914NS-04-D-00109/0	\$39,021,180.00	\$39,021,180.00	IDIQ	PCO	Full & Open	Washington International	Northern Region- Restore, Repair, And Develop Power Generation, Transmission, Distribution And Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition Systems Projects To Support The Iraq Cpa Mission
306	7/21/2004	W915WE41702900/0	\$6,221,460.00	\$6,221,460.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Caterpillar Inc	
307	7/22/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0027/0	\$46,928,540.00	\$46,928,540.00	CPAF	PCO	Full & Open	Kellogg Brown Root	Soc Workover Of Wells
308	7/22/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0026/0	\$35,287,472.00	\$35,287,472.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Distribution - Opc
309	7/22/2004	W9126G-04-D-0001/0028/0	\$7,155,977.00	\$7,155,977.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Kellogg Brown Root	Micrsc Consolidated Chemicals
310	7/23/2004	W914NS-04-D-011717/0	\$33,986,948.00	\$33,986,948.00	IDIQ	PCO	Full & Open	Mac International Fze	
311	7/23/2004	W914NS-04-M-01160/0	\$21,180,000.00	\$21,180,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Orenburgsnab Xxi Century	Railroad Equipment
312	7/25/2004	W914NS-04-D-00108/0	\$21,016,010.00	\$21,016,010.00	IDIQ	PCO	Full & Open	Washington International	Northern Region- Restore, Repair, And Develop Power Generation, Transmission, Distribution And Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition Systems Projects To Support The Iraq Cpa Mission
313	7/25/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/12/0	\$16,000,000.00	\$16,000,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Parsons	Workover Of Wells
314	7/25/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/13/0	\$8,146,270.00	\$8,146,270.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Parsons	Restore Compressions Stations In Northern Iraq
315	7/28/2004	W914NS-04-D-0008/9/0	\$13,609,053.00	\$13,609,053.00	CPAF	PCO	Full & Open	Fluoramec LLC	

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
316	7/28/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8900/01 P0001	\$12,054,399.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Not Available	Caterpillar Inc	Cat Motor Graders, Manuals
317	7/28/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8900/0001/02	\$106,999.00	\$106,999.00	FFP	DCMA	Not Available	Caterpillar Inc	Change Caterpillar Model To 140h
318	7/28/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8900/0001/02	\$106,999.00	\$106,999.00	FFP	DCMA	Not Available	Caterpillar Inc	Caterpillar Graders, Manuals
319	7/29/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8970/0001	\$0.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Caterpillar Inc	Caterpillar P3360c
320	7/29/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8970/0001/0	\$318,962.00	\$318,962.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Caterpillar Inc	Caterpillar P3360c
321	7/29/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8970/0002/01	\$1,018,728.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Caterpillar Inc	Caterpillar P360c
322	7/30/2004	W914NS-04-D-0008/10/0	\$17,549,897.00	\$17,549,897.00	CPFF	PCO	Full & Open	Fluorharc LLC	
323	8/3/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/9/2	\$3,000,000.00	\$3,000,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Parsons	Nte Amount Increased
324	8/6/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8024/0002/0	\$1,409,640.00	\$1,409,640.00	Not Available	TACOM Warren	Full & Open	Navistar	
325	8/13/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8104/0001/0	\$3,723,886.00	\$3,723,886.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Rosenbauer America LLC	Fire Truck Mini-pumper
326	8/13/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8104/0001/0	\$401,602.00	\$3,723,886.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Rosenbauer America LLC	Fire Truck Mini Pumper
327	8/13/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8019/0001/0	\$1,054,000.00	\$1,054,000.00	IDIQ	TACOM Warren	Full & Open	Terex Corporation	Crane, Hydraulic, All Terrain
328	8/17/2004	FA8903-04-D-8680/0003/0	\$9,961,000.00	\$9,961,000.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Washington International	Repair Schools
329	8/18/2004	FA8903-04-D-8680/0002/0	\$21,409,173.00	\$21,409,173.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Washington International	Repair Schools
330	8/19/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8016/0001/0	\$2,077,180.00	\$2,077,180.00	IDIQ	TACOM Warren	Full & Open	Grove	Crane Truck
331	8/19/2004	W914NS-04-M-9042/01 P00001		\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraq Contractor - 1588	Cancel Order In Its Entirety
332	8/20/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8880/0001/0	\$1,144,000.00	\$1,144,000.00	IDIQ	TACOM Warren	Full & Open	Komatsu America International Company	Hydraulic Excavator
333	8/27/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8036/0001/0	\$967,236.00	\$967,236.00	IDIQ	TACOM Warren	Full & Open	Terex Corporation	Trucks: 6x4 With Low Bed Trailer, 70 Ton
334	9/1/2004	267-A-00-04-00405/1/0	\$40,000,000.00	\$40,000,000.00	Not Available	USAD	Full & Open	Cepps Ivifas	Improved Efficiency & Accountability Of Local Governance
335	9/3/2004	267-C-00-04-00405/2/0	\$184,637,237.00	\$33,500,000.00	CPFF	USAD	Full & Open	Bearingpoint	Economy, Finance, Agriculture & Rural Economy
336	9/3/2004	W914NS-04-D-0128/5/0	\$11,169,276.00	\$11,169,276.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Bertoll Srl	
337	9/7/2004	DABV01-03-C-0002/01 P00003	\$804,585.00	\$804,585.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 3237	Setup,operate And Maintain The Kirkush Military Base
338	9/9/2004	FA8903-04-D-8681/00126/0	\$4,928,000.00	\$4,928,000.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Weston	Tallil Upgrades
339	9/10/2004	W56HZV-04-8074/0001/0	\$4,226,482.00	\$4,226,482.00	IDIQ	TACOM Warren	Not Available	Navistar	Water Tank Truck
340	9/10/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8069/0001/0	\$523,000.00	\$523,000.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Isometrics, Inc.	Fuel Tank Truck
341	9/13/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8041/0002/0	\$684,600.00	\$684,600.00	Not Available	TACOM Warren	Full & Open	S.c. Roman S.a.	Firetrucks
342	9/15/2004	W914NS-04-E-9014/0/0	\$26,246,562.00	\$26,246,562.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	American Science And Engineering Inc.	
343	9/15/2004	W9126G-04-D-0002/9/3	\$12,167,384.55	\$12,167,384.55	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Parsons	Increase Nte Amount
344	9/15/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8125/0001/0	\$653,880.00	\$653,880.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Volvo Construction Equipment North America Inc	Grader
345	9/15/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8125/0002/0	\$2,701,996.00	\$2,701,996.00	IDIQ	TACOM Warren	Not Available	Volvo Construction Equipment North America Inc	Grader
346	9/16/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/7/0	\$8,000,000.00	\$8,000,000.00	CPAF	PCO	Full & Open	Parsons	
347	9/16/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8076/0001/0	\$214,448.00	\$207,748.00	Not Available	TACOM Warren	Not Available	Certified Stainless Service Inc	Water Tank Truck
348	9/16/2004	W914NS-04-D-9006/0/0	\$439,545.00	\$0.00	IDIQ	PCO	Full & Open	Tti Service Professional Support Services	Flights
349	9/16/2004	W914NS-04-D-9007/0/0	\$622,845.00	\$0.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Sallyport Global Holdings	Flights
350	9/16/2004	W914NS-04-D-9007/0/0	\$769,600.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Sallyport Global Holdings	Flights
351	9/16/2004	W914NS-04-M-9166/0/0	\$27,564.46	\$27,564.46	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	American International Radio	Radio Supplies
352	9/16/2004	W914NS-05-M-9166/0/0	\$27,564.46	\$27,564.46	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	American International Radio	Installation
353	9/17/2004	W914NS-04-D-9006/1/0	\$540,000.00	\$540,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Tti Service Professional Support Services	No Schedule Attached

APPENDIX G

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contract Type	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
354	9/18/2004	W914NS-04-D-90071/10	\$769,600.00	\$769,600.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Sallyport Global Holdings	Flight Tasking Order
355	9/18/2004	W914NS-04-D-90071/10	\$102,000.00	\$769,600.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Sallyport Global Holdings	Add Additional Flight
356	9/18/2004	W914NS-04-M-90230/P00001	(\$17,528.00)	(\$17,528.00)	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Skylink	Decrease Unit Price And Add Line Item
357	9/20/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/80	\$21,000,000.00	\$21,000,000.00	CPAF	PCO	Full & Open	Parsons	Modernize Maternity And Pediatric Hospitals South Central
358	9/20/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/0008/0	\$21,000,000.00	\$21,000,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Parsons	Hospital Modernization
359	9/20/2004	W56HZV-04-D-0181/0004/0	\$10,317,894.56	\$10,317,894.56	Not Available	TACOM Warren	Not Available	Anham Joint Venture	Cargo Trailer
360	9/20/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8022/0/0	\$0.00	\$0.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Terex Corporation	Boom Truck
361	9/20/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8022/T0001/0	\$586,950.00	\$586,950.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Terex Corporation	Boom Truck
362	9/20/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8110/0001/0	\$88,250.00	\$88,250.00	Not Available	DCMA	Not Available	S.C. Roman S.a.	Flatbed Trucks
363	9/20/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8110/0001/0	\$88,250.00	\$88,250.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Not Available	Cargo Truck, Manuals
364	9/20/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8111/0001/0	\$109,581.73	\$109,581.73	Not Available	DCMA	Not Available	P & G Chevrolet, Inc.	3 Ton Dump Trucks
365	9/20/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8111/0001/0	\$109,581.73	\$109,581.73	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	P & G Chevrolet, Inc.	Dump Trucks, Manuals.
366	9/20/2004	W56HZV-04-P-8041/0/0	\$4,500.00	\$4,500.00	Not Available	DC SOUTHERN EUROPE	Full & Open	S.C. Roman S.a.	Manuals For Fire Trucks
367	9/20/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8126/0/0	\$138,455.00	\$0.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	James Worldwide Sales, Inc.	Buses
368	9/20/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8126/0001/0	\$1,169,602.00	\$1,169,602.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	James Worldwide Sales, Inc.	Buses
369	9/20/2004	W914NS-04-D-9007/DO0001/01	\$866,400.00	\$102,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Sallyport Global Holdings	Flights
370	9/20/2004	W914NS-04-M-9178/0/0	\$9,850.00	\$9,850.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1707	Power Connection At Karbala Police Academy
371	9/21/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/0009/0	\$8,000,000.00	\$8,000,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Parsons	Hospital Renovation
372	9/21/2004	W914NS-04-M-9176/0/0	\$4,617.00	\$4,617.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1544	Mattresses
373	9/22/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/001/0/0	\$25,000,000.00	\$25,000,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Parsons	Pediatric Hospitals
374	9/22/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/10/0	\$25,000,000.00	\$25,000,000.00	CPAF	PCO	Full & Open	Parsons	Renovation Of Hospitals Northern Iraq
375	9/22/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8046/0001/0	\$732,878.00	\$732,878.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Rosenbauer America LLC	Firetrucks
376	9/23/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/006/04	\$55,779,999.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Parsons	Modification To Increase The Nie Amount In Clinab - Najaf Teaching Hospital To \$1,050,000.00, And To Further Define The Added Items To Modification 02 Paragraph E. Scope Of Emergency Work Najaf Teaching Hospital.
377	9/23/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8113/0001/0	\$401,308.00	\$401,308.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	S.C. Roman S.a.	Truck, 30 Ton Trailer
378	9/23/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8860/0001/0	\$160,699.00	\$160,699.00	Not Available	DCMA	Not Available	Volvo Construction Equipment North America Inc	Backhoe Shipment To Baghdad And Baarah
379	9/23/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8860/0001/0	\$160,699.00	\$160,699.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Volvo Construction Equipment North America Inc	Construction Equipment
380	9/23/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8860/0001/0	\$160,699.00	\$160,699.00	Not Available	DCMA	Not Available	Volvo Construction Equipment North America Inc	Backhoes
381	9/23/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8860/0001/0	\$160,699.00	\$160,699.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Volvo Construction Equipment North America Inc	Backhoes, Water Tank Trucks, Manuals
382	9/23/2004	W914NS-04-M-9192/0/0	\$1,200.00	\$1,200.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Global Business Group	Floor Fans
383	9/24/2004	W914NS-04-M-0161/0/0	\$331,100.00	\$331,100.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Naran General Trading Co. LLC	Deliver Twin Lift Spreaders To Port Umm Qasr
384	9/24/2004	W914NS-04-M-9202/0/0	\$13,629.75	\$13,629.75	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 162	Office Supplies
385	9/27/2004	267-C-00-04-004171/1/0	\$87,999,873.00	\$27,200,000.00	CFFF	USAD	Full & Open	Louis Berger Group/moka	Economy, Finance, Agriculture & Rural Economy
386	9/27/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8075/0001/0	\$6,293,357.00	\$6,293,357.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Navistar	Water Tank Truck
387	9/27/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8830/0001/0	\$254,200.00	\$254,200.00	Not Available	DCMA	Not Available	Independent Systems Inc	Forklift Daewo Model D50c
388	9/27/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8830/0/0	\$179,759.00	\$0.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Independent Systems Inc	Forklifts
389	9/27/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8830/0001/0	\$254,200.00	\$254,200.00	CPAIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Independent Systems Inc	Forklifts
390	9/27/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8830/0001/0	\$254,200.00	\$254,200.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Independent Systems Inc	Forklifts, Manuals
391	9/28/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8067/0002/0	\$171,180.00	\$171,180.00	Not Available	DCMA	Not Available	Certified Stainless Service Inc	Truck With Fuel Tank Trailer

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
392	9/28/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8067/0002/0	\$171,180.00	\$171,180.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Certified Stainless Service Inc.	Semi Fuel Tank, Manuals
393	9/28/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8032/0001/0	\$186,200.00	\$186,200.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Mifram Projects Ltd	Agricultural Tractor, Manuals
394	9/28/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8032/0001/0	\$186,200.00	\$186,200.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Mifram Projects Ltd	Agricultural Tractors
395	9/28/2004	W56RCZ-04-C-0332/0/0	\$5,818,000.00	\$5,818,000.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Transatlantic Traders, Inc	Surveillance Aircraft, Misc
396	9/28/2004	W914NS-04-M-9222/0/0	\$375,350.00	\$375,350.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 2132	Camp Filji Interior Renovation
397	9/29/2004	267-C-00-04-00417-000/0	\$87,999,873.00	\$24,950,000.00	CFR	USAD	Not Available	Louis Berger Group/ MTC-Iraq, LLC. Joint Venture	Rehabilitate, Open And Operate Vocational Training And Employment Services
398	9/29/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8105/0001/0	\$1,379,744.00	\$1,379,744.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Lifeline Shelter Systems, Inc	Blood Transport Truck
399	9/29/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8105/0001/0	\$1,379,744.00	\$1,379,744.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Lifeline Shelter Systems, Inc	Refrigerated Blood Transport Truck
400	9/30/2004	267-C-00-04-00435/0/0	\$119,073,300.00	\$12,636,115.00	CFR	USAD	Full & Open	Louis Berger Group/psdi	Economy, Finance, Agriculture & Rural Economy
401	9/30/2004	267-C-00-04-00435-000/0	\$119,073,300.00	\$12,636,115.00	CFR	ACQUISITION AND ASSISTANCE OFFICE	Not Available	Louis Berger Group	Develop Private Sector And Generate Employment In Iraq
402	9/30/2004	FA8903-04-D-8669/0006/M0001	\$2,299,979.00	\$2,299,979.00	CFR	DCMA	Full & Open	Amec Earth & Environmental, Inc.	Renovate Tadiji Military Base
403	9/30/2004	FA8903-04-D-8672/0008/002	\$4,120,000.00	\$4,119,999.00	CFR	AFCEE	Not Available	Ecc International LLC	An Numanijah Phase I Part B
404	9/30/2004	FA8903-04-D-8672/0008/M0002	\$4,119,999.00	\$4,119,999.00	CFR	DCMA	Not Available	Ecc International LLC	Renovate And Construct Permanent Utilities
405	9/30/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8125/0002/01	(\$614,090.00)	(\$614,090.00)	FFP	DCMA	Not Available	Volvo Construction Equipment North America Inc	Grader
406	9/30/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/5/3	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00	Not Available	State Department/ PCO	Not Available	Parsons	Nte Amount Is Increased
407	9/30/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8022/0002/0	\$2,439,990.00	\$2,439,990.00	CPAIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Terex Corporation	Boom Truck
408	9/30/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8032/0002/0	\$1,083,250.00	\$1,083,250.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Certified Stainless Service Inc	Vacuum Haul Truck
409	9/30/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8114/0001/0	\$432,000.00	\$432,000.00	Not Available	DCMA	Not Available	S.c. Roman S.a	Flatbed Trucks
410	9/30/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8114/0001/0	\$432,000.00	\$432,000.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	S.c. Roman S.a	Trucks
411	9/30/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8114/0001/0	\$432,000.00	\$432,000.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	S.c. Roman S.a	Manuals
412	9/30/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8307/0002/0	\$761,850.00	\$761,850.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Independent Systems Inc	Forklift
413	9/30/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8830/0002/0	\$761,850.00	\$761,850.00	Not Available	DCMA	Not Available	Independent Systems Inc	Forklift, 5 Ton
414	9/30/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8830/0002/0	\$761,850.00	\$761,850.00	CPAIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Independent Systems Inc	Forklifts
415	9/30/2004	W56HZV-04-D-0022/0002/0	\$2,439,990.00	\$2,439,990.00	Not Available	TACOM Warren	Not Available	Terex Corporation	Boom Truck
416	9/30/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8028/0002/0	\$3,311,214.00	\$3,311,214.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Caterpillar Inc	Side Boom Truck
417	9/30/2004	W914NS-04-M-01740/0	\$174,788.00	\$174,788.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	W.s. Darley & Co	Fire Protection Equipment
418	9/30/2004	W914NS-04-M-01760/0	\$187,373.30	\$187,373.30	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Skylink	Fire Fighting Supplies
419	10/12/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8075/0002/0	\$3,742,392.00	\$3,742,392.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Navistar	Water Tank Trucks, Manuals
420	10/12/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8880/0002/0	\$4,914,000.00	\$4,914,000.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Komatsu America International Company	Hydraulic Excavator Fitted With Essential Equipment
421	10/12/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8880/0002/0	\$1,493,965.00	\$1,493,965.00	Not Available	DCMA	Not Available	Volvo Construction Equipment North America Inc	Excavator
422	10/12/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8049/0001/03	\$409,900.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Not Available	S.c. Roman S.a	Manuals
423	10/12/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8039/0002/0	\$1,427,535.00	\$1,427,535.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Terex Corporation	Cement Mixer Truck, Manuals
424	10/12/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8103/0001/0	\$292,575.00	\$292,575.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Lifeline Shelter Systems, Inc	Bloodmobile, Manuals
425	10/12/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8103/0001/0	\$292,575.00	\$292,575.00	Not Available	DCMA	Not Available	Lifeline Shelter Systems, Inc	Bloodmobiles
426	10/12/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8820/0002/0	\$3,180,724.00	\$3,180,724.00	Not Available	TACOM Warren	Not Available	Caterpillar Inc	Forklift, 5 Ton
427	10/12/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8075/0002/0	\$3,742,392.00	\$3,742,392.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Navistar	Water Tank Trucks

APPENDIX G

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
428	10/12/2004	W956HZV04-D-8099/0002/0	\$1,427,535.00	\$1,427,535.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Teres Corporation	Cement Mixer Truck
429	10/12/2004	W956HZV04-D-820/0002/0	\$3,180,724.00	\$3,180,724.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Caterpillar Inc	Forklift, 5 Ton
430	10/12/2004	W914NS-04-M-9226/0/0	\$235,000.08	\$235,000.08	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Advanced Technology	Internet& Computer Training Labs
431	10/12/2004	W914NS-05-M-9026/0/0	\$20,834.84	\$20,834.84	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Supplycore, Inc	Washers And Dryers
432	10/22/2004	W914NS-05-M-9032/0/0	\$7,325,000.00	\$34,200.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1919	Gas Cans And Water Cans
433	10/22/2004	W914NS-04-C-9036/0/0	\$653,891.00	\$653,891.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3238	Radat Vessel Traffic System
434	10/22/2004	W914NS-05-M-9031/0/00001	\$7,875.00	\$7,875.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Saudi Naval Support Company Ltd.	Add Dapping To Each Badge
435	10/22/2004	W914NS-05-M-9031-P00001/0/1	\$7,875.00	\$7,875.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Saudi Naval Support Company Ltd.	Badges
436	10/22/2004	W914NS-05-M-9032/0/0	\$34,200.00	\$34,200.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1919	Gas Cans
437	10/22/2004	W914NS-04-C-9051/0/0	\$12,000,000.00	\$12,000,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1715	
438	10/22/2004	W914NS-05-M-9033/0/0	\$12,104.00	\$12,104.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 162	Office Supplies
439	10/22/2004	W914NS-05-M-9034/0/0	\$84,600.00	\$84,600.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Triple Nickel Tactical Supply	N-vision Optics
440	10/22/2004	W914NS-05-M-9035/0/0	\$12,367.00	\$12,367.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 162	Office Supplies
441	10/22/2004	W914NS-05-M-9036/0/0	\$8,447.00	\$8,447.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 162	Office Supplies
442	10/22/2004	W914NS-05-M-9037/0/0	\$136,240.00	\$136,240.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2157	Repair Belat Al Shuhadaa Police Station
443	10/22/2004	W914NS-05-M-9038/0/0	\$12,839.75	\$12,839.75	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 162	Office Supplies
444	10/22/2004	W914NS-05-M-9061/0/0M0002	\$87,830.00	\$87,830.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2718	Supplies
445	10/42/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/0005/04	(\$8,589,036.00)	(\$8,589,036.00)	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Parsons	Modification To Reduce The Statement Of Work And To Reduce The Amount Funded Against This Contract From \$10,089,036.00 To \$1,500,000.00
446	10/42/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/0002/0	(\$8,589,036.00)	(\$8,589,036.00)	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Parsons	Reduce Statement Of Work
447	10/42/2004	W956HZV04-D-8066/0002/0	\$1,471,400.00	\$1,471,400.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Isometrics, Inc.	Fuel Tank Truck
448	10/42/2004	W956HZV04-D-8066/0002/0	\$1,471,400.00	\$1,471,400.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Isometrics, Inc.	Fuel Tanks
449	10/42/2004	W914NS-05-M-9039/0/0	\$10,949.00	\$10,949.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 162	Fixtures, Furnishings, Equipment For Al Zubour Patrol Station
450	10/42/2004	W914NS-05-M-9040/0/0	\$11,044.00	\$11,044.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 162	Fixtures, Furnishings, Equipment For Al Tajil Police Station
451	10/42/2004	W914NS-05-M-9041/0/0	\$45,915.00	\$45,915.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Motorola	Handheld Terminals, Sim, And Scratch Cards
452	10/42/2004	W914NS-05-M-9042/0/0	\$16,760.00	\$16,760.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Motorola	160 Unit Search Cards And Spare Batteries
453	10/52/2004	W914NS-05-M-9043/0/0	\$28,883.00	\$28,883.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2615	Sanitary Building
454	10/52/2004	W914NS-05-M-9046/0/0	\$11,220.00	\$11,220.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 162	Office Supplies
455	10/52/2004	W914NS-05-M-9047/0/0	\$258,125.00	\$258,125.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Richfield International, Inc.	Welding Supplies
456	10/62/2004	W956HZV04-D-8072/0001/0	\$585,600.00	\$585,600.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Isometrics, Inc.	Truck, Crespool Emptier
457	10/62/2004	W91150-04-A-0004/0029/01	(\$270.00)	(\$270.00)	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Triple Canopy Inc	Decrease Contract Amount
458	10/62/2004	W914NS-04-D-0139/0/00001	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Ma-tex Wire And Rope Co, Inc.	Change Payment Office
459	10/62/2004	W914NS-04-M-9048/0/0	\$53,342.60	\$53,342.60	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Asco	Aluminum Welding Wires, Steel Electrodes, Welder, Blow Torch
460	10/62/2004	W914NS-05-M-9048/0/0	\$53,342.60	\$53,342.60	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Asco	Welding Equipment
461	10/72/2004	W914NS-04-C-0001/0004/00004	\$2,255,009.00	\$2,255,009.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Atc Services, Inc	None.
462	10/72/2004	W914NS-05-M-2381/0/0	\$1,282,480.00	\$1,282,480.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Residential Power Distribution System For Mahalla 218
463	10/72/2004	W914NS-05-M-2382/0/0	\$1,452,550.00	\$1,452,550.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Residential Power Distribution System For Mahalla 218
464	10/72/2004	W914NS-05-M-9031/T0001/0	\$291,375.00	\$291,375.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Saudi Naval Support Company Ltd.	

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
465	10/12/2004	W914NS-05-M-91890/0	\$14,650.00	\$14,650.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Motorola	Thuraya Sat Phone Wchp
466	10/8/2004	FA8903-04-D-8672/0003/2	\$13,199,923.00	\$13,199,923.00	Not Available	AFCEE	Full & Open	Ecc International LLC	Construct Kirkuk Imb
467	10/8/2004	FA8903-04-8672/0003/0002	\$13,199,923.00	\$13,199,923.00	CPFF	AFCEE	Full & Open	Ecc International LLC	Construct Kirkuk Imb
468	10/8/2004	W914NS-04-D-0066/0002/07	(\$2,661,449.00)	(\$2,661,449.00)	Not Available	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	Building, Housing, And Health Sector Design/ Build Services To Restore, Rebuild, And Develop Public Projects To Support The Iraq Cpa Mission
469	10/8/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8039/00001/0	\$2,868,699.00	\$2,868,699.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Navistar	Recovery Truck
470	10/8/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8039/1/0	\$2,868,699.00	\$2,868,699.00		DCMA	Full & Open	Navistar	Recovery Trucks
471	10/8/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8039/00001/0	\$2,868,699.00	\$2,868,699.00	CPALQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Navistar	Recovery Truck
472	10/8/2004	W56HZV-05-D-8122/00001/0	\$126,582.43	\$126,582.43	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	P & G Chevrolet, Inc.	Distributor Asphalt 100
473	10/8/2004	W914NS-05-M-9053/0/0	\$160,620.59	\$160,620.59	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Dfs Logistics, LLC	Medical Equipment
474	10/9/2004	W914NS-05-M-2383/0/0	\$4,440,624.00	\$4,440,624.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Electrical Power Cables & Components
475	10/10/2004	W914NS-04-M-0114/0/ P00001	\$42,288.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Xuan Yuan Industrial Development Co, Ltd	Modification Of Contract Terms Only - Fix Typo And Change Payment Method
476	10/10/2004	W914NS-04-M-0114/0/ P00001	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Xuan Yuan Industrial Development Co, Ltd	Fix Typo And Change Payment Method
477	10/11/2004	W914NS-05-M-9054/0/0	\$7,960.00	\$7,960.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Office Supplies And Furniture
478	10/11/2004	W914NS-05-M-9061/0/0	\$77,030.00	\$77,030.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2691	Office Supplies
479	10/11/2004	W914NS-05-M-9063/0/0	\$69,000.00	\$69,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2625	Police Station Construction
480	10/11/2004	W914NS-05-M-9066/0/0	\$9,710.00	\$9,710.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2613	Repair And Replace Heating A/c And Electrical
481	10/12/2004	W914NS-04-D-0104/ T00260	\$39,561.14	\$39,561.14	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2722	Printer, Laptop, Computer Supplies
482	10/12/2004	W914NS-04-D-0104/ T00270	\$92,569.28	\$92,569.28	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2722	Printer, Laptop, Computer Supplies
483	10/12/2004	W914NS-04-D-0104/ T00280	\$169,483.56	\$169,483.56	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2722	Printer, Laptop, Computer Supplies
484	10/12/2004	W914NS-04-D-0104/ T00290	\$376,544.41	\$376,544.41	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2722	Printer, Laptop, Computer Supplies
485	10/12/2004	W914NS-04-D-0104/ T00300	\$58,497.22	\$58,497.22	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2722	Computers, And Computer Supplies
486	10/12/2004	W914NS-04-D-0104/ T00310	\$48,275.11	\$48,275.11	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2722	Computers, And Computer Supplies
487	10/12/2004	W914NS-05-M-9067/0/0	\$254,680.00	\$254,680.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Global Link Distribution LLC	Karadah-maryam Police Station Refurbishment
488	10/13/2004	W914NS-05-C-9003/0/0	\$709,183.00	\$709,183.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Overseas Support Services	Costal Patrol Boats
489	10/13/2004	W914NS-05-D-9001/00001/0	\$29,897.98	\$29,897.98	IDIQ	PCO	Full & Open	Supplycore, Inc	Tools And Shop Supplies
490	10/13/2004	W914NS-05-D-9001/00002/0	\$9,577.62	\$9,577.62	IDIQ	PCO	Full & Open	Supplycore, Inc	Tool Sets
491	10/13/2004	W914NS-05-M-9069/0/0	\$131,380.50	\$131,380.50	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2603	Computers, And Computer Supplies
492	10/13/2004	W914NS-05-M-9070/0/0	\$13,020.00	\$13,020.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 743	Police Training Facility Construction
493	10/13/2004	W914NS-05-M-9071/0/0	\$26,019.00	\$26,019.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2603	Twalls, Jersey Barriers
494	10/13/2004	W914NS-05-M-9074/0/0	\$23,760.00	\$23,760.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 620	Upgrade Radios
495	10/14/2004	W914NS-05-F-9001/0/0	\$363,878.00	\$363,878.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	American International Radio	New Brigade Kirkuk Military Base
496	10/15/2004	FA8903-04-D-8672/0003/ M0002	\$13,199,923.00	\$13,199,923.00	CPFF	DCMA	Not Available	Ecc International LLC	Mobile Phone, Laptops
497	10/15/2004	W914NS-05-M-9080/0/0	\$90,631.00	\$90,631.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2721	Phone And Phone Accessories
498	10/15/2004	W914NS-05-M-9102/0/0	\$10,340.00	\$10,340.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1246	Pave 39.1 Kms Road-diyala
499	10/16/2004	W914NS-04-D-0104/ T00320	\$42,752.06	\$42,752.06	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2722	
500	10/16/2004	W914NS-05-C-0001/0/0	\$1,885,827.25	\$1,885,827.25	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	

APPENDIX G

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contract Type	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
501	10/16/2004	W914NS-05-C-9002/0/0	\$541,503.00	\$541,503.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Pave 10.2 Kms Road-diyala
502	10/16/2004	W914NS-05-M-9082/0/0	\$17,920.00	\$17,920.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1588	Office Supplies
503	10/16/2004	W914NS-05-M-9083/0/0	\$4,620.00	\$4,620.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 812	Fuel Truck, Gasoline
504	10/16/2004	W914NS-05-M-9084/0/0	\$11,460.00	\$11,460.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Mini Mag Lights
505	10/16/2004	W914NS-05-M-9085/0/0	\$42,000.00	\$42,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2644	Computer Supplies
506	10/17/2004	W914NS-05-C-9008/0/0	\$189,500.00	\$189,500.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 744	Force Protection And Renovation Of Mcu
507	10/18/2004	GS-07F-90100/W914NS-05-F-9002/0	\$414,567.00	\$414,567.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1048	Evd-3000 Handheld Explosive Detectors
508	10/18/2004	W914NS-05-M-9088/0/0	\$17,225.00	\$17,225.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Highcom Security Inc.	Gps And Gps Software
509	10/19/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8051/0/0	\$2,850.00	\$2,850.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Rosenbauer America LLC	Fire Truck
510	10/19/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8051/0/0001	\$474,580.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Not Available	Rosenbauer America LLC	Establishes The Unit Price For The Shipment Of Fire Trucks To Mosul And Baghdad
511	10/19/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8051/0002/0		\$0.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Rosenbauer America LLC	Fire Truck
512	10/19/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8051/0002/0	\$704,620.00	\$704,620.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Rosenbauer America LLC	Fire Truck
513	10/19/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8051/0002/0	\$704,620.00	\$704,620.00	Not Available	DCMA	Not Available	Rosenbauer America LLC	Firetrucks
514	10/19/2004	W56HZV-04-R-8051/0/0	\$2,850.00	\$2,850.00	CPAIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Rosenbauer America LLC	Manuals For Firetrucks
515	10/19/2004	W914NS-05-C-9009/0/0	\$115,570.00	\$115,570.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2721	Hy Al Amil Police Station Reconstruction
516	10/19/2004	W914NS-05-M-9087/0/0	\$430,641.25	\$430,641.25	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2592	Field Equipment
517	10/19/2004	W914NS-05-M-9090/0/0	\$259,200.00	\$259,200.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Naman & Basil Consulting Group	Boots, Pants, Short Sleeve Shirts
518	10/19/2004	W914NS-05-M-9092/0/0	\$187,575.00	\$187,575.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Motorola	Motorola Equipment
519	10/19/2004	W914NS-05-M-9094/0/0	\$7,290.00	\$7,290.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1919	Gas Cans, Heavy Duty
520	10/20/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8085/0001/0003	\$123,954.00	\$123,954.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Komatsu America International Company	Computers, And Computer Supplies
521	10/20/2004	W914NS-05-M-9100/0/0	\$21,000.00	\$21,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1588	Mop, Bucket, Padlock, 4 Wheel Handcart
522	10/20/2004	W914NS-05-M-9103/0/0	\$4,099.50	\$4,099.50	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1246	Construct Fence W/razor Wire, Renovate
523	10/21/2004	W914NS-05-M-9104/0/0	\$138,900.00	\$138,900.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2297	Carpenter Tool Kits
524	10/22/2004	GS-06F-0018U/W914NS-05-F-9003/0	\$12,690.00	\$12,690.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Klipper Tool	Supplies: Card Id, Film, Cleaning Kit
525	10/22/2004	W914NS-05-M-9110/0/0	\$14,308.00	\$14,308.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Alpha Card Systems	Ceia HI-pe Multi Zone Magnetometer
526	10/24/2004	GS-07F-9997/GW914NS-05-F-9004/0	\$89,992.00	\$89,992.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Smiths Detection	Flights
527	10/25/2004	W914NS-04-D-9006/0/00002	\$0.00	\$0.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Tri Service Professional Support Services	Fire Truck, Medium Rescue
528	10/27/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8106/0002/0	\$8,129,580.00	\$8,129,580.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Rosenbauer America LLC	Upgrade Armor
529	10/27/2004	W914NS-05-M-9035/0/0	\$629,100.00	\$629,100.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2638	Biap Military Airport
530	10/28/2004	FA8903-04-D-8678/0073/0	\$21,017,439.00	\$21,017,439.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Toltest, Inc.	Renovation Of Baghdad Airport
531	10/28/2004	FA8903-04-D-8678/0073/0	\$21,017,439.00	\$21,017,439.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Toltest, Inc.	Trucks
532	10/28/2004	W56HZV-05-D-8109/0/0	\$203,159.82	\$203,159.82	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	P & G Chevrolet, Inc.	Trucks
533	10/28/2004	W56HZV-05-D-8109/0001/0	\$101,151.13	\$101,151.13	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	P & G Chevrolet, Inc.	Fixtures, Furnishings And Equipment
534	10/28/2004	W914NS-05-M-0135/0/0	\$13,863.00	\$13,863.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 620	Fixtures, Furnishings And Equipment
535	10/28/2004	W914NS-05-M-0108/0/0	\$117,540.00	\$117,540.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 162	Fixtures, Furnishings And Equipment
536	10/28/2004	W914NS-05-M-9132/0/0	\$14,140.00	\$14,140.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 620	Fixtures, Furnishings And Equipment
537	10/28/2004	W914NS-05-M-9134/0/0	\$13,786.50	\$13,786.50	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Linen Sets
538	10/28/2004	W914NS-05-M-9135/0/0	\$13,863.00	\$13,863.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 620	Fixtures, Furnishings And Equipment

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
539	10/28/2004	W914NS-05-M-91360/0	\$290,789.70	\$290,789.70	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Sohel General Trading	First Aid Kits, Sleeping Bags, Towels
540	10/29/2004	FA8903-04-D-866970027/0	\$43,985,787.00	\$43,985,787.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Amec Earth & Environmental, Inc.	Construct An Operating Special Police Station
541	10/29/2004	FA8903-04-86720016/0	\$38,241,721.00	\$38,241,721.00	CFF	AFCEE	Full & Open	Ecc International LLC	2nd Brigade Kirkuk
542	10/29/2004	FA8903-04-D-86720016/0	\$38,241,721.00	\$38,241,721.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Ecc International LLC	Civil Site Work
543	10/29/2004	W914NS-05-C-9011/0/0	\$9,396,761.50	\$9,396,761.50	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Nour Usa	Portable Radios And Radio Supplies
544	10/29/2004	W914NS-05-M-91390/0	\$4,918,640.00	\$4,918,640.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Motorola	Mobile And Portable Raiois
545	10/29/2004	W914NS-05-M-91420/0	\$6,153.00	\$6,153.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1246	Office Supplies
546	10/29/2004	W914NS-05-M-91430/0	\$13,597.50	\$13,597.50	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 620	Fixtures, Furnishings And Equipment
547	10/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-9011/0/ P00001	\$9,396,761.50	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Nour Usa	Portable Radios
548	10/30/2004	W914NS-05-M-91450/0	\$872.00	\$872.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Kipper Tool	Mechanics Tool Kit
549	10/31/2004	W914NS-04-D-9015/0/ P00001	(\$2,400.00)	(\$2,400.00)	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Thuraya Satellite Communications	
550	10/31/2004	W914NS-04-D-9015/0001/ P00001	(\$2,400.00)	(\$2,400.00)	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Thuraya Satellite Communications	39 Unit Scratch Cards
551	10/31/2004	W914NS-05-M-9061/0/ P00002	\$10,800.00	\$10,800.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2718	
552	11/1/2004	W914NS-05-M-20000/0	\$307,000.00	\$307,000.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Residential Power Distribution System For Doura Q & Salam 410
553	11/1/2004	W914NS-05-M-2001/0/0	\$199,500.00	\$199,500.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Install And Test New 33kv Yarmouk To Ma'amoon 1st Cav
554	11/1/2004	W914NS-05-M-2002/0/0	\$299,750.00	\$299,750.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Supply, Install And Test 1 New 11kv Ugf Cable Al Jehad 1st Cav
555	11/2/2004	W914NS-05-M-91480/0	\$13,238.50	\$13,238.50	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 620	Office Supplies
556	11/2/2004	W914NS-05-M-91490/0	\$13,867.75	\$13,867.75	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 620	Office Supplies
557	11/2/2004	W914NS-05-M-91500/0	\$14,400.00	\$14,400.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 620	Furniture
558	11/2/2004	W914NS-05-M-9151/0/0	\$14,500.00	\$14,500.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 620	Furniture
559	11/2/2004	W914NS-05-M-9152/0/0	\$23,517.12	\$23,517.02	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3237	Office Supplies
560	11/2/2004	W914NS-05-M-9153/0/0	\$185,000.00	\$185,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2663	Beds And Tables
561	11/2/2004	W914NS-05-M-9154/0/0	\$2,480.00	\$2,480.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1027	Remote Speaker
562	11/2/2004	W914NS-05-M-91680/0	\$16,200.00	\$16,200.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2629	Parking Lot Security Fence
563	11/2/2004	W914NS-05-M-91960/0	\$10,000.00	\$10,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 620	Delivery And Setup Complexes
564	11/2/2004	FA8903-04-86720017/0	\$7,515,177.00	\$7,515,177.00	CFF	AFCEE	Full & Open	Ecc International LLC	Al Kut Police Academy
565	11/2/2004	FA8903-04-D-8672/0017/0	\$7,515,177.00	\$7,515,177.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Ecc International LLC	Al Kut Regional Safety Academy Facilities
566	11/3/2004	W914NS-04-D-0006/5/5	(\$384,265.00)	(\$384,265.00)	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Parsons	Modification To Reduce Total Funds Obligated To Task Order 0005 From \$1,500,00.00 To \$1,115,735.00
567	11/3/2004	W56HZV-04-D-B114/0001/01	\$440,000.00	\$8,000.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	S.c. Roman S.a.	Trk 6x4tr1
568	11/3/2004	W56HZV-04-D-B123/0001/0	\$287,920.00	\$287,920.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	S.c. Roman S.a.	123/121 Trk, Mobile Equipment
569	11/3/2004	W56HZV-04-D-B123/0001/01	\$0.00	\$4,000.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	S.c. Roman S.a.	Worker's Comp
570	11/3/2004	W914NS-04-D-0125/0004/0	\$2,143,071.20	\$0.00	FFP	CPA	Not Available	Fisher Scientific Company L.L.c.	Fire Protection Equipment
571	11/3/2004	W914NS-05-M-9171/0/0	\$188,381.92	\$188,381.92	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	O-two Medical Technologies Inc.	Carevent Mri
572	11/4/2004	FA8903-04-D-8672/0018/0	\$48,615,094.00	\$48,615,094.00	IDIQ	AFCEE	Full & Open	Ecc International LLC	Camp India Reconstruction
573	11/5/2004	W56HZV-04-D-B104/0002/0	\$38,210,520.00	\$0.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Rosenbauer America LLC	Fire Truck Mini Pumper
574	11/5/2004	FA8903-04-D-8669/0028/0	\$35,746,440.00	\$35,746,440.00	CFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Amec Earth & Environmental, Inc.	Furnishing All Labor, Equipment, Materials, Security
575	11/5/2004	W56HZV-04-D-B104/0002/0	\$15,063,352.00	\$15,063,352.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Rosenbauer America LLC	Fire Truck Mini-pumper

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contract Type	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
576	11/6/2004	W914NS-05-M-91750/0	\$299,736.00	\$299,736.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2710	Base Station Conversion Kits
577	11/6/2004	W914NS-05-M-20040/0	\$295,000.00	\$295,000.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Supply, Install And Test A 33kv Ugf Cable Al Washash To New Washash 1st Cav
578	11/7/2004	W914NS-05-C-90110/ P00002	\$9,474,118.60	\$77,357.10	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Nour Usa	Uhf Radios For Iraq Security Forces
579	11/7/2004	W914NS-05-C-90110/ P00002	\$77,357.10	\$77,357.10	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Nour Usa	Uhf Radios For Iraq Security Forces
580	11/7/2004	W914NS-05-C-00050/0	\$1,291,740.00	\$1,291,740.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Pave 15.35 Kms Road-najaf
581	11/7/2004	W914NS-05-C-00060/0	\$337,697.00	\$337,697.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Pave 7 Kms Road-najaf
582	11/7/2004	W914NS-05-M-91900/0	\$5,008.18	\$5,008.18	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1919	Gas And Water Cans
583	11/7/2004	W914NS-05-M-91920/0	\$68,900.00	\$68,900.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1102	Mobile Kitchen
584	11/8/2004	W914NS-05-M-91830/0	\$85,000.00	\$85,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2665	River Patrol Station
585	11/8/2004	W914NS-05-M-91850/0	\$42,712.00	\$42,712.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 580	Construction An Al-muhadam Police Station
586	11/8/2004	W914NS-05-M-91860/0	\$285,630.00	\$285,630.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1748	Construction At Al Shulla Police Station
587	11/8/2004	W914NS-05-M-91950/0	\$66,953.25	\$66,953.25	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3237	Paint 2 Front Doors For 351 Land Cruisers.
588	11/9/2004	FA8903-04-D-867800770	\$13,214,865.00	\$13,214,865.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Toltest, Inc.	Increase The Water Flow And Replace Water Pipeline
589	11/9/2004	FA8903-04-D-867800770	\$13,214,865.00	\$13,214,865.00	CPFF	DCMA	Full & Open	Toltest, Inc.	Mandal Pipe Line
590	11/9/2004	W56HZV-04-D-B042/0001/03	\$190,300.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	S.c. Roman S.a.	Fire Truck
591	11/9/2004	W56HZV-04-D-B042/0/ P00005	\$382,900.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	S.c. Roman S.a.	Fire Truck
592	11/9/2004	W914NS-05-C-20000/0	\$1,785,000.00	\$1,785,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Caterpillar Diesel Engine Generator
593	11/10/2004	W56HZV-04-D-B104/ T0001/02	\$38,172,710.00	\$38,172,710.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Rosenbauer America LLC	
594	11/10/2004	W56HZV-04-D-B104/0001/03	\$3,770,588.00	\$46,702.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Rosenbauer America LLC	Fire Truck Mini Pumper
595	11/10/2004	W914NS-05-M-91780/0	\$3,176,480.57	\$3,176,480.57	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2722	Augment Equipment
596	11/10/2004	W914NS-05-M-91870/0	\$246,881.00	\$246,881.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2643	Construct Al Jauaifer Police Station
597	11/12/2004	W56HZV-04-D-B085/ T000040		\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Komatsu America International Company	Utility Vehicles, Manuals
598	11/12/2004	W56HZV-04-D-B085/ T0000404		\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Komatsu America International Company	Utility Vehicles, Manuals
599	11/12/2004	W914NS-05-C-00070/0	\$1,147,547.90	\$1,147,547.90	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Pave 22.25 Kms Road-babil
600	11/12/2004	W914NS-05-C-00080/0	\$810,000.00	\$810,000.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Pave 6.6. Kms Road-babil
601	11/12/2004	W914NS-05-M-90320/ P00001	\$1,560.00	\$1,560.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 1919	Administrative Mod: Change Delivery Address Add Clin 0003 And Increase Award
602	11/13/2004	W914NS-05-C-00090/0	\$1,119,476.00	\$1,119,476.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Pave 21 Kms Road-ninawa
603	11/13/2004	W914NS-05-C-00100/0	\$2,258,275.00	\$2,258,275.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Pave 33.1kms Road-ninawa
604	11/13/2004	W914NS-05-C-00260/0	\$1,458,580.00		Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	
605	11/13/2004	W914NS-05-C-00420/0	\$910,300.00	\$910,300.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Pave 8.9 Kms Road-baghdad
606	11/13/2004	W914NS-05-C-00430/0	\$548,280.00	\$548,280.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Pave 6.5 Kms Road-baghdad
607	11/13/2004	W914NS-05-M-91880/0	\$874,520.00	\$874,520.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2643	Construction Of Al Mahmoudya Police Station
608	11/13/2004	W914NS-05-M-92100/0	\$4,500.00	\$4,500.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2025	Electrical Work At Umm Qsar

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
609	11/13/2004	W914NS-05-M-9212/0/0	\$30,000.00	\$30,000.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2025	Install Perimeter Security Fence At Umm Qasr
610	11/13/2004	W914NS-05-M-9213/0/0	\$1,750.00	\$1,750.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2568	Install Barriers At Road Entrance For Police College
611	11/13/2004	W914NS-05-M-9214/0/0	\$8,140.00	\$8,140.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2568	Install Chainlink Fence For Police College Entrance
612	11/14/2004	W914NS-05-M-9209/0/0	\$4,460.00	\$4,460.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2129	Tv And Digital Cameras
613	11/14/2004	W914NS-05-M-9220/0/0	\$995,371.00	\$995,371.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2631	Construction Of Al Madean Police Station
614	11/14/2004	W914NS-05-M-9225/0/0	\$14,460.00	\$14,460.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2629	Design And Replace Fencing At Ice House Gate
615	11/14/2004	W914NS-05-M-9226/0/0	\$235,000.00	\$235,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Global Link Distribution LLC	Perimeter And Interior Construction For Jisr Diyala Ip Station
616	11/15/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8062/0001/A1	\$192,366.00	\$500.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Certified Stainless Service Inc	Tik 6x4/r1
617	11/15/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8062/T0002/02		\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Certified Stainless Service Inc	Tik 6x4/r1
618	11/15/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8063/0001/02	\$0.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Not Available	Certified Stainless Service Inc	Truck With Hydrochloric Acid Tank
619	11/15/2004	W914NS-05-M-9229/0/0	\$2,890.00	\$2,890.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2166	Computer Desks And Chairs
620	11/15/2004	W914NS-05-M-9230/0/0	\$46,800.00	\$46,800.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1758	Concrete Fence
621	11/16/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8125/T0001/0	\$270,235.00	\$270,235.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Volvo Construction Equipment North America Inc	Construction Equipment
622	11/16/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8125/0/P0001	\$283,920.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Volvo Construction Equipment North America Inc	Modification To Contract Terms Only: Increased The Unit Price For Clin 1251aa By \$10,765 And Clin 1251ab By \$10,808
623	11/16/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8124/0/0	\$190,050.00	\$0.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Econ Energy & Construction Inc.	Tanker
624	11/16/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8124/0001/0	\$95,050.00	\$95,050.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Econ Energy & Construction Inc.	Tanker
625	11/17/2004	W914NS-04-D-0104/0028/P00002	\$30,000.00	\$30,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2722	Increase Monetary Value
626	11/17/2004	W914NS-04-D-0104/0028/P00002	\$30,000.00	\$30,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2722	None.
627	11/17/2004	W914NS-04-D-0104/T0028/P00001	\$30,000.00	\$30,000.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2722	Printer, Laptop, Computer Supplies
628	11/17/2004	W914NS-04-D-0104/0028/P00002	\$30,000.00	\$30,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2722	Computers, And Computer Supplies
629	11/17/2004	W914NS-05-C-0030/0/0	\$1,398,315.00	\$1,398,315.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Pave 22.1 Kms Road-lameem
630	11/17/2004	W914NS-05-C-0034/0/0	\$1,802,360.00	\$1,802,360.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Pave 20.5 Kms Road-missan
631	11/17/2004	W914NS-05-C-0041/0/0	\$2,888,268.36	\$2,888,268.36	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Pave 34 Kms Road-muthanna
632	11/17/2004	W914NS-05-M-2003/0/0	\$212,500.00	\$212,500.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	33kv Underground Feeder Cable From The Yosifiya 132/33/11kv Substation To The Al Awairej 33/11kv Substation
633	11/17/2004	W914NS-05-M-9215/0/0	\$229,020.00	\$229,020.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1665	Renovation For Living Barracks And Construct Sanitary Building
634	11/17/2004	W914NS-05-M-9228/0/0	\$203,934.00	\$203,934.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2157	Renovation Of Alsadir Patrol Hq
635	11/17/2004	W914NS-05-M-9233/0/0	\$9,450.00	\$9,450.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 187	Water Supply To Pontoons
636	11/17/2004	W914NS-05-M-9235/0/0	\$398,000.00	\$398,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Metro Star General Trading	Renovation Of Al Hurriya Police Station
637	11/17/2004	W914NS-05-M-9236/0/0	\$163,365.00	\$163,365.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2157	Renovation Of Baghdad Traffic Police
638	11/18/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8106/0/P00001	\$1,948,780.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Not Available	Rosenbauer America LLC	Modification To Contract Terms Only: Replace The Contract Specifications Of Attachment 1 - Amended 11-15-04
639	11/18/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8106/0/P00001	\$0.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Not Available	Rosenbauer America LLC	Modification To Contract Terms Only: Replace The Contract Specifications Of Attachment 1 - Amended 11-15-04
640	11/18/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8125/0001/01	\$707,705.00	\$53,825.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Volvo Construction Equipment North America Inc	Construction Equipment
641	11/18/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8125/0001/02	\$707,705.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Not Available	Volvo Construction Equipment North America Inc	Construction Equipment
642	11/18/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8056/0001/01	\$0.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Not Available	S.c. Roman S.a	Mobile Cold Storage Truck, Manuals

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contract Type	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
643	11/18/2004	W914NS-05-C-0032/0/0	\$150,000.00	\$150,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Design--schalschiya
644	11/18/2004	W914NS-05-C-0033/0/0	\$897,000.00	\$897,000.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Not Available	
645	11/18/2004	W914NS-05-C-0044/0/0	\$2,535,250.00	\$2,535,250.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Pave 21.4 Kms Road-al Qadissiya
646	11/18/2004	W914NS-05-M-9179/ T0001/0	\$1,610.00	\$1,610.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Jtsi Inc	
647	11/18/2004	W914NS-05-M-9237/0/0	\$620,000.00	\$620,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Global Link Distribution LLC	Renovation Of Al Khadamiyah Taji Patrol Station
648	11/19/2004	W56HZV-04-D- B002/0001/01	\$58,022,308.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Navistar	Administrative Modification: Change Shipping Information
649	11/19/2004	W56HZV-04-D- B002/0001/01	\$5,782,382.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Navistar	Administrative Modification: Change Shipping Information
650	11/19/2004	W914NS-05-C-0031/0/0	\$1,619,825.00	\$1,619,825.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Pave 21.35 Kms Road-taneem
651	11/22/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8044/0/ P00002	\$0.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Rosenbauer America LLC	Fire Truck
652	11/22/2004	W914NS-05-C-0035/0/0	\$1,161,937.65	\$1,161,937.65	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Pave 15.1 Kms Road-karbala
653	11/22/2004	W914NS-05-M-9245/0/0	\$3,232.25	\$3,232.25	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Advanced Technology	Microsoft Office Professional 2003
654	11/22/2004	W914NS-05-M-9264/0/0	\$173,130.00	\$173,130.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1737	Renovation Of Ing Hq
655	11/22/2004	W914NS-05-M-9265/0/0	\$485,335.00	\$485,335.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 76	Renovation For Ing Traing Center @ Fob Normandy
656	11/24/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8126/0/ P0001	\$1,270,222.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	James Worldwide Sales, Inc.	Mini Bus
657	11/24/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8126/0/0	\$144,045.00	\$144,045.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	James Worldwide Sales, Inc.	Standard Commercial Practice For Safe Delivery To Umm Qsar
658	11/24/2004	W914NS-05-M-9083/0/ P00001	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 812	Change Accounting Classification Of Contract
659	11/25/2004	W914NS-05-M-9277/0/0	\$14,450.00	\$14,450.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3229	Construction Of Shoot House In An Numanjay Iaf Base
660	11/27/2004	W914NS-05-C-0036/0/0	\$840,000.00	\$840,000.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Pave 15 Kms Road-salah Al Din
661	11/27/2004	W914NS-05-M-2005/0/0	\$182,000.00	\$182,000.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Not Available	Replace Two 11kv Ugrf Cables From The Abu-disher Substation, Baghdad
662	11/27/2004	W914NS-05-M-9280/0/0	\$9,585.00	\$9,585.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2569	Construct Two Room Facility Baghdad Police College Gate
663	11/28/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8002/0/ P00001	\$5,728,382.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Navistar	Administrative Modification: Change Shipping Information
664	11/28/2004	W914NS-05-C-0037/0/0	\$908,370.00	\$908,370.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Pave 11.3 Kms Road-salah Al Din
665	11/28/2004	W914NS-05-M-9284/0/0	\$190,000.00	\$190,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2649	Refurbishment For Fob 2, Al Faw
666	11/28/2004	W914NS-05-M-9285/0/0	\$160,000.00	\$160,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2161	Refurbishment And Construction For Fob3, Al Qurnah
667	11/28/2004	W914NS-05-M-9286/0/0	\$203,000.00	\$203,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2521	Refurbishment For 603 Bn, As Samawah
668	11/28/2004	W914NS-05-M-9287/0/0	\$8,000.00	\$8,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2630	Eod Bunker Weekly Camp Steven Refurbishment
669	11/28/2004	W914NS-05-M-9288/0/0	\$4,000.00	\$4,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2606	Eod Bunker Weekly Camp Steven Refurbishment
670	11/28/2004	W914NS-05-M-9289/0/0	\$110,360.00	\$110,360.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2712	Al Qurnah Tactical Support Unit Refurbishment
671	11/29/2004	W914NS-05-C-0038/0/0	\$2,451,000.00	\$2,451,000.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Pave 19 Kms Road-basrah
672	11/29/2004	W914NS-05-C-0040/0/0	\$3,888,725.00	\$3,888,725.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Pave 50 Kms Road-wasit
673	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-0011/0006/0	\$1,705,279.00	\$1,705,279.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Construction--basrah & Tr Qar Stations
674	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-0013/0008/0	\$913,371.00	\$913,371.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Construction--babil & Baghdad Stations
675	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-0014/0009/0	\$2,210,823.00	\$2,210,823.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Construction--salad Al Din & Taamin Stations
676	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-0015/0011/0	\$1,200,000.00	\$1,200,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Construction--ninewa Stations
677	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-0016/0011/0	\$5,000,000.00	\$5,000,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Construction--baghdad Central Station

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
678	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-0017/0022/0	\$1,175,040.00	\$1,175,040.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Construction—umm Qasr Operations Center
679	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-0018/ Several/0	\$59,200.00	\$59,200.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Design—additional Irr Stations
680	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-0019/0000/0	\$110,000.00	\$110,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Design—zuba Bridge
681	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-0020/0005/0	\$482,155.00	\$482,155.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Design—sheikh Sa'ad Bridge
682	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-0021/0006/0	\$86,000.00	\$86,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Design—basrah & Thi Qar Stations
683	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-0022/0007/0	\$66,000.00	\$66,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Design—muthanna & Qadisiya Stations
684	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-0023/0008/0	\$44,000.00	\$44,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Design—babil & Baghdad Stations
685	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-0024/0009/0	\$80,000.00	\$80,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Design—salad Al Din & Taamim Stations
686	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-0025/0010/0	\$58,000.00	\$58,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Design—nineewa Stations
687	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-0026/0011/0	\$44,000.00	\$44,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Design—baghdad Central Station
688	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-0027/0/0	\$925,190.00	\$925,190.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Roofing/asbestos Removal
689	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-0028/0015/0	\$355,000.00	\$355,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Design—kufa Bridge
690	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-C-0029/0/0	\$87,930.00	\$87,930.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Design—nabriyah Bridge
691	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-M-9241/0/0	\$101,888.38	\$101,888.38	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3237	Apartment Furniture Kit
692	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-M-9298/0/0	\$110,000.00	\$110,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2657	Sand Bags, Burlap
693	11/30/2004	W914NS-05-M-9304/0/0	\$25,000.00	\$25,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2586	Renovation Of Latfiyah Highway Patrol
694	12/1/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8041/ T0003/0	\$467,800.00	\$467,800.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	S.c Roman S.a	Fire Truck Water 16k L
695	12/1/2004	W56HZV-04-D- B049/0001/04	\$403,400.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	S.c Roman S.a	Fire Truck 6x4
696	12/1/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8049/0/ P00004	\$413,500.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	S.c Roman S.a	Fire Truck 6x4
697	12/1/2004	W914NS-05-M-9300/0/0	\$1,736,224.60	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2389	Portable Radios And Radio Supplies
698	12/1/2004	W914NS-05-M-9300/0/ P00001	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2389	Radios W/encryption Kifs
699	12/1/2004	W914NS-05-M-9300/0/ P00002		\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2389	Mobile Radios W/encryption Installed
700	12/1/2004	W914NS-05-M-9303/0/0	\$38,287.00	\$38,287.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1887	Construct Facilities/Foundation Roads For Ibp Ataqadish
701	12/1/2004	W914NS-05-M-9305/0/0	\$99,805.00	\$99,805.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1898	Construct Roads/foundation/facilities For Ibp At Baula
702	12/1/2004	W914NS-05-M-9313/0/0	\$14,320.00	\$14,320.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Global Link Distribution LLC	Fixtures, Furnishings And Equipment
703	12/1/2004	W914NS-05-M-9315/0/0	\$13,896.50	\$13,896.50	IMI	PCO	Full & Open	Global Link Distribution LLC	Fixtures, Furnishings And Equipment
704	12/2/2004	W56HZV-05-D-8127/0002/0	\$140,522.00	\$140,522.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Parts Express International Inc	Tank Truck
705	12/2/2004	W56HZV-05-D-8127/0002/0	\$140,522.00	\$140,522.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Parts Express International Inc	Tank Truck
706	12/2/2004	W914NS-05-C-0039/0/0	\$1,312,258.00	\$1,312,258.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Pave 7.1 Kms Road-th-qar
707	12/2/2004	W914NS-05-M-9325/0/0	\$143,000.00	\$143,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2601	Upgrade Police Fuel Pit
708	12/2/2004	W914NS-05-M-9326/0/0	\$118,000.00	\$118,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2601	Upgrade Police Logistics Warehouse
709	12/2/2004	W914NS-05-M-9327/0/0	\$573,194.00	\$573,194.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 142	Construct Zuhor Patrol Station
710	12/3/2004	W56HZV-04-D- B044/0001/03	\$1,099,116.99	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Rosenbauer America LLC	Fire Truck
711	12/3/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8044/0/ P00004	\$0.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Rosenbauer America LLC	
712	12/4/2004	W914NS-05-F-9022/0/0	\$66,982.56	\$66,982.56	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2708	Tents
713	12/4/2004	W914NS-05-F-9024/0/0	\$45,954.20	\$45,954.20	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Bea Maurer Inc	Light Kit
714	12/4/2004	W914NS-05-F-9025/0/0	\$508,214.85	\$508,214.85	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2708	Tents
715	12/4/2004	W914NS-05-F-9026/0/0	\$44,475.81	\$44,475.81	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2708	Tents

APPENDIX G

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contract Type	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
716	12/4/2004	W914NS-05-M-2007/00	\$474,490.00	\$474,490.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	33kv Underground Cable Between Talaea Substation And Khalood Substation
717	12/4/2004	W914NS-05-M-9022/00	\$66,982.56	\$66,982.56	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2708	Tents
718	12/4/2004	W914NS-05-M-9283/00	\$210,000.00	\$210,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 288	Refurbishment And Construction For Fob 1, Safwan
719	12/4/2004	W914NS-05-M-9333/00	\$55,200.00	\$55,200.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2711	Window And Doors
720	12/4/2004	W914NS-05-M-9335/00	\$24,552.00	\$24,552.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2618	Tactical Load Bearing Vest
721	12/4/2004	W914NS-05-M-9338/00	\$123,000.00	\$123,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Global Link Distribution LLC	Zafaraniya Ip Station
722	12/5/2004	W914NS-05-M-2009/00	\$522,340.00	\$522,340.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	33kv Underground Cable From Opera Power Station To Sadoon Power Station
723	12/5/2004	W914NS-05-M-2010/00	\$895,500.00	\$895,500.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Supply, Install And Test A 11kv /400volt Residential Network In Aldura 820
724	12/5/2004	W914NS-05-M-9334/00	\$54,273.00	\$54,273.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2614	A/C, Tv, Washer Dryer, Etc...
725	12/5/2004	W914NS-05-M-9336/00	\$185,700.00	\$185,700.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 142	Renovate Al Habbia Police Station
726	12/5/2004	W914NS-05-M-9337/00	\$535,785.00	\$535,785.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Metro Star General Trading	Renovate Al Muthana And New Baghdad Hig Fp
727	12/5/2004	W914NS-05-M-9339/00	\$431,700.00	\$431,700.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Global Link Distribution LLC	Renovate New Baghdad Police Station
728	12/5/2004	W914NS-05-M-9340/00	\$220,000.00	\$220,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Metro Star General Trading	New Baghdad Traffic Sector
729	12/5/2004	W914NS-05-N-9348/00	\$490,000.00	\$490,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2601	Renovation Of Vehicle Registration Site
730	12/6/2004	G5-35F-0358M/W914NS-05-F-9027/0	\$7,295,880.00	\$7,295,880.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Pracom Inc.	Radios
731	12/6/2004	G5-35F-0358M/W914NS-05-F-9027/0	\$7,295,880.00	\$7,295,880.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Pracom Inc.	Convert Radio Systems
732	12/6/2004	W914NS-05-M-2006/00	\$616,340.00	\$616,340.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	33kv Underground Cable Between Talaea Substation And Khalood Substation
733	12/6/2004	W914NS-05-M-9329/00	\$24,000.00	\$24,000.00	ICDF	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1545	50. Cal Machine Gun Mounts
734	12/6/2004	W56HZV4-D-B125/0002/02	\$2,270,911.00	\$183,005.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Voko Construction Equipment North America Inc	Grader
735	12/6/2004	W56HZV4-D-B124/T0001/01	\$95,050.00	\$95,050.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Econ Energy & Construction Inc.	Tanker
736	12/6/2004	W914NS-05-M-2011/00	\$235,000.00	\$235,000.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Supply, Install, Commission And Test Two Residential Networks In Malhalla 835 In Karakh
737	12/6/2004	W914NS-05-M-2012/00	\$896,000.00	\$896,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Glagn-002/supply & Install Ten New 11kv Underground Feeder Cable In Ninewa
738	12/6/2004	W914NS-05-M-9357/00	\$169,055.90	\$168,055.90	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Eagle General Services	Dental Supplies
739	12/6/2004	W914NS-05-M-9357/1500 M28/0	\$169,055.90	\$169,055.90	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Eagle General Services	Dental Supplies
740	12/6/2004	W914NS-05-M-9359/00	\$112,125.00	\$112,125.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Winter Outfits
741	12/6/2004	W914NS-05-M-9360/00	\$10,000.00	\$10,000.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Blankets
742	12/6/2004	W914NS-05-M-9360/T00001/1	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Soheil General Trading	None.
743	12/6/2004	W914NS-05-M-9361/00	\$25,000.00	\$25,000.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Blankets
744	12/6/2004	W914NS-05-M-9367/00	\$28,300.00	\$28,300.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2609	Purchase And Install Fuel Tank
745	12/6/2004	W914NS-05-M-93000/P00003	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2389	Changes Payment Terms From Net 15 To Net 30
746	12/9/2004	W914NS-05-M-9300/T00003/P00003	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2389	None.
747	12/10/2004	W914NS-05-D-9008/0001/0	\$11,914,731.00	\$11,914,731.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Sapura Limited	Radios, Training And Related Equipment
748	12/10/2004	W914NS-05-M-9008/T0001/0	\$11,914,731.00	\$11,914,731.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Sapura Limited	Office Supplies
749	12/10/2004	W914NS-05-M-9358/00	\$320,000.00	\$320,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1953	1000 Watt Portable Light Tower With Generator
750	12/10/2004	W914NS-05-M-9363/00	\$3,000.00	\$3,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 165	Radiator Heaters

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
751	12/10/2004	W914NS-05-M-9356/0/0	\$9,174.00	\$9,174.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Ess	Lg Heating And Cooling Units
752	12/10/2004	W914NS-05-M-9371/0/0	\$48,000.00	\$48,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2600	Electric Power S Phase
753	12/10/2004	W914NS-05-M-9373/0/0	\$710,000.00	\$710,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1953	Blankets, Bed Sets
754	12/11/2004	W914NS-05-M-2008/0/0	\$196,140.00	\$196,140.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	33kv Underground Cable Between Kaleeg Substation To Riyadh Substation
755	12/11/2004	W914NS-05-M-9364/0/0	\$108,750.00	\$108,750.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2228	Furniture And Electronic Equipment
756	12/11/2004	W914NS-05-M-9376/0/0	\$20,504.85	\$20,504.85	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 927	Coats And Pants
757	12/11/2004	W914NS-05-M-9376/0/0	\$16,000.00	\$20,504.85	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 927	Coats And Pants
758	12/11/2004	W914NS-05-M-9382/0/0	\$3,481,161.00	\$3,481,161.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2644	Cameras & Monitors
759	12/12/2004	W914NS-05-M-9362/0/0	\$5,000.00	\$5,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2623	Construct An Obstacle Course
760	12/12/2004	W914NS-05-M-9366/0/0	\$22,555.00	\$22,555.00	IMAR	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 165	Office Supplies
761	12/12/2004	W914NS-05-M-9366/0/1	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 165	Modification To Contract Terms: Change The Accounting And Appropriation Data
762	12/12/2004	W914NS-05-M-9378/0/0	\$1,400.00	\$1,400.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2747	Face Masks
763	12/12/2004	W914NS-05-M-9379/0/0	\$949,200.00	\$949,200.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1722	T Wall, Bunkers, Barriers
764	12/12/2004	W914NS-05-M-9380/0/0	\$6,551.00	\$6,551.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1416	Furniture, Electronic Equipment, And Supplies
765	12/12/2004	W914NS-05-M-9381/0/0	\$11,500.00	\$11,500.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2228	Radiator Heaters
766	12/13/2004	W914NS-04-D-0135/0003/0	\$366,973.71	\$366,973.71	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Tactical & Rescue Gear, Ltd.	Rescue Equipment
767	12/13/2004	W914NS-04-D-0135/0003/0	\$366,973.71	\$366,973.71	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Tactical & Rescue Gear, Ltd.	Tactical & Rescue Gear
768	12/13/2004	W914NS-04-D-0137/T0002/0	\$141,880.00	\$141,880.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Tactical & Rescue Gear, Ltd.	Tactical & Rescue Gear
769	12/13/2004	W914NS-04-D-0140/T0002/0	\$98,158.50	\$98,158.50	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Tactical & Rescue Gear, Ltd.	Positive Pressure Ventilation Fan
770	12/13/2004	W914NS-05-M-2013/0/0	\$536,000.00	\$536,000.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Supply, Install And Test A 11kv /400volt Residential Network In Aldura 829
771	12/13/2004	W914NS-05-M-9372/0/0	\$990,000.00	\$990,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 861	Field Jackets
772	12/13/2004	W914NS-05-M-9393/0/0	\$1,350.00	\$1,350.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Sohel General Trading	Space Heaters
773	12/14/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8010/T0001/01	\$8,510,480.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	James Worldwide Sales, Inc.	Buses
774	12/14/2004	W56HZV-04-D-8010/0/P00001	\$1,364,157.00	\$0.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	James Worldwide Sales, Inc.	Buses
775	12/14/2004	W914NS-05-M-9267/0/0	\$500,000.00	\$589,682.20	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2389	Radios
776	12/14/2004	W914NS-05-M-9395/0/0	\$137,789.00	\$137,789.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Jisi Inc.	Radio Equipment
777	12/14/2004	W914NS-05-M-9402/0/0	\$990,000.00	\$990,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1722	Sleeping Bags
778	12/14/2004	W914NS-05-M-9404/0/0	\$264,100.00	\$264,100.00	TMTB	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1765	Bunk Beds, Mattresses
779	12/15/2004	DABV01-03-C-0002/0/P00004	\$6,000,000.00	\$6,000,000.00	Not Available	CFA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3237	Setup,operate And Maintain The Kirkush Military Base
780	12/15/2004	DABV01-03-C-0002/0/P00005	\$4,887,379.00	\$4,887,379.00	Not Available	CFA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3237	Setup,operate And Maintain The Kirkush Military Base
781	12/15/2004	W914NS-05-M-9360/0/1	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Sohel General Trading	Change Accounting And Appropriation Data
782	12/15/2004	W914NS-05-M-9360/0/01	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Sohel General Trading	Purpose Of This Mod Is To Change The Accounting Info
783	12/15/2004	W914NS-05-M-9392/0/0	\$264,000.00	\$264,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 329	Laundry Machines
784	12/15/2004	W914NS-05-M-9396/0/0	\$24,976.00	\$24,976.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1791	Kerosene Heaters
785	12/15/2004	W914NS-05-M-9399/0/0	\$15,381.00	\$15,381.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 140	Weapons Mobile Base
786	12/16/2004	F48903-04-D-867/0026/0	\$35,470,192.00	\$35,470,192.00	IDIQ	AFCEE	Full & Open	Tetra International LLC	Brigade Facilities Al Rashed
787	12/16/2004	W914NS-05-M-9406/0/0	\$473,000.00	\$473,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 142	Renovation Of Al Karkh Police Computer Repair
788	12/16/2004	W914NS-05-M-9407/0/0	\$241,500.00	\$241,500.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 142	Repair Al Saliha Ips Station And Karkh Juvenile Station
789	12/17/2004	W56HZV-05-D-8071/0001/0	\$1,496,887.00	\$1,496,887.00	IDIQ	DCMA	Full & Open	Navistar	Truck, Tractor

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contract Type	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
790	12/17/2004	W914NS-05-M-9397/00	\$24,990.00	\$24,990.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2547	Sleeping Bags
791	12/18/2004	W914NS-04-D-0136/0002/0	\$291,067.10	\$291,067.10	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Hagemeyer North American Inc.	Rescue Gear
792	12/18/2004	W914NS-04-D-0136/0002/0	\$291,067.10	\$291,067.10	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Hagemeyer North American Inc.	Rescue Supplies
793	12/18/2004	W914NS-04-D-0136/0002/0	\$291,067.10	\$291,067.10	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Hagemeyer North American Inc.	Rescue Supplies
794	12/18/2004	W914NS-05-M-9409/00	\$13,202.50	\$13,202.50	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1246	Office Supplies
795	12/18/2004	W914NS-05-M-9410/00	\$46,250.00	\$46,250.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2538	Three 7-ton Nissan Flat-bed Trucks.
796	12/19/2004	W914NS-05-C-2001/00	\$3,686,663.00	\$3,686,663.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Replaced Residential Electric Distribution Network-al Dawasa
797	12/19/2004	W914NS-05-M-9414/00	\$7,080.00	\$7,080.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Tools
798	12/19/2004	W914NS-05-M-9416/00	\$120,000.00	\$120,000.00	CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 920	Used Vehicles For Training
799	12/19/2004	W914NS-05-M-9417/00	\$52,000.00	\$52,000.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Sleeping Bag
800	12/19/2004	W914NS-05-M-9418/00	\$119,000.00	\$119,000.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 141	Jps Stickers
801	12/19/2004	W914NS-05-M-9420/00	\$1,100.00	\$1,100.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 6	Sim Card
802	12/20/2004	W914NS-04-D-0139/0004/0	\$247,318.58	\$247,318.58	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Ma-tex Wire And Rope Co, Inc.	Thermal Imager, Bolt Cutter
803	12/20/2004	W914NS-04-D-0139/0004/0	\$247,318.58	\$247,318.58	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Ma-tex Wire And Rope Co, Inc.	Thermal Imager & Bolt Cutter
804	12/20/2004	W914NS-04-D-0139/0004/0	\$247,318.58	\$247,318.58	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Ma-tex Wire And Rope Co, Inc.	Thermal Imager And Bolt Cutter
805	12/20/2004	W914NS-05-M-9408/00	\$16,250.00	\$16,250.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 892	Short Sleeve Shirt
806	12/20/2004	W914NS-05-M-9419/00	\$187,500.00	\$187,500.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1953	Long Underwear
807	12/20/2004	W914NS-05-M-9422/00	\$14,688.75	\$14,688.75	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Global Link Distribution LLC	Fixtures, Furnishings And Equipment
808	12/20/2004	W914NS-05-M-9423/00	\$11,895.00	\$11,895.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Jackets
809	12/20/2004	W914NS-05-M-9424/00	\$14,689.75	\$14,689.75	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Global Link Distribution LLC	Fixtures, Furnishings And Equipment
810	12/20/2004	W914NS-05-M-9425/00	\$24,000.00	\$24,000.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Cots
811	12/20/2004	W914NS-05-M-9426/00	\$59,378.00	\$59,378.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 142	Renovation Of Al Jazzer Station
812	12/21/2004	W914NS-05-M-9025/00	\$508,214.85	\$508,214.85	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2708	Tents
813	12/21/2004	W914NS-05-M-9415/ QF0337/0	\$578.00	\$578.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 899	Batteries
814	12/21/2004	W914NS-05-M-9421/00	\$29,000.00	\$29,000.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Toiletries Kit
815	12/21/2004	W914NS-05-M-9428/00	\$9,000.00	\$9,000.00	IDIQ CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2220	Load And Unload Trailers At Tadjj Military Base
816	12/21/2004	W914NS-05-M-9430/ QF0445/0	\$24,975.00	\$24,975.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2228	Pillow
817	12/22/2004	W914NS-05-F-9036/00	\$1,491.00	\$1,491.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Stretchers Inc	Peerless Handcuffs
818	12/22/2004	W914NS-05-M-9442/00	\$1,900.00	\$1,900.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2655	Steel Bars
819	12/23/2004	W914NS-05-9447/00	\$7,200.00	\$7,200.00	IDIQ CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 899	Truck Batteries
820	12/23/2004	W914NS-05-C-2002/00	\$3,423,413.00	\$3,423,413.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Replaced Residential Electric Distribution Network-al Asri
821	12/23/2004	W914NS-05-F-9035/00	\$803.60	\$803.60	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Brigade Quartermaster Ltd	Handcuff Pouch
822	12/23/2004	W914NS-05-M-9430/00	\$24,975.00	\$24,975.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2228	Pillow
823	12/23/2004	W914NS-05-M-9430/0/ QF0445	\$24,975.00	\$24,975.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2228	Pillows
824	12/23/2004	W914NS-05-M-9444/00	\$988.00	\$988.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2693	Supplies: Mop, Pine Oil, Brooms, Bleach, Record Books, Carbon Paper
825	12/23/2004	W914NS-05-M-9446/00	\$59,948.00	\$59,948.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2695	Furniture
826	12/23/2004	W914NS-05-M-9447/00	\$7,200.00	\$7,200.00	CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3212	Truck Batteries
827	12/26/2004	W914NS-05-M-2014/00	\$496,781.00	\$496,781.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Supply And Install Three New 11kv/400volt Residential Distribution Networks In Babylon
828	12/26/2004	W914NS-05-M-9429/PIN: QF0453/0	\$118,625.00	\$118,625.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Shirts, Boots, Gloves, Socks
829	12/26/2004	W914NS-05-M-9429/ QF0453/0	\$118,625.00	\$118,625.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Winter Clothes

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
830	12/26/2004	W914NS-05-M-94460/P00001	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2589	Modification To Contract Terms Only, Line Item 004 In Block 19 Of \$1,449 Is Changed To Read - Tables, Folding, Quantity 40 Each; Unit Price \$82.50; Total Price \$3,300.00 And Block 17a Of \$11449 Should Read - Ais Amin Construction & Supplies Bld 17/Street
831	12/26/2004	W914NS-05-M-94500/0	\$59,500.00	\$59,500.00	CMAAT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 328	Storage Tanks
832	12/27/2004	W914NS-05-M-94540/0	\$120,100.00	\$120,100.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2617	Renovation Of Police Logistics Warehouse Backup Generator
833	12/27/2004	W914NS-05-M-94550/0	\$25,000.00	\$25,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2570	Supplies, Tents
834	12/27/2004	W914NS-05-M-94600/0	\$12,000.00	\$12,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2568	Construct And Install Vehicle Spike Bars
835	12/27/2004	W914NS-05-M-94610/0	\$499,000.00	\$499,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2612	Bunk Beds, Mattresses
836	12/27/2004	W914NS-05-M-94620/0	\$186,040.00	\$186,040.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2720	Design And Construct Bulk Storage Facility
837	12/27/2004	W914NS-05-M-94630/0	\$241,060.00	\$241,060.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 142	Renovation Of Al Khadamiyah Police Station
838	12/28/2004	W914NS-05-M-94730/0	\$50,000.00	\$50,000.00	CPI	PCO	Full & Open	Total Communication Services	Handheld Radios
839	12/28/2004	W914NS-05-M-9476/PC310000	\$24,701.42	\$0.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	The Institution Of Internal Auditors	Internal Audit Books And Materials
840	12/28/2004	W914NS-05-M-9476/PC310000	\$24,701.42	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	The Institution Of Internal Auditors	Internal Audit Books And Materials
841	12/29/2004	FA8903-04-D-8678/0085/0	\$6,230,506.00	\$6,230,506.00	IDIQ	AFCEE	Full & Open	Toilets, Inc.	Military Academy Kirkush Military Training Base
842	12/29/2004	W914NS-05-M-94720/0	\$6,090.00	\$6,090.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 148	Supplies: Nokia 2100 Mobile Phones, Sim Cards, Minutes Card, Laptop Computers
843	12/29/2004	W914NS-05-M-94790/0	\$7,000.00	\$7,000.00	IDIQ CMAAT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2713	1991 Bmw, 5 Series
844	12/29/2004	W914NS-05-M-94800/0	\$8,088.00	\$8,088.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Sohel General Trading	Supplies: Yellow Police Tape, Flash Lights, Aa Batteries, Welder, Metal
845	12/29/2004	W914NS-05-M-94810/0	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2770	Construction Of Iraqi Police Medical Dispensary
846	12/30/2004	W914NS-05-M-90330/P00001	\$10,265.50	(\$1,838.50)	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 162	Office Supplies
847	12/30/2004	W914NS-05-M-91190/P00001	\$9,820.00	\$0.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 162	Office Supplies
848	12/30/2004	W914NS-05-M-94850/0	\$57,684.00	\$57,684.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2627	The Electrical, Plumbing And Sanitary System Of Barsa Ips Will Be Repaired And Bought To An Intended Functional Level
849	12/30/2004	W914NS-05-M-94860/0	\$6,025.00	\$6,025.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1953	Supplies: Benzene, Diesel, Water
850	12/30/2004	W914NS-05-M-94990/0	\$2,875.00	\$2,875.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2741	Supplies: Screen Pieces, Bridge Steel Fence Maintenance.
851	12/31/2004	W914NS-05-C-2004/00	\$1,495,000.00	\$1,495,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Supply & Install Electric Network
852	12/31/2004	W914NS-05-M-2015/0/0	\$93,500.00	\$93,500.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Residential Electrical Service Network To The Al-asuhada Residential Area In The Kerbala
853	12/31/2004	W914NS-05-M-2016/0/0	\$333,843.00	\$333,843.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Residential Electrical Service Network To The Al-asary Residential Area In The Kerbala
854	12/31/2004	W914NS-05-M-2017/0/0	\$595,000.00	\$595,000.00	FFP	PCO	Limited Competition	Not Available	Ghaigc-368 / Rashdiya Substation To Hamed Shihab 33/11kv Substation Rusafa Gov of Baghdad
855	12/31/2004	W914NS-05-M-95020/0	\$15,460.00	\$15,460.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Supplies: Cell Phones,
856	1/1/2005	W914NS-05-M-94840/0	\$1,600.00	\$1,600.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 421	Computer Supplies: Cdrw, V Converter
857	1/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-93560/01	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 165	Purpose Of This Mod Is To Change The Accounting Info
858	1/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-9511/0/0	\$24,000.00	\$24,000.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Sohel General Trading	Watch Cap
859	1/3/2005	W914NS-05-M-95180/0	\$22,500.00	\$22,500.00	IDIQ CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 812	Fuel, And Fuel Truck
860	1/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-94960/0	\$1,998,805.00	\$1,998,805.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Barrett Communications Party Ltd	HF Radio Equipment
861	1/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-95220/0	\$24,000.00	\$24,000.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 139	Winter Gloves
862	1/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-95250/0	\$24,250.00	\$24,250.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 745	Office Furniture
863	1/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-95260/0	\$24,250.00	\$24,250.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 745	Office Furniture
864	1/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-94970/0	\$6,000.00	\$6,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 164	1994 Daewoo Car
865	1/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-95180/P00001	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 812	To Add Fund Cite, Payment Office, And Add Partial Payments

APPENDIX G

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contract Type	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
866	1/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-9519/00	\$749,100.00		CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Sohel General Trading	Uniform Items
867	1/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-9530/00	\$839.30		Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Sunshine Products Corp	Binoculars
868	1/6/2005	W914NS-05-M-9532/00	\$4,000.00		CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Shark Tek For Computer & Technology	Internet Service Subscription
869	1/7/2005	W914NS-05-M-9453/0/ P00001	\$0.00		Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2228	The Purpose Of This Mod Was To Modify Block 17a
870	1/7/2005	W914NS-05-M-9537/00	\$24,000.00		FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 139	20' Containers W/2 Locks
871	1/7/2005	W914NS-05-M-9538/00	\$16,000.00		CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2372	Office Furniture
872	1/8/2005	W914NS-05-M-9540/00	\$24,750.00		CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 6	Thuraya Phones And Sim Chips
873	1/9/2005	W914NS-05-C-2003/00	\$1,291,175.00		FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Supply & Install Electric Network Feeders
874	1/9/2005	W914NS-05-M-9547/00	\$200,000.00		CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Dark Socks
875	1/9/2005	W914NS-05-M-9707/00	\$62,000.00		FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1997	Wall Lockers
876	1/9/2005	W914NS-05-M-9708/00	\$10,320.00		CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1923	Phones And Setup
877	1/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-9456/00	\$118,600.00		CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2854	Truckforklift
878	1/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-9457/00	\$88,296.00		CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2817	Hangzou
879	1/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-9458/00	\$255,245.00		CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Supplycore, Inc	Loadali
880	1/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-9548/00	\$24,600.00		CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 139	Thermal Underwear
881	1/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-9550/00	\$180,000.00		FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 142	Renovate Al Rafadan Police Station
882	1/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-9551/00	\$215,500.00		FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 142	Renovate Al Tahteeb Police Station
883	1/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-9552/00	\$217,500.00		FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 142	Renovate Al Tharwa Police Station
884	1/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-9553/00	\$188,000.00		FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 142	Renovate Bab Al Sheikh Police Station
885	1/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-9558/00	\$5,200.00		CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2703	Removal, Setup Generators
886	1/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-9559/00	\$6,030.00		CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 862	Latrine Trailers
887	1/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-9560/00	\$7,450.00		CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 862	20000 L Steel Tank, Tank Prep, And Pump
888	1/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-9561/00	\$71,800.00		CPATT	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2742	Refurbish Barracks At Ain Al Tumar
889	1/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-9562/00	\$1,300.00		FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 862	Taji lhp Station
890	1/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-9563/00	\$68,000.00		FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2101	Renovate Checkpoints
891	1/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-9564/00	\$99,910.00		FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 382	Renovate 401 St. Checkpoint
892	1/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-9565/00	\$498,555.00		FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 161	Construct 405th Ing Bn
893	1/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-9567/00	\$223,795.00		FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2620	Refurbish Battalion Headquarters
894	1/12/2005	W914NS-04-D-9008/ T0008/0	\$419,995.00		Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Csi Aviation Services, Inc.	Air Transportation
895	1/12/2005	W91150-05-M-9031/0/ P00002	\$0.00		Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Symbolants	Change The Vendors Address On The Contract
896	1/12/2005	W914NS-05-M-9214/00/01	\$0.00		Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2568	Change Accounting And Appropriation Data
897	1/12/2005	W914NS-05-M-9565/0/ P00001	\$0.00		Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 161	Change Accounting Data
898	1/12/2005	W914NS-05-M-9566/00	\$41,155.00		FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2742	Office Equipment
899	1/12/2005	W914NS-05-M-9567/0/ P00001	\$0.00		Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2620	Correct Accounting And Appropriation Data
900	1/13/2005	W914NS-04-D-9008/T0008/ M0001	\$0.00		Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Csi Aviation Services, Inc.	Air Transportation
901	1/13/2005	W914NS-05-M-9574/00	\$46,500.00		Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2462	20,000 Tanks
902	1/13/2005	W914NS-05-M-9405/00	\$147,600.00		FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Solutions 123	Renovate Psd Joint Communications Center
903	1/13/2005	W914NS-05-M-9575/00	\$9,135.00		CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 165	Shredders
904	1/13/2005	W914NS-05-M-9576/00	\$10,552.00		CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2424	Black Socks

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
905	1/14/2005	W914NS-04-D-0138/0003/01	\$100.00	\$100.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Transatlantic Traders, Inc	Increase Contract Value By \$100
906	1/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-9571/0/0	\$112,370.00	\$112,307.00	CM/AT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2543	Iraqi Flags
907	1/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-9573/0/0	\$125,000.00	\$125,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 625	Vehicle Purchase
908	1/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-9577/0/0	\$171,000.00	\$171,000.00	CP/AT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1997	Sleeping Bags
909	1/15/2005	W914NS-04-D-006/001/002	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	The Purpose Of This Mod Is To Definitize This Task Order
910	1/15/2005	W914NS-05-M-9568/0/0	\$3,900.00	\$3,900.00	CP/AT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 293	Internet Service Subscription
911	1/15/2005	W914NS-05-M-9580/0/0	\$110,000.00	\$110,000.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2670	Construct Government Dispatch Center
912	1/15/2005	W914NS-05-M-9583/0/0	\$8,350.00	\$8,350.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2629	Hesko Barriers East Gate
913	1/15/2005	W914NS-05-M-9587/0/0	\$71,850.00	\$71,850.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1351	Porta Johns And Cleaning Service
914	1/17/2005	W914NS-04-D-006/0003/003	(\$2,927,270.00)	(\$2,927,270.00)	Not Available	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	The Purpose Of This Mod Is To Debilitate Money From The Original \$8,000,000.00
915	1/17/2005	W914NS-04-D-9007/0/ T0009	\$420,000.00	\$420,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Sallyport Global Holdings	Movement Of 500 Pax
916	1/17/2005	W914NS-05-M-9588/0/0	\$19,109.82	\$19,109.82	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3237	Golf Carts
917	1/17/2005	W914NS-05-M-9589/0/0	\$24,300.00	\$24,300.00	CP/AT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1747	T-shirts
918	1/17/2005	W914NS-05-M-9590/0/0	\$19,109.82	\$19,109.82	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3237	Golf Carts
919	1/17/2005	W914NS-05-M-9594/0/0	\$279,998.00	\$279,998.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 761	Construct Traffic Police Station In Baqubah
920	1/18/2005	W914NS-04-D-9007/0/1	\$1,200.00	\$1,200.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Sallyport Global Holdings	Change Price And Accounting Info
921	1/18/2005	GS-06F-0015/W914NS-05-F-9052/0	\$44,116.80	\$44,116.80	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Gerber Legendary Blades	Entrenching Tool
922	1/19/2005	W914NS-05-F-9055/0/0	\$421,484.91	\$421,484.91	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Dell Inc	Optiplex Gx280 Small Minitorwer Pentium 4, Office Pro 2003 Win 32 English Mvl, Office Pro 2003 English Cd
923	1/19/2005	W914NS-05-M-9570/0/0	\$391,925.00	\$391,925.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2682	Construct Barracks
924	1/20/2005	W914NS-04-D-0006/70007/ M0004	\$8,000,000.00	\$8,000,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Parsons	The Purpose Is To Increase The Not To Exceed Amount
925	1/20/2005	W914NS-04-D-0021/0/ P00005	\$0.00	\$0.00	Time and Materials	PCO	Not Available	Stanley Baker Hill	The Purpose Of This Mod Is To Incorporate Fair Clauses 5.2.246-6
926	1/20/2005	W914NS-05-C-9003/0/ P00002	\$85,500.00	\$85,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Overseas Support Services	Add Two Line Items
927	1/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-9599/0/0	\$25,000.00	\$25,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 139	Shipping Containers
928	1/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-9600/0/0	\$193,575.00	\$193,575.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 798	Swat And Anti-terrorist Uniforms
929	1/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-9602/0/0	\$47,500.00	\$47,500.00	CP/AT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1246	Aksa Generators
930	1/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-9603/0/0	\$203,390.00	\$203,390.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2636	Camouflage Uniforms
931	1/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-9604/0/0	\$2,100.00	\$2,100.00	CP/AT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 673	Keys For Toyota Land Cruisers
932	1/21/2005	W914NS-04-D-0006/001/003	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	The Purpose Of This Mod Is To Definitize This Task Order
933	1/21/2005	W914NS-04-D-0006/001/004	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	The Purpose Of This Mod Is To Definitize This Task Order
934	1/21/2005	W914NS-04-D-0006/001/005	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	The Purpose Of This Mod Is To Definitize This Task Order
935	1/21/2005	W914NS-04-D-0021/ T0005/0	\$896,931.00	\$896,931.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Stanley Baker Hill	Support The Development Of Policies, Procedures, And Methodologies To Institute And Operate Financial Systems With In The Country Of Iraq
936	1/21/2005	W56H2/-04-D-8107/ T0001/0	\$1,026,000.00	\$1,026,000.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Tamara Vehicles And Equipment Co	Forklifts
937	1/21/2005	GS07F-5494/W914NS-05-F-9057/0	\$211,063.28	\$211,063.28	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Sunshine Products Corp	Binoculars
938	1/21/2005	W914NS-05-M-9608/0/0	\$18,330.00	\$18,330.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 140	Military Web Vest

APPENDIX G

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
939	1/22/2005	GS-35F-4120D/W914NS-05-F-90580	\$54,262.00	\$54,262.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Gtsi, Inc.	Printer
940	1/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-9610/00	\$222,000.00	\$222,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2601	Flatbed Recovery Vehicle
941	1/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-9612/00	\$1,670.00	\$1,670.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Not Available	Adaptec Snap Server
942	1/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-9613/00	\$150,000.00	\$150,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 147	Toilets
943	1/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-9614/00	\$150,000.00	\$150,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 147	Used Water Trucks
944	1/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-9617/00	\$365,500.00	\$365,500.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 745	Renovate Baghdad Patrol Station
945	1/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-9618/00	\$220,215.00	\$220,215.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 162	Police Station Renovation
946	1/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-9619/00	\$380,000.00	\$380,000.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 745	Police Headquarters In Baghdad
947	1/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-9620/00	\$1,370.00	\$1,370.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 862	Installation Of Security Doors And Weapon's Rack For Tajj Ihp Station
948	1/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-9621/00	\$1,080.00	\$1,080.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 139	Map Display Units
949	1/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-9622/00	\$13,450.00	\$13,450.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2679	Printer Fargo And Color Ribbon
950	1/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-9601/00	\$21,000.00	\$21,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 139	Foot Containers
951	1/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-9626/00	\$102,575.00	\$102,575.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 145	Construct Adhan Telephone Center
952	1/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-9631/00	\$25,000.00	\$25,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1953	Tires
953	1/25/2005	W914NS-04-D-0009/2/3	\$1,212,617.00	\$1,212,617.00	Not Available	CPA	Not Available	Parsons	Increase Obligated Funds
954	1/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-9638/00	\$24,750.00	\$24,750.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 71	Construction Materials
955	1/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-9640/00	\$360,000.00	\$360,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Ess	Water Truck
956	1/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-9642/00	\$24,855.00	\$24,855.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 1348	Repair Living Areas, Police Special Ops Unit
957	1/26/2005	W914NS-04-D-0009/001601	(\$1,952,767.00)	(\$1,952,767.00)	Not Available	CPA	Not Available	Parsons	The Purpose Of This Mod Is To Deobligate Money From The Original
958	1/26/2005	W914NS-05-F-9052/0/P00001	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Gerber Legendary Blades	The Purpose Of This Mod Is To Change The Req # To W915we42822094
959	1/27/2005	W914NS-05-F-9046/00	\$760.14	\$760.14	Not Available	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	The Purpose Of This Mod Is To Definitize This Task Order
960	1/27/2005	W914NS-05-F-9046/00	\$760.14	\$760.14	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Caddo Office Supplies	Sony Transcriber
961	1/27/2005	W914NS-05-F-9046/00	\$11,220.00	\$760.14	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Caddo Office Supplies	Sony Transcribers
962	1/27/2005	W914NS-05-M-9647/00	\$28,647.45	\$28,647.45	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Tyson Enterprise LLC	Gps Systems
963	1/28/2005	W914NS-04-D-0006/001007	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	The Purpose Of This Mod Is To Definitize This Task Order
964	1/28/2005	W914NS-05-M-9651/00	\$206,100.00	\$206,100.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2730	Al Yamouk Ipttraffic Station
965	1/28/2005	W914NS-05-M-9652/00	\$141,800.00	\$141,800.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2260	Construct Al Kharkh Ip Traffic
966	1/28/2005	W914NS-05-M-9653/00	\$179,625.00	\$179,625.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 138	Construct Khadamiya Ip Traffic
967	1/29/2005	GS-35F-4076D/W914NS-05-F-9062/0	\$348,475.00	\$348,475.00	C/MATT	PCO	Full & Open	Dell Inc.	Dell Optiplex's And Office Pro's
968	1/29/2005	W914NS-05-M-9654/00	\$247,000.00	\$247,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 138	Construct Al Qanat Police Station
969	1/29/2005	W914NS-05-M-9655/00	\$253,500.00	\$253,500.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 142	Construct New Baghdad Patrol Station
970	1/29/2005	W914NS-05-M-9656/00	\$493,950.00	\$493,950.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 3226	Renovation Of Predator Palace
971	1/29/2005	W914NS-05-M-9658/00	\$20,000.00	\$9,980.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open		Uniform Items
972	1/29/2005	W914NS-05-M-9660/00	\$22,000.00	\$22,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 495	Paint Dodge Pickup Trucks
973	1/29/2005	W914NS-05-M-9661/00	\$24,000.00	\$24,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2594	36,000Hr Tank, 10,000Lr Diesel Tank, With Electric Pumps
974	1/29/2005	W914NS-05-M-9662/00	\$3,774.00	\$3,774.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 899	Repair And Paint Trucks
975	1/29/2005	W914NS-05-M-9663/00	\$16,800.00	\$16,800.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1572	Dodge Cars
976	1/29/2005	W914NS-05-M-9664/00	\$140,000.00	\$140,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2666	T-walls Camp Justice
977	1/31/2005	W914NS-04-D-0006/1008			Not Available	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	Definitize Task Order 0010, Statement Of Work, Summarize Funding
978	1/31/2005	W914NS-04-D-0006/6/9	(\$24,948,730.00)	(\$24,948,730.00)	Not Available	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	Deobligate Excess Funds And Definitize Final Hospital On Task Order
979	1/31/2005	W914NS-04-D-0006/8/3	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	Definitize Task Order 0008 For Maternity & Children's Hospital

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
980	1/31/2005	W914NS-04-D-0006/8/4	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	Modification To Contract Terms Only. Modification To Define Total Estimated Cost To Renovate And Modernize Kerkala Pediatric Hospital. Incorporate The Statement Of Work Attached To Modification 04, And Summarize The Funding Obligated Against Clin 000
981	1/31/2005	W914NS-05-M-9569/0/0	\$11,750.00	\$11,750.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2103	Computer Parts
982	1/31/2005	W914NS-05-M-9666/0/0	\$12,000.00	\$12,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3237	Window Bars For Arms Rooms
983	1/31/2005	W914NS-05-M-9667/0/0	\$12,250.00	\$12,250.00	CMAAT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1351	Nail Spikes And Tetrahedrons
984	1/31/2005	W914NS-05-M-9669/0/0	\$18,845.00	\$18,845.00	CMAAT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 165	Swing Arm Chairs
985	1/31/2005	W914NS-05-M-9670/0/0	\$22,000.00	\$22,000.00	CMAAT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 863	Soldier Manuals
986	1/31/2005	W914NS-05-M-9671/0/0	\$5,800.00	\$5,800.00	CMAAT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2173	Projector, Generator, Water Tanker, And Power Vehicle Washer
987	1/31/2005	W914NS-05-M-9673/0/0	\$40,000.00	\$40,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1765	Western European Latrine And Shower Trailers
988	1/31/2005	W914NS-05-M-9673/0/P0001	\$40,000.00	\$40,000.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 1765	To Correct Buyer Error. Change \$11449, Page 1, Block 23 From \$20,000 To \$40,000
989	1/31/2005	W914NS-05-M-9674/0/0	\$147,815.00	\$147,815.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2696	Wall Lockers
990	1/31/2005	W914NS-05-M-9675/0/0	\$180,000.00	\$180,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2706	Automobiles
991	2/1/2005	W914NS-05-M-9596/0/0	\$50,589.00	\$50,589.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2103	Computer Enclosures
992	2/1/2005	W914NS-05-M-9668/0/0	\$7,735.00	\$7,735.00	CMAAT	PCO	Full & Open	Middle East Trading Company	Ear Muffs
993	2/3/2005	W914NS-04-D-0006/0003/12	(\$15,000,000.00)	(\$15,000,000.00)	Not Available	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	Modification To Reduce The Total Amount Obligated Against Clins 0002, 0002aa And 0002ab On Pr&c W915we41980590 To From \$15,000,000.00 \$0.00
994	2/3/2005	W56HZV-04-D-8103/00002/0	\$4,846,870.00	\$4,846,870.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Lifeline Shelter Systems, Inc	
995	2/3/2005	W914NS-05-F-9063/0/0	\$27,142.00	\$27,142.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Carmanah Technologies	Taxiway Lights
996	2/3/2005	W914NS-05-M-9535/0/0	\$18,000.00	\$18,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 840	Al Heel Children's Magazine
997	2/3/2005	W914NS-05-M-9679/0/0	\$24,750.00	\$24,750.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2598	Forklift
998	2/4/2005	W914NS-04-D-0006/0008/05	(\$10,408,993.00)	(\$10,408,993.00)	Not Available	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	Modification To Reduce The Amount Obligated Against This Task Order From \$21,000,000.00 To \$10,591,007.00
999	2/4/2005	W914NS-04-D-0006/0010/09	(\$5,776,982.00)	(\$5,776,982.00)	Not Available	USACE	Not Available	Parsons	The Purpose Of This Mod Is To Deobligate Money From The Original
1000	2/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-9597/0/0	\$129,168.93	\$129,168.93	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Ricoh Business Systems	Printer Supplies
1001	2/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-9685/0/0	\$24,000.00	\$24,000.00	CFAIT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2594	Fuel Tanks And Pumps
1002	2/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-9686/0/0	\$6,900.00	\$6,900.00	CFAIT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Containers
1003	2/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-9688/0/0	\$6,000.00	\$6,000.00	CFAIT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1997	Containers
1004	2/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-9689/0/0	\$22,247.70	\$22,247.70	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Dell Inc.	Tablet PCs
1005	2/7/2005	W914NS-05-F-9064/0/0	\$15,782.90	\$15,782.90	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Dell Inc.	Optiplex Gx280 Small Minitower Pentium 4, Office 2003 Win32 English IM, Office Xp English Cd
1006	2/7/2005	W914NS-05-M-9541/0/P0001	\$378,825.00	\$378,825.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2721	Modification To Cancel Contract In Its Entirety
1007	2/8/2005	W914NS-05-M-9687/0/0	\$20,700.00	\$20,700.00	CFAIT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Containers
1008	2/8/2005	W914NS-05-M-9701/0/0	\$312,724.00	\$312,724.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 729	60th Al Ummariyah Bde Barracks Building And Armory
1009	2/8/2005	W914NS-05-M-9702/0/0	\$103,740.00	\$103,740.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 1110	Renovation Of Ba qubah, Iraq
1010	2/8/2005	W914NS-05-M-9703/0/0	\$251,500.00	\$251,500.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 139	Automobiles
1011	2/8/2005	W914NS-05-M-9704/0/0	\$126,000.00	\$126,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 98	Bunk Beds And Mattresses
1012	2/8/2005	W914NS-05-M-9705/0/0	\$5,000.00	\$5,000.00	CFAIT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2390	Construct Six Sliding Map Panels And Two Map Boards
1013	2/9/2005	W914NS-05-M-9677/0/0	\$61,160.00	\$61,160.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2307	Porta Johns And Cleaning Service
1014	2/9/2005	W914NS-05-M-9709/0/0	\$55,075.00	\$55,075.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2608	Latrine And Shower Facilities At Tuz, Iraq
1015	2/9/2005	W914NS-05-M-9713/0/0	\$24,750.00	\$24,750.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2667	Site Clean Up At Commando Base Site One
1016	2/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-9680/0/0	\$7,423.00	\$7,423.00	CMAAT	PCO	Full & Open	Hp Federal Sales	Laserjet Printers
1017	2/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-9714/0/0	\$75,848.00	\$75,848.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2770	Porta Johns And Cleaning Service

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contract Type	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
1018	2/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-9715/00	\$92,984.00	\$92,984.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2770	Porta Johns And Cleaning Service
1019	2/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-9716/00	\$134,900.00	\$134,900.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2770	Porta Johns And Cleaning Service
1020	2/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-9717/00	\$134,900.00	\$134,900.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2770	Porta Johns And Cleaning Service
1021	2/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-9717/00	\$134,900.00	\$134,900.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2770	Porta Johns And Cleaning Service
1022	2/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-9719/00	\$59,900.00	\$59,900.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1868	Construct Maintenance Bay At Ghalbiya
1023	2/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-9723/00	\$18,500.00	\$18,500.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1747	Flashlights
1024	2/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-9727/00	\$4,620.00	\$4,620.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Office Supplies
1025	2/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-9145/07 P00002	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Kipper Tool	Change The Requisition Number
1026	2/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-9711/00	\$8,675.00	\$8,675.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2257	Guard Command Post For Tcp 30
1027	2/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-9724/00	\$52,200.00	\$52,200.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 139	Containers
1028	2/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-9726/00	\$241,547.00	\$241,547.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2464	Beds And Mattresses, Electrical Supplies, Lumber
1029	2/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-9730/00	\$140,000.00	\$140,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2427	Twalls
1030	2/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-9731/00	\$4,050.00	\$4,050.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1252	Phones And Fax Machines
1031	2/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-9732/00	\$81,565.00	\$81,565.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 355	Construction For Barracks In Tikrit
1032	2/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-9733/00	\$12,000.00	\$12,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Flashlights
1033	2/13/2005	W914NS-05-M-9738/00	\$594,500.00	\$594,500.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2631	Renovation Of Al-siek(Railway) Police Station
1034	2/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-9729/00	\$32,822.00	\$32,822.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 1788	Tactical Checkpoint Upgrades
1035	2/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-9743/00	\$323,000.00	\$323,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2768	Barriers And Bunkers
1036	2/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-9744/00	\$304,500.00	\$304,500.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2570	Beds And Bed Supplies
1037	2/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-9745/00	\$10,900.00	\$10,900.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 386	Generator, Oil Tank
1038	2/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-9746/00	\$10,900.00	\$10,900.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1123	Generator
1039	2/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-9749/00	\$24,000.00	\$24,000.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2568	Baghdad Police Academy Renovation
1040	2/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-9750/00	\$120,000.00	\$120,000.00	CMATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2706	Sedans And Vans
1041	2/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-9754/00	\$18,975.00	\$18,975.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2593	Curtains
1042	2/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-9755/00	\$15,265.00	\$15,265.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1590	Furniture
1043	2/15/2005	W914NS-05-M-9712/00	\$384,720.00	\$384,720.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 1381	Renovation At Ba'qubah Mc
1044	2/15/2005	W914NS-05-M-9753/00	\$87,022.00	\$87,022.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 1201	South Castle Renovation
1045	2/15/2005	W914NS-05-M-9756/00	\$24,000.00	\$24,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1508	Anti-terrorist Trainers
1046	2/15/2005	W914NS-05-M-9757/00	\$2,155.00	\$2,155.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 812	Batteries
1047	2/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-9700/00	\$467,955.00	\$467,955.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 76	Maintenance Kit For 205th Ing
1048	2/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-9735/00	\$145,600.00	\$145,600.00	CMATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2741	T Wall Installation
1049	2/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-9740/00	\$60,000.00	\$60,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Spring General Trading Co.	Electrical Generation Plants For Police Facilities
1050	2/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-9748/00	\$6,000.00	\$6,000.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Saudi Naval Support Company Ltd.	Shipping Container
1051	2/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-9763/00	\$22,475.00	\$22,475.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Toileries Kits
1052	2/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-9766/00	\$23,975.00	\$23,975.00	CMATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1590	Classroom Furniture A/Rustamiyah
1053	2/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-9768/00	\$8,600.00	\$8,600.00	CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 165	Bed Sheets And Pillows
1054	2/17/2005	W914NS-05-M-9767/00	\$8,600.00	\$8,600.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 471	Carpet Installation
1055	2/18/2005	W914NS-05-M-9751/00	\$17,930.00	\$17,930.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2683	Furniture, Electronic Equipment, Stove, Refrigerator
1056	2/18/2005	W914NS-05-M-9770/00	\$600.00	\$313,475.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2634	Security Fence At Hillah, Iraq
1057	2/18/2005	W914NS-05-M-9771/00	\$147,600.00	\$147,600.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2689	Beds And Bed Supplies
1058	2/18/2005	W914NS-05-M-9775/00	\$55,511.00	\$55,511.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2646	Office Space Construction
1059	2/18/2005	W914NS-05-M-9776/00	\$4,000.00	\$4,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1382	Move Gravel To Kasik Military Training Base
1060	2/18/2005	W914NS-05-M-9777/00	\$442,800.00	\$442,800.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 539	Beds And Appliances

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
1061	2/18/2005	W914NS-05-M-97790/0	\$22,824.00	\$22,824.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 2599	Building For 208th Ing Bn, Kirkkk, Iraq
1062	2/18/2005	W914NS-05-M-97800/0	\$7,512.00	\$7,512.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 892	Furniture
1063	2/18/2005	W914NS-05-M-97810/0	\$288,000.00	\$288,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 2635	Generators And Room For Generators
1064	2/19/2005	W914NS-05-M-97720/0	\$238,000.00	\$238,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 3236	Chevy Suburbans
1065	2/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-97520/0	\$240,000.00	\$240,000.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraq Contractor - 955	Barracks Construction
1066	2/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-97880/0	\$42,000.00	\$42,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 80	Road Repair At Tmnb
1067	2/21/2005	W914NS-05-M-92360/ P00001	(\$163,365.00)	(\$163,365.00)	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraq Contractor - 2157	The Purpose Of This Mod Is To Cancel Contract W914ns05-m-9236
1068	2/21/2005	W914NS-05-M-97910/0	\$24,750.00	\$24,750.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 2570	Toiletries
1069	2/21/2005	W914NS-05-M-97920/0	\$37,200.00	\$37,200.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 1750	Generators For Abu Ghraib
1070	2/21/2005	W914NS-05-M-97940/0	\$455,500.00	\$455,500.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 798	Tactical Supplies For Hilla Swat Team
1071	2/22/2005	W914NS-04-D-9006/0002/0	\$2,004,800.00	\$2,004,800.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Astro Systems	Voice And Data Networking
1072	2/22/2005	W914NS-05-C-9010/0/ P00001	\$655,978.00	\$655,978.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Satco	Increase Monthly Man Days And Total Price
1073	2/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-96810/0	\$90,420.00	\$90,420.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraq Contractor - 2660	Build/ Refurbish Diyala Provincial Detention Facilities
1074	2/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-97900/0	\$14,850.00	\$14,850.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Micro World	Memory Sticks
1075	2/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-97950/0	\$468,125.00	\$468,125.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 798	On Person Military Supplies
1076	2/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-97960/0	\$505,400.00	\$505,400.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 798	Construction On Jebella Police Station
1077	2/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-97970/0	\$208,460.00	\$208,460.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 798	Digital Cameras, Garmin Gps, Pistol Holsters, Used Cars, And Map Marking Pens
1078	2/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-97990/0	\$3,180.00	\$3,180.00	CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 144	Apc Back-ups
1079	2/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-98020/0	\$6,000.00	\$6,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 2590	Fuel Tank
1080	2/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-98030/0	\$24,000.00	\$24,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 2594	Diesel/ Benzene Tanks, Pumps And Walls
1081	2/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-97280/0	\$47,500.00	\$47,500.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraq Contractor - 2681	Communications Building Construction
1082	2/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-97780/0	\$488,294.00	\$488,294.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 2635	Construction In Najaf
1083	2/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-98040/0	\$5,000.00	\$5,000.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 152	Fuel For Diesel Generators
1084	2/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-95970/ P00001	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Ricoh Business Systems	Change Clin 0005
1085	2/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-98050/0	\$2,413.30	\$2,413.30	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 1997	Cleaning Supplies
1086	2/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-98100/0	\$78,800.00	\$78,800.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Rock Solid Solution Inc	Shower/Larline Hook Up At Tadi Base
1087	2/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-98140/0	\$31,190.00	\$31,190.00	CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 2570	Video Camera, Power Strips, Extension Cords, Microsoft Visio 2004, Paper Shredder, Extension Cords, Etc
1088	2/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-98180/0	\$11,500.00	\$11,500.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 957	Repair Buildings
1089	2/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-97670/ P00001	\$400.00	\$400.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraq Contractor - 471	Change Price
1090	2/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-98200/0	\$22,974.50	\$22,974.50	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 165	Chairs And Lan Adaptors
1091	2/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-98210/0	\$5,010.00	\$5,010.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 165	Padlocks, Projector Stands And Hand Trucks
1092	2/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-98090/0	\$13,600.00	\$13,600.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 152	Cabinets
1093	2/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-98190/0	\$9,135.00	\$9,135.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 165	Shredder, Copier, Memory Sticks, Printer Server Card, Power Strips, And Plastic Comb Binding Machine
1094	2/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-98230/0	\$8,000.00	\$8,000.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 2383	Shipping Container
1095	2/27/2005	W914NS-05-M-98220/0	\$9,595.00	\$9,595.00	CMATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 165	Recreational Furnishings
1096	2/28/2005	W914NS-05-M-98260/0	\$1,250.00	\$1,250.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 2570	Wheeled Travel Bags
1097	3/1/2005	W914NS-05-M-98300/0	\$56,000.00	\$56,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 1351	Vehicle Repair
1098	3/1/2005	W914NS-05-M-98330/0	\$5,880.00	\$5,880.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraq Contractor - 1570	Internet Service
1099	3/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-97510/ P00001	(\$17,930.00)	(\$17,930.00)	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraq Contractor - 2683	Cancel The Order In Its Entirety Since The Contractor Cannot Be Located.

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
1100	3/3/2005	W914NS-05-M-9811/00	\$211,200.00	\$211,200.00	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1592	Fence At 1st Mech Bde Inf, Iadji
1101	3/4/2005	W914NS-05-A-0001/0001/0	\$35,347.00	\$35,347.20	PCO	Full & Open	Agon Group International	Bri Armored Carrier
1102	3/5/2005	W914NS-05-A-0001/0002/0	\$61,857.60	\$61,857.60	PCO	Full & Open	Agon Group International	Nissan Cabstar
1103	3/5/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0001/0	\$98,100.00	\$98,100.00	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3233	Security And Transportation
1104	3/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-9844/00	\$20,400.00	\$20,400.00	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 1180	Barracks Renovation
1105	3/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-9846/00	\$28,890.00	\$28,890.00	CPATT	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1888	Recreational Training Equipment
1106	3/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-9847/00	\$52,000.00	\$52,000.00	ISOF AND CMATT	Full & Open	Usajfswcs	Handbooks
1107	3/6/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0002/0	\$26,000.00	\$26,000.00	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3233	Security And Transportation
1108	3/7/2005	W914NS-05-A-0001/0003/0	\$78,092.00	\$78,092.00	PCO	Full & Open	Agon Group International	Armored Hmwws And Kuwait Rate
1109	3/7/2005	W914NS-05-C-9036/2/0	\$723,792.00	\$723,792.00	PCO	Full & Open	Ess	Exercise Option Period For Contract
1110	3/7/2005	W914NS-05-M-9585/0/P0001	\$117,700.86	\$117,700.86	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2694	Modification Of Contract To Extend Period Of Performance And Increase Overall Contract Value; All Other Terms And Conditions Remain The Same
1111	3/7/2005	W914NS-05-M-9672/0/P0002	(\$14,000.00)	(\$14,000.00)	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 3236	Change Payment Office, Appropriation Data And Price
1112	3/8/2005	W56HZ/V04-D-8132/T0001/0	\$2,051,748.00	\$2,051,748.00	CPAIQ	Full & Open	Lifeline Shelter Systems, Inc	Truck/mobile X-ray Unit
1113	3/8/2005	W914NS-05-M-9851/00	\$825,000.00	\$825,000.00	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 1580	Twalls
1114	3/9/2005	W914NS-05-M-9847/0/P0001	(\$52,000.00)	(\$52,000.00)	JCCI	Not Available	Usajfswcs	Cancel Order
1115	3/9/2005	W914NS-05-M-9854/00	\$23,708.19	\$23,708.19	CMATT	Full & Open	Fuad Al-essa & Partner Company	Hygiene Kit
1116	3/9/2005	W914NS-05-M-9984/00	\$22,000.00	\$22,000.00	Not Available	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2173	Conex Containers
1117	3/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-9859/00	\$119,338.00	\$119,338.00	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 539	Phone Services
1118	3/12/2005	W914NS-05-M-9853/00	\$34,280.00	\$34,280.00	CMATT	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1590	Office/medical Furnishings
1119	3/12/2005	W914NS-05-M-9861/00	\$619,625.00	\$619,625.00	JCCI	Full & Open	Sohel General Trading	Clothing
1120	3/12/2005	W914NS-05-M-9807/00	\$236,250.00	\$236,250.00	CMATT	Not Available	Gerber Legendary Blades	T Walls
1121	3/12/2005	W914NS-05-M-9866/00	\$1,160.00	\$1,160.00	Not Available	Full & Open	Gss	Usb To Serial Port Cable
1122	3/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-1213/00	\$25,000.00	\$25,000.00	CMATT	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3225	Refrigerator
1123	3/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-9614/0/P0001	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 147	The Purpose Of This Mod Is To Cancel Contract W914ns-05-m-9614
1124	3/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-9807/0/P0001	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	Not Available	Gkl	Change Payment Address
1125	3/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-9870/00	\$187,082.50	\$187,082.50	JCCI	Full & Open	Sohel General Trading	Various Office And Training Equipment
1126	3/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-9872/00	\$4,600.00	\$4,600.00	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2757	250kw Generator With Electrical Connections, Construct Concrete Base And Wall And Provide Fuel Tank
1127	3/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-9873/00	\$9,525.00	\$9,525.00	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 975	Table Chairs
1128	3/15/2005	W56HZ/V04-D-8132/T0002/0	\$7,360,680.00	\$7,360,680.00	CPAIQ	Full & Open	Lifeline Shelter Systems, Inc	Truck/mobile X-ray Unit
1129	3/15/2005	W914NS-04-D-9006/T0003/0	\$233,151.00	\$233,151.00	CPATT	Full & Open	Astro Systems	Telephones And Supplies
1130	3/15/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0003/0	\$205,500.00	\$205,500.00	Not Available	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3233	Security And Transportation
1131	3/17/2005	W914NS-05-A-0001/0004/0	\$110,544.00	\$110,544.00	Not Available	Full & Open	Agon Group International	Mixed Cargo
1132	3/19/2005	W914NS-05-M-9886/00	\$8,000.00	\$8,000.00	Not Available	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3218	Weapon Mount
1133	3/19/2005	W914NS-05-M-9889/00	\$1,101.00	\$1,101.00	CPATT	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 788	Wireless Access Point, 5 Port Ethernet Switch, 10' Cat 5 Patch Cable, Power Strip
1134	3/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-9877/00	\$5,640,777.50	\$5,640,777.50	MOI	Full & Open	Mine Safety Appliances Company	Breathing Apparatuses
1135	3/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-9892/00	\$24,850.00	\$24,850.00	Not Available	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 139	Construction Materials
1136	3/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-9894/00	\$20,000.00	\$20,000.00	CMATT	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 863	Training Manuals
1137	3/21/2005	W914NS-05-M-9883/00	\$180,000.00	\$180,000.00	Not Available	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2756	Training

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
1138	3/22/2005	W914NS-05-D-9009/0/0	\$377,603.00	\$377,603.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2692	Maintenance, Utilities And Protection
1139	3/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-9901/0/0	\$56,880.00	\$56,880.00	MOI	JCCI	Full & Open	Boston Rack & Wire	Lockers And Shipping
1140	3/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-9902/0/0	\$19,232.00	\$19,232.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	The Fire Safety Engineering College	Fire Instructor Training
1141	3/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-9906/0/0	\$1,252,500.00	\$1,252,500.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Motorola	Handheld Radio And Encryption Board
1142	3/23/2005	W914NS-05-A-0001/0005/0	\$221,088.00	\$221,088.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Agon Group International	Mixed Cargo
1143	3/23/2005	W914NS-05-A-0001/0006/0	\$97,279.00	\$97,279.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Agon Group International	Soldier Equipment To Tadij
1144	3/24/2005	W56HZ/04-D-B01/4000/10/4	\$600.00	\$600.00	FFP	DCMA	Not Available	Altec Industries Inc.	Increase Contract Value By \$600
1145	3/24/2005	W56HZ/04-D-B05/9000/20/3	\$600.00	\$600.00	FFP	DCMA	Not Available	Altec Industries Inc.	Aerial Platform Vehicles
1146	3/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-9927/0/0	\$356,200.00	\$356,200.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 262	Wasit Military Intl. Equipment
1147	3/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-9928/0/0	\$215,085.00	\$215,085.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2767	Ezza Ip District Station
1148	3/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-9928/0/0	\$66,643.00	\$215,085.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2767	Ezza Ip District Station
1149	3/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-9930/0/0	\$280,625.00	\$280,625.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2611	Falhiyah Ip District Station
1150	3/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-9882/0/0	\$5,004.00	\$5,004.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2619	Meals/drinks
1151	3/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-9895/0/0	\$11,150.00	\$11,150.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2424	Cleaning Supplies
1152	3/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-9929/0/0	\$15,700.00	\$15,700.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2599	Trailer
1153	3/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-9931/0/0	\$2,245.00	\$2,245.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2770	Chairs
1154	3/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-9937/0/0	\$12,550.00	\$12,550.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1203	Internet Service And Supporting Hardware
1155	3/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-9940/0/0	\$12,000.00	\$12,000.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1935	Heavy Duty Shredders
1156	3/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-9942/0/0	\$264,000.00	\$264,000.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Triple Canopy Inc.	Suv
1157	3/27/2005	W914NS-05-M-9943/0/0	\$29,250.00	\$29,250.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2568	Staff Office Renovation
1158	3/28/2005	W914NS-05-M-9041/0/P00001	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Motorola	Change Accounting And Appropriation Data
1159	3/28/2005	W914NS-05-M-9944/0/0	\$16,000.00	\$16,000.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2568	Demolish "Ticket Building"
1160	3/28/2005	W914NS-05-M-9945/0/0	\$450.00	\$450.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2390	Construct Plasma Screen
1161	3/29/2005	W56HZ/04-D-B108/T0001/0	\$49,041.00	\$49,041.00	CPALQ	DCMA	Full & Open	P & G Chevrolet, Inc.	11-16 Passenger Van
1162	3/29/2005	W56HZ/05-D-B108/1/0	\$49,041.00	\$49,041.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	P & G Chevrolet, Inc.	Van
1163	3/29/2005	W914NS-05-M-9955/0/0	\$134,550.00	\$134,550.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2233	Rgan Open Sin Chip
1164	3/29/2005	W914NS-05-M-9956/0/0	\$30,100.00	\$30,100.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Sohel General Trading	Generators, And Trailers
1165	3/30/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0004/0	\$107,400.00	\$107,400.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3233	Additional Funding For Bpa
1166	3/30/2005	W914NS-05-D-9016/00001/0	\$1,701,370.52	\$1,701,370.52	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2692	Services And Equipment For Al Walid
1167	3/30/2005	W914NS-05-D-9016/1/0	\$1,701,370.52	\$1,701,370.52	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2692	Services And Equipment For Al Walid
1168	3/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-9952/0/0	\$965,000.00	\$965,000.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Integrated Convoy Protection Ltd.	Reva Apc W/upgrades
1169	3/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-9960/0/0	\$12,000.00	\$12,000.00	CMAATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2745	Blankets
1170	3/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-9961/0/0	\$9,466.00	\$9,466.00	CMAATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2765	Flashlights
1171	3/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-9965/0/0	\$125,138.00	\$125,138.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2754	Construct Subhani Border Post
1172	3/31/2005	W914NS-05-M-9969/0/0	\$3,045.30	\$3,045.30	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1997	Cleaning Supplies
1173	3/31/2005	W914NS-05-M-9973/0/0	\$24,474.80	\$24,474.80	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2765	School Supplies
1174	4/1/2005	W914NS-05-M-9016/T0001/0	\$1,701,370.52	\$1,701,370.52		PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2692	Life Support Operations
1175	4/3/2005	W914NS-05-M-9958/0/0	\$5,300.00	\$5,300.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3401	Arabic Instruction
1176	4/3/2005	W914NS-05-M-9989/0/0	\$5,300.00	\$5,300.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2753	Arabic Instructions
1177	4/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-9957/0/0	\$12,825.00	\$19,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2632	Logical Support Including Translators, Interpreters And Oversight
1178	4/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-9957/0/0	\$19,000.00	\$19,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2632	Logistical Support

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contract Type	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
1179	4/5/2005	W914NS-04-D-0125/0003/0	\$2,143,071.20	\$0.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Fisher Scientific Company L.L.C.	Regular Heavy Duty Suspenders Red
1180	4/5/2005	W914NS-04-D-0125/0003/0	\$180,468.75	\$0.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Fisher Scientific Company L.L.C.	Bunker Gear Heavy Duty Suspenders
1181	4/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-9535/0/ P00001	\$7,000.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 840	Modification To Increase Contract Amount For Al Heel Children's Magazine
1182	4/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-9982/0/0	\$589,911.40	\$589,911.40	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3237	Refurbishment Of Bpc Living Quarters
1183	4/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-9983/0/0	\$11,300.00	\$11,300.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2568	Build A Gate At Baghdad Police Academy
1184	4/6/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/5/0	\$41,000.00	\$41,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3233	Additional Funds For Existing Bpa's
1185	4/6/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0005/0	\$41,000.00	\$41,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3233	Additional Funding For Bpa
1186	4/6/2005	W914NS-05-M-931/0/ P00001		\$0.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2770	Change Accounting And Appropriation Data
1187	4/6/2005	W914NS-05-M-9931/0/ P00001		\$0.00		JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2770	Change Accounting And Appropriation Data
1188	4/6/2005	W914NS-05-M-9990/0/0	\$25,000.00	\$25,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 840	Al Heel Children's Magazine
1189	4/6/2005	W914NS-05-M-9991/0/0	\$19,000.00	\$19,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 840	Pens, Mugs, Calendars....
1190	4/7/2005	W914NS-05-M-9993/0/0	\$24,000.00	\$24,000.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2462	Construct A Concrete Barrier
1191	4/8/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/6/0	\$94,000.00	\$94,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3233	Spare Parts And Miscellaneous Military Equipment
1192	4/8/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0006/0	\$94,000.00	\$94,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3233	Bedding, Spare Parts, Misc. Military Equipment
1193	4/8/2005	W914NS-05-M-9999/0/0	\$992,215.00	\$992,215.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Harris Corporation	400 Watt Hf Base Station
1194	4/9/2005	W914NS-05-M-1001/0/0	\$23,010.00	\$23,010.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Rock Solid Solutions, Inc.	Install Fence At Mx Base, Taji, Iraq
1195	4/9/2005	W914NS-05-M-1002/0/0	\$4,000.00	\$4,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Cranes And Trucks
1196	4/9/2005	W914NS-05-M-1007/0/0	\$175,000.00	\$175,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2705	Renovate Medical Warehouse
1197	4/9/2005	W914NS-05-M-1007/0/0		\$175,000.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2705	Renovate Medical Warehouse
1198	4/9/2005	W914NS-05-M-1010/0/0	\$89,976.48	\$89,976.48	CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Computers, Phones And Supplies
1199	4/9/2005	W914NS-05-M-1010/0/0	\$89,976.48	\$89,976.48	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Computer Equipment, Phones, Chairs
1200	4/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-1017/0/0	\$19,755.00	\$19,755.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 142	Office Annex For Al Nasir Police Station
1201	4/12/2005	W914NS-05-A-0001/7/0	\$90,475.00	\$90,475.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Agon Group International	Mixed Cargo
1202	4/12/2005	W914NS-05-A-0001/0007/0	\$90,475.00	\$90,475.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Agon Group International	Mixed Cargo
1203	4/13/2005	W914NS-05-A-0001/8/0	\$123,375.00	\$123,375.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Agon Group International	Pickup Truck
1204	4/13/2005	W914NS-05-A-0001/0008/0	\$123,375.00	\$123,375.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Agon Group International	Pick-up Truck
1205	4/13/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/8/0	\$88,700.00	\$88,700.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3233	Nissan Cabstar Vehicle Transportation
1206	4/13/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0008/0	\$88,700.00	\$88,700.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3233	Vehicles And Transportation
1207	4/13/2005	W914NS-05-M-1027/0/0	\$24,900.00	\$24,900.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2756	Vehicle Armor For Pick-up Truck
1208	4/13/2005	W914NS-05-M-1040/0/0	\$48,200.00	\$48,200.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 3235	Planning Facility And Shoot House Improvements
1209	4/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-1026/0/0	\$29,794.63	\$29,794.63	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Ultimak	Optic Mount
1210	4/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-1041/0/0	\$54,300.00	\$54,300.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2427	Bridge Fencing, Steel Plate And Concertina Wire
1211	4/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-1043/0/0	\$14,813.00	\$14,813.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3215	Iraqna Subscription
1212	4/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-1048/0/0	\$38,460.00	\$38,460.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2427	Motorpool Overhead Cover
1213	4/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-9913/0/0	\$6,327.00	\$6,327.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 892	Furnishings And Cleaners
1214	4/15/2005	W914NS-05-A-0004/1/0	\$24,976.25	\$24,976.25	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Toiletries
1215	4/15/2005	W914NS-05-A-0004/0001/0	\$24,976.25	\$24,976.25	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Toiletries Kit
1216	4/15/2005	W914NS-05-A-0005/1/0	\$24,968.25	\$24,968.25	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1888	Toiletries
1217	4/15/2005	W914NS-05-A-0005/0001/0	\$24,968.25	\$24,968.25	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1888	Toiletries Kit
1218	4/15/2005	W914NS-05-D-9009/0003/0	\$377,603.00	\$377,603.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2692	Maintenance And Management For Utilities And Vehicles
1219	4/15/2005	W914NS-05-D-9009/0003/0	\$377,603.00	\$377,603.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2692	Maintenance And Management For Utilities And Vehicles
1220	4/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-1055/0/0	\$210.00	\$210.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Office Supplies

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
1221	4/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-1061/0/0	\$4,850.00	\$4,850.00	CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3204	Furniture
1222	4/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-9997/0/0	\$62,165.00	\$62,165.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1737	3" Plus Gravel Dump Truck Loads
1223	4/19/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/11/0	\$78,700.00	\$78,700.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3233	Ambulances And Leyland Trucks Transportation
1224	4/19/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0011/0	\$78,700.00	\$78,700.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3233	Ambulances And Trucks
1225	4/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-1073/0/0	\$61,200.00	\$61,200.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Galls Inc.	Body Armor & Shipping
1226	4/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-1076/0/0	\$42,300.00	\$42,300.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Sohel General Trading	Cage Pallets, And Utility Cabinets
1227	4/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-1077/0/0	\$6,515.00	\$6,515.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Sohel General Trading	Did Player, Tow Straps And Bars, Air Compressors, High Pressure Washers, Battery Chargers
1228	4/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-1299/0/0	\$173,500.00	\$173,500.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	Construct T-walls
1229	4/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-9912/0/0	\$11,010.00	\$11,010.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1737	Fire Fighting Equipment
1230	4/21/2005	W914NS-05-A-0001/10/0	\$82,250.00	\$82,250.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Agon Group International	Mixed Cargo
1231	4/21/2005	W914NS-05-A-0001/0010/0	\$82,250.00	\$82,250.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Agon Group International	Mixed Cargo And Trucks
1232	4/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-1080/0/0	\$127,308.00	\$127,308.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2607	Office Furniture
1233	4/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-1082/0/0	\$13,450.00	\$13,450.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Galls Inc.	Ap300 Rino Gps Radio
1234	4/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-1086/0/0	\$4,950.00	\$4,950.00	CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2688	Iron And Ironing Boards
1235	4/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-1088/0/0	\$3,270.00	\$3,270.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Disstage.com/ Greg Detray	Diso Plus
1236	4/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-9915/0/0	\$70,610.00	\$70,610.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2723	10 Ton Forklift
1237	4/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-1048/0/P00001	\$5,000.00	\$5,000.00	JCCI	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2427	Include Sand Bags Into Contract
1238	4/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-1048/0/P00001	\$5,000.00	\$5,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2427	Increase Amount And Replace Sand Bags
1239	4/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-1089/0/0	\$491,948.00	\$491,948.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2605	Build Headquarters For For Military Intelligence Division
1240	4/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-1090/0/0	\$12,600.00	\$12,600.00	CMATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 863	Printing Services - MI Student Courseware
1241	4/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-1091/0/0	\$91,520.00	\$91,520.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 675	Exercise Equipment
1242	4/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-1092/0/0	\$32,000.00	\$32,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2720	Install Laundry Facility
1243	4/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-1094/0/0	\$350.00	\$350.00	CMATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2746	Alterations Of Vests W/pockets & Pouch
1244	4/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-9985/0/0	\$414.00	\$414.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2723	Hammers, Mallets, Axes, And Tape Measure
1245	4/24/2005	W914NS-05-A-0001/11/0	\$82,250.00	\$82,250.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Agon Group International	Ambulances
1246	4/24/2005	W914NS-05-A-0001/0011/0	\$82,250.00	\$82,250.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Agon Group International	Army Ambulances And Car Carrier Trucks
1247	4/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-1095/0/0	\$4,000.00	\$4,000.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 3221	Move And Install Guard Towers
1248	4/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-1097/0/0	\$23,275.00	\$23,275.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2637	Installationg Of Fence And Gate
1249	4/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-1098/0/0	\$805.00	\$805.00	CMATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Sohel General Trading	Paints
1250	4/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-1101/0/0	\$8,525.00	\$8,525.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1590	Desk And Table
1251	4/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-1081/0/0	\$499,933.00	\$499,933.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 609	Renovation Of The Emergency Ip Team Building
1252	4/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-1105/0/0	\$43,810.00	\$43,810.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Tactical & Rescue Gear, Ltd.	Flashlights, Weapon Flashlight Mounts
1253	4/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-1106/0/0	\$24,800.00	\$24,800.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3200	Spotted Paint And Auto Body Work For 36 Vehicles
1254	4/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-1108/0/0	\$40,000.00	\$40,000.00	CMATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1737	Generator And Change Over Switch
1255	4/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-1109/0/0	\$11,700.00	\$11,700.00	CMATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 675	Projector
1256	4/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-1110/0/0	\$90,000.00	\$90,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3230	Shower Trailers
1257	4/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-1115/0/0	\$7,250.00	\$7,250.00	CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2173	Internet Connection And Service
1258	4/26/2005	W914NS-05-A-0006/1/0	\$70,520.00	\$70,520.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3232	Additional Funds For Existing Bpa's
1259	4/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-1052/0/0	\$22,000.00	\$22,000.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3207	Modify Mercedes Truck
1260	4/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-1099/0/0	\$1,600.00	\$1,600.00	CMATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2715	Printer Ribbons
1261	4/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-1111/0/0	\$17,400.00	\$17,400.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	Renovate Commando Site Entry Road (Al-rassalah)
1262	4/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-1112/0/0	\$134,750.00	\$134,750.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	Install A 500kva Generator

APPENDIX G

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contract Type	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
1263	4/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-11180/0	\$60,000.00	\$60,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2568	T-wall Barriers
1264	4/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-11190/0	\$22,500.00	\$22,500.00	CMAATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3221	Tent Move
1265	4/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-11200/0	\$24,850.00	\$24,850.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3210	Nissan Bus
1266	4/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-11210/0	\$14,000.00	\$14,000.00	CPATT, CMAATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Tdi-arms Inc.	Rail Hand Guard For Ak-47
1267	4/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-11240/0	\$21,440.00	\$21,440.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Laurus Systems Inc.	Battery Pack And Air Sampler For Batteries
1268	4/26/2005	W914NS-05-S-0006/0001/0	\$70,520.00	\$70,520.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 3232	Delivery Services
1269	4/27/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/12/0	\$156,600.00	\$156,600.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3233	Additional Funds For Existing Bpa's
1270	4/27/2005	W914NS-05-M-11250/0	\$5,040.00	\$5,040.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Hygiene Kits
1271	4/27/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0012/0	\$156,600.00	\$156,600.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Universal Security LLC	Additional Funds For Bpa
1272	4/28/2005	W914NS-05-A-0006/0002/0	\$6,898.00	\$6,898.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3232	Mobile Generator
1273	4/28/2005	W914NS-05-M-11260/0	\$14,396.00	\$14,396.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Furniture
1274	4/28/2005	W914NS-05-M-11290/0	\$995,450.00	\$995,450.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	Helicopter Pad Construction
1275	4/28/2005	W914NS-05-M-11300/0	\$200.00	\$200.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3206	Sign
1276	4/28/2005	W914NS-05-M-11310/0	\$4,296.00	\$4,296.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2770	Porta Johns
1277	4/28/2005	W914NS-05-M-11320/0	\$113,017.32	\$113,017.32	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2704	Office Supplies
1278	4/28/2005	W914NS-05-M-11260/0	\$14,396.00	\$14,396.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Office Furniture
1279	4/28/2005	W914NS-05-M-11290/0	\$995,450.00	\$995,450.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	Helicopter Pad
1280	4/28/2005	W914NS-05-M-11300/0	\$200.00	\$200.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3206	Ihp Aluminum Sign
1281	4/28/2005	W914NS-05-M-11310/0	\$4,296.00	\$4,296.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2770	Porta-johns And Service
1282	4/28/2005	W914NS-05-M-11320/0	\$113,017.32	\$113,017.32	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2704	Water Cooler, Refrigerator, Desk, Office Supplies
1283	4/29/2005	W914NS-05-F-9072/0/0	\$16,551.80	\$16,551.80	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Danaher Tool Group, Easco T.	Tool Sets
1284	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-A-0006/0/0	\$171,940.00	\$171,940.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3232	Move Trailers
1285	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-11350/0	\$8,050.00	\$8,050.00	CMAATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 892	Printers And Cartridges
1286	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-11360/0	\$1,200.00	\$1,200.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2424	Print Cartridges
1287	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-11370/0	\$9,740.40	\$9,740.40	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3237	Metal Detectors
1288	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-11390/0	\$275.00	\$275.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2424	Air Compressor
1289	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-11400/0	\$358.75	\$358.75	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3237	Battery And Paint Supplies
1290	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-11410/0	\$750.00	\$750.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 429	Arm Bands
1291	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-11420/0	\$15,415.00	\$15,415.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2720	Printer Cartridges And Other Computer Supplies
1292	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-11430/0	\$4,100.00	\$4,100.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Danish-jordan Company For Contracting, General Supply And Concrete Works	Counter
1293	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-11440/0	\$12,100.00	\$12,100.00	CMAATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 675	512 Memory Sticks
1294	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-11480/0	\$4,771.00	\$4,771.00	CMAATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2727	Tent Repairs
1295	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-12330/0	\$24,750.00	\$24,750.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2462	Diesel & Benzene Fuel
1296	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-99590/0	\$850.00	\$850.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Sohel General Trading	Filing Cabinets
1297	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-11350/0	\$8,050.00	\$8,050.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 892	Hp 4250 Printer, Hp Laserjet Black Print Cartridge
1298	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-11360/0	\$1,200.00	\$1,200.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2424	Hp Print Cartridges
1299	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-11370/0	\$9,740.40	\$9,740.40	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3237	Metal Detectors
1300	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-11390/0	\$275.00	\$275.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2424	Air Compressor
1301	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-11400/0	\$358.75	\$358.75	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3237	Liquid Battery, Paint Supplies
1302	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-11420/0	\$15,415.00	\$15,415.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2720	Hp Laserjet Toner, Canon Toner, Paper, Cat-5 Cable
1303	4/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-11440/0	\$12,100.00	\$12,100.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 675	Memory Sticks
1304	5/1/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0013/0	\$149,700.00	\$149,700.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3233	Additional Funding For Bpa

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
1305	5/1/2005	W914NS-05-M-1146/0/0	\$277,500.00	\$277,500.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2752	Transportation
1306	5/1/2005	W914NS-05-M-1147/0/0	\$347,500.00	\$347,500.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2752	Transportation
1307	5/1/2005	W914NS-05-M-1192/0/0	\$36,000.00	\$36,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2656	Engineering Support Services
1308	5/1/2005	W914NS-05-M-1147/0/0	\$347,500.00	\$347,500.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3638	Services Non-personal: Provide All Labor, Vehicles, And Fuel For Transportation Of Baggage
1309	5/1/2005	W914NS-05-M-1146/0/0	\$277,500.00	\$277,500.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3638	Services Non-personal: Provide All Labor, Vehicles, And Fuel For Transportation Of Baggage
1310	5/1/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0013/0	\$149,700.00	\$149,700.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Universal Security LLC	Water Trailers
1311	5/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-1123/0/0	\$30,381.00	\$30,381.00	CPATT & CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Ultimak	Ultimak Optic Mount For The Ak-47
1312	5/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-1150/0/0	\$23,200.00	\$23,200.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Motorola	Cables
1313	5/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-1151/0/0	\$24,196.00	\$24,196.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2715	Tools
1314	5/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-1155/0/0	\$22,100.00	\$22,100.00	CMATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2570	Flash Lights
1315	5/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-1156/0/0	\$43,305.00	\$43,305.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3228	Office Supplies/ Appliances
1316	5/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-1157/0/0	\$22,000.00	\$22,000.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 863	Printing Services: Moi Soldier Handbook
1317	5/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-1157/0/0	\$22,000.00	\$22,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 863	Printing Services
1318	5/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-1155/0/0	\$22,100.00	\$22,100.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2570	Flash Lights, Holsters, Batteries
1319	5/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-1151/0/0	\$24,196.00	\$24,196.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2715	Tools
1320	5/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-1150/0/0	\$23,200.00	\$23,200.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Motorola	Rg-213 Connectors, Cables
1321	5/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-1123/0/0	\$30,381.00	\$30,381.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Ultimak	Optic Mount Model
1322	5/3/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0014/0	\$93,000.00	\$93,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3233	Cargo To Kirkush Mtb
1323	5/3/2005	W914NS-05-M-1164/0/0	\$29,400.00	\$29,400.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 784	Generator Service
1324	5/3/2005	W914NS-05-M-1164/0/0	\$37,050.00	\$37,050.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 784	Raising Fuel Tank, Change Fuel Pump, Connecting Generator
1325	5/3/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0014/0	\$93,000.00	\$93,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Universal Security LLC	Trucks
1326	5/4/2005	W914NS-05-A-0007/0/0 P00001	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Reep Dba Operational Support Services	The Purpose Of This Mod Is To Change The Accounting Data
1327	5/4/2005	W914NS-05-F-9073/0/0	\$556,906.20	\$556,906.20	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Agilent Technologies, Inc.	Major Crime Unit Specialized Forensic Equipment
1328	5/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-1165/0/0	\$6,000.00	\$6,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2568	Install Gate Vehicle Search
1329	5/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-1166/0/0	\$12,816.17	\$12,816.17	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Sprint Communication Company	Phone Service
1330	5/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-1167/0/0	\$17,000.00	\$17,000.00	CMATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2679	Ymckk Color Ribbon
1331	5/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-1168/0/0	\$1,560.00	\$1,560.00	CMATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Sohel General Trading	Office Supplies
1332	5/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-1169/0/0	\$19,375.00	\$19,375.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2568	Wood Test Booths
1333	5/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-1171/QF-1161/0	\$62,220.00	\$62,220.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Sohel General Trading	Body Armor, Computers, Supplies
1334	5/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-9909/0/0	\$6,954.00	\$6,954.00	PC2100	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Locking Key Cabinet, Power Strip, Transformer, Extension Cord, Memory Stick 512mb, Jumper Cables
1335	5/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-9909/0/0	\$6,954.00	\$6,954.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Computer Equipment And Misc Supplies
1336	5/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-1165/0/0	\$6,000.00	\$6,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2568	Install Gate Vehicle Search Area
1337	5/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-1171/0/0	\$62,220.00	\$62,220.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Sohel General Trading	Computer, Thumb Drive, Memory Card, Body Armor, Binoculars
1338	5/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-1169/0/0	\$19,375.00	\$19,375.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2568	Manufacturing, Delivery, And Installation Of Wood Test Booths
1339	5/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-1168/0/0	\$1,560.00	\$1,560.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Sohel General Trading	Copy Paper, Printer Cartridges, Memory Stick, Paper Cutter
1340	5/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-1167/0/0	\$17,000.00	\$17,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2679	Color Ribbon
1341	5/4/2005	W914NS-05-M-1166/0/0	\$12,816.17	\$12,816.17	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Sprint Communication Company	Calling Package
1342	5/4/2005	W914NS-05-F-9073/0/0	\$556,906.20	\$556,906.20	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Agilent Technologies, Inc.	Equipment, Windows Xp
1343	5/5/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0015/0	\$107,700.00	\$107,700.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3233	Additional Funding For Bpa
1344	5/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-1174/0/0	\$123,879.00	\$123,879.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Emw	It Services

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
1345	5/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-11790/0	\$142,800.00	\$142,800.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Golden Spectrum Engineering Co. (G.s.t.)	X-ray And Inspection System
1346	5/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-11800/0	\$15,120.00	\$15,120.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1765	Porta Johns
1347	5/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-11810/0	\$21,000.00	\$21,000.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2570	Bottled Water
1348	5/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-11820/0	\$8,343.45	\$8,343.45	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3217	Digital Scales
1349	5/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-11840/0	\$10,491.00	\$10,491.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	The Peavey Corporation	Office Supplies
1350	5/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-9482/0/ P0001	\$6,402.24	\$6,402.24		PCO	Not Available	Reep Dba Operational Support Services	Add Clin 0013
1351	5/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-11790/0	\$142,800.00	\$142,800.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Golden Spectrum Engineering Co. (G.s.t.)	X-ray/Wbatteries And Charger- Pc Based Inspection System Wvideo Control Unit, Notebook Computer Cables And Carrying Case.
1352	5/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-11800/0	\$15,120.00	\$15,120.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1765	Porta-johns (60 Each)
1353	5/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-11810/0	\$21,000.00	\$21,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2570	Bottled Water
1354	5/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-11820/0	\$8,345.45	\$8,345.45	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3217	Digital Scale, Shipping
1355	5/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-11840/0	\$10,491.00	\$10,491.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	The Peavey Corporation	Adhesive Ruler, Photo Scale, Dhl Shipping
1356	5/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-11740/0	\$123,879.00	\$123,879.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Ernw	Labor, Transportation, Materials, And Equipment To Perform It Services
1357	5/5/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0015/0	\$107,700.00	\$107,700.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Universal Security LLC	Trucks
1358	5/6/2005	W914NS-05-M-11850/0	\$51,460.00	\$1,460.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Sohell General Trading	Furniture, Outlets And Power Strips
1359	5/6/2005	W914NS-05-M-11850/0	\$1,460.00	\$1,460.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Sohell General Trading	Office Supplies
1360	5/6/2005	W914NS-05-M-11880/0	\$3,500.00	\$3,500.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2597	Jersey Barriers
1361	5/6/2005	W914NS-05-M-11890/0	\$945,000.00	\$945,000.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 790	Armored Mercedes
1362	5/6/2005	W914NS-05-M-1361/0/0	\$18,250.00	\$18,250.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2705	Engineer Payment
1363	5/6/2005	W914NS-05-M-11880/0	\$3,500.00	\$3,500.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2597	Jersey Barriers
1364	5/7/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/16/0	\$246,500.00	\$246,500.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3233	Move Leyland Trucks
1365	5/7/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0016/0	\$246,500.00	\$246,500.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3233	Trucks
1366	5/7/2005	W914NS-05-M-11280/0	\$885,500.00	\$885,500.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2372	Beds And Bed Supplies
1367	5/7/2005	W914NS-05-M-11830/0	\$880.00	\$880.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3208	Satellite Package
1368	5/8/2005	W914NS-05-F-90750/0	\$142,546.00	\$142,546.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Horiba Jobin Yvon, Inc.	Forensk Light Source
1369	5/8/2005	W914NS-05-M-11930/0	\$11,676.00	\$11,676.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Jtsi Inc.	Internet Connectivity In Nato Annex B
1370	5/8/2005	W914NS-05-M-11970/0	\$39,000.00	\$39,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Sohell General Trading	Fax Machines
1371	5/8/2005	W914NS-05-M-11990/0	\$100,616.00	\$100,616.00	CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Sohell General Trading	Furniture
1372	5/9/2005	W914NS-05-A-0007/0003/0	\$24,927.50	\$24,927.50	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Operational Support Services	Translated Panel
1373	5/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-12050/0	\$8,850.75	\$8,850.75	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Sohell General Trading	Transport And Bid For Furniture And Support Equipment For Baghdad Police Station
1374	5/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-12070/0	\$18,934.00	\$18,934.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Sohell General Trading	Furniture And Appliances
1375	5/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-12080/0	\$11,735.51	\$11,735.51	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Sohell General Trading	Furniture
1376	5/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-12100/0	\$1,500.00	\$1,500.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2705	Window Shades
1377	5/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-12110/0	\$20,400.00	\$20,400.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Motorola	Scratch Cards And Sat Phones
1378	5/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-12110/0	\$70,400.00	\$70,400.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Motorola	Scratch Cards And Sat Phones
1379	5/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-12140/0	\$16,000.00	\$16,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3234	Mattress Cover
1380	5/12/2005	W914NS-05-A-0007/0004/0	\$24,927.50	\$24,927.50	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Operational Support Services	Translated Panels
1381	5/12/2005	W914NS-05-A-0007/0004/0	\$24,927.50	\$24,927.50	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Operational Support Services	Translated Panel
1382	5/12/2005	G5-35F-01368/W914NS-05-F-9079/0	\$39,068.00	\$39,068.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Digital Connect Communications, Inc.	Photographic Supplies
1383	5/12/2005	W914NS-05-M-12160/0	\$24,500.00	\$24,500.00	CMATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3221	Tents City Repair
1384	5/12/2005	W914NS-05-M-12170/0	\$5,500.00	\$550.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2705	Termite Treatment
1385	5/12/2005	W914NS-05-M-12180/0	\$86,400.00	\$86,400.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2597	Pumps, Cleaning Supplies, Safety Gear, Tools

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
1386	5/12/2005	W914NS-05-M-12350/0	\$598,600.00	\$598,600.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3211	Pick Up Trucks
1387	5/13/2005	W914NS-05-M-12200/0	\$25,000.00	\$25,000.00	CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3237	Tactical Goggles
1388	5/13/2005	W914NS-05-M-12210/0	\$2,750.00	\$2,750.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 497	Engineering Electrical Assessment
1389	5/13/2005	W914NS-05-M-12230/0	\$5,317.50	\$5,317.50	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3237	Printer Supplies
1390	5/13/2005	W914NS-05-M-12230/0	\$5,317.50	\$5,317.50	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3237	Printer Supplies
1391	5/13/2005	W914NS-05-M-12240/0	\$22,200.00	\$22,200.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Motorola	Coax Cables
1392	5/13/2005	W914NS-05-M-12460/0	\$15,000.00	\$15,000.00	CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2715	Provide All Equipment And Personnel To Clean 6 Miles Of Sewage
1393	5/13/2005	W914NS-05-M-912390/0	\$25,000.00	\$25,000.00	CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3237	Tactical Goggles
1394	5/14/2005	W914NS-04-D-0133/80	\$1,287,360.00	\$1,287,360.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Pae Government Systems Inc	Firefighter Training
1395	5/14/2005	W914NS-05-F-9076/0/ P00001		\$0.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Gtsi, Inc.	Correct Payment Information
1396	5/14/2005	W914NS-05-F-9076/0/ P00001	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Gtsi, Inc.	Incorporate The Correct Paying Information
1397	5/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-12040/0	\$353,651.00	\$353,651.00	CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Bdl Systems Ltd	Bomb Disposal
1398	5/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-12120/0	\$13,500.00	\$13,500.00	CMATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3225	Cooler Boxes
1399	5/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-12250/0	\$42,500.00	\$42,500.00	IRIMO/MOI	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3224	Junk Cars Used For Rescue Training
1400	5/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-12280/0	\$498,000.00	\$498,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 798	Nissan Pick-ups
1401	5/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-99280/ P00001	\$66,643.00	\$66,643.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2767	Increase Performance Period And Force Protection Measures
1402	5/15/2005	W914NS-05-M-12260/0	\$495,000.00	\$495,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1862	Pick-up Truck
1403	5/15/2005	W914NS-05-M-12270/0	\$5,500.00	\$5,500.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2705	Janitorial Services
1404	5/15/2005	W914NS-05-M-12310/0	\$1,550.36	\$1,550.36	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Starcraft	Tactical Templates
1405	5/15/2005	W914NS-05-M-12340/0	\$9,000.00	\$9,000.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3231	Deliver And Setup 40' Shipping Containers
1406	5/15/2005	W914NS-05-M-12660/0	\$495,000.00	\$495,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1862	Gmc Pick Up Trucks
1407	5/16/2005	W914NS-04-D-0133/10/0	\$1,287,360.00	\$1,287,360.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Pae Government Systems Inc	Firefighter Training
1408	5/16/2005	W914NS-04-D-0133/11/0	\$1,287,360.00	\$1,287,360.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Pae Government Systems Inc	Firefighter Training
1409	5/16/2005	W914NS-04-D-0133/12/0	\$1,287,360.00	\$1,287,360.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Pae Government Systems Inc	Firefighter Training
1410	5/16/2005	W914NS-04-D-0133/13/0	\$1,287,360.00	\$1,287,360.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Pae Government Systems Inc	Firefighter Training
1411	5/16/2005	W914NS-04-D-0133/9/0	\$1,287,360.00	\$1,287,360.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Pae Government Systems Inc	Firefighter Training
1412	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-A-0007/0005/0	\$24,927.50	\$24,927.50	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Operational Support Services	Translated Panels
1413	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-A-0007/0005/0	\$24,927.50	\$24,927.50	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Operational Support Services	Translated Panel
1414	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-D-0133/ T0009/0	\$1,287,360.00	\$1,287,360.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Pae Government Systems Inc	Basic Recruit/firefighting Training Class #9
1415	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-D-0133/ T0010/0	\$1,287,360.00	\$1,287,360.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Pae Government Systems Inc	Basic Recruit/firefighting Training Class #10
1416	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-D-0133/ T0011/0	\$1,287,360.00	\$1,287,360.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Pae Government Systems Inc	Basic Recruit/firefighting Training Class #11
1417	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-D-0133/ T0012/0	\$1,287,360.00	\$1,287,360.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Pae Government Systems Inc	Basic Recruit/firefighting Training Class #12
1418	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-D-0133/ T0013/0	\$1,287,360.00	\$1,287,360.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Pae Government Systems Inc	Basic Recruit/firefighting Training Class #12
1419	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-11270/0	\$490,048.30	\$490,048.30	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Charles Kendall And Partners Limited	Supplies
1420	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-12320/0	\$49,500.00	\$49,500.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2462	Diesel Fuel And Benzene
1421	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-12360/0	\$900,167.50	\$900,167.50	CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Protective Communications Inc.	Various Electronic Supplies
1422	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-12370/0	\$20,000.00	\$20,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3203	Guard Tower Improvement
1423	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-12380/0	\$13,430.00	\$13,430.00	CMATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2173	Furniture
1424	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-12390/0	\$20,290.00	\$10,290.00	CMATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2738	Warehouse Shades

APPENDIX G

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contract Type	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
1425	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-1240/00	\$7,000.00	\$7,000.00	CMAAT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3214	Patches
1426	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-1241/00	\$8,200.00	\$8,200.00	CMAAT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3220	Construction
1427	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-1242/00	\$5,408.00	\$5,408.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Health Safety Supplies
1428	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-1243/00	\$7,020.00	\$7,020.00	CMAAT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2715	Speakers And Speaker Supplies
1429	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-1244/00	\$27,000.00	\$27,000.00	CMAAT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2678	Supplies: Bunk Beds, Pillows, Wall Lockers, Mattresses
1430	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-1245/00	\$24,895.00	\$24,895.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Carpets, Ceiling, Conference Table And Office Chairs
1431	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-1247/00	\$24,000.00	\$24,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3216	Trailer
1432	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-1250/00	\$3,280.00	\$3,280.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Tools
1433	5/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-1251/00	\$415,000.00	\$415,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1862	Trucks
1434	5/17/2005	W914NS-05-M-1219/00	\$11,700.00	\$11,700.00	CPATT	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 1173	Furniture
1435	5/17/2005	W914NS-05-M-1248/00	\$3,048,000.00	\$3,048,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Computers
1436	5/17/2005	W914NS-05-M-1273/00	\$200,000.00	\$200,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3223	Barriers
1437	5/17/2005	W914NS-05-M-9988/00	\$10,895.00	\$10,895.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Painting And Welding Supplies
1438	5/18/2005	W914NS-05-M1254/00	\$1,447,580.00	\$1,447,580.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Wamar Lnternational, Lnc	Armored Vehicles
1439	5/18/2005	W914NS-05-M-1254/00	\$1,447,580.00	\$1,447,580.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Wamar Lnternational, Lnc	Cars
1440	5/18/2005	W914NS-05-M1255/00	\$189,500.00	\$189,500.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	Construct T-wall At Suleik Baghdad
1441	5/18/2005	W914NS-05-M-1255/00	\$189,500.00	\$189,500.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	Construct T-wall At Suleik Baghdad
1442	5/18/2005	W914NS-05-M-1281/00	\$5,100.00	\$5,100.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2705	Cement, Sand, Gravel, Water Tank
1443	5/18/2005	W914NS-05-M-1283/00	\$15,465.00	\$15,465.00	CMAAT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2720	Supplies
1444	5/18/2005	W914NS-05-M-1285/00	\$2,990,998.00	\$2,990,998.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Textron	Weapon Supplies
1445	5/18/2005	W914NS-05-M-1288/00	\$120,600.00	\$120,600.00	CMAAT	PCO	Full & Open	Reep DbA Operational Support Services	Cultural Awareness Sessions
1446	5/18/2005	W914NS-05-M-1289/00	\$70,816.80	\$70,816.80	CMAAT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2622	Cameras
1447	5/19/2005	W914NS-05-A-0004/20	\$24,600.00	\$24,600.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Toiletry Kits
1448	5/19/2005	W914NS-05-A-0004/0002/0	\$24,600.00	\$24,600.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Toiletries Kit
1449	5/19/2005	W914NS-05-M-1219/00	\$11,700.00	\$11,700.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 1173	Furniture
1450	5/19/2005	W914NS-05-M-1253/00	\$139,986.80	\$139,986.80	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Segovia	Deliver And Install Fiber Optics
1451	5/19/2005	W914NS-05-M-1286/00	\$5,500.00	\$5,500.00	MOD	JCCI	Full & Open	Agon Group International	Supplies And Furniture
1452	5/19/2005	W914NS-05-M-1292/00	\$14,000.00	\$14,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3213	Renovation Of 300 M Bern
1453	5/19/2005	W914NS-05-M-1295/00	\$497,400.00	\$497,400.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	Soil Barrier And Sewage System
1454	5/19/2005	W914NS-05-M-1297/00	\$113,500.00	\$113,500.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	T-walls For Al-ameen Public Order Battalion Site
1455	5/19/2005	W914NS-05-M-1298/00	\$996,170.00	\$996,170.00	FFP	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	Rehabilitation Of Al-saidia Public Order Battalion
1456	5/19/2005	W914NS-05-M-1300/00	\$97,875.00	\$97,875.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3231	Provide Meals And Water
1457	5/19/2005	W914NS-05-M-1301/00	\$63,700.00	\$63,700.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1765	Materials And Services At Camp Solidarity
1458	5/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-1054/00	\$25,770.00	\$25,770.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Smith Security Sales, Inc.	Magnum Gun Safe
1459	5/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-1302/00	\$396,380.00	\$396,380.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2770	Tents, Generators, And Furnishings
1460	5/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-1303/00	\$153,580.00	\$153,580.00	CMAAT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2740	Office Furniture
1461	5/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-1304/00	\$204,000.00	\$204,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1888	Cots And Blankets
1462	5/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-1305/00	\$5,840.00	\$5,840.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3231	Furniture
1463	5/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-1307/00	\$2,450.00	\$2,450.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2583	Furniture
1464	5/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-1308/00	\$484,300.00	\$484,300.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2621	Generators
1465	5/21/2005	W914NS-05-M-1127/0/P0001	(\$490,048.30)	(\$490,048.30)		PCO	Not Available	Charles Kendall And Partners Limited	Cancel Purchase Order
1466	5/21/2005	W914NS-05-M-1287/00	\$1,423.60	\$1,423.60	CMAAT	PCO	Full & Open	Blackhawk Products Group	Emergence Medical Supply Roll
1467	5/21/2005	W914NS-05-M-1311/00	\$152,000.00	\$152,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1592	Install Force Protection Fence

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
1468	5/21/2005	W914NS-05-M-13130/0	\$51,618.00	\$51,618.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2602	Computers, Printers And Supplies
1469	5/21/2005	W914NS-05-M-13140/0	\$128,000.00	\$128,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	Construct T-walls
1470	5/21/2005	W914NS-05-M-13150/0	\$118,500.00	\$118,500.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	T-wall And Jersey Barriers
1471	5/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-11640/ P00001	(\$7,650.00)	(\$7,650.00)		JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 784	Reduce Scope And Change Sow
1472	5/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-11640/ P00001	(\$7,650.00)	(\$7,650.00)	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 784	Reduce Scope And Make Changes To Work
1473	5/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-12930/0	\$112,700.00	\$112,700.00	CMAAT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1508	Tents,covering,flooring,electricity, And Fixtures
1474	5/23/2005	W914NS-05-F-09800/0	\$842,567.00	\$1,199.75	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Identification Data And Imaging	Law Enforcement Close Up Kits
1475	5/23/2005	W914NS-05-F-09800/0	\$1,199.75	\$1,199.75	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Identification Data And Imaging	Law Enforcement Close Up Kits
1476	5/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-11340/0	\$534,282.48	\$534,282.48	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	B And H Foto And Electronics	Photographic Materials And Cameras
1477	5/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-12560/0	\$123,250.00	\$123,250.00	CMAAT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2597	Furniture
1478	5/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-13180/0	\$40,000.00	\$40,000.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Construct Training Range	
1479	5/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-13190/0	\$314,075.00	\$314,075.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2709	Bunk Beds And Bed Supplies
1480	5/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-12520/0	\$994,950.00	\$994,950.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	Ihp Academy Site Rehabilitation
1481	5/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-12820/0	\$13,585.00	\$13,585.00	CMAAT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2723	Supplies
1482	5/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-13120/0	\$179,548.00	\$179,548.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Aco Electronics Ltd	Software And Software Training
1483	5/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-13160/0	\$528,813.00	\$528,813.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2727	Cold Bottled Water Delivery
1484	5/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-13200/0	\$997,221.00	\$997,221.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	Commando Site 3 Force Protection
1485	5/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-13210/0	\$22,281.00	\$22,281.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 163	Janitor Supplies
1486	5/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-13230/0	\$748,130.00	\$748,130.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	Al-dora Pob Renovation
1487	5/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-13240/0	\$710,800.00	\$710,800.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	Supply T-walls And Construct towers
1488	5/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-13250/0	\$9,600.00	\$9,600.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 899	Vehicle Engineering Support
1489	5/25/2005	W914NS-04-D-0122/120	\$1,040,000.00	\$1,040,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3236	Supplies Or Services
1490	5/25/2005	W914NS-04-D-0122/ DO00120	\$1,040.00	\$1,040,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3236	Supplies Or Services
1491	5/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-12570/0	\$20,000.00	\$20,000.00	CMAAT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 760	Furniture And Office Supplies
1492	5/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-13270/0	\$2,700.00	\$2,700.00	CMAAT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2704	Brassards
1493	5/26/2005	W914NS-04-M-92260/ P00001	\$189,000.00	\$189,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Advanced Technology	The Purpose Of This Mod Is To Incorporate Training In The Contract
1494	5/26/2005	W914NS-05-P-00010/0	\$127,750.00	\$127,750.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Caps And Brassards
1495	5/28/2005	W914NS-04-D-0121/710	\$1,044,000.00	\$1,044,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Wamar International, Inc	Armored Vehicles
1496	5/28/2005	W914NS-05-M-13320/0	\$41,060.00	\$41,060.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2652	Beds, Sheets, Safes
1497	5/28/2005	W914NS-05-P-00020/0	\$59,700.00	\$59,700.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2597	Twalls, Weapon Clearinf Barrels
1498	5/29/2005	W914NS-05-M-13360/0	\$1,000.00	\$1,000.00	CMAAT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2705	Install Battery Chargers For Forklifts
1499	5/29/2005	W914NS-05-M-13370/0	\$15,415.00	\$15,415.00	CMAAT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2720	Printing Supplies
1500	5/29/2005	W914NS-05-M-13390/0	\$130,000.00	\$130,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2610	Construct Vehicle Loading And Unloading Ramps
1501	5/30/2005	W914NS-05-A-000700060/0	\$24,927.50	\$24,927.50	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Operational Support Services	Translated Panels
1502	5/30/2005	W914NS-05-A-0007710	\$24,927.50	\$24,927.50	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Operational Support Services	Translated Panels
1503	5/30/2005	W914NS-05-A-000700060/0	\$24,927.50	\$24,927.50	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Operational Support Services	Translated Panel
1504	5/30/2005	W914NS-05-A-000700070/0	\$24,927.50	\$24,927.50	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Operational Support Services	Translated Panel
1505	5/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-13340/0	\$78,170.00	\$78,170.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2724	Repair & Renovat The 5th Ia Brigade Headquarters
1506	5/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-13400/0	\$20,000.00	\$20,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Motorola	Install Unif Repeater
1507	5/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-13420/0	\$15,700.00	\$15,700.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	C.d.s. Consultants	Generators
1508	5/30/2005	W914NS-05-P-00030/0	\$4,200.00	\$4,200.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2705	Air Conditioners

APPENDIX G

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contract Type	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
1509	5/30/2005	W914NS-05-P-0004/0/0	\$62,848.00	\$62,848.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2748	Furniture
1510	5/30/2005	W914NS-05-P-0005/0/0	\$84,000.00	\$84,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 163	Shower Trailers
1511	5/30/2005	W914NS-05-P-0008/0/0	\$400,000.00	\$400,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Anham Joint Venture	Vehicle Maintenance Agreement
1512	5/31/2005	W914NS-04-D-0117/17/3	\$748,086.00	(\$748,086.00)	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Mac International Fze	Change Schedule Of Supplies
1513	5/31/2005	W914NS-05-F-9081/0/0	\$842,567.00	\$842,567.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Remotec Inc.	Major Crimes Unit Specialized Forensics Equipment
1514	5/31/2005	W914NS-05-M-13380/0	\$33,500.00	\$33,500.00	CMAATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2677	Iraqi Human Rights Handbook
1515	5/31/2005	W914NS-05-P-0009/0/0	\$4,900.00	\$4,900.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 784	Generator
1516	6/1/2005	W914NS-05-M-1345/0/0	\$112,000.00	\$112,000.00	CMAATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2724	Sleep Tents
1517	6/1/2005	W914NS-05-M-1346/0/0	\$145,500.00	\$145,500.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Mac International Fze	Chevy Express 2005 Cargo Van
1518	6/1/2005	W914NS-05-P-0010/0/0	\$56,250.00	\$56,250.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 162	Generators
1519	6/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-1341/0/0	\$54,780.00	\$54,780.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2773	Construct Latrine And Shower Facilities
1520	6/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-1351/0/0	\$8,748.00	\$8,748.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Ameco	Lease 3 Diesel Generator Light Towers With Lamps
1521	6/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-1353/0/0	\$24,850.00	\$24,850.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 116	International Housing Project
1522	6/2/2005	W914NS-05-P-0013/0/0	\$370,983.00	\$370,983.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Communication Specialists, Ltd	Radio Equipment
1523	6/3/2005	W914NS-05-P-0012/0/0	\$748,326.69	\$748,326.69	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	American International Radio	Radios And Equipment
1524	6/3/2005	W914NS-05-P-0014/0/0	\$200,570.97	\$200,570.97	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2723	Plumbing Supplies
1525	6/3/2005	W914NS-05-P-0016/0/0	\$27,682.00	\$27,682.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Trans Atlantic Gen Trdg & Contig Co.wll	Wood Flooring And Tents
1526	6/4/2005	W914NS-04-M-9080/0/P00001	\$97,292.00	\$97,292.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 1380	Include Server Installation And Lan Maintenance To Existing Contract
1527	6/4/2005	W914NS-05-P-0017/0/0	\$5,953.10	\$5,953.10	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2762	Communication Equipment
1528	6/4/2005	W914NS-05-P-0018/0/0	\$14,100.00	\$14,100.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2738	Shelves, Security Doors
1529	6/4/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0021/0	\$110,100.00	\$110,100.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Universal Security LLC	Loading And Transporting Cargo
1530	6/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-1177/0/0	\$110,650.00	\$110,650.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Ballistics Research, Inc.	Dprs Dp-05 Systems
1531	6/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-1355/0/0	\$8,900.00	\$8,900.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2736	Range Signs
1532	6/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-1357/0/0	\$579,635.00	\$579,635.00	FFP	PCO	Full & Open	Aey Inc.	Supplies: Bunk Beds, Pillows, Wall Lockers, Mattresses
1533	6/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-1364/0/0	\$587,147.42	\$587,147.42	CMAATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2723	Miscellaneous Electrical & Hvac Material
1534	6/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-1364/0/0	\$0.00	\$587,147.42	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2723	Change Agencies From Usace To Hhd 9th Fb Bn
1535	6/6/2005	W914NS-05-M-1365/0/0	\$8,375.00	\$8,375.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2650	E-tech Engine Maintenance Tools
1536	6/6/2005	W914NS-05-M-1367/0/0	\$7,970.95	\$7,970.95	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	London Bridge Trading Co., Ltd	Vests
1537	6/7/2005	W914NS-05-M-1373/0/0	\$22,000.00	\$22,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2705	Concrete Pads
1538	6/8/2005	W914NS-05-M-1358/0/0	\$13,700.00	\$13,700.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2724	Showers
1539	6/8/2005	W914NS-05-M-1359/0/0	\$19,040.00	\$19,040.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2765	Office And Recreational Supplies
1540	6/8/2005	W914NS-05-M-1374/0/0	\$129,000.00	\$129,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3434	Generators And Preventive Maintenance
1541	6/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-1382/0/0	\$27,000.00	\$27,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Set Aside Small Business	Not Available	Heating And Cooling Units
1542	6/10/2005	W914NS-05-M-1387/0/0	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00	CPTM	JCCI	Full & Open	Anham Joint Venture	Repair Of Ministry Of Interior Vehicles
1543	6/12/2005	W914NS-05-M-1391/0/0	\$84,000.00	\$84,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Haajl Company	Renovation Of The Maintenance Building
1544	6/13/2005	W914NS-05-M-1376/0/0	\$460.00	\$460.00		JCCI	Full & Open	Blp	Provide Vehicle And Services For Grader Hire, Front End Loader Hire, Crane Hire, And All Purpose Truck Hire
1545	6/13/2005	W914NS-05-M-1395/0/0	\$1,500.00	\$1,500.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3408	Repair Door
1546	6/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-1399/0/0	\$21,000.00	\$21,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2738	Steel Doors And Windows
1547	6/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-1400/0/0	\$120,000.00	\$120,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 892	Containers
1548	6/15/2005	W914NS-04-D-0015/30/0	\$288,200.00	\$288,200.00	Not Available	CPA	Full & Open	Parsons	
1549	6/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-1393/0/0	\$3,294,649.00	\$3,294,649.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2704	Furniture And Office Items For Department Of Border Enforcement
1550	6/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-1416/0/0	\$2,877.20	\$2,877.20	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	West Coast Business Products, Inc.	Life Vests

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
1551	6/18/2005	W914NS-05-M-1398/0/0	\$25,000.00	\$25,000.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Aerosmith Aviation Services, Inc.	Parts, Tools, Etc.
1552	6/18/2005	W914NS-05-P-1424/0/0	\$20,020.00	\$20,020.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2738	Sewing Materials
1553	6/19/2005	W914NS-05-M-1429/0/0	\$2,500.00	\$2,500.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2568	Repairs
1554	6/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-1431/0/0	\$169,326.00	\$169,326.00	Time and Materials	JCCI	Full & Open	Lee Dynamics International	Carpentry And Woodwork Shop
1555	6/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-1437/0/0	\$20,500.00	\$20,500.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Qatar International Trading Company, Wll	T-walls And Jersey Barriers
1556	6/21/2005	W914NS-05-M-1438/0/0	\$73,000.00	\$73,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2568	T-walls And Clearing Barrels
1557	6/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-1443/0/0	\$8,916.70	\$8,916.70	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 892	Tools
1558	6/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-1448/0/0	\$1,800.00	\$1,800.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2621	Fuel Tank
1559	6/29/2005	GS-07F-0157/MW914NS-05-F-9090/0	\$473.40	\$473.40	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Galls Inc.	Training Gun
1560	6/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-1454/0/0	\$64,986.00	\$64,986.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 892	Forklifts
1561	7/1/2005	GS-27F-0009/W914NS-05-F-9089/0	\$635.90	\$635.90	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Meek Manufacturing Company, LLC	Inspection Mirror
1562	7/1/2005	W914NS-05-F-0133/10014/0	\$194,580.00	\$194,580.00	JCCI	JCCI	Full & Open	Pae Government Systems Inc	Pre Screening Program
1563	7/1/2005	W914NS-05-F-1458/0/0	\$1,022,760.00	\$1,022,760.00	CPATT	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1747	Provide Cold Bottled Water
1564	7/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-9883/0/P00003	\$0.00	\$0.00	PCO	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2756	Change The Accounting Data To 2004 1096.0103
1565	7/3/2005	W914NS-05-F-1463/0/0	\$998,380.00	\$998,380.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	Commando Site 8
1566	7/6/2005	W914NS-05-M-1366/0/0	\$3,750.00	\$3,750.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2621	Portable Generators
1567	7/6/2005	W914NS-05-M-1672/0/0	\$2,080.00	\$2,080.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Sohel General Trading	School Supplies
1568	7/10/2005	W914NS-05-A-0001/0020/0	\$14,500.00	\$14,500.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Agon Group International	Flatbed Trailers
1569	7/12/2005	W914NS-05-M-1520/0/0	\$1,840.00	\$1,840.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Green Shield Limited	Gun Safe
1570	7/13/2005	W914NS-05-M-1530/0/0	\$24,990.00	\$24,990.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3414	Children's Magazines
1571	7/13/2005	W914NS-05-M-1536/0/0	\$576,550.00	\$576,550.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	Construction And Installation At Commando Site 11
1572	7/14/2005	W914NS-05-M-1353/0/2	\$22,750.00	\$22,750.00	CPATT	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 116	Recind Mod 1, Change Fund Code, Incorporate Funding And Change Statement Of Work
1573	7/15/2005	W914NS-05-M-1549/0/0	\$37,182.00	\$37,182.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 268	Testing Supplies
1574	7/15/2005	W914NS-05-M-1551/0/0	\$60,000.00	\$60,000.00	CPATT	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3424	Tents
1575	7/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-1552/0/0	\$456,050.00	\$456,050.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3431	Force Protection
1576	7/16/2005	W914NS-05-M-1564/0/0	\$350.00	\$350.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3430	Barber Services
1577	7/19/2005	W914NS-05-M-1575/0/0	\$100,826.29	\$100,826.29	CPATT	DCMA	Full & Open	American Science And Engineering Inc.	Backscatter Repairs
1578	7/21/2005	W914NS-05-M-1576/0/0	\$65,807.48	\$65,807.48	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 268	River Boat Parts
1579	7/22/2005	W914NS-05-M-1589/0/0	\$945,930.00	\$945,930.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	River Police Hq Renovation
1580	7/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-1471/0/0	\$707.36	\$707.36		JCCI	Full & Open	lboats Incom	Misc. Boating Equipment
1581	7/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-1596/0/0	\$4,175.00	\$4,175.00	CPI	JCCI	Full & Open	Galls Inc.	Lockers
1582	8/3/2005	GS-07F-0038/HW914NS-05-F-9098/0	\$127,182.32	\$127,182.32	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3493	River Patrol Boats
1583	8/6/2005	W914NS-05-1167/0/0001	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	Not Available	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2679	"The Purpose Of This Is To Correct The Requisition Number And The Line Of Accounting. Req No A0029-5121-4002 21 4 1096.0103 71-2089pi 2230.00 83 9acc A0029-5121-4002 9acc 83 50907 6"
1584	8/6/2005	W914NS-05-M-1167/0/0001	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2679	"1. The Purpose Of This Modification Is To Correct The Requisition Number And The Line Of Accounting. A. Block 1 (Requisition No.) Ofthe Contract Should Read: A00295121-4002 B. Block 21 (Accounting And Appropriation Data) Ofthe Contract Should Read:
1585	8/9/2005	W915WES141762/0/P00002	(\$487,532.14)	(\$487,532.14)	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	American International Radio	Modify Scope Of Contract

APPENDIX G

#	Award Date	Contract Number	Contract Value	Amount Obligated	Contract Type	Contracting Office	Competition Type	Contractor Name	Scope
1586	8/17/2005	W914NS-05-M-1714/00	\$293,831.00	\$293,831.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Supplies For The Setup Of A Department Of Border Enforcement Academy Located At Al Kut.
1587	8/19/2005	GS-07F-0038H/W914NS-05-F-9098/000001	\$2,100.00	\$2,100.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 3493	Increase Amount Of Contract
1588	8/20/2005	W914NS-05-M-1737/00	\$5,691.45	\$5,691.45	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	I Comport Inc.	Nato Supplies Finance
1589	8/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-1765/00	\$117,000.00	\$117,000.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3483	Benzene And Diesel
1590	8/25/2005	W914NS-05-M-1764/00	\$62,400.00	\$62,400.00	FFP w/NTE clin	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1737	Poable Water
1591	8/27/2005	W914NS-05-M-1776/00	\$69,825.00	\$69,825.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Bob Barker Company	50 Gun Lockers
1592	8/29/2005	GS-24F-1325C/W914NS-05-F-9105/0	\$752,276.70	\$752,276.70	FFP w/NTE clin	DCMA	Full & Open	Leica Microsystems	Microscopes
1593	9/1/2005	W914NS-05-M-1650/00	\$423,957.68	\$423,957.68	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Cadillac Gage Textron Inc.	Various Tools
1594	9/1/2005	W914NS-05-A-0008/0/000002	\$803,640.00	\$803,640.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2770	Clarify Clin 0001 And Add Clin 0002
1595	9/2/2005	W914NS-05-M-1800/00	\$320,000.00	\$320,000.00	Not Available	JCC-IAA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3502	Worldwide Linguist Support Services
1596	9/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-1814/00	\$1,460.00	\$1,460.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2723	Paints And Brushes
1597	9/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-1812/00	\$1,925.00	\$1,925.00	FFP	JCCI	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Nato College Supplies
1598	9/5/2005	W914NS-05-M-1814/00	\$1,460.00	\$1,460.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2723	Paint And Paint Brushes
1599	9/6/2005	W914NS-05-M-1751/00	\$389,367.77	\$389,367.77	FFP w/NTE clin	DCMA	Full & Open	Whitley, Bradlee And Brown, Inc.	Ethics Training For Iraqi Soldiers
1600	9/8/2005	W914NS-05-M-1771/00	\$360,000.00	\$360,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3450	Khaki Uniforms
1601	9/8/2005	W914NS-05-A-0008/0/000003	\$202,200.00	\$202,200.00	BPA	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2770	Additional Funding To Bpa
1602	9/8/2005	W914NS-05-M-1771/00	\$360,000.00	\$360,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3450	Khaki Uniforms
1603	9/11/2005	W914NS-05-P-0014/0/000001	\$38,215.68	\$38,215.68	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2723	Renovate Plumbing In Ing Dorms
1604	9/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-1838/00	\$53,000.00	\$53,000.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Furniture
1605	9/11/2005	W914NS-05-M-1838/00	\$53,000.00	\$53,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 152	Furniture
1606	9/12/2005	W914NS-05-M-1364/0/P00003	\$0.00	\$14,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2723	Increase Total Contract Award Amount From \$587,147.72 To \$601,147.42
1607	9/13/2005	GS-07F-0210J/W914NS-05-F-9106/0	\$330,915.00	\$330,915.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Salc	Portable Surveillance System W/ Maintenance
1608	9/13/2005	W914NS-05-A-0008/0/00100001	\$7,605.00	(\$6,560.00)	BPA	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2770	Cancel Do 0001
1609	9/15/2005	W914NS-05-M-1834/00	\$129,000.00	\$129,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	C.d.s. Consultants	Septic Vacuum Truck
1610	9/19/2005	W914NS-05-M-1836/00	\$7,902.78	\$7,902.78	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3493	Radar Systems
1611	9/19/2005	W914NS-05-M-1836/00	\$7,902.78	\$7,902.78	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Furuno Usa, Inc	Radar System
1612	9/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-1857/00	\$980,400.00	\$980,400.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Global Link Distribution LLC	Repair Parts Recovery At Taj law
1613	9/23/2005	W914NS-05-M-1857/00	\$980,400.00	\$980,400.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Global Link Distribution LLC	Parts Reclamation Services
1614	9/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-1872/00	\$16,821.00	\$16,821.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1173	Commercial Dining Table And Chails.
1615	9/24/2005	W914NS-05-M-1872/00	\$16,821.00	\$16,821.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 1173	Furniture
1616	9/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-1883/00	\$22,900.00	\$22,900.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Global Link Distribution LLC	40' Connex Boxes. Delivery And Crane Operator To Offload.
1617	9/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-1882/00	\$34,800.00	\$34,800.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Adult Size Military Sleeping Bag, Military Sleeping Cots, Military Sleeping Mats.
1618	9/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-1882/00	\$34,800.00	\$34,800.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Soheil General Trading	Sleeping Bags And Mats
1619	9/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-1883/00	\$22,900.00	\$22,900.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Global Link Distribution LLC	40' Connex Containers
1620	9/26/2005	W914NS-05-M-9075/0/P00001	\$102,900.00	\$102,900.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 3627	Increased Funding By \$102,900
1621	9/29/2005	W914NS-05-M-1896/00	\$46,620.00	\$46,620.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 3452	Construct Iraq Scout Platoon Compound
1622	9/29/2005	W914NS-05-M-1865/00	\$0.00	\$194,040.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Laser Data Command	Id Cards
1623	9/29/2005	W914NS-05-M-1865/00	\$194,040.00	\$194,040.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Laser Data Command	Id Cards, Shipping

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
1624	9/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-1900/0-0	\$12,200.00	\$12,200.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Global Business Group	Delivery And Installation Of One Caravan, 3 Bathrooms, 3 Showers, And 2 Sinks
1625	9/30/2005	W914NS-04-M-9080/000002	\$15,975.00	\$15,975.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 1380	Extend Service To October 2005
1626	9/30/2005	W914NS-05-M-1900/0-0	\$12,200.00	\$12,200.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Global Business Group	Bathroom/Shower Trailers
1627	10/2/2005	W91GYO-06-M-0006/0-0	\$135,545.00	\$135,545.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Advanced Technology	1 Year Internet Service
1628	10/6/2005	GS-07F-8942DW91GYO-06-F-0001/0	\$4,475,150.00	\$4,475,150.00	Not Available	DCMA	Not Available	Point Blank Body Armor	Body Armor
1629	10/8/2005	W91GYO-06-M-0015/0-0	\$9,077.50	\$9,077.50	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	I Comport Inc.	Junior Course Booklet And Notes, Senior Course Booklet, Other Items.
1630	10/8/2005	W91GYO-06-M-0016/0-0	\$299,046.00	\$299,046.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 3082	Construct Two Barracks With Water Closet And Offices In Accordance With Statement Of Work.
1631	10/9/2005	W914NS-05-F-9082/0-P00001	\$2,034.70	\$1,017.35	JCCI	JCCI	Not Available	Ocean Enterprises Military Sales	Adjust The Shipping For Contract W914ns-05-F-9082 And Correcting The Line Of Accounting Data
1632	10/10/2005	GS-06F-00461MW91GYO-06-F-0003/0	\$2,990.00	\$2,990.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Complete Packaging & Shipping Supplies Inc	Nvy Batteries; Model Cx-123a; 3 Volt Lithium
1633	10/15/2005	W91GYO-06-D-0001/0001/0	\$16,669,950.00	\$16,669,950.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	I Comport Inc.	Uhf Handheld Radios, Uhf Vehicle Mobile Radios, Z20v Multi Charger, Z20v Single Charger, Spare Ultra High Capacity Battery, Windows Os Programming Sw/hw, Programming Cables For Uhf Handheld Radio, Programming Cables For Uhf Vehiclebase Station Radio
1634	10/16/2005	W91GYO-06-M-0038/0-0	\$100,000.00	\$100,000.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3601	Training On Computers, Ms Office, And Internet And Relevant Subjects
1635	10/20/2005	W91GYO-06-M-0037/0-0	\$94,246.59	\$94,246.59	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3602	Security Supplies
1636	10/20/2005	W91GYO-06-M-0037/0-0	\$94,246.59	\$94,246.59	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3602	Projectors, Rubber Ball Grenades
1637	10/21/2005	W914NS-05-A-0007/0020/0	\$24,927.50	\$24,927.50	JCCI	JCCI	Not Available	Operational Support Services	Coordinate Pick Up And Deliveries With Chris Rose At Chris.rose@centcom.mil Or Henrik Storch At Henrik.storch@centcom.mil
1638	10/24/2005	W914NS-05-D-9007/0001/P00003	(\$1,110,884.10)	(\$1,110,884.10)	PCO	PCO	Not Available	Proactive Communications, Incorporated	Change Quantities For Clins 0001 And 0004
1639	10/24/2005	W915NS-05-D-9007/0003/P00001	(\$346,068.87)	(\$346,068.87)	PCO	PCO	Not Available	Proactive Communications, Incorporated	Change The Quantity For Clin 0002
1640	10/29/2005	W914NS-05-A-0007/0021/0	\$24,927.50	\$24,927.50	JCCI	JCCI	Not Available	Operational Support Services	Coordinate Pick Up And Deliveries With Chris Rose At Chris.rose@centcom.mil Or Henrik Storch At Henrik.storch@centcom.mil
1641	10/30/2005	W914NS-05-D-9007/0001/P00004	(\$1,110,884.19)	(\$1,110,884.19)	PCO	PCO	Not Available	Proactive Communications, Incorporated	Correct Administrative Errors Which Will Change The Deobligation Amount
1642	10/31/2005	W914NS-05-A-0011/0012/0	\$3,087.00	\$3,087.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Northbridge Services Group, Ltd	Loading And Transporting Cargo
1643	11/1/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0045/0	\$23,000.00	\$23,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Universal Security LLC	Loading And Transporting Cargo
1644	11/1/2005	W914NS-05-A-0011/0013/0	\$9,317.00	\$9,317.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Northbridge Services Group, Ltd	Loading And Transporting Cargo
1645	11/2/2005	W914NS-05-A-0011/0012/P00001	\$3,087.00	\$0.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Northbridge Services Group, Ltd	Loading And Transporting Cargo
1646	11/5/2005	W914NS-05-A-0011/0014/0	\$3,287.00	\$3,287.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Northbridge Services Group, Ltd	Loading And Transporting Cargo
1647	11/5/2005	W914NS-05-A-0011/0015/0	\$5,500.00	\$5,500.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Northbridge Services Group, Ltd	Loading And Transporting Cargo
1648	11/5/2005	W914NS-05-A-0011/0016/0	\$4,900.00	\$4,900.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Northbridge Services Group, Ltd	Loading And Transporting Cargo
1649	11/9/2005	W91GYO-06-M-0048/0-0	\$109,998.00	\$109,998.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3602	Holsters, Glock, Black Nylon, Style B
1650	11/11/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0046/0	\$20,000.00	\$20,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Universal Security LLC	Loading And Transporting Cargo
1651	11/11/2005	W914NS-05-A-0011/0017/0	\$18,575.00	\$18,575.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Northbridge Services Group, Ltd	Loading And Transporting Cargo
1652	11/12/2005	W914NS-05-A-0010/0009/0	\$104,000.00	\$104,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Rover Global Services	Loading And Transporting Cargo
1653	11/15/2005	W914NS-05-A-0003/0047/0	\$6,000.00	\$6,000.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Universal Security LLC	Loading And Transporting Cargo
1654	11/15/2005	W914NS-05-D-9008/0003/P00002	(\$192,590.00)	(\$192,590.00)	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Sapura Limited	Change Quantity Of Clin Item 2.7 Gps Antenna Kit And Related Delivery Schedules And Cancel Line Item 9 For Dahimex Training
1655	11/17/2005	W914NS-05-D-9008/0003/P00003	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Sapura Limited	Change Line Item 6 Shown In The Previous Modification, P00002
1656	11/19/2005	W914NS-05-M-1689/0-P00001	\$2,565.00	\$2,565.00	Not Available	DCMA	Not Available	Sohel General Trading	Change Clin 0006 And Establish Clin 0028, Results In An Increase In Contract Value Of \$2,565
1657	11/20/2005	W914NS-05-A-0011/0018/0	\$9,465.00	\$9,465.00	FFP	JCCI	Not Available	Northbridge Services Group, Ltd	Loading And Transporting Cargo

#	AWARD DATE	CONTRACT NUMBER	CONTRACT VALUE	AMOUNT OBLIGATED	CONTRACT TYPE	CONTRACTING OFFICE	COMPETITION TYPE	CONTRACTOR NAME	SCOPE
1658	11/26/2005	GS-07F-8942D/W916GYO-06-F-00060	\$88,162.50	\$88,162.50	Not Available	DCMA	Not Available	Point Blank Body Armor	Level Iia Vests, Shipping
1659	12/2/2005	W91GYO-06-M-01500/0	\$98,200.00	\$98,200.00	FFP	DCMA	Full & Open	Methaq Un Company	Cargo Truck
1660	12/6/2005	W91GYO-06-M-02040/0	\$14,994.40	\$14,994.40	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Galls Inc.	Monadnock 26 inch Polycarbonate Baton, Double Coifs, Flex Cuf Cutters, Stealth Goggles, Shipping
1661	12/6/2005	W91GYO-06-M-02050/0	\$4,940.50	\$4,940.50	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Galls Inc.	\$396oc Uvex Stealth Goggles, Clear Lens
1662	12/9/2005	W914NS-05-M-98830/ P00005	(\$1,200.00)	(\$1,200.00)	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 2756	Decrease Modification Number 1 (P00001), Line B By \$1,200 To Make The New Contract Cost \$181,200
1663	12/11/2005	W91GYO-06-M-02300/0	\$69,100.00	\$69,100.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 129	Cannon Color Laser Printer, Canon B&w Laser Printer, Computer With Monitors, Laptop Hp
1664	12/12/2005	W91GYO-06-M-02360/0	\$87,100.00	\$87,100.00	Not Available	DCMA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 3603	Nato Buildings Furniture
1665	12/15/2005	W91GYO-06-M-02550/0	\$14,760.00	\$14,760.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2587	Tactical Knee/shin/foot Guard
1666	12/21/2005	W914NS-05-M-9421/P1: QF0432/0	\$29,000.00	\$29,000.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Sohell General Trading	Toiletries Kit
1667	12/22/2005	W91GYO-06-M-02750/0	\$64,750.00	\$64,750.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 129	Computer Hardware (Printer, Desktop, Laptop)
1668	1/17/2006	W91GYO-06-D-0001/0005/ P00001	\$28,245.12	\$28,245.12	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	I Comport Inc.	Increase Funding From \$18,486,338.40 To \$18,514,583.52
1669	1/24/2006	W91GYO-06-M-038170/0	\$109,994.00	\$109,994.00	Not Available	JCCI	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 325	Sand Bags, Supply, Fill, Place
1670	2/4/2006	W91GYO-06-M-00370/ P0001	(\$2,500.00)	(\$2,500.00)	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 3602	Decrease Value By \$2,500,
1671	2/21/2006	W914NS-05-M-18000/ P00001	\$160,000.00	\$160,000.00	Not Available	JCCI	Not Available	Iraqi Contractor - 3502	Contract Value Increased From 320000 To 480000
1672		FA8903-04-D-8671/7B0/ M0002	\$64,368,328.00	\$64,368,328.00	CPFF	DCMA	Not Available	Earth Tech, Inc.	Renovate An Numaniyah Military Base
1673		EMF-C-00-03-00007/0/10	(\$6,000,000.00)	\$0.00	CPFF	USAID	Full & Open	International Resources Group Ltd. (Irg)	Support Usaid In The Overall Planning, Monitoring, Management, And Reporting On Reconstruction Activities
1674		W914NS-04-D-0102/0001/0	\$3,439,668.47	\$3,439,668.47	FFP	CPA	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 2720	Base Camp Life Support
1675		W91150-05-M-9031/0/ P00002	\$0.00	\$0.00	Not Available	PCO	Not Available	Symbolarts	Change Contractor Details
1676		W914NS-05-C-9005/0/0	\$747,000.00	\$747,000.00	Not Available	PCO	Full & Open	Iraqi Contractor - 201	Adron Palace Basement
1677		W914NS-05-M-1194/0/0	\$23,750.00	\$23,750.00	CPATT	PCO	Full & Open	Agon Group International	Ford Explorer

## SECTOR CROSS-REFERENCE

This appendix provides a cross-referenced display of how sectors from the Department of Defense Project and Contracting Office (DoD PCO), Department of State *Section 2207* report, and Public Law 108-106, as amended, relate to the SIGIR-defined sectors.

### PROPOSED DEFINITIONS OF SIGIR SECTORS (CROSS-REFERENCE)

	THE PROPOSED SIGIR SECTORS	PCO SECTORS	2207 SECTORS	PUBLIC LAW 108-106 SECTORS
1	Oil	Oil & Gas	Oil Infrastructure	Oil Infrastructure
2	Water	Potable Water & Wastewater (Pw&w)	Water Resources and Sanitation	Water Resource and Sanitation
3	Electricity	Electrical	Electricity Sector	Electric
4	Security	Security & Justice "MNSTC-I"	Security & Law Enforcement	Security & Law Enforcement
			Justice, Public Safety Infrastructure, and Civil Society	Justice, Public Safety Infrastructure, and Civil Society
5	Transportation and Communications	Transportation & Communications	Transportation & Communications	Transportation & Telecommunications
			Roads, Bridges, & Construction <sup>a</sup>	Roads, Bridges, & Construction
6	Democracy, Education, And Private Sector Development	Buildings, Health, & Education <sup>c</sup>	Democracy	Justice, Public Safety Infrastructure, and Civil Society
			Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Governance	Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Governance
			Roads, Bridges, & Construction <sup>b</sup>	Roads, Bridges, & Construction
			Private Sector Development	Private Sector Development
7	Health Care	Buildings, Health, & Education <sup>d</sup>	Health Care	Health Care

<sup>a</sup> Excludes Construction of Schools and Public Buildings

<sup>b</sup> Includes Only Construction Of Schools and Public Buildings

<sup>c</sup> Excludes Construction of Health Care Facilities

<sup>d</sup> Includes Only Construction of Health Care Facilities



# FINANCIAL IMPACT OF SIGIR OPERATIONS

The operations of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) have resulted savings of \$24 million and a total financial and potential financial-related impact of \$1.745 million involving the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and other funds and assets. SIGIR audit, investigation, inspection, and evaluation actions have resulted in financial impact by:

- 1. Recovery of weapons and funds
- 2. Audit, inspection, and assessment recommendations that enabled reconstruction management officials to:
  - a. Improve efficiency/effectiveness and reduce expenditures
  - b. Implement or improve fund and asset controls
  - c. Enhance construction quality by ensuring adequacy of design specifications, stopping inadequate construction, and preventing re-work
  - d. Increase potential oil revenue
  - e. Avoid waste and unnecessary expenditures

Tables I-1, I-2, and I-3 detail the financial and financial-related impact of SIGIR:

Audit Operations	\$ 391,800,000
Investigative Operations	\$ 13,011,304
Inspection Operations	\$1,339,700,000

## Financial-related Impact of SIGIR Audits

SIGIR audit saved \$10.9 million, recovered funds of \$1.4 million, and improved use of \$7.8 million of funds. We also challenged payments of \$306.9 million which included possible duplicate payments, overpayments, and payments for ghost workers and work that was not completed. We also made recommendations that improved property accountability valued at \$64.8 million. The net potential impact of SIGIR audit as of December 31, 2005 is about \$391.8 million.

## Financial-related Impact of SIGIR Investigations

SIGIR Investigations reports recovered funds, potential recovered funds as a result of prosecution, and the value of property recovered and returned to the Iraqi government. The \$13.1 million represents 18 investigative actions out of a total of 177 open, closed or referred cases. Recovered funds were seized from subjects identified in ongoing and closed SIGIR investigations. Recoveries are documented from fraudulent payments and seizure of unaccounted for cash. Property seizures reflect the assessed value of currently seized assets purchased with illegally obtained funds and recovered pursuant to criminal investigations.

# APPENDIX I

## AUDIT PERFORMANCE SUMMARY (Millions)

AUDIT #	DOLLARS SAVED	FUNDS RECOVERED	BETTER USE	CHALLENGED PAYMENTS	IMPROVED ACCOUNTABILITY	TOTAL FINANCIAL AND FINANCIAL RELATED IMPACT
04-003	\$ 10.90					\$10.90
04-011					\$ 64.80	64.80
05-004				204.00 <sup>1</sup>		204.00
05-006				96.60 <sup>2</sup>		96.60
05-008				0.04 <sup>3</sup>		0.40
05-015				2.70 <sup>4</sup>		2.70
05-016				1.30 <sup>5</sup>		1.30
05-017			\$7.80			7.80
05-020		\$ 0.20 <sup>6</sup>		1.80 <sup>7</sup>		2.00
05-023				0.50		0.50
7/16/05		0.50 <sup>8</sup>				0.50
9/20/05		0.70 <sup>9</sup>				0.70
TOTAL	\$ 10.90	\$ 1.40	\$ 7.80	\$ 306.90	\$ 64.80	\$ 391.80

<sup>1</sup> During the Audit of the Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the National Budget Process, auditors identified the inadequacy of controls over DFI funds used for salaries of Iraqi employees. Prior to the completion of the audit, management identified and agreed to work to implement corrective action.

<sup>2</sup> DFI account manager did not properly account for the disposition of this money

<sup>3</sup> Potential overpayments: \$40,000

<sup>4</sup> R3P challenged

<sup>5</sup> Needless expended, duplicated construction, equipment not needed

<sup>6</sup> Grant rescinded, money found in bank account: \$154,000

<sup>7</sup> Work not performed

<sup>8</sup> Recovery of cash turned in to Comptroller by audit and investigations (Mr Keith Kidd): \$527,456

<sup>9</sup> Recovery of cash turned in to Comptroller by audit and investigations: \$670,664

TABLE I-1

## INVESTIGATIONS PERFORMANCE SUMMARY

	FUNDS RECOVERED	POTENTIAL RECOVERY AS RESULT OF PROSECUTION	VALUE OF PROPERTY RECOVERED AND RETURNED TO IRAQ GOVERNMENT	TOTAL FINANCIAL AND FINANCIAL-RELATED IMPACT
TOTAL	\$11,686,224	\$1,265,570	\$59,510	\$13,011,304

TABLE I-2

## Financial-related Impact of SIGIR Inspections

SIGIR Inspections reports the value of potential improved outcome of funds invested. An assessment of the Kirkuk Oil Pipeline disclosed that operational effectiveness could be greatly improved through certain engineering improvements. A plan to implement SIGIR recommendations was initiated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers during the timeframe of the assessment. Management's actions have the potential to increase annual oil revenues by \$1,277.5 million annually. The potential improved outcome of funds of \$62.2 million covers eight assessments and includes recommendations that will enhance the effectiveness of projects, ensure that project funds are put to better/more effective use and avoid additional unnecessary expenditures to re-contract for additional work.

### INSPECTIONS PERFORMANCE SUMMARY (Millions)

INSPECTIONS #	POTENTIAL IMPROVED OUTCOME OF FUNDS INVESTED	POTENTIAL ANNUAL INCREASE OF IRAQ REVENUE	TOTAL FINANCIAL AND FINANCIAL-RELATED IMPACT
PA-05-001	\$ 11.0		\$ 11.0
PA-05-004	0.7		0.7
PA-05-005 TO 9	27.9		27.9
PA-05-010		\$1,277.5	1,277.5
PA-05-016	7.4		7.4
PA-05-107	0.5		0.5
PA-05-018	2.2		2.2
PA-05-021 TO 24	1.1		1.1
PA-05-029	11.4		11.4
TOTAL	\$ 62.2	\$1,277.5	\$1,339.7

TABLE I-3



